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‘Viral Loads demonstrates anthropology’s power of description, analysis and theory to capture 
a global tragedy as it unfolds. Anthropologists from around the world draw on their own deep 
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and exceedingly unequal world. 
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Stratified livability and pandemic effects
Ayo Wahlberg, Nancy J. Burke  
and Lenore Manderson
On the streets of Mumbai, in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, in South 
Africa’s informal settlements and in overflowing hospital corridors in 
Milan, Madrid and New York, the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic and 
efforts to ‘flatten the curve’ laid bare and amplified, viscerally, failures of 
government and healthcare governance. The pandemic exposed gross 
variations in access to healthcare, and showed glaring disregard for 
the lives of the majority of people, deeply rooted inequalities and uneven 
co-morbidities. Thriving on human sociality, commensality and intimacy, 
the SARS-CoV-2 virus raced through a globally connected world, dis- 
proportionately infecting those compelled to live and work in constricted 
conditions. Laboratories around the world hurried to understand how 
this virulence might be stopped – to develop treatments to inhibit COVID-
19’s potentially life-threatening progression, and to develop vaccines to 
prevent transmission and further infection. As we write in February 2021, 
vaccines are being rolled out. Even so, questions of production and 
distribution globally have yet to be resolved, not least in less-resourced 
parts of the world, and for those most vulnerable among ‘frontline’ 
workers, those living without legal documentation and those with limited 
or no rights to healthcare. Meanwhile, morbidity and mortality continued 
to rise at a staggering pace in the second wave, with hospitals in Los 
Angeles, Stockholm, London, Manaus and Lisbon teetering. The only 
strategy for most governments, when coronavirus surfaced in humans in 
late 2019 and throughout 2020, was for individuals to be compelled and 
responsibilised to do their part: stay at home, maintain physical distance, 
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wash their hands and self-quarantine. The first months of 2021 suggest 
that this will likely remain the primary strategy of control among most 
populations.
The exhortatory measures of preventive action and isolation had 
little regard for the limits to the capacity of many people to ‘shelter in 
place’, observe hand hygiene and ensure physical distancing. As numerous 
anthropologists and others have insisted (Iskander 2020, 1, 15; Kochhar 
2020), these are luxuries of the few in a grossly uneven world where 
millions live on the streets, in crowded quarters, without adequate water 
and sanitation, making do. Further, people already living with (multiple) 
chronic illnesses – the so-called ‘underlying conditions’ of COVID-19 – 
have been asked by health authorities to take extra care by self-isolating, 
again with little regard for their ability to do so, not least because such 
chronic conditions disproportionately affect those who are least well off 
(Manderson and Wahlberg 2020), and the accumulation of chronic 
conditions places increasing economic pressure on them (Manderson 
and Warren 2016). As the first year closed, the effects of the pandemic 
and of efforts to contain it continued to be unevenly experienced in 
racialised, disabling and discriminatory ways. As contributing authors in 
this volume demonstrate, the COVID-19 pandemic loaded onto already 
existing socio-economic inequalities, racial discrimination and uneven 
access to healthcare, exacerbating what we call stratified livability. 
Exigent temporalities have laid bare and amplified disadvantage. These 
reverberations across disease risk, control, containment and care call for 
anthropologies of urgency.
Over the past few decades, anthropologists have shown how 
epidemics of HIV/AIDS, SARS, H1N1 influenza, cholera and Ebola are all 
‘mirrors held up to society’ (Lindenbaum 2001, 380). These are seen to 
follow and produce ‘cycles of shame and blame, stigmatising discourses, 
isolation of the sick, fear of contagion, and end-of-the-world scenarios’ 
(Herring and Swedlund 2010, 4), as ‘an “outbreak narrative” is often 
pushed by international agencies and governments in northern settings’ 
(Leach et al. 2010, 371). At the same time, Charles Briggs has illustrated 
how communicability itself is infectious, with narratives of epidemics that 
typically naturalise socio-economic, racial and sexual inequalities ‘as if 
bacteria and viruses gravitate toward populations and respect social 
boundaries’ (2005, 274). Through the designation of ‘risk groups’, 
representations of epidemics are transformed into self-knowledge and 
self-regulation while also intensifying stigmatisation and discrimination. 
Most recently, in The Anthropology of Epidemics, Ann Kelly, Frédéric Keck 
and Christos Lynteris have argued that:
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as a mode of constitution of social life that has been cast anew by 
recent conceptions of virality, information, and communication … 
epidemics necessitate not simply the study of the disease itself 
and the way it affects social relations, but also the study of its modes 
of anticipation, visualisation, fictionalisation, and materialisation 
(2019, 1, 15).
In Viral Loads, we draw on such anthropological insights and ethnographic 
evidence gleaned from other diseases, conditions and times, and use this 
archive to illuminate the circumstances and effects of COVID-19. This is 
the anthropology of urgency. Anthropologists have the responsibility to 
bring knowledge of other infections and other disasters, structures and 
systems, to anticipate and interpret responses to the pandemic. At the 
same time, we carry a responsibility to chronicle such viral loads and their 
social impact (Herring and Swedlund 2010; Kelly et al. 2019). This is not 
ethnography conducted in haste as an alternative to the slow research 
that is a hallmark of our discipline (Adams et al. 2014), although rapid 
ethnographic assessment surely has its place in times of crisis. Nor is it a 
pathography of the disease itself (MacPhail 2015). Rather, as we analyse 
the particularities of this novel coronavirus and the social and political 
responses that it has elicited, our prior work and long-term engagements 
shape our interpretive lens.
On 3 April 2020, in the Financial Times, Arundhati Roy (2020) 
argued that ‘(h)istorically, pandemics have forced humans to break 
with the past and imagine their world anew. This one is no different. It is 
a portal, a gateway between one world and the next’. In this volume, we 
illustrate how COVID-19 serves as a portal to rethink and reimagine 
health and medical care, health systems and welfare throughout the 
world. It is also a portal to rethink the structures, systems and ideologies 
that shape health and wellbeing. Like those involved in the front line 
of social movements in 2020, we attend to the social and racialised 
unevenness and gross economic disparities exposed in the uneven 
distribution of illness and death, and in the limits of global and local 
responses to the pandemic. The pandemic demands that we revisit and 
sharpen our understandings of state power, public health and citizenship. 
COVID-19, like any disease, is a social and political as well as a biological 
fact, grinding against the lived realities of everyday life. Its examination 
is a launching pad to draw out how any disease is implicated in and might 
impact on social life.
In Viral Loads, the contributing authors mobilise anthropological 
concepts to analyse how these developments interrupt daily lives, state 
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infrastructures and healthcare systems, and, in turn, how these structures, 
systems and everyday flows shape the course of the pandemic. This 
interplay of biology and society finds form on all continents. COVID-19 
instantiates anthropological theory and layers our evidence base. In 
Viral Loads, we illustrate how the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the 
stratified livability that medical, social and cultural anthropologists have 
ethnographically documented over decades.
Lockdown: the power of the state
In Part I of this volume, ‘The power of the state’, we begin by considering 
institutionalised and governmental responses to the pandemic as it 
gained momentum and took shape and form throughout 2020. People 
looked to the state for quick intervention as health crises unfolded, even 
if they were surprised and sometimes resistant to the crude measures 
available. Countries faced the deadly combination of a highly contagious 
‘stealth’ virus, host populations with no immunity, decades of austerity, 
the neglect of healthcare systems and an all too obvious lack of 
‘preparedness’ (Benton and Dionne 2015; Caduff 2015; Lakoff 2017). 
With this toxic mix, governments worldwide drew on nineteenth- 
century tactics of infection control to contain infection and head off its 
exponential transmission. Nation-states and the power structures within 
them mandated curfews and lockdowns, closed borders, and tested and 
quarantined people in more or less coercive and authoritarian ways. 
Within six months, over half the world’s population was affected by 
restrictions of movement, checking both global and local flows of goods 
and populations. Physical distancing requirements and self-isolation 
recommendations halted the habitual busyness of everyday life. Flights 
were grounded, stay-at-home measures were enforced, movement 
in public spaces was limited. The capacity to maintain these measures 
fluctuated, in some cases, monitored through digital technology, a 
viral network to ensure viral containment. Countries like Vietnam and 
Finland managed to keep infection rates low by enforcing lockdown 
and responding to localised outbreaks, but more widely, nation-states 
responded to the economic, political and human costs of the virus very 
differently. In countries like Brazil and the US, where political leaders 
downplayed and even dismissed coronavirus, rates soared early; through 
to the end of 2020, they continued to do so.
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Box 1 COVID-19: a timeline
• Late December 2019: Doctors in Wuhan, capital of China’s 
Hubei province, raise concerns about a SARS-like virus in 
patients presenting with pneumonia symptoms and are initially 
censured by State authorities.
• 7 January 2020: Chinese health authorities rule out SARS and 
race to subtype what media are calling a ‘mystery virus’.
• 12 January: WHO confirms that ‘a new type of coronavirus 
(novel coronavirus, nCoV)’ has been identified.
• 23 January: Wuhan city goes into lockdown, closing airports, 
train stations and highways in an effort to contain the outbreak, 
but hundreds of thousands of people had already fled the city by 
air, rail and road. International air travel out of Wuhan becomes 
a key pandemic vector.
• 3 February: Built in 10 days, Huoshenshan Hospital opens for 
coronavirus patients to alleviate overwhelmed hospitals in 
Wuhan city.
• 11 February: The International Committee on Taxonomy of 
Viruses (ICTV) names the novel coronavirus ‘severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)’, which the 
WHO promptly shortens to ‘COVID-19’.
• 9 March: Doctors in Bergamo, part of Italy’s northern Lombardy 
region, warn of overwhelmed hospitals and critical shortages 
in personal protective equipment, leading Prime Minister 
Giuseppe Conte to impose a national quarantine. A week later, 
military trucks are filmed moving coffins from Bergamo to 
neighbouring provinces.
• 10 March: Schools are closed down in Iran, which has become 
a COVID-19 epicentre, as hospitals are overwhelmed and 
numerous senior government officials fall ill.
• 11–23 March: European countries follow suit announcing 
lockdowns and/or restrictions: Denmark (11 March), Spain 
(14 March), France (17 March), Germany (22 March), UK 
(23 March).
• 23 March: President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa announces 
a 21-day lockdown which would be enforced by the military, dis- 
proportionately impacting those living in informal settlements.
• 24 March: Prime Minister Narendra Modi announces a complete 
lockdown in India, leading to frantic scenes and protests as 
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migrant labourers try to return from major cities to their towns 
of origin.
• 26 March: Under fire for mixed messaging and also downplaying 
the seriousness of the pandemic, UK Prime Minister Boris 
Johnson tests positive for COVID-19, eventually requiring 
intensive care before recovering.
• Early April: New York becomes the first epicentre of the US 
as the city runs out of respirators and personal protection 
equipment, leading to tensions between governor Andrew 
Cuomo and the Federal Government as President Donald Trump 
downplays the virus. Field hospital units are set up in parks and 
refrigeration trucks are brought in to store bodies.
• April: In Ecuador and Peru, bodies pile up in hospital corridors 
and on streets as healthcare officials struggle to keep up with the 
pandemic.
• End April: Brazil becomes Latin America’s epicentre as hospitals 
are overwhelmed and mass graves are dug to cope with the 
growing numbers of dead. Meanwhile, President Jair Bolsonaro 
insists that COVID-19 is a minor disease.
• May–June: Throughout the world (US, Germany, Qatar, 
Singapore and more) workers in meat plants and other factories 
with cramped working and dormitory living conditions are 
exposed to COVID-19 through workplace outbreaks.
• 8 July: President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil tests positive for 
COVID-19 while continuing to deny the seriousness of the 
pandemic as Brazil sees infection and mortality rates soar.
• 20 July: Researchers at the University of Oxford report that a 
vaccine they are developing has triggered an immune response 
in 1,000 test persons.
• 2 October: President Donald Trump of the US tests positive for 
COVID-19 and is transported from the White House to the 
Walter Reed National Military Medical Center for treatment.
• 9 November: Pfizer and BioNTech announce by press release 
that the mRNA vaccine they have been developing ‘was found to 
be more than 90 per cent effective in preventing COVID-19’ in 
Phase 3 trial participants.
• 8 December: 90-year-old Margaret Keenan from Coventry in the 
UK becomes first person to receive a vaccine for COVID-19 
outside of trials.
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• 15 December: The US surpasses 300,000 deaths from COVID-19 
as a surge in infections following Thanksgiving holiday 
gatherings takes hold, while Brazil with the second largest tally 
of deaths surpasses 180,000. Hospitals throughout the world 
struggle to keep up with the ‘second wave’ and countries close 
borders in attempts to contain new viral strains.
• 31 January: Globally, the reported number of infections was 
close to 108 million, and the death toll directly associated with 
COVID-19 had reached 2.1 million. Hospitals in the US, Sweden, 
the UK, Brazil, Japan and Portugal struggled to keep up with a 
‘second wave’ of patients.
Restrictive measures were near universally applied; these tended to 
reinforce existing spatial inequalities. In many countries, the rich were 
able to ‘escape’ to their holiday cottages, and middle-class workers juggled 
home-schooling responsibilities while setting up home offices in their 
living rooms. But so-called ‘essential workers’, often living in dense city 
quarters, continued to work so that supermarkets and convenience stores 
were open and home delivery available. Others – living on the fringes 
of cities, in mobile homes and shelters, and on the streets – continued 
working to maintain basic services – street cleaning, garbage collection, 
and cleaning hospitals and hotels. Still others worked in unsafe yet 
essential industries, including meat packing plants, which became super 
spreader sites (Shultz 2020; Zhou 2020). Spatial inequality, characteristic 
of cities worldwide, meant that those already disadvantaged and 
discriminated were at much greater risk of exposure to COVID-19. Low 
income, precarious employment and, for many, the challenges associated 
with ‘illegal status’, further compromised their access care. These people 
were also least able to take time off work to care for themselves and avoid 
infecting others, and were at greatest risk of severe symptoms, sequelae 
and death.
As a twenty-first-century pandemic, COVID-19 was shaped by 
and is shaping contemporary social life, through forms of virtual 
communication, global and regional political economies, the shifting 
nature of nation-states, and the role of governments and supragovernment 
entities. In the first substantive chapter of Viral Loads, Nancy J. Burke 
describes how an app, Pesquisador Virtual, was designed and introduced 
by the Universidad de las Ciencias Informáticas, with the Ministerio de 
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Salud (MINSAP) of Cuba, to provide real-time identification of people 
symptomatic of COVID-19. The app served as a tool in the country’s 
arsenal against infection, along with brigades of physicians and medical 
students going door-to-door to screen residents, population-based testing, 
school and border closures, and mask-wearing enforced through fines. 
These interventions were largely adapted from prior effective efforts in 
controlling infectious disease (Whiteford 2000); the app enhanced rather 
than displaced them. Meanwhile, as across the globe, new WhatsApp 
groups began to promote food delivery for a fee, although in Cuba 
restaurants also brought food to elderly residents for free. Nancy J. Burke 
describes the systems of surveillance and governance enacted by the 
Cuban state under the guise of care – along with official recognition of 
tension between public health measures and cultural practices – and 
creative moves among individuals and groups to support each other while 
earning incomes as tourist revenue receded. These practices could coexist 
as a result of Cuba’s particular form of post-Soviet socialism; their 
intersections suggest one way in which care was produced and enacted 
during the pandemic as in other crises, in the context of geopolitical 
isolation. Even so, as several authors illustrate, these responses were not 
atypical nor limited to a particular ideology or system of government. 
Everywhere, people adapted to the convergence of seeming totalitarian 
control with extraordinary kindness and expressions of solidarity.
Stringent lockdowns early in the pandemic were enforced in other 
countries too, including South Africa, India and Bangladesh, as we 
illustrate. Maintaining or reinstating total lockdowns became near 
impossible, however, given the devastating socio-economic and personal 
consequences of these measures for most people. Responding to the 
emerging direct costs of lockdown, restrictions often loosened – but too 
early, only to be tightened again regionally or nationally when spikes of 
new infections occurred. The Australian city of Melbourne was one of the 
few able to reinstate and – for three months – sustain harsh lockdown to 
virtually eliminate all community transmission.
Viral transmission escalated rapidly in early 2020, in Wuhan, 
Lombardy, Madrid and throughout the US, notably New York. This fuelled 
a sense of urgency. Field hospitals were erected in parks and convention 
centres were converted; military vehicles were requisitioned to transport 
corpses; and political messaging centred on the metrics of COVID’s spread 
and toll. Public health campaigns rolled out to exhort people to physically 
distance, wash hands, wear masks, cough into elbows, monitor symptoms, 
self-isolate and quarantine. Posters reiterating these messages were 
plastered across cities. Plexiglass shields were introduced into shops 
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and public institutions, and, with symbolic payoff as much as protection 
against infection, between drivers and pillion riders on motorcycles in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Distancing lines and standing 
spots were painted on footpaths to organise queuing. Home living rooms 
and kitchen tables were turned into offices where possible. And, as we 
have already noted, so-called ‘essential services’ continued, such that 
people in the lowest-paying jobs remained at risk – cleaners, couriers, 
rickshaw drivers, bus drivers, fast food eatery staff, food production 
workers and more (see Chapter 15 by Rashid and colleagues, and 
Garimella and colleagues, Chapter 11). It is still too early for the 
epidemiological data to demonstrate the price of this segregation between 
those who serve and those able to continue to live within bubbles of 
protection (Manderson and Veracini 2020).
Additional limitations on movement to contain viral spread slowed 
the return of citizens living abroad. Governments grappled with imported 
cases, from Italian tourists in Cuba to returning citizens in Senegal (see 
Onoma, Chapter 10), then the inevitable shift to community spread. Such 
measures to control contagion exacerbated the economic effects of the 
pandemic for those most precariously employed. From street peddlers in 
Bangladesh to bed and breakfast entrepreneurs in Havana, the lack of 
access to potential customers has had devasting effects, increasing 
hunger, indebtedness and fear. Countries like Australia and New Zealand, 
because they are islands, simply closed their border to outsiders to the 
cost of the travel and tourism industries. At the same time, the seeping of 
infection into the community as a result of breaches in infection control 
from quarantine hotels, via security guards and cleaning staff, highlighted 
as vectors of disease not returning citizens but the marginalised workers 
charged with containing them. Border control shifted in Australia 
from nation to individual states, as the military moved in to prevent 
people from crossing state boundaries. Lockdown contained and controlled 
populations, overriding modes of everyday living that for many, until 
then, had operated across borders for medical care, education, employment 
and family connections (Ormond and Lunt 2020; Whittaker et al. 2010). 
While the tensions and personal costs of containment were patent in 
some countries, the to and fro across borders elsewhere slipped past, or 
continued to warrant levels of militarisation that predated COVID-19 (De 
León 2015). COVID-19 opened up questions of the role of the state in 
caring for citizens, in contrast to the lesser regard of stateless people, 
those living marginal lives (and marginalised experiences of COVID-19) 
and those who, because of their pathways of mobility, were not even in 
the record.
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As suggested above, lockdown measures were often enforced not 
by virtual technology, but by deploying troops, in ways reminiscent of 
population containment during other wars on infection – Ebola is the 
most recent – and wars against populations and political interests (Benton 
and Dionne 2015; Lynteris and Poleykett 2018). Viruses are micro-
guerrillas, moving across surfaces and from person to person with stealth 
and subterfuge, and militarisation was (and is) always about containing 
populations. Microbes are less easily contained.
In Chapter 3, Lenore Manderson and Susan Levine describe South 
Africa’s early and temporary success to contain transmission through 
stringent lockdown, enforced by police, defence troops and private 
security employees. Soldiers in camouflage and masks strong-armed 
homeless residents into camps and broke into homes in informal 
settlements, brandishing arms to threaten and kill particular citizens; 
they patrolled shopping malls and apprehended those escaping to 
beaches and parkland. Drawing on technologies that had been the 
hallmark of apartheid, South Africa effected lockdown with relatively 
little violence and resistance. Under apartheid, citizens were brutalised 
by house arrests, curfews, detention, torture and imprisonment. But 
with a backdrop of chronic and systemic poverty, the massification of 
debility through TB and HIV/AIDS, and a robust public health infra- 
structure for coping with chronic disease, the country largely 
accommodated rules around lockdown and its militant surveillance, 
and the racial inflections of social hierarchy contained in their 
imposition. In South Africa, political authority was sufficiently robust 
to remain unchallenged even while COVID-19 deepened poverty, 
unemployment and hunger. Viral spread eventually outran the measures 
to contain it.
South Africa was only one of many countries to introduce lockdown 
through emergency regulations, enabling law enforcement as if it were 
wartime. In countries like Malaysia and South Korea too, lockdown, 
isolation and quarantine were presented as necessary measures and 
military personnel ensured their strict adherence. Elsewhere, as in Italy, 
the earliest days of self-isolation were novel and anxiously romanticised, 
with social media busy with clips of balcony concerts to rally public 
support and confidence; this technology of support was echoed in various 
ways, including in the UK, and as Aditya Bharadwaj describes in this 
volume, in India. At the same time, individuals and collectivities flayed 
the World Health Organization and United Nations and found in the 
spread of the virus proof of ‘deep state’ conspiracy. In Chapter 4, Elisa J. 
Sobo and Elżbieta Drążkiewicz take on this tendency toward conspiracy, 
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and the emergence of collectives of seemingly incongruous groups 
purporting conspiracy theories in the face of public health challenges. 
They contend that such conspiracy theories serve as powerful tools to 
express the tensions that arise between governance and freedom 
as individual rights are pitted against state-defined visions of the 
public good.
Exclusion, blame and consequence
Public responses to coronavirus took their cues from other viral outbreaks 
and illnesses in the late twentieth and first decades of the twenty-first 
century: HIV and AIDS, SARS-CoV-1, MERS, dengue, H1N1 (swine flu), 
Ebola and Zika (MacPhail 2015; Mason 2016; Niehaus and Jonsson 
2005; Williamson 2018). Scapegoating and increasing vitriol were 
directed at governments, populations and communities associated with 
likely spread of infection; to countries perceived as central to the 
pandemic (notably China); and to questions of capacity to case find, 
prevent and contain.
In Part II of the volume, ‘Exclusion and blame’, we attend to the 
familiar ways in which the pandemic kindled scapegoating and conspiracy 
theories, rumour, blame and stigma. Medical anthropologists have 
documented at length the stigmatising power of infection, most markedly 
in relation to HIV and AIDS, as viral spread was threaded into other 
stigmatising identities, affiliations and activities – same-sex relation- 
ships, injecting drug use, sex work and place (Parker and Aggleton 2003; 
Patton 1991; Rhodes et al. 2005). The stigma of these alliances flowed to 
other identities linked to HIV infection, such that haemophilia and 
particular ethnicities were also initially subject to powerful discourses 
of blame. COVID-19 has been spared considerable stigma because its 
spread, airborne, was less predictable and unassociated with perceived 
breaches in morality. Even so, as the pandemic unfolded, we have witnessed 
scapegoating towards populations who have long been subject to 
discrimination.
COVID-19 brought to the surface the ways in which global 
inequality is welded into the colonial past, underpinning racist regimes 
in the present. Being Black quickly proved to be the best predictor of 
infection and death from COVID-19 in countries like the US and UK. 
Being a person of colour otherwise was weighted to risk of infection and 
poor outcome, with this in turn tied to poverty, unemployment, food and 
housing insecurities, chronic disease and comorbidities. Exposing these 
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links between the social and the biological, anthropologists have drawn 
on and foregrounded decades of work on structural violence, structural 
vulnerability, syndemics and comorbidity, as well as colonialism, 
neocolonialism, globalisation and their ugly legacies (Farmer 2001; 
Fassin 2007). But in 2020 there was a global eruption of outrage against 
racism, and COVID-19 spurred the Black Lives Matter movement against 
institutionalised and personalised racism, and propelled insistence on 
transformation. Hanna Garth makes this personal for us all. In her 
account of outrage in Los Angeles following George Floyd’s murder on 
25 May, Garth brings structural violence to the fore: not just because of 
the concurrence of protests against violence and COVID-19 but because 
the pandemic illustrated how racism determines health outcomes. Some 
of the most striking mass-mediated images from 2020 were of mask-
wearing protestors on the streets in various cities in the US, at a time 
where COVID-19 was disproportionately lethal for people of colour. 
COVID-19 might have been less virulent in the US had there been less 
violence, structural and literal, from racism.
At the societal level, everywhere, viral loads are disproportionately 
shouldered by the disadvantaged and discriminated. Jennie Gamlin, 
Sahra Gibbon and Melania Calestani in their chapter explore how legacies 
of colonialism in the UK are experienced in populations placed in high 
exposure roles as frontline health and social care providers. The naming 
of these ‘essential workers’ ensuring food, amenities and care as BAME 
(Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic) highlights the ‘nostalgic nationalism’ 
underlying pandemic preparedness and public health response. Gamlin 
and colleagues connect the roles of EU migrants, caring for the ill 
and dying, with ongoing isolationism arising in post-Brexit UK. The 
government’s refusal of EU offers of personal protective equipment 
for these caregivers, for example, left many unsafe and contributed to 
the overrepresentation of Black and ethnic minority populations in 
coronavirus death toll figures, again highlighting the continuity of present 
inequalities to colonialism and its racial hierarchies.
Writing on the forms of discrimination that Dalit groups endured as 
the pandemic unfolded in India, Aditya Bharadwaj introduces the figure 
of the ‘shroud stealer’ from the writings of twentieth-century poet and 
scholar Ahmed Ali, as an allegory for caste-based violence and inequality. 
He discusses Dalit activists’ observation that the term ‘social distancing’ 
as a safety measure simply bled into established upper caste prejudice and 
practices of ‘untouchability’. In this way pandemic responses in India 
reinforced the dehumanisation of poverty and its stratification. ‘Shroud 
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stealers’ who dug up graves to recover and resell burial shrouds as part of 
a macabre economy during the 1918 influenza pandemic, Bharadwaj 
argues, can help us reflect on the unfolding pandemic, and better 
apportion responsibility, including our own.
Cristina A. Pop extends an examination of caste and related age-old 
hierarchies in her analysis of how singling out the Roma in Romania 
during the H1N1 flu pandemic (2009–10), and a recent measles epidemic 
(2016–18), help explain Roma reactions to confinement measures during 
the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. As Pop shows, Romania’s 
responses brought into public visibility old and new assumptions 
about the need to purify the ‘social body’ from ‘corruption’, ‘superstition’ 
and ‘civil disobedience’, thereby setting the ground for continued dis- 
crimination against Roma.
The pandemic has also provided opportunities for publics to 
question the legitimacy of the state, and for alternative congregations and 
alliances to test their power against the state. Oğuz Alyanak addresses 
this in his analysis of the ways Turkey’s ruling party, Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP), retained its legitimacy 
despite mounting criticism. Alyanak considers scholarly conversations on 
moral authority and politics, with a particular emphasis on political 
Islam, to explain how a moral discourse on COVID-19 (which validated 
stigma against LGBT communities) enabled new configurations of state 
power. As he illustrates, the Diyanet, the Turkish religious authority, 
weighed heavily in conversations on the pandemic during its first phase 
peak in mid-April, and through this, the AKP was able to divert attention 
from its own mishandling of the situation. The use of political Islam, 
however, was a dangerous manoeuvre, for it risked the lives of the very 
people whom the Turkish state is meant to protect.
Pandemics call into question who falls inside and outside the 
boundaries of state protection and belonging. Ato Kwamena Onoma 
takes up questions of boundary maintenance, referencing the scape- 
goating of Peul migrants from Guinea during the 2013–16 Ebola 
epidemic to explore current reactions to nationals returning to Senegal. 
Blame on these returning citizens for the spread of the virus, expressed 
on radio, social media and in news outlets, Onoma argues, illustrates 
the limitations of citizenship and the porousness of communal 
boundaries in public health crises. Tense relations between migrants 
and home communities informed recent discourses, so demonstrating 




Anthropologists and others have documented how poverty and racial 
discrimination are always ‘underlying conditions’ impacting health, 
healthcare, vulnerability and poor outcomes (Benjamin 2020; Crane 
and Pascoe 2020). Given how coronavirus spreads, housing and housing 
conditions emerged as ‘hot spot’ sites for transmission, so exposing 
the unequal distribution of space. In India, migrant workers fled their 
cramped urban living conditions to return home during lockdown, 
often travelling by foot for hundreds of kilometres. In Singapore, 
known for its futuristic, modernised cityscapes, the living conditions of 
thousands of migrant workers came to light as their crowded dormitories 
turned into transmission hotspots (Kathiravelu 2020). In Melbourne, 
people in social housing were criminalised with a second wave outbreak 
on 4 July 2020, stimulating debate on state housing policies. In Cuba, the 
call to shelter-in-place exposed the precarity of crumbling buildings, 
whose modifications to create extra rooms to meet the government’s 
commitment to housing for all inhibited airflow in sweltering tropical 
heat.
The realities of lockdown and threat of COVID-19 infection for 
those precariously housed and marginalised, as Surekha Garimella, 
Shrutika Murthy, Lana Whittaker and Rachel Tolhurst illustrate, were 
experienced as yet another of a series of insults and injuries to body 
and mind. Garimella and colleagues mobilise the concept of ‘debility’ to 
drive home the endemic versus exceptional nature of the pandemic on 
those who live by waste-picking in India. In controlling COVID-19 and 
ensuring critical care as needed, resources have been diverted from other 
public health programmes, patient needs and vulnerable populations. 
Linda Rae Bennett and Setiyani Marta Dewi illustrate how COVID-19 
has amplified pre-existing challenges to sexual and reproductive health 
and rights, with potential long-term consequences due to interrupted 
services. They show how a clear ‘amplification effect’ from COVID-19 and 
responses to it is discernible in Indonesia and beyond, as everyday lives 
routinely marked by deprivation of resources, access to healthcare 
and the denial of human rights, are disproportionally vulnerable to 
COVID-19.
This cutback and suspension of services, with resources redirected 
to address urgencies related to COVID-19, occurred widely. Claudia 
Fonseca and Soraya Fleischer illustrate the impact of COVID-19 on 
disability support for lower income Brazilians caught in the crossfire of 
physical or mental disability, poverty and minimal state services. Their 
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focus is on children born with microcephaly and other disabilities 
associated with maternal infection of the Zika virus in 2015–16. Such 
childhood disabilities precipitated a range of interventions supporting 
both individual children and their families. COVID-19 deflected this 
attention. Yet, as Garimella and colleagues also illustrate for India, 
COVID-19 was a disaster neither new nor untoward. For populations who 
are habitually without basic sanitation, steady employment or regular 
housing, COVID-19 may be just one more misery, or the ‘last straw’ that 
cuts off the meagre gains of the past few decades.
In Mexico, the challenge seems less about the diversion of resources 
and more the strategic amplification of individual blame to obfuscate 
underlying structural inequalities fuelling pandemic spread. Abril 
Saldaña-Tejeda details the state’s continual attention to individual 
bodies, diets and genetic make-up that place the responsibility for 
‘risk’, ‘vulnerability’ and poor outcomes on individuals. Blaming and 
fat-shaming became a focal point for infection, diverting public 
attention from structural inequalities to individual bodies and personal 
(ir)responsibility. Saldaña-Tejeda argues that attention must be given to 
other forms of vulnerability and ‘underlying conditions’ such as police 
brutality, pre-existing negligence and poverty if we are to understand the 
disproportionate impact of COVID-19 in Mexico.
Sabina Faiz Rashid, Selima Kabir, Kim Ozano, Sally Theobald, 
Bachera Aktar and Aisha Siddika draw on their collaborative research to 
describe the devastating impact on vulnerable and impoverished 
populations of measures to contain COVID-19 in Bangladesh. The nation-
wide lockdown initiated in Bangladesh in late March shut down public 
transport, shops and all institutions (education, business, partial 
government, etc.); millions of informal sector workers (street peddlers, 
domestic workers, rickshaw drivers, construction workers, day labourers, 
etc.) lost their only income source. As the authors illustrate, for adolescents 
and young adults, the pandemic and resultant lockdown magnified pre-
existing instability, uncertainty, social suffering and neglect.
The reach of care
Shifts of resources and priorities to address COVID-19 everywhere came 
at the cost of the already stretched capacity of health systems to diagnose 
and treat endemic and chronic conditions such as diabetes and heart 
disease, cancers and malaria. In countries with constrained resources, 
‘normal capacity’ is limited at the best of times, vulnerable to austerity, 
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neoliberalism, countless ‘structural adjustment’ and global health 
projects. Here, medicine is unstable, access triaged and care practices 
improvised on an everyday basis (Livingston 2012; Nguyen 2010; 
Street 2014).
While lockdowns slowed infection and transmission, they were also 
used initially to ‘buy time’ in the context of woeful lack of preparedness. 
Few places, it turned out, had adequate infection control measures, 
laboratory services, personal protection equipment, intubators and 
mechanical ventilators to manage large numbers of acute cases. This was 
so despite decades of public health warnings, particularly from 2003 
(with SARS-CoV-1), and years of multilateral and regional investment to 
develop and implement local pandemic preparedness plans (Caduff 
2015; Sambala and Manderson 2018).
Early efforts were designed to control the pandemic and so avoid 
overwhelming healthcare systems, as had happened in Wuhan as the 
novel coronavirus took hold in January 2020. With speed, however, 
Milan, Bergamo, Madrid, New York and New Delhi were overwhelmed; 
with the onset of winter in the northern hemisphere, again municipal 
governments erected tented field hospitals, appropriated other spaces, 
and (in Europe) sent patients across national borders for hospital care. 
Everywhere, healthcare systems were overwhelmed by an influx of 
patients requiring intensive respiratory care, and often had to reprioritise 
resources in anticipation of such influxes during first, second and third 
peaks of infection. By January 2021, as the second wave of infection 
peaked, intensive care unit capacity reached zero percent in major cities 
in Europe, the US and elsewhere in the Americas, South Africa and 
increasingly in countries across Asia. Rural hospitals struggled to cope, 
and everywhere, exhausted healthcare workers struggled, yet again, to 
locate beds and resources. The necessity of improvisation (Livingston 
2012), and the hopelessness of such efforts, was by this time no longer an 
index of national poverty, and systems in which shortages of supplies and 
staff are common.
Ellen Block and Cecilia Vindrola-Padros illustrate how healthcare 
workers in the UK and US grappled with an unknown disease while 
working with massive shortages of personal protective equipment and, 
at times, hospital beds and respirators. Forms of triage and improvisation 
became a daily reality of ‘frontline’ healthcare workers in European 
and American cities with surges of critically ill patients. Block and 
Vindrola-Padros, in demonstrating how healthcare staff worked to 
adapt to circumstances, overcoming often obdurate bureaucratic 
obstacles, reinforce what anthropologists have long shown to be the case 
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in situations of (chronic) crisis (Samuelsen 2020; Street 2014; Livingston 
2012).
In writing on people living with (multiple) chronic conditions, Sofie 
Rosenlund Lau, Marie Svensson, Natasja Kingod and Ayo Wahlberg 
illustrate how established and institutionalised forms of care were 
abruptly disrupted as resources shifted from welfare services and routine 
prioritisations of care towards COVID-19. In Denmark, the political 
decision to ‘postpone … all forms of outpatient surveillance of patients 
with stable illnesses’ generated instability and uncertainty, especially for 
people living with multiple conditions and in need of extensive social 
support; Fonseca and Fleischer (this volume) also illustrate this for 
families with children with disabilities in Brazil. Those living with 
‘underlying conditions’ were asked to self-isolate, and the care provided 
to them in the past was constrained. Care workers warned that isolation 
would affect people with cognitive decline who could not understand why 
loved ones had stopped visiting them. Lockdown worsened loneliness 
that was already a burden, and exposed disease hierarchies within 
Denmark’s universal healthcare system. At the same time, the intervention 
kept COVID-19 mortality rates low through 2020.
COVID-19 has, in many ways, been the first digital pandemic, 
although mobile phone coverage and internet connectivity have increased 
dramatically over the past two decades. Notwithstanding a wide digital 
divide, for millions of people, digital forms of communication and social 
media platforms have made it possible for people to work from home, 
participate in distance learning, shop online to avoid supermarket visits, 
and socialise and provide care virtually. New technologies such as Zoom 
and Teams flourished along with established social media such as 
Facebook and WhatsApp to allow people to connect with colleagues, 
friends and loved ones. Earvin Charles Cabalquinto and Tanja Ahlin 
show how media platforms like Google, Facebook and YouTube came to 
capitalise on ‘their moment’, partnering with organisations like the WHO 
to ‘promote care at a distance’. These efforts, the authors show, generated 
‘fantasies of caregiving’, allowing multinational social media giants to 
amplify profits through advertisements and online engagements. 
Meanwhile, the difficulties and struggles of people whose marginality 
and vulnerability left them without the social networks, support systems 
or technologies of care, were largely overlooked.
Haripriya Narasimhan, Mahati Chittem and Pooja Purang show 
how, in India, living in an extended lockdown of over seven weeks (25 
March to 18 May) presented an existential crisis for the middle classes. 
Worried about getting essential commodities, a highly mediated class 
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struggled with sudden changes in their daily lives. These anxieties were 
attenuated by coronavirus-related statistics appearing on their mobiles 
in this highly WhatsApp-ed nation (Agrawal 2018). With the highest 
number of WhatsApp users in the world, the Indian middle classes 
constantly chat with family or friends, forward jokes and memes, and 
participate in serious debates on any number of ‘groups’. Narasimhan, 
Chittem and Purang show how through the circulation of jokes and 
memes, ‘traditional’ gender roles in the home were challenged not by 
globalisation or feminism but by the virus. And while these media 
satirised the revision of gender roles, they also illustrated how COVID-19 
enforced changes as working men and women struggled to find order in 
upended home and working life.
The challenges of a healthcare system under pressure pre-pandemic, 
and the opportunities that the crisis afforded to review social conventions, 
are also addressed in Tsipy Ivry and Sarah Segal-Katz’s chapter, this time 
with pressure from religious authorities. Ivry and Segal-Katz describe 
how women rabbinic scholars engaged in efforts to raise awareness of 
the problematic interstices between institutional religious and health 
services, and in doing so, turned COVID-19 into an opportunity. The 
pandemic exposed contradictions between public health messages about 
hygiene and risks of infection, and the mandated use of public ritual bath 
houses on the cessation of menstrual bleeding. This contradiction at a 
time of crisis allowed women to reclaim authority in rabbinic debates on 
intimacy, and highlighted how religious authority overstepped and 
underperformed in assuring hygienic conditions. In both these examples 
– of India and the redistribution of domestic labour, and of Israel and 
halachic laws on purity – the pandemic created opportunities to reflect on 
the institutionalisation of gender and its inequalities.
Lessons for a future
When global media were still reporting on a ‘mystery virus’ in Wuhan 
in January 2020, researchers and conspiracy theorists alike pondered 
its origins. With the first confirmed cases linked to the Huanan Seafood 
Market, scientists speculated about how and at which point the novel 
coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 zoonotically jumped species, and so to the 
pandemic. Culprits included horseshoe bats and pangolins – species that 
evoke Mary Douglas’s (1966) analysis of anomaly and danger. While 
some believed the spillover can be pinpointed to the seafood market, 
others argued that given its ‘stealth’ nature, COVID-19 was likely already 
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in circulation much earlier. Whatever the origins, COVID-19 intensified 
global concerns about the effects of humanity’s encroachment on ever 
greater swathes of forest and land. A year on, it continues to provoke 
reflection.
Rebecca Marsland draws upon her many years of research on 
malaria in Tanzania to illustrate not only the challenges that epidemics 
and pandemics create in resource poor settings, but also the complexity 
of interventions contingent on human/insect separation in contexts 
better characterised by co-existence. She argues that despite many calls 
for global solidarity in pandemic times, we are certainly not all ‘in it 
together’. Marsland chronicles how viruses, bacteria and insect/animal 
vectors intervene in human socialities. As efforts to control malaria have 
consistently shown, interventions depend on a logic of separation in a 
world where farming, urbanisation and industrialisation continue to 
trouble nature/culture boundaries. Marsland makes a strong case for 
thinking in terms of ‘multidemics’ rather than the singular experience 
implied by the term pandemic.
Gideon Lasco carries these ideas into his argument that the 
coronavirus pandemic has drawn attention to the necessity, for social 
scientists and other publics, of an ecological, non-anthropocentric view 
of the world. Noting that humans grapple with microbes, surround 
themselves with plants and engage with non-human animals, Lasco 
reflects on the Philippine experience of COVID-19, offering illustrative 
examples, sketching tentative insights and concluding with a research 
agenda for future work. Lasco argues that as the pandemic unfolds, we 
need to ask how humans and non-humans can live together in precarious 
times. He offers a way forward to think about environments and 
ecologies, with implications for anthropological teaching, research and 
practice.
Finally, in their chapter, Chiara Bodini and Ivo Quaranta show 
how the pandemic drew attention to market-oriented reforms which 
undermine the capacity of healthcare systems, with attention to Italy as 
one of the regions outside of China which very early experienced 
exponential infection rates. The collapse of hospitals in the north of 
Italy in early 2020 was in some ways not surprising, given cuts during 
preceding years; in this context, families lost loved ones and were 
unable to say goodbye to them. Bodini and Quaranta emphasise that 
future preparedness should not be reduced to maintaining medical 
supplies and their adequate storage, of sufficient virological testing 
and contact tracing capacities. They call for a culture of health and 
healthcare capacity built up around local participatory action. Together, 
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the chapters in this section point to a rethinking of ‘preparedness’ and 
‘response’, away from a biomedical focus on how to extinguish an 
outbreak and towards thinking about the building of more resilient and 
balanced societies.
Past, present, future
Viruses are famously not fully alive; rather ‘they verge on life’ (Villareal 
2004). For decades, virologists have sought to understand the 
mechanisms by which viruses parasitise host cells in order to multiply 
and spread. There are thousands of viruses, their pathogenic effects on 
human hosts range from ‘mild flu-like symptoms’ to deadly organ failure. 
The effect of COVID-19 on those who contract it spans this spectrum of 
severity: extremely virulent for some (especially those who are elderly, 
those with certain ‘underlying medical conditions’); less virulent for 
others (Wahlberg 2020). While media reporting has focused on infection 
and mortality rates, a growing number of people who contract COVID-19 
live with its debilitating sequelae months after their infection. Initially 
invisible by the focus on mortality, hundreds of thousands of ‘Long 
COVID’ patients have found each other through social media to insist 
that they be counted (#CountLongCovid) (Callard and Perego 2021). To 
this day, we know little of the virus and its natural and social history. It 
has simply not been around long enough. While many currently use 
‘Long COVID’ to describe extended symptoms and drawn-out periods 
of recovery, we do not know yet whether there might also emerge 
post-viral syndromes or other debility or life-threatening conditions, as 
occurs with other viral infections: shingles following chicken pox; post-
polio syndrome decades after poliomyelitis; immune-compromised 
conditions after dengue infections; cervical cancer following human 
papillomavirus. COVID-19’s lethality has not unfolded. Equally, it is 
unclear how often people get second or even third COVID-19 infections. 
There are questions about terminology, clinical features, epidemiology, 
the natural history and the social life of the disease/diseases. There 
are also questions about how the disease is monitored, how we factor 
in underreporting, and how we might best model and manage its 
continued spread. The new directions of research in coming years, and 
the translation of this into interventions and models of care, are matters 
of thoughtful speculation.
In the twenty-first century, if it ever did, it no longer makes sense to 
think in terms of epidemiological transition. Globally, multiple forms of 
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infectious disease, noncommunicable disease and related disability 
co-circulate, often with cascading co-morbidities (Manderson and Warren 
2016). As COVID-19 burst on to the global health agenda, it joined a 
long list of medical conditions which continue to affect millions of 
people around the world. For over a century, medical anthropologists 
have ethnographically studied how individuals, families and loved ones 
perceive, live with and respond to medical conditions. COVID-19 is yet 
another communicable condition that now syndemically interacts with 
various other biological, social, economic and political conditions. The 
virus itself, and the responses to it ethnographically documented in this 
volume, have all too lucidly accentuated the stratified livability that 
results when poverty, racial discrimination and disability are permanent 
‘underlying conditions’.
While countless medical questions remain, as the chapters in Viral 
Loads show, anthropologists have been at the forefront, alongside 
epidemiologists and virologists, documenting, monitoring, analysing 
and interpreting patterns of transmission, and tracking the social life 
of the COVID-19 as it reshapes lives. It is essential that we remain so 
engaged. As we document, the pandemic has exposed how, worldwide, 
livability remains stratified and entrenched as lockdowns, viral 
infections and (access to) medical care are experienced and lived in 
racially, socio-economically and globally uneven ways. The biopolitical 
distinctions between ‘making live’ and ‘letting die’, of bios and zoē, are 
insufficient if we are to capture and account for the vast differences and 
divides that separate, for example, the lives of India’s migrant labourers 
stranded by lockdown, with little access to medical care, from the lives 
of those who live in spacious, serviced residences that keep the outside 
world at bay. Stratified livability calls for anthropologies of urgency if 
we are to document and account for the far-reaching consequences of a 
twenty-first-century pandemic in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America 
and North America. This anthropology of urgency underscores the need 
for our voices in other concurrent crises that threaten our lives: crises of 
racism, violence, inequality and climate change. The comparative 
analysis that the chapters in Viral Loads enables is essential. It sharpens 
our understanding of the racialised, disabling and discriminatory ways 
in which the pandemic and responses to it came to impact on people 
around the world throughout 2020 and beyond. At the same time, it 
demonstrates the strength of anthropological theory, rich ethnography 
and critical engagement to make sense of a world that seems to be 
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Care in the time of COVID-19
Surveillance, creativity and sociolismo in Cuba
Nancy J. Burke
On 19 April, the Universidad de las Ciencias Informáticas in Cuba, in 
collaboration with the Ministerio de Salud (MINSAP), announced the 
launch of Virtual Screen, Pesquisador Virtual, an app designed to provide 
‘real time identification of those with COVID-19 symptoms’. Users were 
told ‘it is simple’, and instructed to download the app, input their personal 
information, and, if they display symptoms, record their location, their 
interactions over the previous week and any contact with COVID-19 
patients (Redaccion OnCuba 2020a). Along with brigades of physicians 
and medical students going door to door to actively screen residents, 
administer tests and provide symptomatic treatment as needed, the app 
was seen as another tool in Cuba’s arsenal for controlling the spread of 
the virus that built on decades of effective infectious disease control. At 
the same time, police handed out fines to those not wearing masks. New 
services were promoted on WhatsApp groups, such as the delivery, for 
a fee, of fresh vegetables to the homes of those unable or unwilling to 
wait in long lines for daily provisions. Paladars (small, privately owned 
restaurants) adapted delivery services to bring food to elderly residents 
for free. Daily communications on state TV from the president and 
minister of public health, while reiterating the importance of social 
distancing, acknowledged how hard it was not to kiss people hello and to 
maintain six feet between each other, especially for Cubans for whom 
physical closeness is a part of daily life.
I explore the productive tensions inherent in the expansive forms of 
surveillance and governance enacted by the Cuban state under the guise 
of caring for the population since the arrival of the novel coronavirus 
SARS-CoV-2, and the creative moves among individuals and groups to 
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support each other while earning an income as revenues from the tourist 
sector disappeared. I propose that the co-existence and intersection of 
these practices are made possible by Cuba’s particular form of post-Soviet 
bureaucratic socialism (Hoffmann 2016) and are conditioned by multiple 
forms of social and physical infrastructure. Analysis of these forms of care 
is useful for understanding how care is enacted and experienced in a time 
of crisis and geopolitical isolation.
Arundhati Roy (2020) posited the pandemic as a portal through 
which to imagine new futures, but others have argued that pandemic 
responses reveal what was already there (Whitacre et al. 2020). In the 
United States, this has taken the form of revealing the gross generational 
inequities that have led to disproportionate burdens of chronic illnesses 
and persistent poverty in black and brown populations, and the 
consequent disproportionate burden of death from complications linked 
to COVID-19 (Garth, Chapter 5). In Cuba, the reforms and slight changes 
that have occurred since the mid-2000s were revealed as just that – slight. 
The pandemic response re-instantiated the value of what had been lauded 
as the key triumphs of the Cuban Revolution – universal healthcare, 
investment in education, and commitment to addressing inequality and 
injustice throughout the world as operationalised in international medical 
missions. It highlighted the bureaucratic nature of the government’s 
approach to population health, using punitive means of enforcement, and 
the valuable experience gained from participation in international and 
local responses to prior epidemics (e.g. dengue, HIV/AIDS, Ebola). It also 
created an opening for the re-assertion of comprehensive, coordinated 
and centralised state power in the interest of the public’s health. At the 
same time, the pandemic response afforded the creation of new forms of 
relational care and entrepreneurism utilising online platforms and 
cellular data. Such responses were made possible by Cuba’s socialist and 
social infrastructure, including training a deep and expansive public 
health workforce, and the changes, albeit complicated, that occurred 
with the opening of the economy since the 1990s. These forms of 
connectedness enabled creative approaches to resolver, or meet daily 
needs, in a context where the combination of US sanctions, crumbling 
municipal and housing infrastructures, loss of tourist revenue and the 
pandemic made it more and more difficult to do so.
At the time of this writing (November 2020), Cuba has 8,110 cases 
and 133 deaths.1 This equates to 12 deaths per million. Compared with 
comparably sized nations such as Bolivia, the Dominican Republic 
and Belgium, ranked 44, 46 and 18, respectively, with cases ranging 
from 144,390 to 567,532, Cuba’s pandemic response has resulted 
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in impressively low numbers. In the following, I detail the Cuban 
government’s swift and early response as part of a professional ethos 
of care, and highlight key aspects of the island’s socialist infrastructure 
that underlie and pose challenges to this public health response and 
its enforcement. I follow this with a description of individual acts of 
community support, particularly on behalf of those most vulnerable. 
I conclude with a reflection on what this convergence of humanitarian 
intervention and governmentality reveals in this moment on the island.
Biopolitics and the anthropology of care
Anthropologists studying Cuba’s healthcare system have highlighted 
the strong arm of the state in the maintenance of extraordinary health 
outcomes with few financial resources, the techniques the government 
has employed to engage citizens in the production of these metrics, 
and their subsequent influences on subjectivity (Andaya 2013, 2014; 
Brotherton 2005, 2012). Conducting research in the 1990s, Sean 
Brotherton described the deprivations of what is referred to on the island 
as the Special Period in a Time of Peace (el Periodo Especial), a time of 
extreme economic scarcity that severely impacted living standards, led 
to rising unemployment, and witnessed the plummeting of the value of 
national currency and further deterioration of already faulty housing and 
municipal infrastructures. This was seen as a state of exception (Agamben 
2005) in which a well-educated population, ‘inundated with biomedical 
knowledge’, developed ‘state fostered expectations and feelings of 
entitlement’ to a level of wellbeing and healthcare that the socialist 
government could no longer provide (Brotherton 2005, 360). Faced with 
incomes insufficient to meet basic needs, Cubans relied more and more 
on their networks of socios,2 friends and acquaintances connected 
to resources, including accessing care and prescribed and necessary 
medications (Brotherton 2012). Brotherton looked to Foucault’s 
concept of biopolitics to theorise the production of ‘governable subjects’ 
(Burchell et al. 1991) on the island, arguing that strategies underlying 
the establishment of the Cuban healthcare system required increasing 
degrees of state intervention, management and protection, resulting in 
a Cuban form of biological citizenship. Biopolitical strategies, according 
to Foucault (1990, 139), seek to understand and regulate ‘the level of 
health, life expectancy, and longevity’ of population groups. Care for the 
health of the population is clearly a biopolitical endeavour, and one that 
infers both intimate and disciplinary processes.
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As anthropologists have illustrated, physicians and nurses play 
essential biopolitical roles within Cuba’s socialist health infrastructure 
(Andaya 2014; Brotherton 2012; Burke 2013). Having been declared 
‘symbols of the Revolution’ by Fidel Castro (Rojas 1986), they are 
positioned within neighbourhoods and communities to reinforce the 
values of the Revolution through their continuous contact with the 
population, and their attention to lifestyle factors as elemental to health. 
Most recently, oncology clinical trials have been inserted into Cuban 
primary care practice, suggesting an extension of this biopolitical role 
into experimental treatments (Graber 2018; see also Livingston 2012). 
Within what Graber (2018) identifies as a professional ethos of care, 
physicians build upon their intimate relationships with patients in their 
neighbourhoods and health areas to incorporate palliative care and 
clinical research into their primary work of disease prevention and 
chronic disease management. In so doing, they engage in everyday 
practices that transform their work (e.g. incorporating experimental 
trials into clinical care) and their relationships with patients (normalising 
cancer as a chronic illness). Graber illustrates how the contours of 
individual care in the context of Cuba’s neighbourhood clinics serve as an 
extension of the state’s commitment to care for the population. Responses 
to pandemics, as we shall see, require a biopolitical approach that benefits 
from the trust established in these micro-interactions.
Medical institutions have worked to direct humanitarian resources 
to situations and places of extreme need (Farmer 2005), while they have 
played a regulative role imposing coercive norms of behaviour through 
conceptualisations of health and security (Foucault 1990; Ong 2003; 
Rose 2009). Lisa Stevenson’s historical analysis of the mid-twentieth 
century tuberculosis outbreak in Northern Canada provides some insight 
into the complex tacking back and forth between the individual and 
population, or between Foucault’s anatomo- and bio- politics, in the 
context of epidemics (Garcia 2010; Livingston 2012; Stevenson 2014). In 
her juxtaposition of the 1940s–1960s tuberculosis outbreak with the 
more recent suicide epidemic among Northern Canadian Inuit (in the 
1980s), Stevenson (2014) aligns government efforts to provide care to a 
population through forced removal with the pain and suffering such 
separations wrought on individuals and families. As she describes, this 
‘anonymous care’, directed toward population groups rather than toward 
named and known individuals and members of families and communities, 
met bureaucratic ends but was experienced as a form of genocide by those 
‘cared for’. This suggests important differences between ‘anonymous care’ 
aimed at population health, such as a population group experiencing a 
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pandemic, and relational care provided to individuals, ‘the way that 
someone comes to matter’ (Garcia 2010).
Reflections on the Cuban response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic raise 
similar concerns. Rather than approaching HIV/AIDS transmission as 
an individual behavioural challenge within a human rights/individual 
choice framework, as occurred in much of the world, the Cuban 
government in the 1980s responded to the return of 40,000 troops from 
highly infected parts of Central Africa with classic public health strategies. 
The government implemented routine testing, contact tracing with 
partner notification, close surveillance and isolation of all seropositive 
individuals. This swift population level disciplinary response was possibly 
due to the socialist government’s willingness to do so, despite likely 
opposition, and because of the comprehensive health system already in 
place. While the government was largely successful in controlling viral 
spread, especially compared with neighbouring Haiti and Puerto Rico, 
this was achieved at the cost of the forced isolation of people who tested 
positive in AIDS sanatoria. The approach was criticised as a violation of 
human rights (Scheper-Hughes 1994, 2020).
Perhaps more prescient to the current pandemic response, was the 
Cuban experience with the dengue outbreak of the 1980s, which also 
involved a ‘massive and military’ response (Whiteford 2000, 63) that 
resulted in the eradication of the source of the virus – the Aedes aegypti 
mosquito – three months after the epidemic reached its highest peak 
(Kouri et al. 1986). This response, explored further below, was multilevel, 
coordinated across sectors, and required the mobilisation of thousands of 
community health workers tasked with entering homes, assessing vector 
control compliance and imposing fines if necessary. The epidemic, 
recognised in May and brought under control by August, resulted in 0.46 
deaths per 1,000 cases, the ‘lowest lethality index reported until then for 
a dengue epidemic involving confirmed dengue haemorrhagic fever 
(DHF)’ (Kouri et al. 1986). In the unfolding response to the COVID-19 
pandemic, Cuba again employed traditional public health strategies 
designed to contain, control and manage the population, and, through 
them, the virus. At the same time, Cuban individuals worked through 
their social networks – socios – to provide forms of relational care.
Heeding early warning signs
Cuba’s first cases of COVID-19 were confirmed on 11 March 2020 – three 
Italian tourists visiting the town of Trinidad, a World Heritage Site. The 
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tourists were immediately isolated, as were the 11 people with whom 
they had come into contact. But the government had been preparing well 
before this. In January 2020, the National Action Plan for Epidemics, last 
revised during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, was updated 
and activated, surveillance commenced at all ports, and immigration 
officials were trained in COVID-19 response (e.g. immediate testing 
and quarantine of those suspected of being infected). In February, 
polyclinics were reorganised across the island, and beds identified for 
potential patients. Staff were trained in COVID-19 symptoms, testing and 
quarantine, and in March meetings across Cuba’s 15 provinces started to 
coordinate responses across sectors, identify and activate testing labs and 
began research into diagnostics and treatments. Daily briefings from 
the Ministry of Public Health on state TV began; tax payments were 
suspended for all small businesses; and protections were put in place for 
worker salaries and social security. Before the first case was confirmed, 
deans from medical schools across the country had already called for 
volunteers to participate in administration of active screening. Over 
28,000 medical students responded (MEDICC 2020). In mid-March, 155 
workshops turned their attention to manufacturing masks, schools were 
closed and outbound travel by Cuban citizens was limited to humanitarian 
reasons. By the end of the month, Camilo Cienfuegos, in Pinar del Rio, 
was the first community put under quarantine.
On 1 April, face coverings were made obligatory, and by 5 April, all 
police stations were staffed with someone from the district attorney’s 
office, placed there to charge those in violation of COVID-19 regulations 
according to Article 87 of the penal code (crimes against health). Alcohol 
sales were limited, and drinking was prohibited in public; restaurants 
were closed or limited to take-out. By 15 April, 20 communities in six 
provinces were under total or partial quarantine and by 23 April, over 
nine million of the island’s total 11.4 million population had been visited 
in their homes or places of work as part of the active screening programme 
(Gorry 2020; MEDICC 2020). At the end of the month, through primary 
care case detection and contact tracing, the sources of infection for 
85.7 per cent of active cases had been identified (Gorry 2020).
Mobilisation of the public health system
As in prior epidemics, Cuba’s readiness to act builds on the socialist 
infrastructure of free and universal healthcare and education established 
as a core tenet of the post-1959 Revolutionary state. Trained infectious 
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disease specialists, microbiologists, laboratory technicians, epidemio- 
logists and over 13,000 family doctors and nurses serving neighbourhoods 
across the island positioned the country well for a quick response. This 
density of trained health professionals was made possible by the 
13 medical universities and 25 medical faculties across the country that 
confer six-year medical degrees at no cost to students. Medical training 
has been prioritised since Fidel Castro came into power in 1959, at which 
time over 3,000 of the island’s 6,286 doctors migrated to the United 
States (Gómez 2019), leaving the country with a dearth of trained 
physicians equipped to build a new national healthcare system envisioned 
to reflect socialist values and the principle of health as a human right.
Cuba’s public health infrastructure took shape over time, first in 
1965 with the integral polyclinic programme (policlinico integral), and in 
1974, with the ‘Medicine in the Community’ programme (policlinicos 
comunitarios). In the 1980s, the healthcare system was re-envisioned to 
become the well-known Family Doctor and Nurse programme, Medico y 
Enfermera de la Familia (MEF). Elemental to this, physician and nurse 
pairs were placed in every neighbourhood, thus creating consultorios 
(neighbourhood clinics) responsible for the population of a ‘health area’, 
usually of about 120 households. Physicians and nurses retain detailed 
health histories of individuals embedded in families and social networks 
and serve as a hub for referral to the next levels of care in the polyclinic 
and hospital (Burke 2013). The achievements of Cuba’s health system, 
which build upon this structure, are important not only for their impacts 
on the population, but also because the government has used them to 
gain international prestige, respect (Feinsilver, 2008, 1993) and, at times, 
hard currency (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009; Brotherton 2013). The 
strength of Cuba’s health statistics has become a significant source of 
Cuban nationalism and ‘global empowerment’ (Eckstein 1994, 128). The 
MEF programme, central to the production of these health statistics, has 
also been criticised for its potential role in neighbourhood level 
surveillance (Brotherton 2012, 2008).
In the midst of the scarcities of the Special Period of the 1990s, the 
public health system – like all industry on the island – was threatened. 
While the government made a commitment to retain investments in 
public health, education and biotechnology, the geopolitical isolation 
resulting from the continuing US Trade Embargo and loss of the Soviet 
Union greatly impacted access to externally produced medicines, basic 
materials for local pharmaceutical production and clinical supplies. In 
addition, vegetables, fruit and other basic elements of the Cuban diet 
were difficult to find in urban centres due to lack of fuel. Building 
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initiatives designed to deliver on the state’s commitment of housing for 
all slowed to a halt, leaving the crumbling housing inherited by the 
Revolution to continue to decay (Coyula-Cowley 2000). Municipal 
infrastructures including water and wastewater plants built over 50 years 
previously were left to deteriorate (Cueto and de Leon 2010; Randal 
2000; Westbrook and de Freitas Alves 2016).
Economic reforms enacted to stimulate the economy and bring in 
much needed hard currency included continued investment in 
biotechnology and expansion of patents (Reid-Henry 2010), investment 
in tourism (recreational, educational and medical), introduction of a 
dual currency and opening to entrepreneurism (Burke 2013). While the 
scarcities experienced in the 1990s have to varying degrees continued 
into the present, the strength of Cuba’s socialist public health infra- 
structure has been identified as the reason behind continuously robust 
health indicators (Spiegel and Yassi 2004). A core element of this infra- 
structure is the libreta, or ration book. Despite the scarcities imposed by 
the US Embargo and geopolitical shifts, Cuba is known as a place where 
nadie se muere de hambre (no one dies from hunger) (Garth 2019) due to 
a national food ration system which provides about half of an individual’s 
monthly nutritional requirements, with additional rationed items for 
children, the elderly and those with certain chronic conditions (e.g. 
diabetes, cancer), at very low cost.
Since Fidel Castro fell ill and turned over power to his brother 
Raul in 2006 and Raul to Miguel Díaz-Canel in 2018, Cuban politics 
have undergone major transformations largely in the interest of 
continuity (Hoffmann 2016). While scholars have argued over how to 
characterise this period, referring to it as post-Soviet, post-socialist and 
post-Soviet/post-socialist, some have suggested that the transition is 
most appropriately described as a shift from a charismatic socialism 
characterised by mass mobilisation to a more depersonalised bureaucratic 
socialism which has brought with it a diversification of Cuba’s public 
sphere, particularly through the liberalisation of access to digital media 
and data, liberalisation of travel and migration, and more moderate 
foreign policy (Hoffmann 2016). In the 2000s this transition led to 
centralisation and efficiency campaigns that began to reshape the 
healthcare system yet again, largely in response to the burden on the 
system placed by Cuba’s robust and extensive medical missions (Briggs 
and Mantini-Briggs 2009; Brotherton 2013; Feinsilver 2008).
In 2016, Cuba’s foreign policy opening resulted in rapprochement 
with the United States. US President Obama’s visit to the island in March 
that year symbolised hope and possibility for many and resulted in a 
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reinvestment in tourism with the expectation of an onslaught of US 
visitors. The 2016 election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the 
United States quashed this hope. With his election, the US Embargo 
tightened, locked in by the Helms–Burton law passed in 1996, which 
curtails foreign trade and investment on the island. In 2019, the Trump 
administration imposed 86 new punitive measures including full 
implementation of the Helms–Burton Act. From September 2019, this has 
resulted in reductions in oil imports from Venezuela, which left Cuba 
functioning with 50 per cent of its required fuel (Rodriguez 2020a). 
Economic challenges were exacerbated by a regional drought that 
reduced agricultural production over the prior year. In the context of the 
pandemic, the Cuban government faced difficulty in procuring much-
needed respirators, and medical donations from China were stymied 
by US intervention (Granma 2020; Rodriguez 2020a). The Jack Ma 
Foundation’s donation of facemasks, diagnostic kits, ventilators and 
gloves, for example, was thwarted because a major shareholder of the 
Avianca Airlines cargo carrier set to bring the materials was a US-based 
company, subject to the trade restrictions set by the US embargo 
(Weissenstein 2020). As Cuban economist Jose Luiz Rodriguez argued, 
‘At this point, no one questions that the pandemic is not just a health 
crisis. It is what the social sciences describe as a “total social fact,” in the 
sense that it convulses all social relations, and shocks all the actors, 
institutions and values’ (2020b).
Prior epidemic experiences
In addition to Cuba’s robust primary care system, the healthcare 
workforce’s experience with prior epidemics influenced the island’s 
ability to respond. In Cuba these include dengue outbreaks (1981, 1997), 
a neuropathy epidemic3 (1990s), cholera outbreaks (2012–13), and Zika 
(2019). The 1980s dengue epidemic provides the clearest precedent 
for the current pandemic in terms of response. Prior to 1981, dengue 
haemorrhagic fever (DHF) had not been seen in the Caribbean region; it 
was limited to Southeast Asia and the western Pacific (Kouri et al. 1986). 
But in the summer of 1981, when infestations of the mosquito vector 
Aedes aegypti were recorded in almost all the island’s urban centres, Cuba 
was hit by a major dengue epidemic that included DHF cases and 
fatalities. The Ministry of Health reported 344,203 cases between May 
and August 1981, with 116,151 hospitalised and 158 deaths. The last 
case was reported in October 1981. Similar to the swift response to 
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COVID-19, once the epidemic was recognised in June 1981, the 
government launched an intensive national campaign to eradicate the 
Aedes aegypti mosquito, initially managed by the Cuban civil defence and 
later the Ministry of Public Health (Kouri et al. 1989). The government’s 
response included 15 provincial directors, 60 entomologists, 27 general 
supervisors, 729 team leaders, 2,801 inspectors and 1,947 vector 
controllers (Whiteford 2000). On the ground, approximately 15,000 
health workers were mobilised to conduct house-to-house inspections, 
during which they identified potential mosquito larvae breeding grounds, 
treated disposal containers with insecticides, and treated the insides of 
apartments and buildings with portable blowers. The insecticide 
Malathon was sprayed from planes, sanitary laws regarding treatment 
of containers were enforced and health education about the mosquito 
and its ability to transmit the virus intensified (Gessa and Gonzalez 
1987; Kouri et al. 1986; Whiteford 2000). All available resources were 
marshalled to quell the epidemic; the government spent close to US$43 
million on the campaign, mainly on insecticides. But like the current 
COVID-19 response, the Cuban government relied largely on existing 
human capital. Household inspections and breeding ground removal 
were conducted by community members who, after being trained, 
became ‘vector controllers’ organised into brigades with the power to fine 
those who failed to comply with regulations designed to reduce breeding 
sites (Kouri et al. 1986; Whiteford 2000; Gessa and Gonzalez 1986). The 
similarities with the current behavioural challenges associated with 
reducing the spread of COVID-19 are clear, as is the role of infrastructure 
– social and physical – in the state’s response. Neighbours surveilled each 
other’s homes to ensure that they complied with eradication efforts and 
could be fined if not. Those who failed to comply put others in danger, as 
now those who fail to wear face coverings or maintain social distance may 
put others at risk. Crumbling buildings and inadequate water supply 
influenced, in the 1980s, the maintenance of water containers in 
households; in 2020 these conditions make sheltering in place and 
hygienic hand washing challenging.
Internationally, Cuban healthcare professionals have responded to 
epidemics and natural disasters as part of a long tradition of international 
humanitarianism begun in post-quake Chile in 1960. Since just 2005, the 
Henry Reeve Brigade4 has provided free medical services in nearly 30 
post-disaster and epidemic situations, including the cholera outbreak 
following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the 2014 Ebola epidemic in 
West Africa (Ubieta 2019). Especially following the expulsion of Cuban 
physicians from formerly allied states in Brazil, Ecuador and Bolivia, a 
CArE iN thE t iME of CoVid-19 37
robust cadre of doctors on the island with excellent field experience 
were poised to support the pandemic response. When 28,000 students 
responded to the medical school deans’ call for volunteers, they needed 
to be supervised and their case findings evaluated and communicated to 
clinicians. Family doctors in each neighbourhood, many of whom had 
returned from international missions, filled this supervisory role.
Cuban doctors were the first to arrive in Wuhan, China (Granma 
News Staff 2020). On 26 March, the first team to go abroad began 
treating COVID-19 patients in Lombardy, Italy, and since this time over a 
thousand health professionals have worked in 18 countries on three 
continents. Of note is the number of women serving as part of the nurse 
brigade working in Barbados (95 of the 101 are women). As mentioned 
previously, Cuba’s international missions serve a symbolic as well as 
financial role (Bernstein 2013; Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2009; 
Brotherton 2013).
The state is back
The government’s immediate response to the looming global pandemic 
included both international support and, as mentioned above, the 
re-instantiation of paternalistic controls on the population. In April, six 
people confined to an isolation centre in Sancti Spiritus escaped. Isolation 
centres, established in March 2020, are adapted schools and hotels in 
which those either diagnosed with or suspected to have been exposed to 
COVID-19 are housed, with the supervision of medical personnel. News 
reports detail the limitations on movement for individuals in quarantine, 
and the high degree of medical attention they receive including 
temperature checks and PCR testing (Curbelo 2020). The escapees were 
found in their own homes; upon their arrest only 24 hours later, they were 
subject to three months to a year in prison (Redaccion OnCuba 2020b). 
Police started imposing fines of 300 pesos (the equivalent of a month’s 
salary) in April under the supposition of Article 87 of the penal code,5 but 
the specific decree enforcing face covering was not published until 
12 May. The state began limiting alcohol sales in May, and drinking in 
public became a finable offence in the same month. Those criticising the 
state’s approach to the pandemic or deemed to spread false information 
on social media were subject to fines and arrest (Alemán 2020), a return, 
in some senses, to the pre-transition mode of response to dissidence 
(Hoffmann 2016). As noted by Amalia Peréz, ‘along with the amplifying 
effects of inequality and precarity associated with this crisis, the expansion 
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of authoritarianism, hidden in the justification of health management 
and prevention, is also a risk’ (Pérez and Correa 2020).
State provisions were also reinstated, fostering a return to what had 
been a slow loosening of dependency with the burgeoning of the private 
sector under Raul Castro’s reforms. The ration book, thought to be on its 
way out just months prior, was restored and reinvigorated in April 2020 
in attempts to keep Cubans from traveling far from home to different 
grocery stores in search of basic goods, and to minimise long lines as 
potential sources of infection. Cubans pay less than the equivalent of 
US$2 for their monthly rations, which is estimated as 12 per cent of the 
food’s real value (Benjamin n.d.). With the recognition of increasing 
unequal access to hard currency between those living on a state salary or 
pension and those working in the tourist sector or receiving remittances 
from abroad over the last decade, government subsidisation of every 
citizen regardless of income at the cost of approximately one billion/year 
has been a point of contention. In 2011, for example, Raul Castro stated 
that the ration system distributes food at ‘laughable prices’ and that a 
system introduced in a time of shortages had turned into ‘an unbearable 
burden for the economy and a disincentive to work’ (Benjamin n.d.). Raul 
Castro’s reforms included a gradual reduction in the items included in 
la libreta. But during the pandemic, the offerings expanded. In recognition 
of the economic hit that citizens, especially those in the tourist sector, 
have taken with the closure of the island in response to COVID-19, the 
state began to pardon taxes for entrepreneurs and to ensure salaries for 
state workers, including artists and musicians, in March 2020.
Care (and humour)
Among ordinary citizens, pandemic response revealed the creativity and 
care Cubans have for each other, including via the well-known Cuban 
turn to humour. Anthropologists working on the island in the 1990s and 
since have chronicled the pivotal role of humour, jokes and laughter in 
coping on a daily basis with scarcities and insecurities – food, water, 
electricity and fuel – during and following Cuba’s Periodo Especial. Jokes 
recorded included one popular in the 1980s mocking that the Revolution 
had eradicated capitalism’s three classes (upper, middle and lower) only 
to replace them with three new socialist ones: the dirigentes (few 
communist officials at the top), the diplogente (the fewer diplomats and 
foreigners in the middle) and the indigentes (the indigent masses at the 
bottom). The egalitarianism of socialism made everyone equal by making 
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everyone poor (Henken 2007). During the Special Period, another group 
was added, the delincuentes (delinquents, people who survived by 
breaking the law). As a Cuban blogger commented, ‘there seems to be a 
direct relationship between the seriousness of the problems and the 
ingenuity of our humour, so in times of crisis hilarity wins. The nineties 
were marked by scarcities and abundant jokes; prodigious in both 
problems and humour’ (Sanchez 2012).
Nadine Fernandez (2010) reminds us of this humour in her account 
of the affectionate name many had for their white 1950s model 
refrigerators in the 1990s: el coco – white on the outside and only water 
on the inside. At the same time, she highlighted the sharp edges of this 
humour when addressing race and difference. Other popular jokes of the 
time include: ‘What are the three successes of the Cuban Revolution? 
Medicine, education and athletics. What are the three failures of the 
Cuban Revolution? Breakfast, lunch and dinner’. Tanuma (2007) argues 
that such jokes indicate a post-utopian irony reflecting ambivalence 
toward the status quo and the state. This ironic stance enabled criticism 
in a somewhat acceptable manner.
Humour emerging in the context of the pandemic includes the 
song by Virulo, Dale Candela, which critiques US President Trump’s 
suggestion of injecting bleach as a means to kill the coronavirus. The 
recurring refrain of ‘dale candela para que el virus se muera’ (heat it up so 
that the virus dies) refers to uncooked bats as a source of the virus 
(insomne 2020). Other jokes include those referring to the refrigerator 
as a great place to store clothing (because there is no food), and finally 
understanding what good la libreta serves, as a passport to leave the 
house, since it is no longer useful for accessing food in empty state-run 
bodegas.
Jokes like these are told while Cubans wait in long lines for 
groceries, not adequately social distancing and fumbling with wearing 
masks as the temperature continues to rise. Streets in Central Havana 
became a hot spot for spreading the virus (OnCubaNews 2020), given 
their crowding due to the state of the buildings, rising temperatures and 
the need to resolver (meet daily needs). Nearly 80 per cent of the city was 
built between 1902 and 1958, and a large proportion of this housing stock 
was already in disrepair at the onset of the Revolution in 1959 (Kerr 
2009). In central Havana, 85 per cent of housing is over 80 years old, and 
the remainder between 40 and 80 years old (Coyula 2010). Much of this 
housing is crumbling, overcrowded and in dire need of repair; there has 
been little renovation of existing structures. In addition, municipal 
utilities, including electricity and water, continue to breakdown. In 
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April 2020 residents of Havana were asked to reduce their electricity use 
and preserve water in anticipation of the kinds of blackouts and brownouts 
that characterised the Special Period.
Prior to the pandemic, Cubans expressed concern about how 
President Trump’s crackdown on trade was impacting the availability of 
prescription drugs – particularly hypertension medication, which many 
people take daily – and food. As a result, people were traveling across the 
city at the rumour of one store having canned tomatoes in order to get 
them before they disappeared, and turning to the black market for 
medications no longer available on pharmacy shelves. Since the onset of 
the pandemic, these sanctions, resulting from the Helms–Burton Act, 
have also impacted the availability of personal protective equipment 
(PPE) and real time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) tests on the island, both acquired through donations from the Pan 
American Health Organization (PAHO) and trade with China (Duran 
2020). In response to the lack of PPE, ‘makers’ started to construct face 
masks and shields out of recycled plastic bottles. They created a network 
of collectors across neighbourhoods and towns, and shared patterns and 
methods via social media to enable individuals across the island to join in. 
Their makeshift masks are worn by medical personnel throughout Cuba 
(Cabrera 2020).
In addition to waiting in lines and shopping for each other, Cubans 
established WhatsApp groups to facilitate grocery delivery to the elderly, 
and the state created online shopping options that were less successful 
(Boza 2020). These groups were made possible by the increased access to 
cellular data Cubans have had since 2016, and high speed internet in 
homes and public spaces since 2017. With the quick adaptation of the 
long Cuban tradition of sociolismo, the use of social networks and 
friendships to meet daily needs, WhatsApp also facilitated entrepreneurial 
endeavours such as gyms offering free classes and renting out bicycles. 
Restaurants and cafeterias started using WhatsApp for pizza, dinner, 
pastry and fresh juice delivery. Cuber, Cuba’s version of Uber, expanded 
to deliver groceries and other products. Paladares such as cafeteria 
Jaunky’s Pan repurposed their delivery service to ensure that elderly 
Cubans could receive groceries at home at no cost (Lima 2020). Some of 
these adaptations were expansions on or adaptations of pre-existing 
entrepreneurial projects; others – particularly those designed to provide 
support and social connections to older Cubans living alone – were 
collective and creative responses to a recognised need, a way to minimise 
suffering among the most vulnerable.
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Conclusions
Cuba’s pandemic response reveals the value of a deep and available public 
health workforce, trained and experienced in epidemic response, and the 
continued power of the state to mobilise across sectors in the context of 
an emergency. Vietnam has also had success in keeping the pandemic at 
bay through similar early closure of borders, multisector coordination, 
healthcare system mobilisation, extensive monitoring and investigation 
of potential cases, strict quarantine enforcement and massive health 
education and communication campaigns. These endeavours, as in Cuba, 
are made possible by a government willing to enforce containment 
measures. The strong arm of the state was evidenced in Vietnam, for 
example, in the quick quarantine of a community of 10,000 residents near 
Hanoi when four cases were reported in February 2020. In April, the 
country entered a heavily enforced nationwide 14-day lockdown (Minh 
Hoang et al. 2020). Similar to the Cuban response, the Vietnamese 
government developed several apps to facilitate case reporting and 
contact tracing but took things a step further by making declarations of 
health status and travel history via apps compulsory (Trevisan and Le 
2020). At the end of April 2020, the country had only 270 cases; in 
early December, it still had only 1,361 reported cases and 35 deaths. 
As noted in a recent editorial in the American Journal of Public Health, 
‘the Vietnamese experience suggests the need for a strong public 
health infrastructure and good coordination among the government 
agencies dealing with the emergency’ (Trevisan and Le 2020). It also 
suggests, as does the Cuban response, the value of biopolitics to pandemic 
control.
In the context of the pandemic, Cuban health professionals have 
worked to ‘adapt biomedicine to people’s needs, and, by doing so, ensure 
continuity of care’ (Graber 2018, 276). In this case, continuity refers to 
everything from meeting basic needs to enforcing public health measures 
to limit spread. The response to the pandemic highlights paternalistic and 
egalitarian roles of the state (in the delivery of social goods per the mass 
mobilisation model) as well as the space within this biopolitical regime 
for individuals and communities’ ‘capacities to reshape and transform 
health politics’ (Graber 2018, 277) through local interpretations and 
enactments of care. Thus, the Cuban pandemic response contributes to 
emerging trends in the anthropology of care that elaborate connections 
between everyday practices, the inter-relational and intersubjective 
aspects of care, and the regimes and hierarchies of governance. As Buch 
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so aptly describes in her review on anthropology and care, ‘(w)ithin these 
discussions, care remains a shifting and unstable concept – alternately 
referring to everyday practices, engagements with biomedicine, 
biopolitics, affective states, forms of moral experience and obligation, 
structures of exploitation, and the relationships between these various 
things’ (2015, 279).
The Cuban pandemic response also reveals the value of the daily 
practices of survival, captured in the term resolver, that Cubans have in 
their back pocket, honed from prior and continuous experiences of 
economic uncertainty. These include extensive networks of socios through 
which needs for medicines and food might be met, and care for the most 
vulnerable delivered. These networks have been characterised elsewhere 
as essential infrastructure for urban living, filling in where public services 
fail (Simone 2004). Challenges to shelter in place orders on the island 
reveal the effects of persistent poverty and geopolitical isolation on 
individuals’ ability to stay in lockdown in the midst of neglected housing, 
electrical and sanitary infrastructure. As the images of crowded streets 
and long lines on blogs and online newspaper sites attest, people find it 
difficult to stay inside crumbling buildings with little to no air flow and at 
times intermittent water and electricity.
The multiple forms of care emergent in the Cuban response to the 
pandemic – bureaucratic approaches to population health which take the 
form of anonymous care (Stevenson 2014) accompanied by new forms of 
relational care facilitated by cellular data – take place within contexts 
of social, public health and physical infrastructures in varying levels of 
decay (buildings, water pipes and treatment plants, electrical conduits), 
maintenance and transition (see also Cabalquinto and Ahlin, Chapter 18). 
All are active participants conditioning Cuba’s pandemic response (Appel 
et al. 2018; Larkin 2013).
In October 2020, Cuban airports re-opened to tourists, and entre- 
preneurs on the island who had thrived pre-pandemic with full bed and 
breakfasts and tour groups breathed a sigh of relief. Since then, the 
number of new infections have started creeping up. For example, on 27 
November 2020, MINSAP reported 35 new cases of COVID-19. Twenty-
eight of these were tourists (Redaccion OnCuba 2020c). How the country 
will continue to maintain pandemic control while opening up to 
international tourism – an essential form of revenue on the island – 
remains to be seen.
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Notes
1 https://oncubanews.com/cuba/cuba-casi-la-mitad-de-los-contagios-por-coronavirus-esta-
semana-fueron-importados/. Redaccion OnCuba. 2020c.
2 Socios are friends or acquaintances through which one accesses business advantages/
opportunities or resources needed for daily living. Socios are a key part of sociolismo, a strategy 
Cubans employ to resolver, or get what they need, in a context of scarcity.
3 Over 50,000 cases of optical and peripheral neuropathy were diagnosed between 1991 and 
1994, out of a population of 10.8 million. According to MINSAP, likely causes include 
nutritional deficiencies stemming from the deprivations of the Special Period complicated by 
alcohol and tobacco use (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1994).
4 Group of Cuban health professionals, established in 2005 in response to Hurricane Katrina, 
regularly deployed to provide humanitarian support in response to disasters throughout the 
world. 
5 This article refers to crimes against health.
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Militarising the pandemic
Lockdown in South Africa
Lenore Manderson and susan Levine
Until mid-2020, South Africa controlled the transmission of coronavirus 
and avoided a heavy toll from COVID-19 by an early and stringent 
lockdown enforced by police and defence troops. The iconic images of the 
pandemic were of soldiers in camouflage and masks, strong-arming 
homeless residents and populations in informal settlements. Such images 
are redolent of South Africa’s long history of police, soldiers and private 
security employees enforcing civil obedience; significant numbers of 
citizens live with the memory of their own house arrests, detention and 
imprisonment (Ross 2003). Consistent with apartheid’s deployment of 
the military to curtail social movement, arms were used to threaten and 
kill particular citizens at the height of South Africa’s aggressive COVID-19 
response, so underlying the violence of class and race hierarchy. For those 
old enough to have lived through the worst years of apartheid curfews, 
passbooks, military surveillance, torture and house arrests, the sudden 
arrival of COVID-19 not only deepened poverty, unemployment and 
hunger, but it also unveiled the thin veneer of South Africa’s transition 
to democracy. Having already endured chronic and systemic poverty, 
the massification of debility through TB and HIV/AIDS, and an uneven 
public health infrastructure to address chronic disease, the country 
has accommodated rules governing lockdown and its different forms of 
militant surveillance. The deadly experience of chronic pandemics 
created the conditions under which citizens across the country, in both 
urban and rural settings, complied to a much larger extent with public 
health protocols than in other parts of the world where we continue to 
witness the tragic results of anti-masker campaigns and COVID-19 
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denialism. That said, the spatialisation of poverty in the form of insecure 
and densely populated black townships has militated against the 
possibility of adequate social distancing (Manderson and Levine 2020).
How and why did South Africa manage with so little violence and 
resistance to enforce lockdown, and what counter factors came into play 
to address what might have been the catastrophic transmission of the 
virus in its early months? In this chapter, we show how lockdown in South 
Africa was enforced through its militarisation, drawing on the techniques 
and technologies of apartheid. We reflect on the unevenness of the 
risk and outcomes of infection from early in the pandemic, including in 
relation to the economic and social conditions of everyday life and access 
to care. We draw inspiration from a diverse range of theoretical directions 
and concepts to analyse South Africa’s lockdown. Derrida’s ‘hauntology’ 
allows us to apprehend the structural legacies of apartheid; Goffman’s 
‘total institution’ provides understanding of how the military works; 
Habermas (1975) allows us to comprehend the responsibility of the state 
to its population, and so to question state shortfalls, not only in South 
Africa but also in other settings. As we show, racism and capitalism 
converge and co-exploit to sharpen the inequalities of the pandemic.
Lockdown
South Africa’s lockdown was initiated on 26 March, at the time one of the 
strictest lockdowns to be imposed globally. It continued to be extended 
thereafter at different levels, with the rise and fall of infections. Yet, even 
by the time the lockdown was introduced, schools and universities had 
already taken the first steps to deliver courses online, and retail, personal 
services and other industries had contracted in scope and engagement. 
Entry into corporate spaces and public buildings was limited; social 
distancing and hand sanitisation were pervasive. Armed security guards 
and police were far more visible along city streets and malls than they 
might have been under ordinary circumstances; bank tellers and shop 
assistants stepped back from customers; and television and radio news 
and magazine programmes consistently attended programmes to the 
sanitary requisites of prevention and the risks inherent in everyday life. 
The lockdown reinforced these practices, with strict Stage 4 constraints 
to movement that initially prohibited and later limited the hours of 
outdoor exercise, walking dogs and other recreational uses of public 
space, and mandated the use of masks when outside the home. The 
sale and purchase of cigarettes was prohibited, most likely to obviate 
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excursions to shops, although also because smoking increased the risk 
associated for respiratory infection. Alcohol was also prohibited to limit 
what are, under any circumstances, painfully high levels of intimate 
partner violence (Friedman 2020), and as a measure to limit car accidents 
and injuries due to inebriation, which might lead to hospitalisations that 
would take up beds and medical services needed for patients with 
respiratory distress. The lockdown and associated measures constraining 
social life arguably contained the transmission of coronavirus for a time; 
in theory, they enabled hospitals, laboratories and health services to 
reorient to manage growing numbers of people with COVID-19. Some of 
the constraints were subsequently judged unconstitutional and irrational 
by the High Court of South Africa on 2 June 2020, by which time, 37,525 
cases of coronavirus infection had been reported. And this was only the 
beginning of what became a shocking escalation of cases that fed on 
poverty, immiseration and civil unrest.
Even before lockdown had been declared, disinfectant dispensers 
were handheld by guards at shop doors; within three months, pedal 
dispensers had been installed in some premises to further minimise 
human contact. At upmarket establishments, temperatures were taken 
upon entry and contact details logged for tracking and tracing. Only a few 
people at a time were (and, in November 2020, still were) allowed into 
shops and government offices, including police stations and social security 
offices; the remainder stood spaced out to observe social distancing 
regulations, in South Africa as in the global north. Our social skin 
expanded to accommodate distance in contexts of privilege where social 
distancing is possible. In his May address to the nation, President Cyril 
Ramaphosa said that ‘hugging and kissing is a thing of the past’ (Tembo 
2020). Self-surveillance, the regulation of others through citizen arrests 
and public shaming through social media platforms, assisted state 
response. Although the use of social media to ‘sting’ people recalcitrant or 
wilfully disobeying the law is not unique to South Africa (Sundaram 
2015), the incremental encouragement of citizen surveillance pushed 
Michel Foucault’s (2012) panopticon to its limit.
The temporary nature of this containment did not prepare South 
Africans for the scale and speed of viral spread. At the first lockdown, 
there were 927 reported cases; on 22 April, there were 4,546 cases and a 
total of 65 deaths; these low numbers, relative to infections and death 
rates elsewhere in the world, suggested that continued extreme state 
measures were unnecessary. But the effectiveness of such measures to 
avert a catastrophe were overestimated. By mid-July, South Africa was 
number five in the global league stakes that no one wanted to win; the 
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number of cases and deaths continued to rise and viral transmission 
continued to accelerate across provinces and from urban to rural areas. 
By mid-November 2020, there were 750,000 cases of infection and over 
20,000 deaths, with rural areas and the poorest states increasingly 
affected.
From the beginning of lockdown, the heightened presence of private 
security forces, citizen arrests,1 the police, newly empowered national 
park rangers and the massification of South Africa’s military response 
to enforce COVID-19 lockdown regulations contributed to a highly 
differentiated reality along the well-worn lines of class, race and gender. 
Two key questions emerged from these events and the continued 
repercussions of the pandemic: the extent to which social and economic 
inequality results in vulnerability to infection; and, as discussed below, 
the processes and consequences of militarisation in enforcing adherence 
to lockdown. By mid-July, the top 10 countries globally in terms of total 
reported cases of coronavirus were mostly countries with relatively large 
populations. The unequal impact of COVID-19, however, reflected not 
population density nor health systems factors alone, despite the fact that 
these factors surely influenced patterns and risks of transmission and 
infection. Rather, these countries, all high and middle-income countries, 
were among the most unequal countries in their regions and in the world 
(using World Bank Gini coefficients and government reports). We had, in 
the early weeks of the pandemic, argued that COVID-19 would track 
social fault lines and disproportionately infect and affect poor people 
(Manderson and Levine 2020). COVID-19 did not ‘track’ such fault lines: 
it fed on, burned into and abraded them. While vaccine development 
proceeded at remarkable pace through 2020, with research groups and 
pharmaceutical companies in the UK, Australia and the US fiercely 
competing, questions of its production at scale, and its stability, 
affordability, distribution and delivery, especially in countries with weak 
health systems and limited human and other resources, have yet to be 
addressed. In this respect, COVID-19, like HIV before it, will continue to 
impact unevenly in ways that penalise both the individuals and countries 
who are poorest and with the least power.
The one sure means we have to limit risk is to manage proximity, but 
proximity is also a scarce resource for people who live in the insanitary 
and crowded conditions that prevail in informal settlements, tenement 
buildings, workers’ dormitories, high-rise apartments and public housing 
estates, slums and favelas in cities like Cape Town, Mexico City, New York, 
London, Delhi and Sao Paulo. People with low incomes, some without 
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formal papers that allow them free access to services, routinely live with 
their families and others in makeshift shelters, often confined to single 
rooms. These are places with limited municipal services and poor social 
care, areas that typically lack sewage, drainage and waste disposal. They 
are characterised by extreme poverty and endemic unemployment, 
property and intimate partner violence, drug and alcohol abuse, and gang 
rule. The people in these environments live with disproportionate rates 
of chronic disease, the outcome of a calculated necropolitics (Mbembe 
2008). In South Africa, this includes especially HIV; in India and South 
Africa, TB; and everywhere high rates of cardiometabolic disease, poor 
nutrition and poor mental health. Poor people do not have enough food, 
and lockdown has stripped many of even the most precarious and poorly 
remunerated income-generating activities such as recycling, flower 
markets and informal food stands. In some cases, in acknowledging this, 
state and NGO entities have extended grants and food relief; in other 
cases, they have not.
On 11 May, the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) 
introduced a programme – the Special COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress 
Grant – which would provide 350 rand (c. US$20) per month for six 
months to people who were unemployed, were receiving no other 
benefits, and met other conditions relating to age and residence (South 
African Government 2020). Applications had to be electronic. Clearly, the 
intervention was unlikely to assist people whose employment was always 
precarious, who lacked access to basic virtual communication technology 
or who could not afford to pay for data. Moreover, people living in impover- 
ished conditions without resources cannot adhere to the rules of social 
distance. They may not have reliable or clean water, and they may not be 
able to buy soap to wash their hands regularly, nor afford to make or 
purchase masks (Ross 2020). Further, despite little acknowledgement of 
this in dominant discourse in relation to COVID-19, poor populations 
everywhere have access to fewer health and medical services, are least 
often insured, may have no right to care, may be unwilling to present for 
care because of prior experiences of violence, disrespect and abuse, and 
often lack transport and cash to access and pay for advice or medication. 
COVID-19 magnified inequalities as it exploited them. Structural violence, 
discrimination and fear feed into understandings of the pandemic and 
everyday interactions, and were exploited by troops and police overseeing 
adherence to lockdown in informal settlements. The assertion of military 
power and the extension of police rights to punish caused as much 
fear – if not more – than the virus itself.
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Theorising militarisation
In South Africa, as noted above, in order to enforce lockdown, there was 
increased use of police, military and militia deployed from private 
security companies and armed response teams, many of them soldiers 
from civil wars and insurgencies in neighbouring countries. The 
outsourcing to militarised forces to ensure public health compliance, 
rather than to social or healthcare workers, centralised state power and 
consolidated the uneven distribution of force along the lines of class and 
race. Likewise, it deepened fear in the social context of collective grief, 
loss and growing hunger and unemployment. The 1.5-metre rule of 
interaction and social distance became a mnemonic of risk and its 
embodiment in race and class. Such is the dystopic if not myopic landscape 
of COVID-19.
The rationale for military engagement is perhaps obvious yet it 
is useful, for our purposes, to reiterate this. The military is a highly 
organised and tightly regimented institution – a ‘total institution’ (Goffman 
1961) – comprising a large number of people trained to operate without 
question, as part of a group, in unpredictable, volatile and dangerous 
settings. The scenarios of future violence for which defence forces are 
trained include terrorism with highly technical weaponry that might 
include chemical and biological warfare, explosive devices, and armed 
drones and guided missiles, and, on the other hand, low intensity and low-
technology warfare such as that characteristic of recent civil wars and 
episodic resistance in countries in southern and central Africa, including 
Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, DR Congo and Rwanda. Many of the 
troops and security officers involved in enforcing lockdown have had 
experience in such settings. South African soldiers are also trained to work 
alongside civilian entities in disaster management, including to rescue 
affected populations, reduce population risk and run disaster management 
centres. The laws that define these roles were invoked in 2020 to meet the 
emergent needs of taming and containing the pandemic.2
Contemporary democracies, including South Africa after apartheid, 
are meant to balance the lives of individuals and families with the 
collective interests related to social, economic and public life. Habermas 
(1975), among other theorists, has argued that by protecting contempo- 
rary democracy, the public sphere allows for mediation between family 
and the state, in ways that might temper the arbitrary exercise of power. 
The methods of governance for this include both formal and informal 
public institutions that enable debate, dissent and consensus. The ensuing 
debates, and power and authority, flow through political parties and 
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parliamentary processes, trade unions and associations, and different 
structures of authority (including those associated with formal religion 
and traditional authority structures). The media, which in South Africa 
has a strong tradition and enduring practice of directly engaging in public 
life, also plays a significant role in governance in civil society. But the state 
also controls the military (excluding those militarised states where the 
reverse is true) and exercises power through it. COVID-19 has empowered 
the military in many contexts to reassert state domination over civilian 
populations under the guise of protection and care, while the military has 
taken advantage of the virus to subvert attempts to protest against and 
address systemic injustices and human rights abuses. COVID-19, like 
other global pandemics, has laid bare the myth of democracy as outlined 
by Habermas (1975). Let us take this moment to revisit the patriarchal 
and racist foundations of democracy as established by an elite class of 
white men to the exclusion of all others (Pateman 1989), and we will be 
better equipped to understand the uneven distribution of care in societies 
masquerading as egalitarian.
In South Africa after apartheid, the political rights of all people 
were guaranteed in the constitution, one of the most liberal, and clear, 
worldwide. The judicial system was established to assess claims between 
individuals and communities or groups in the private sphere, and to 
establish justice where points of contestation existed between specific 
populations and the state. At the core of these structures and the 
principles that underlie them are ideas of public good and the role of 
the state to ensure this. The legitimacy of a welfare state, even with a 
truncated active contribution to welfare, derives from its capacity to 
protect civil liberty and allow for democratic debate, protect the general 
population against sectarian interests (while allowing, within limits, their 
articulation consistent with commitment to democracy) and to provide a 
range of services essential for everyday life. The mandate to ensure and 
protect public health derives from this: specific state entities have a 
responsibility to guarantee conditions of public safety and wellbeing, 
including through the provision of infrastructure and services. These 
change with time. At present, they might include potable water, electricity, 
drainage, sewerage and garbage collection, and adherence to environ- 
mental and occupational health and building standards, although not 
all of these exist in all places, and although what is considered an 
infrastructural right might also change (clean energy, for example). 
Public health includes these services insofar as breaches in these areas 
might indirectly or directly infringe on health, as has been long 
documented in the case of bacterial disease outbreaks. In certain 
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circumstances, the capacity of the state to maintain these conditions is 
undermined, as might occur in the case of an extreme weather event such 
as flood or drought or unprecedented local disaster (an explosion in 
a crowded inner city area, for instance, or a fire in a high-rise block or 
tearing through a suburb). Under such conditions, one can imagine the 
value of a reserve army of workers, as a defence force not engaged in 
active warfare might be regarded. How an army might be deployed in the 
case of infectious disease not transmitted as a result of the breakdown of 
infrastructure or social structure is less obvious. The use of the military in 
previous epidemics, not in South Africa but elsewhere on the continent – 
as occurred with Ebola – suggests that states are prepared to use 
exceptional measures under exceptional circumstances and to suspend 
usual protocol, as mandated by the constitutional responsibility of a state 
to declare an emergency. The coronavirus pandemic was one such 
moment.
In this context, discussion and debate about lockdown did not relate 
to options, but were centrally concerned with the threat of escalating 
infection and its venality. This extended to talk-back radio sessions on the 
implications of closing institutions, to the way in which isolation might 
impact on everyday life, to risks for specific activities. A week before the 
initial lockdown, one of us (LM) led a 90-minute webinar and Q & A session 
with the Institute of Plumbing South Africa, with hundreds of workers 
sharing computers and cell phones at service points and workshops to 
discuss the risks of infection as a result of using portable toilets on building 
sites, or accepting calls to attend to plumbing problems at people’s homes. 
These media, word of mouth, WhatsApp, Facebook and press reports all 
allowed for the travel of information, of variable quality, about viral risk, 
spread and encounters, in ways that facilitated citizen’s engagement in and 
reinforced the lively quality of South Africa’s democratic institutions.
However, perhaps influenced by a rising mood of fear and anxiety, 
there was limited discussion of the ways that state acts of care – 
instantiated by advice about social distancing and hand washing and 
institutionalised through strictly enforced lockdown – might affect 
different populations. Although radio, television and social media provide 
venues for critical and oppositional voices in South Africa, these were 
unevenly distributed, and the most vocal concerns about lockdown 
related to monetary impact – an inevitability as the economy shuttered 
– and paid relatively limited attention to those whose lives were already 
precarious. With the easing of restrictions across the country there was 
an easing of draconian measures to curb the virus, but the easing of the 
military and police response was also attributed to ordinary citizens and 
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activist journalists who rendered visible the violence of the state and the 
deepening of chaos at a moment that called for epistemic and ethical 
generosity.
Ebola occurred, as anthropologists illustrated, in the context of 
highly fragmented societies where the ghosts of colonial domination 
seeped into the management of bodies and communities during the crisis 
(Parker, et al. 2019; Sams, et al. 2017). In South Africa, with its specific 
history of militarisation, the response to COVID-19 was remarkably if 
uncomfortably accommodated, even as questions of race, racism and 
structural violence gained purchase. It was tolerated too despite the 
assumed impossible return of apartheid era curfews, lockdowns and the 
use of the military to contain populations and the movement across 
(internal) borders (Levine 2020).
The upscaling deployment of police and militia to urban and rural 
South Africa distorts the temporal imaginary of the past as it animates the 
present. The collapse of linear time is best indexed by Derrida’s illuminating 
idea of ‘hauntology’, where the ghosts of the past enflesh the present 
(see Davis 2005). In South Africa, the specific history of militarisation to 
impose apartheid and enact gross human rights abuses might suggest that 
this response would be intolerable. And yet, the mass use of surveillance 
technologies to enforce COVID-19 lockdown regulations and curfews in 
South Africa, as elsewhere, seem largely to have been tolerated to a far 
greater extent than might be anticipated, with limited capacity to oppose 
these measures when set against the immediate threat of viral invasion and 
its effects on human lives. The increased presence of force, via the bodies of 
armed security guards, police and soldiers, consolidated fear along the 
lines of class and race, and sharpened the fear of the consequences of 
disease in terms of growing hunger, unemployment and localised violence. 
Without addressing questions of inequality, South Africa is likely to 
face similar problems in containing future unfolding crises in health and 
wellbeing. The uncomfortable trinity of class, race and gender remains 
in South Africa – as elsewhere – a prism through which an ontology of 
inequality surfaces at different intersectional axes, each of which requires 
further elaboration with the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic.
Enforcing isolation
The initial and continued lockdowns depended, increasingly, on 
enforcement. The informal settlements of South Africa, the slums of 
Mexico and the favelas of Brazil have long been characterised by gun rule 
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and the venal power of street gangs, but in mid-2020, these spaces were 
equally sites of soldiers and police, using terror and the occasional display 
of force to maintain social distancing, curfews and isolation. In South 
Africa, on 26 March, 2,820 soldiers were mobilised to work with police to 
enforce Stage 5 lockdown and its strict regulations to stave off catastrophic 
levels of infection and death (Anon 2020). On 22 April 2020, 73,180 
regular, reserve and auxiliary personnel of the South African National 
Defence Force were deployed for nine weeks – until 26 June – in an 
operation that cost around 4.5 billion rand (US$2.4 million). Even before 
this decision, anecdotal accounts of unnecessary and at times gratuitous 
use of force and police brutality were emerging; troops dressed in army 
fatigues, in military formation, weapons at the ready, descended on 
townships to disperse populations and enforce shelter in place. Local 
municipalities commissioned armoured personnel carriers – the Casspirs, 
Buffels and Hippos used to repress black populations under apartheid – to 
round up people without homes and reinforce lockdown.3 People who 
were homeless in Johannesburg and Pretoria were rounded up and 
confined in sports stadiums and ovals. By late April, armed soldiers, 
municipal police, private security forces (including former militia) and 
national park rangers were being deployed to ‘fight’ the virus by fighting 
those at risk of infection. The war on COVID-19 was claimed to be one of 
the largest army deployments in the country’s history. Consistent eye-
witness accounts and reports of police brutality and abuse went beyond 
the levels of violence, already endemic, that mimic the enforcement of 
law as applied to race and place under apartheid, and that continue to the 
present as reactions to and a result of extreme inequality, deprivation and 
xenophobia. While not on the same scale as apartheid era violence, and 
with very different political groups in power, the muscle memory of 
militia deployment and the unapologetic abuse of police power signals 
the distinct failure of South Africa’s democratic transition to upturn the 
ghosts of apartheid. The Marikana massacre for instance, in 2012, left 42 
mine workers dead after then President Jacob Zuma ordered police to 
shoot at unarmed mine workers who were fighting for a living wage. 
Rather than an ethics of care in the face of grave adversity, the mining 
tycoon resorted to apartheid-era murder. The elasticity of history keeps 
looping back to this default response rather than more imaginative, or at 
the very least, less violent approaches to deploying care in time of crisis.
The confluence of science, medicine and the army is not new; direct 
links between the military and medical and surgical practice are well 
established historically and in the present (Chua 2018; Cooter et al. 1999; 
Harrison 2001; Pickstone 1992; Terry 2017). The matrix of South Africa’s 
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response to COVID-19 follows the use of police to enforce vaccination 
during the 2009 avian flu epidemic in Malawi (Sambala and Manderson 
2017; 2018); the earlier use of surveillance and quarantine as a method 
to stem the spread of HIV/AIDS in Cuba (Scheper-Hughes 1993); and the 
controversial deployment of the military in Liberia during the height of 
the epidemic of Ebola virus disease (EVD) (Aizenman 2020). The Ebola 
epidemic was the largest of its type ever seen, characterised by its rapid 
transmission and terrifying case fatality, with almost 30,000 people 
infected and 11,000 fatalities, mainly in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Kelley Sams and colleagues (2017) point out that this was the first time 
that anthropologists were early involved in relatively large numbers, 
although along predictable lines: to help ensure that public health 
interventions were locally relevant (Wilkinson et al. 2017). The measures 
of militarisation and policing that characterised the response to COVID-
19 – to identify and quarantine cases – were amplified by (and amplified 
the power of) the iatrogenic impact of war metaphors for patients 
surviving or succumbing to illness (Sontag 2001). Further, in the race for 
a vaccine, the United States launched Operation Warp Speed in 
partnership with the US Defence Force and leading virologists. Its mission 
was to defeat the enemy because ‘winning matters … a massive scientific, 
industrial, and logistical endeavor unlike anything our country has seen’ 
(National Public Radio 2020). Since then, the language of war has 
extended to reinvoke Cold War politics, with accusations of biological 
warfare and cyber espionage of scientific research increasingly redolent 
of the 1950s.
At the same time, the global upscaling of troops and other armed 
personnel as frontline forces to combat the spread of coronavirus was 
unprecedented. Far from the lexicon of war as metaphor to describe 
battles against illness, actual militia were tasked with implementing 
lockdown regulations to fight this viral enemy. Armed soldiers and police 
were not the metaphorical fighter cells of the human immune system 
under siege in bodies with HIV (Martin 1994); rather, as already 
described, in South Africa, armed soldiers in camouflage and police with 
masks were tasked to combat the virus by controlling population 
mobility, density and interaction even while equally vulnerable to 
infection. This militarised response was not unique; globally, defence 
forces and technologies were deployed at unprecedented levels to 
combat the spread of coronavirus. The first use of war infrastructure that 
captured global media attention was, arguably, army vehicles carrying 
coffins in Bergamo, Italy, in mid-March, when with hindsight, the number 
of deaths was enviably low. In Malaysia, also in March, army forces with 
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protective face masks joined police to enforce border control and national 
lockdown.4 In the US, some 2,000 defence reserve personnel from 
the National Guard were called up on 19 March, and by 24 March, 9,000 
troops were providing transportation, engineering, and planning and 
logistics, including administering tests and supporting medical personnel, 
as part of state efforts to control the spread of infection (Lengyel 2020). 
Field hospitals were erected to manage expanding caseloads and the need 
for hospitalisation. In Belgrade from 9 July, police used tear gas, armoured 
vehicles and horses to disperse people protesting against renewed 
lockdown conditions implemented in an effort to manage the impact of 
increased cases on Serbia’s health system. In Australia, from early July, 
armed forces were patrolling the highways, truck routes and border 
tracks dividing the states of Victoria, New South Wales and South 
Australia. And over this time, countries worldwide, including those with 
the greatest numbers of infections and others (Peru, Mexico, Chile, India, 
Nigeria, Turkey, UK) militarised their responses to the pandemic. And 
while the rhetoric of the deployment of defence forces has not surprisingly 
tilted towards the care of the public, this ‘care’ has extended to patrol 
stores and protect looting, forcibly transfer people believed to be infected 
to hospital – in Nigeria, for example – and constrain everyday movement. 
In Nigeria, military personnel did not receive training to carry out policing 
functions, and this has been linked to reports of the systematic harassment 
and brutalisation of the population, including the deaths of violators of 
lockdown measures in Lagos, Abuja, Warri and elsewhere in the country 
(Iweze 2020).
The murder of George Floyd by policemen in Minneapolis on 
25 May 2020, and the consequent roll-out of protests across the US and 
worldwide, extended the role of the military; troops increasingly 
complemented armed police to constrain protests against systematic 
racism and violence. The deployment of the military to ‘fight’ coronavirus 
provided states with growing opportunities to demonstrate their capacity 
to exercise physical control over members of the population for political 
as well as biological purposes. At the same time, COVID-19 provided a 
reason (or an excuse) for states to roundup and detain unregistered 
migrants and refugees (e.g. in Malaysia and in South Africa).5 By using 
the military to do this, states illustrated how the war on coronavirus 
might serve a dual purpose: containing viral spread and rooting out 
people, too, who were seen to be undesirable.
Thus the war on coronavirus interlocked with and enabled not a 
war against poverty, but a war against people who were poor. Throughout 
2020, as people were evicted from houses for which they could no longer 
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pay rent, new informal settlements sprang up. Three settlements in the 
Cape Flats, on the periphery of the City of Cape Town – ‘Covid’, ‘Sanitizer’ 
and ‘19’ (as in COVID-19) – are named as wry mnemonics of their history. 
But the tin shacks that people built for shelter were destroyed as quickly 
as they were built, torn down by contract workers and employees of the 
city’s Anti-Land Invasion Unit, donned in riot gear and armed (Reinders 
2020; see Figure 3.1).
The world was already lethal
The murder of George Floyd – suffocated under the force of a police 
officer’s knee – ignited the massification of protestors in cities across the 
United States and, with speed, worldwide. President Donald Trump 
deployed armed forces to disperse peaceful protesters with tear gas and 
rubber bullets in the name of implementing curfew regulations put in 
place to limit the duration of public protest. Outside the White House, 
ostensibly to protect a photo shoot of the president, protestors were 
denied their constitutional right to peaceful protest. Floyd was the latest 
Figure 3.1 Land invasion. On an otherwise quiet Sunday in August, the 
Anti-Land Invasion Unit arrived at the settlement next to the new area 
called Covid, and, without warning to the community, proceeded to tear 
it down. Contract workers employed by the city carried the big pieces of 
tin to two waiting trucks. Photo: Samantha Reinders/NPR
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link in a tragic (and continuing) chain of brutal deaths and injuries 
involving police, again, in the US and worldwide – Australia, United 
Kingdom, France, Belgium, South Africa: Rodney King, Malice Wayne 
Green, Abner Louima, Amadou Diallo, Eric Garner, Michael Brown, 
Freddie Gray, Philando Castile, Ahmaud Arbery and Breonna Taylor, 
among them (Allman 2020; Stott et al. 2020; Taskinsoy 2020). Greater 
public scrutiny of police brutality of Black South Africa began to appear 
on Facebook posts. In a world battling with two forms of breath restriction 
– the suffocating effects of COVID-19 and the ‘I can’t breathe’ movement 
triggered by Floyd’s murder – Black people around the world not only fear 
and die from the virus; they also fear and are killed by security officers 
(see Garth, Chapter 5). Thus the pandemics of racism and COVID-19 are 
aligned and solicit similar militarised responses.
Troops deployed by President Cyril Ramaphosa to maintain the 
nationwide lockdown to contain infection, as described above, were 
extended from an initial three weeks and continued until 30 September. 
As noted, armed private security companies were also granted the right 
to enforce COVID-19 regulations. The police were able – as before – to 
issue fines, and to strong-arm, arrest and remove ‘disobedient’ members 
of the public. As radical new modes of sociality were introduced to 
diminish the wanderlust of the virus and its multiple forms of transmission, 
President Ramaphosa praised the courage, resilience, responsibility and 
sacrifices of ordinary South Africans. He failed, however, to be precise 
about the shape of these sacrifices, and he failed to condemn officers who 
abused their power by contributing to the ‘economy of terror’ that brought 
together the toxic combination of a militarised state apparatus with a 
deathly virus (for a comparison with Haiti, see James 2010).
As noted, deeply reminiscent of curfews that constrained the 
movement of dehumanised populations by criminalising black Africans 
as ‘vagrants’ under apartheid, the police enforced COVID-19 curfews in 
overcrowded areas, especially in informal settlements that lack the most 
basic necessities – always and particularly during COVID-19 – of running 
water, indoor toilets and electricity (Manderson and Levine 2020). The 
Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Nkosaaana 
Dlamini Zuma is partly responsible for the declaration of a curfew that 
became established in law as: ‘Every person is confined to his or her place 
of residence from 8:00 pm until 05:00 am daily, except where a person 
has been granted a permit’. Surveillance technologies returned with the 
ease of muscle memory, and thus the haunting. The pandemic had been 
militarised. An SMS message from a friend living in Athlone – a mostly 
coloured neighbourhood in Cape Town – read:
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My brother in Knysna passed away today at noon due to a stroke. 
The police kept us behind walls. I was even sprayed by pepper spray 
on my way to get airtime … I can’t even go to his funeral, I’m just 
very sad … I couldn’t see for a couple of days because of the pepper 
spray … wish this lockdown was over, but hey I’m not taking any 
chances now, too afraid of the cops and army … A young mom that 
was still breastfeeding was shot on her boob with a rubber bullet, an 
elderly man was shot with a Taser, some people got fines for standing 
behind their gates in their own yards, as much as R1500. Oh my 
God, there’s so much to tell, but my airtime will not make it. … they 
really treat us like animals, and that’s the part the President doesn’t 
see (Mara).
Against the opportunity to radically change South Africa’s default position 
in times of crisis that leans into the logic of militarised force aimed at 
the poor, cities across the country afforded even greater power to law 
enforcement officers. In the Western Cape, the province initially hardest 
hit by the pandemic, the Cape Metro Police were backed by the City of 
Cape Town’s traffic services, the latter reported to operate a ‘heavily 
armed municipal militia’ (Farr and Green 2020). Defence Minister 
Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula justified the use of military force in terms of 
tightening regulations, and to ‘make sure that our people understand 
fully the dangers of getting this virus’. The return of apartheid-era military 
tanks including iconic Casspirs, renamed by the Democratic Alliance 
(DA), the ruling party in the province, as ‘hardened vehicles’ (Farr and 
Green 2020), offers obvious material and symbolic links between the past 
and present moment that continues to violate black lives. This violation 
corroborates videos and stories circulating via social media and personal 
communication of police abuse, killing and humiliation of members of 
the public during national lockdown. This includes most recently the 
eviction of Bulelani Qolani, dragged naked from his shack, which the 
police ripped apart before his eyes (Lali and Stent 2020). Greg Nicolson, 
a journalist with the South African newspaper the Daily Maverick, had 
written, nine weeks earlier: ‘I have a strong feeling that we may see a 
rise in incidents of what we regard as abuse simply because the police and 
the soldiers out there are not quite clear how to enforce the curfew 
arrangements’ (Nicolson 2020).
Reports in local newspapers and social media indicate that whether 
or not the laws and regulations protected people from the virus, or slowed 
its spread, the police and others granted exceptional authority grossly 
abused their power. After Collins Khosa was verbally assaulted by police 
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for standing outside his house, his parents report that police chased him 
into the house, ripped his shirt, broke their door down, swore and fired 
rubber bullets (Lali and Stent, 2020). The racism of criminalisation 
during COVID-19 regulations ricocheted against the tide of global forms 
of dehumanisation captured locally in Collins Khosa’s murder and 
globally in George Floyd’s. In his exceptional reporting on the murder of 
Khosa, Kneo Mokgopa (2020) wrote:
The killing of Floyd sparked global protests under the hashtag, 
‘Black Lives Matter’. The death of George Floyd gathered inter- 
national outrage, including from our own government, and protests 
around the globe. So many of us have tried to figure why it is that 
Collins Khosa’s death, and the litany of other black people killed by 
South African law enforcement, could not ignite the same outrage 
and protests, even within our borders.
Mokgopa’s response to reports that 12 people were killed in the first few 
weeks of lockdown signals that no impoverished person was shocked by 
the fact that in South Africa the police kill more than three times the 
number of people killed by the police in the United States. It instantiates 
Derrida’s idea of hauntology and the normalisation of systemic violence 
that the pandemic revealed. Mokgopa’s conclusion was this:
If you are poor and black your life does not count to this society. It is 
often the state that will come to you with a gun. Your home can be 
destroyed, you can be assaulted, tortured and killed with impunity. 
This is the experience of impoverished people across South Africa. 
Our dignity is continuously vandalised by the state (2020).
Conclusion
In acknowledging the hardship that such extreme measures placed on 
the majority of the population, in April 2020 President Ramaphosa 
announced a ‘500 billion rand (around US$26 billion) package to shore 
up an economy devastated by the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic 
and support those who’ve been worst affected’ (Naidoo 2020). This 
massive relief package was intended to support the economy and 
vulnerable people, in recognition that efforts to contain COVID-19 would 
result in increased homelessness, destitution and mass unemployment. In 
this respect and in terms of scale, COVID-19 was reminiscent of the 1918 
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H1N1 pandemic (the so-called ‘Spanish Flu’), the most devastating 
pandemic of modern times (Philips 2020). Then, a century ago, South 
Africa was one of the five worst-hit parts of the world, with about 300,000 
dead within six weeks. After it had finally ebbed, a doctor reflected in the 
South African Medical Record in January 1919: ‘It has truly been an 
irreparable calamity which has fallen on South Africa’ (Philips 2020).
The 1918 flu was not the only experience of pandemic in South 
Africa. More people have been infected and died from HIV and AIDS 
in South Africa than anywhere else in the world; in 2017, 7.7 million 
people were living with HIV. In the early twenty-first century, under the 
leadership of President Thabo Mbeki, when deaths from AIDS were 
escalating, the police curbed protest action by the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC) demanding access to antiretroviral treatment (Robins 
2004). Looking back, one wonders how infection rates and the immense 
social and individual suffering in Sub-Saharan Africa could have been 
limited if governments had been as pro-active as the present moment 
(Heywood 2009; 2020). And yet with 2020 hindsight, the lockdown has 
only intensified poverty, hunger and unemployment, and led to the 
further curtailment of rights among the country’s most vulnerable 
residents. It has yet to flatten the curve.
A healthcare intervention of the magnitude raised by the South 
African government needed a strong infrastructure based on an economy 
of compassion, not terror. Diseases of poverty including HIV, tuberculosis, 
hypertension and diabetes, plus the additional public health crises of 
gender-based violence, drug and alcohol dependence and food insecurity, 
co-mingle with vices of power, systemic racism and privilege. In the 
context of these multiple layers of vulnerability, the presence of the state 
in the form of curfews and surveillance technologies, however violent and 
punitive, has also been greeted by some as a form of state care and 
concern. Especially among middle and upper class South Africans who 
feared the fates of the US, Italy, the UK, Belgium and other countries with 
waves and second wave spikes, the strong arm approach deployed by the 
president has been largely well received. Unlike the tenor of this general 
praise, for the poor and dispossessed the COVID-19 pandemic was less of 
a rupture than a deepening of social fragility.
Jake Skeets (2020) writes that the world before COVID-19 ‘was 
already lethal’, and that systemic disaster capitalism has diminished the 
possibility of hope, for there is no past to which we would wish to return: 
‘If we yearn for a time before the pandemic, what do we yearn for?’ What 
indeed, do we yearn for? If we could answer this question, it might be 
possible to remake a world beyond COVID. This would be a world that 
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would dismantle the machinery of force that deepens public suffering in 
the face of pandemic. It would fuel modes of care that require the total 
abolition of racial capitalism, and the global forces of colonial pillage that 
render some lives more valuable than others.
Notes
1 In terms of Section 42 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, a South African Citizen has 
the right to arrest the following persons: Trespassers; Persons engaged in an affray (Public 
Fighting); and Persons who he (sic) has a reasonable suspicion have committed a Schedule One 
Offence.
2 South Africa, Disaster Management Act, 2002 (Act no. 57 of 30 December 2002).
3 See this for example: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/02/africa/homeless-community-
south-africa-coronavirus-intl/index.html.
4 There are links here to the police use of pepper balls to disperse people protesting the death of 
George Floyd in Washington DC on 1 June, and the consistent oppositional force to resist 
#BlackLivesMatter protests worldwide.
5 Al Jazeera reporters have been arrested and interrogated and there are reports of sustained 
online abuse (13 July 2020).
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4
Rights, responsibilities and 
revelations
COVID-19 conspiracy theories and the state
Elisa J. sobo and Elz·bieta drąz·kiewicz
This is what Bill Gates and George Soros want to do... Secretly stick 
you with a chip while testing you for the corona virus.... the Dems 
have a bill on the house floor ready to vote on it to require this .... 
House Bill 6666.... no bull.... look it up and WAKE UP !!!! (10 May 
2020, Facebook post showing deeply inserted nasal swab, https://
www.facebook.com/john.barno.1/posts/3216228888396817, 
original punctuation)
When the SARS-CoV-2 virus began its global spread, launching the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the race for a vaccine began. Simultaneously, 
authorities sought to reduce the novel coronavirus’s propagation and 
lower the strain on hospitals and morgues. Around the world, governments 
began regulating not only where people could go and with whom but how 
to dress (with masks and gloves) and behave (no shaking hands, keeping 
2 m distance from each other and so on). As epidemiologists turned to 
intensified contact tracing, private companies and governing bodies 
joined forces to create new technologies for scaling up surveillance, 
including virtual queuing tools, devices warning individuals should they 
get too close to others and contact tracing apps.
All this was discussed daily in households and on social media. In 
many instances, concerns over control, authority, transparency and 
freedom – fuelled by competition between officially sanctioned, expert 
knowledge and popular knowledge – supported the circulation of 
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‘conspiratorial beliefs’. Around the world, fraught discussions ensued 
regarding COVID-19 cover-ups, pandemic geopolitics, bot and humanly 
driven disinformation floods on social media, and reporting bias in 
the press.
The rapid incorporation of COVID-19 into conspiratorial schemes 
worldwide (Freeman et al. 2020; Uscinski and Enders 2020) provides us 
with a useful set of cross-culturally comparable conspiracy theories 
involving the state, and thus a useful lens through which to enhance our 
thinking about how conspiracy theories work as sociocultural critiques – 
and what work they do for those who have built careers or identities 
promoting them, cynically or not (see Bailey 1994). Our project draws on 
ideas propagated in the first two-thirds of 2020. We focus on discourses 
circulated via platforms like Twitter and Facebook within Ireland, Poland 
and the US (where we have worked for many years). With this focus, we 
ask how the 2020 pandemic is loaded onto and used by those with vested 
interests to amplify, in the Global North, structure-agency, governance-
freedom, responsibilities-rights tensions – tensions related to ideal visions 
of and for the state and, ultimately, for justice and liberty. To gain insight, 
we aim our investigation toward so-called conspiracy theories questioning 
state-sponsored health interventions including but not limited to 
vaccination. Because no approved COVID-19 vaccine existed at the time 
of our investigation, the prospect of vaccination provided a particularly 
viable projective screen for existential concerns: it was easily drawn into 
use as evidence for the central claims of those already backing a con- 
spiratorial world view.
We are interested specifically in how, in Ireland, Poland and the 
US, and likely other democratic states, local conditions shape people’s 
reception of, and by extension compliance with, governmental public 
health emergency efforts, and how conspiracy theories come into 
play in the process. We are interested in readings of disease threats 
that connect ‘facts on the ground’ in ways that differ from how 
authorised public health experts would have us connect them – readings 
thereby labelled as ‘conspiracy theories’. After preeminent political 
anthropologist F.G. Bailey, we see this as a competitive process of ‘claim 
and counterclaim … about the way our world is and the way it should 
be’ (1991, 17). Such a focus affords us the opportunity to interrogate 
what COVID-19-related conspiracy theories might accomplish for those 
vested in broadcasting them, and how and why even seemingly similar 
conspiratorial ideas can vary in important local and historically 
particular ways.
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Pandemic sense-making and dissent
We begin by observing that, in conspiratorial theorising, knowledge 
is not an end in itself (Boyer 2006; Briggs 2004). This view lines up with 
general anthropological thinking on knowledge as instrumental – as 
used to interpret and act in the world; consequently, it is not dis- 
tinguishable from culture (Barth 2002; see also Bailey 1991, 17–18). 
Further, theorising about the world does not begin with knowledge 
but with how people know things, and so we must examine the processes 
by which people make connections in a fragmented world, how these 
reflect particular styles of reasoning and what can be known under 
particular historical circumstances (Hastrup 2004). This is especially 
relevant in the context of COVID-19, with all its unknowns and the 
ways these have been exacerbated by the diverse containment, 
communication and transparency strategies adopted by different 
governments.
Today’s pandemic conspiracy theories are less contests regarding 
specific detailed facts (although they may be this overtly) than contests 
regarding values. Adopting Bailey’s vantage, through COVID-19 
conspiracy assertions, communities place their values ‘onto the front 
stage’ for affirmation (1994, 152). Their theories are testimonials to 
deep-rooted understandings about the state’s role in relation to citizens 
and other stakeholders, corporations included.
Such visions of how society should function and of the prerogatives 
and limits of government vary across societies. If conspiracy theories are 
shaped by our worldviews (e.g. Harambam 2020), consequently, even 
when the contents of conspiracy theories appear similar across societies, 
their meanings must differ, at least to some degree.
Using case studies, we interrogate publicly propagated con- 
spiratorial views on vaccination and other public health measures (social 
distancing, contact tracing, testing) related to the present pandemic. The 
anthropologist’s task – the remit of all social theorists, in fact – is to ‘find 
explanation beyond the truth of the events themselves’ (Hastrup 2004, 
468). As Engle-Merry and Coutin (2014) point out, to understand 
conflicts over knowledge we must understand the political dynamics of 
these conflicts – which may remain unseen to those embroiled in them 
(see also Bailey 1994). Taking political context seriously is crucial not 
only to fully grasping what various conspiracy theories have to tell us. 




So-called conspiracy theories are fluid networks of ideas deployed against 
the grain of accepted understandings to argue that specific events do not 
unfold at random or as the secondary fall-out of mundane social processes 
or day-to-day, disinterested bureaucratic decisions. Rather, agents work 
covertly and malevolently backstage, pulling strings. Often, conspiracy 
theories assume that conspirators act to harm others; they operate 
through dichotomous categorisations of ‘us’ vs ‘them’, good vs evil.
Although lay discourse tends to lump them together, disdainfully, 
conspiracy theories vary. Some have little more in common than their 
reliance on suspicions regarding secret operations. Further, conspiracy 
theories may contain multiple individually false claims; or they may 
spuriously connect substantively well-justified ‘facts’. They may stand 
alone, or conjoin, or nest into ‘superconspiracies’ (Barkun 2013). The 
salience of conspiracy theories within group culture and their importance 
for social belonging also varies. Sometimes they are paramount to group 
identity. When such groups are put on the defensive they may close 
ranks; their ideas may become ‘self-sealing’ (Sunstein and Vermeule 
2009, 204). That said, a group’s members can hold richly diverse and 
sometimes contradictory positions in support of the same core concern 
(Harambam 2020).
Medical conspiracies and the state
Much of anthropology’s conspiracy theory-related scholarship has 
appeared in medical anthropology, partly reflecting the subfield’s 
longstanding involvement with health aid flows from the Global North 
to the Global South. Such programmes often provoke concerns related 
to sovereignty, exploitation and social coherence – i.e. perceived ruptures 
in the social contract. When voiced in local idioms these can be read as 
conspiracy theories (see Leach and Fairhead 2007; Fassin 2011).
Many cultures use blood-stealing and organ-thieving stories to 
index how they physically fuel the global economy. International medical 
research in sub-Saharan Africa provides a ‘particularly prolific’ matrix for 
such stories (Geissler and Pool 2006, 975). They express colonial trauma 
and critique both the non-democratic distribution of science’s benefits, 
and the state’s role in supporting this.
Epidemics also implore conspiratorial interpretations where the 
state has historically failed in its duties toward citizens. Take the 2008 
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cholera outbreak in Harare, Zimbabwe. When the government insisted 
that individual behaviour change (better handwashing and food hygiene) 
would stem transmission, residents pushed back. They pointed 
to structural drivers such as the dilapidated water and sanitation 
infrastructure, and condemned various arms of the state for victim-
blaming and corruption. In challenging official discourses, they expressed 
‘an aspirational vision of citizenship based on political rights, social 
recognition, and access to high-quality public services delivered by a 
robust, responsible state’ (Chigudu 2019, 415).
In Venezuela, cholera conspiracy theories directly addressed an 
‘economy of erasure’ in which marginalised populations remained 
unheard (Briggs 2004; see also Mathur 2015). The theories embodied a 
bid to be seen – and a refusal to be reduced, for instance by epidemiology, 
which thrives by ‘turning people into categories and numbers’ (Briggs 
2004, 167). They articulated local–global links in ways that questioned 
the discursive production and segregation of these domains in addition 
to highlighting their state’s failures (p. 175).
Similar insights are seen in ideas regarding HIV/AIDS, widely 
rumoured initially to have been invented for nefarious genocidal 
purposes. State-backed corporate treachery did undergird the pandemic’s 
hold in some ways in some locations, for instance, through machinations 
related to the construction of a dam in Haiti that destroyed various 
communities’ livelihoods, pushing people into HIV-fostering survival 
strategies (Farmer 1992). In Eastern Indonesia, HIV/AIDS-related 
conspiracy theories reflected everyday experiences of ‘inconsistent 
applications of policies, missing information, and omissions in formal 
practice’ and colonisation, militarisation and racialisation in the study 
setting (Butt 2005, 432). South African men’s conspiracy theories in 
Bushbuckridge linked HIV/AIDS-related suspicions to precarity wrought 
by job loss and, more broadly, deindustrialisation, itself subtended by the 
distribution of power and of racism in the globalised economy (Niehaus 
and Jonsson 2005, e.g. 182, 202). Conspiracy theories pervaded US HIV/
AIDS discourses also, in ways similarly linked to social, political and 
economic marginalisation (Sobo et al. 1997).
A waiting matrix
COVID-19 emerged in the context of many already-circulating, 
conglomerate ‘superconspiracies’ (Barkun 2013). For instance, it was 
quickly fitted into, and helped amplify, conspiracy theories circulating 
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regarding the health dangers of 5G networks – themselves rooted in much 
older worries about the profit-minded capitalist promotion of purportedly 
unsafe electromagnetic technologies, and worries about modernity 
itself (Tiffany 2020). 5G’s initial roll-out in China, where COVID-19 was 
identified, seemed proof of a causal link. It also boosted antecedent 
chauvinistic prejudices, which situations of crisis intensify (see Butter and 
Knight 2020; Bovensiepen 2016).
In England, pre-existing anti-Semitic and antimuslim prejudice fed 
belief among 20 per cent of the population that ‘Jews have created the 
virus [SARS-CoV-2] to collapse the economy for financial gain’ and that 
‘Muslims are spreading the virus as an attack on Western values’ (Freeman 
et al. 2020). Likewise, labelling SARS-CoV-2 as the ‘Chinese Virus’ or 
‘Kung Flu’ drew upon already well-established jingoist and racist tropes. 
It also expressed pre-existing geopolitical tensions: as some in the US 
blamed its rival China for covering up a laboratory accident or worse in 
Wuhan, others on social media lauded China for besting the Global North 
via how efficiently they managed the pandemic. In these and related 
narratives, SARS-CoV-2 is cast not as coincidental but as part of larger 
conspiratorial machinations.
In addition to underwriting racist scapegoating and related 
brutalities, COVID-19 conspiracy theories entail other risks. Vaccination 
is, internationally, the desired ‘magic bullet’ in the fight against SARS-
CoV-2. However, given that, for instance, about one in five members of a 
representative sample of English adults surveyed believe this vaccine ‘will 
be used to carry out mass sterilization’ or ‘will contain microchips to 
control the people’ (Freeman et al. 2020), mass vaccination promises to 
prove an uphill battle. (The vaccine rollout, which began well after this 
chapter was written, has, in fact, been challenged by those who question 
its ultimate aims; e.g. Sobo 2021.)
Contested expertise
The dominant way for establishment experts to deal with conspiracy 
theories is to try to ‘debunk’ them, often ineffectively. A rich social science 
literature explains that ‘debunking’ disregards people’s extant knowledge 
(e.g. Leach and Fairhead 2007). Further, enhanced communications 
and computing technologies now support a subjective ‘incredulity 
toward metanarratives’ or ‘grand narratives’ (Lyotard 1984; Vine and 
Carey 2017). The technocultural environment of the internet intensifies 
the situation further in the Global North by democratising the 
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‘knowledge-power hierarchy’ (Kirmayer et al. 2013, 180), reinforcing 
expert-doubting overconfidence in one’s capacities for discernment.
How this plays out varies across nations. In the US, for instance, 
idealised distaste for any concentration of power (Fenster 2008), an 
emphasis on free thinking, and the sanctity of free choice further deepen 
distrust of authority. The good citizen does not follow blindly. This 
is further supported in the realm of healthcare by institutionalised 
requests that patients self-educate and ask providers questions regarding 
treatment options, and the doubt-sustaining demand that patients (now, 
‘consumers’) consent to and assume the risks even of biomedically-
indicated procedures.
The debunking approach to conspiracy theories and other dissenting 
knowledge does sometimes work, for example, for hypocognised 
problems or those not already freighted with cultural meaning. But 
COVID-19 was for most people immediately associated with prior 
epidemic diseases, including not just HIV/AIDS and H1N1 influenza but 
the first SARS-COV panic (2003–04). Further, COVID-19 is characterised 
by a much higher degree of indeterminacy.
The uncertainty regarding specific origins, successful cures, 
prevention measures and risk for transmission expressed within the 
scientific community is exacerbated in the public mind by conflicting 
messages from different health authorities (regarding interactions with 
ibuprofen, who is vulnerable, etc.) – and from national and regional 
leaders. Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko has touted washing 
with, and drinking, vodka as a cure; in the US Donald Trump has promoted 
hydroxychloroquine, a drug approved for malaria and rheumatoid arthritis; 
officials in Bolivia have distributed ivermectin, an anti-parasite drug, as an 
ostensible cure. None of these recommendations have authorised science’s 
endorsement (O’Grady 2020). A good example of the doubt-reinforcing 
confluence of varied advice was seen in the dilemma masks posed for the 
public as the pandemic took hold (wear them, don’t wear them, use special 
ones, homemade is fine, only health services professionals should wear 
them, etc.).
Negotiating boundaries between bogus and genuine claims is 
typical of the work done by people exploring alternative or dissenting 
perspectives (Pelkmans and Machold 2011; Mathur 2015). The plethora 
of positions the public has been provided by the state and others regarding 
COVID-19 supports doubt; doubt creates discomfort (Pelkmans 2013). 
Yet, an erosion of trust in authoritative and scientific knowledge does not 
extinguish the ‘will to truth’ (Aupers 2012). On the contrary, it opens a 
space for alternative forms of knowing. Lay investigation flourishes in 
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publics already convinced of their own discernment and primed to 
express this by an ethos of wariness of expertise, and with reference to the 
oppositional forces of local and global governance, and of agency and 
structure.
Accordingly, COVID-19 conspiracy theories ask universally: what 
are governments trying to do through COVID-19? What information are 
governments hiding? What are they revealing? Why? And who is behind 
it all? Who profits? We explore some answers below, bearing in mind that 
beyond the theories described sit those vested in their propagation – 
those who leverage them as evidence of a priori claims, profiting 
themselves in various ways in the process.
New viral loadings: leveraging pandemic  
conspiracy theories
To explore the critiques of power conspiracy theories entail, and how they 
are deployed, we present three case studies. In each, interested parties 
actively characterised the pandemic counterfactually, for their own 
advantage.
ireland: rejecting foreign rule and state corruption
Irish people expressing conspiratorial views on the pandemic questioned 
whether the risk was as severe as the authorities suggested. Many applied 
neologisms popular in the English-speaking world such as ‘plandemic’ or 
‘scamdemic’ to suggest premeditated duplicity. For example, in May, 
member of parliament Mattie McGrath used this construction to imply 
that the lockdown regulations negatively affecting the Irish economy 
were a scam benefiting foreign corporations:
It’s a joke at this stage. We need to move on and get back to work. 
We are now at the stage where instead of having a pandemic it’s 
becoming a scamdemic. Big businesses, the likes of [foreign 
superstores] Tesco and Aldi, and all the big places are flying, but all 
the small stores, small businesses, small retailers, they are being 
squeezed out of it by the two-metre social distancing. It just makes 
things totally unworkable (Farrell and Mooney 2020).
Gemma O’Doherty, once a celebrated investigative journalist, now best 
known for her fringe right-wing views and anti-vaccine statements, took 
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a similar stance. O’Doherty is a founder of Anti-Corruption Ireland, 
which she defines as a ‘formation devoted to ending this toxic culture 
of corruption that is ripping our republic to shreds’. Her agenda includes 
the ‘fight against the threat of globalism’ and its risk to ‘national 
sovereignty, cultural and natural heritage, and endangering our inde- 
pendence’. Through social media, O’Doherty repeatedly implied that use 
of existing vaccines correlated with the COVID-19 death rate, and that 
COVID-19 vaccines would pose risks too when introduced. One of her 
widely circulated flyers claimed that ‘Covid19 is no more serious than the 
flu’, and that because ‘we don’t close the economy for [flu] and never 
quarantine the healthy … social distancing is fraudulent’ (O’Doherty 
2020a). In a leaflet, she argued:
The state’s draconian reaction to Covid19 has nothing to do 
with protecting health. It’s an orchestrated ploy to implement the 
final phase of totalitarian ‘one world’ governance. This is the core 
objective of UN Agenda 2030, a plan to destroy nation states 
and depopulate our planet. It is also known as the New World Order. 
The State is forcing citizens to give up their fundamental rights, 
freedoms, and privacy using: orweallian [sic] surveillance via 
carcinogenic 5G, DNA-Altering mandatory vaccines, cashless 
society, control of media/end free speech (O’Doherty 2020b).
O’Doherty and her followers often share and recycle Twitter and Facebook 
posts originating elsewhere, and other conspiracy theory proponents 
around the world return the favour. However, conspiratorial views 
propagated by O’Doherty and her followers are more than recycled 
internationally circulating tropes. While almost every conspiracy theory 
propagated during the pandemic expresses concern over a loss of 
freedom, in Ireland this view resonates particularly strongly with the 
colonial legacy of, and national sentiments rooted in, the conflict with 
Britain (Moore and Sanders 2002). The painful memory of brutal foreign 
rule was particularly visible in the arguments made by O’Doherty and 
John Waters when they legally challenged Ireland’s lockdown restriction, 
in the High Court, in April and May 2020. Their supporters perceived 
their actions as protective of the freedoms of Irish people. Those lauding 
O’Doherty’s and Waters’ legal efforts often spoke of them as courageous 
patriots ready to fight corrupt politicians and countering state efforts to 
suppress citizens. Frequently, they would draw parallels between the 
1922 Irish civil war and the pandemic situation, describing the fight 
against lockdown measures as participation in the unfinished revolution. 
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O’Doherty and Waters, in their court statements and in public 
communications at the time, frequently referenced the new COVID-19 
situation as ‘the police state’. On 28 April, at the height of the court case 
dispute, O’Doherty tweeted, ‘The words Irish and freedom are inextricably 
linked. No people fought harder for it throughout history than us. We’re 
not going to give it away now to an unhinged police mob, an unelected 
government and their #fakenews who shamed themselves again today 
#LockdownIreland #Covid19’ (O’Doherty 2020c).
In other communications, O’Doherty referred to Irish police (the 
Garda Síochána) as Gestapo or Nazi forces, and criticised COVID-19 laws 
that allowed for armed Gardaí at COVID-19 checkpoints. In Ireland, such 
use of force resonates specifically with memories of the colonial state and 
the brutal policing exercised by the British to control the Irish population 
(as one response, when the Garda Síochána was formed in 1923, it was 
purposefully primarily unarmed). When Irish conspirationists evoke the 
police state, they not only prey upon general concerns over the loss of 
freedom, but specifically Irish sentiments and fears.
In her pandemic communications, O’Doherty often referenced an 
‘unelected government’ that is supposedly inflating death rates to frighten 
the public while using mass immigration to make the Irish a minority. 
For some, an ‘unelected government’ might refer to international 
organisations. In the Irish context, however, the phrase had additional 
inward-facing meaning.
Just before COVID-19 hit Ireland, in February 2020 parliamentary 
elections had been a three-way race, in which Sinn Féin, a left-wing party, 
received the most first-preference votes it had received since the 1970s. 
This was a big blow for the two dominant centre-right parties: Fine Gael 
(the governing party, led by Leo Varadkar), which came in third, and 
Fianna Fáil, which came in second. The votes clearly showed dissatisfaction 
with the establishment. However, before a new government was formed, 
infection began to spread. Emergency legislation was enacted by the 
outgoing rather than the incoming Senate, and state governance 
remained in the hands of Varadkar. In response, conspirationists such as 
O’Doherty and Waters cast COVID-19 as a plot to allow ‘the establishment’ 
to remain in power, disregarding the election’s results. In line with this 
logic, the (old) government misled people into believing that their 
immune systems could not deal with the virus: it enforced a very strict 
lockdown, and introduced emergency laws (according to conspirationists) 
to ‘buy more time’ in power.
Seemingly universal conspiracy theories gain traction when they 
amplify or provide a fitting explanation for a story already being told 
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locally. In the Irish context, resonance with the specific political situation 
coincident to the pandemic’s outbreak fuelled their appeal.
Poland: retaining democratic desires
On 24 June 2020, six months into the pandemic and just days before the 
Polish presidential election, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda made an 
official visit to Washington, DC. During the live broadcast of this bilateral 
meeting, Polish national television announced: ‘Poland will be the first 
country that will be supplied by the USA with the coronavirus vaccine’. 
Given that this news came to Duda from Donald Trump, and was 
propagated by state-owned media managed by Duda supporters, its 
veracity was hard to assess. However, it was immediately picked up by 
‘scamdemic’-endorsing social media channels. On 25 June, a member of 
Facebook’s Nie wierzę w Koronawirusa – Grupa wsparcia/NIE JESTEŚ Sam 
(I don’t believe in Coronavirus – Support group/YOU ARE NOT ALONE), 
to which over 93,000 people belong, asked, ‘I gdzie będą pierwsze testy?’ 
(‘and where will they do initial testing?’). Answering herself, she implied 
Poland. Other members quickly echoed her concerns, suggesting 
sarcastically that their reward for friendship with the US was to be first in 
line for this. Interlocutors agreed that, just as during the world wars, the 
Polish nation would become a battlefield for all empires and ‘mięso 
armatnie’ (cannon fodder) for the more powerful, who would force Polish 
citizens to receive vaccinations experimentally. Associating Duda with 
the ‘Jewish lobby’, some concluded that this was retaliation for when, in 
2009, the country refused to buy vaccines from Big Pharma corporations 
(Nie wierzę w Koronawirusa 2020).
The views expressed by this group’s members (mostly followers 
of alt-right presidential candidate Krzysztof Bosak, who was running 
against Duda) resemble the superconspiracies discussed above, their 
threads weaving pandemic worries into well-rehearsed anti-Semitic and 
Big Pharma tropes. However, as in the Irish case, here, too, ‘universal’ 
ideas need, for traction, to resonate with locally rooted sentiments 
and already-internalised culturally specific tropes. The Polish people 
endured struggles for independence from Russia, Prussia and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in the nineteenth century, from Fascist Germany and 
the Soviet Union during World War II, and from Communism in the 
1940s–80s. These tropes are highly relevant to Bosak’s followers.
However, conspiracy theories can be utilised by actors on all 
sides of the political spectrum when a nation is entangled in political 
rivalry, as is Poland: divided societies are particularly susceptible to 
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conspiratorial thinking. Conspiracy theories help to simplify complex 
histories, enabling people to make sense of constant political changes 
and diverse perspectives (Boyer 2006). When a proliferation of groups 
occurs, and differences between factions are subtle and mostly entail 
boundary-making, conspiracy theories become central to identity, 
keeping group members alert to opponents’ manipulations (Moore and 
Sanders 2002).
These processes are visible in the ways in which Poland’s private 
media expressed concerns over governmental mismanagement of the 
pandemic. A recurring theme of their criticism was that the ‘state is 
purposely hiding the numbers’ to enhance its chances of winning the 
elections, in part by lifting the lockdown quickly. The state’s rush to run 
elections at a time when health risks were still high only enhanced public 
suspicion of its motives.
The idea that the government was hiding the truth behind a façade 
caught on strongly. Healthcare professionals attested that unreliable 
COVID-19 counts simply reflected systematic failures and insufficiencies 
of the country’s healthcare system. Regardless, the theory that ‘the 
Government is lying to us’ and ‘hiding the truth’ propagated in private 
media. It never was labelled as paranoid thinking in the way that alt-right 
candidate Bosak’s followers’ theories were labelled as such: conspiratorial 
ideas voiced by the opponents of the ruling party have retained their 
status as a justified form of political criticism.
Humphrey (2003) argues that, in the post-socialist Eastern 
European and Central Asian region, omnipresent conspiratorial thinking 
and a culture of suspicion is justified given the high number of actual 
conspiracies experienced in the last century (see also Carey 2017). The 
fact that a government with a known history of abusing democracy was 
managing this pandemic made many conspiratorial accusations highly 
plausible. However, the deep lack of trust in the Polish state is not just a 
result of this reality (Drążkiewicz 2016). It inheres in the political 
philosophy that underwrote Poland’s post-1989 political culture – a 
philosophy born out of the struggle against communism and built on the 
assumption that true democracy cannot be realised in and by the state. 
This ideology presumes that government is the enemy of the people and 
so should never be trusted. Although since 1989 the government has 
changed often, Polish suspicion towards authority abides regardless of 
who is in power. In this context critical questions and theories that might 
be labelled as conspiracy theories are given space as a valid form of 
political engagement.
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us: shoring up a dream
In the US, well-known tropes also are in play, but here they are linked to 
the crumbling American Dream of self-built prosperity, and to concerns 
regarding the freedoms meant to support it. Well before COVID-19, 
employment and wages for the US masses were declining. The notable 
uptick in suicides and drug and alcohol-related deaths among college-
educated Whites, a demographic once favoured for economic mobility if 
not stability, demonstrates pervasive anxiety about achieving the 
American Dream (Krause and Sawhill 2018).
The nation’s failure to protect citizens from predatory lenders 
(which led to the 2008 foreclosure crisis and subsequent recession) 
coupled with ‘government bailouts’ meant to shore up corporate wealth 
catalysed increasing cynicism regarding once-trusted institutions. The 
internet enabled disheartened citizens to engage with each other in ways 
heretofore impossible (see ‘contested expertise’, above). Yet as Bailey 
notes, culture entails ‘lies that make life possible’ through their capacity 
to both legitimise actions and ‘neutralize despair’ (1994, 4). So, rather 
than questioning the American Dream as myth, which would mean giving 
up on the prospect, many citizens found it more satisfying to blame their 
downward mobility on ‘bad apples’, favouring the proposition that a few 
(very powerful) bad actors in positions of power barred them from 
‘success’. This perspective fuelled populist desire for leadership from 
beyond ‘the establishment’.
Enter Donald Trump, a self-proclaimed self-made man promising 
to ‘drain the swamp’ – the US federal government – of said bad actors 
(Bierman 2018). To gain followers, Trump courted and received the 
endorsement of an ‘alternative media’ superstar, far-right extremist and 
conspiracy theory monger Alex Jones. The ethos of suspicion long held 
strongly at the fringes of US society ripened with Trump’s candidacy, 
throughout which he encouraged distrust of science and of the mainstream 
press. His presidency brought the phrases ‘alternative facts’ and ‘fake 
news’ squarely into the national and then international lexicon (see 
Glassner 2018) as he encouraged his base to blame downward mobility on 
those previously in power (the Democrats), and their elite allies.
Then, in 2017, an anonymous source purportedly named after the 
letter by which the government designates those with access to restricted 
information – Q – gained a following after bringing to light news of 
Trump’s secret struggle on America’s behalf to overthrow a ‘deep state’ 
during a soon-coming ‘storm’ or ‘great awakening’. Q’s proselytisers 
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(Jones included) use religious tropes and deploy in-group/out-group 
rhetoric to foster a sense of social belonging among adherents, who form 
a loose community active on social media. This millennialist conspiracy 
cult – QAnon – casts itself as a patriotic vanguard doing work of historic 
significance. It seems to appeal most to individuals feeling somewhat 
isolated or otherwise struggling (LaFrance 2020; Roose et al. 2020).
The vigilantism of a few acolytes aside, most adherents use the 
internet to do their own research into the often-cryptic messages Q 
‘drops’, seeking to connect otherwise disparate dots. For instance, after 
a White House pandemic briefing on 14 March 2020, spurred by 
‘scamdemic’-type suspicions, some drew a connection between Trump’s 
necktie colour choice (yellow) and the maritime flag signalling system, 
asserting that Trump thereby proclaimed the pandemic a hoax.
Amidst ideas circulating, some singled out White House coronavirus 
task force member Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, as a deep state pawn. In this scenario, 
Fauci’s contradiction of some of Trump’s statements signalled his 
disloyalty (QAnon had already cast Fauci as a traitor, linking him to 
Hillary Clinton; LaFrance 2020). In addition to mounting calls to fire 
Fauci, some undertook a short-lived campaign to display hospitals as 
empty, despite media reports to the contrary (Nguyen 2020).
As Trump moved to ‘reopen’ the US economy ‘by Easter’ (12 April 
2020), Fauci continued urging caution. His requests for social distancing, 
face masks and so on were seen by denialists as direct, tyrannical threats 
to various civil liberties, including not just the right to make a living in 
industries ordered shut, but how to live. Beginning in mid-April, anti-
lockdown protests led by pre-existing right-wing militias (Wilson 2020) 
began in various states. Resentments were fitted into antecedent 
conspiracy theories regarding the state’s ulterior motives. Further, in 
keeping with the way conspiracy theories function to affirm discernment, 
rally attendees self-identified as knowing the truth: the masses were 
being duped so that others could profit.
And here is a thread we wish to pull vigorously: a concern with 
corporate nefariousness, giving expression to a US-specific need for 
sustaining faith in one’s chances to attain the American Dream despite 
increasing wealth inequity. Trump’s base, cultivated from among the 
disaffected, preserves an imagined ladder to self-made success through 
faith in his leadership (not coincidentally, at his election convention 
Trump promised to ‘save the American Dream’). In part from this loyalty, 
simultaneous to anti-lockdown protests, rumours linking Fauci to Big 
Pharma bourgeoned. But there was more to it than that. Fauci sees 
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COVID-19 squarely through the lens of authorised science – a lens 
discounted by Trump’s base and consistently pelleted with ‘alternative 
facts’ by others drawn to conspiracy theories. Moreover, Fauci argues, 
again pointing to science, that COVID-19 will be vaccine preventable. 
This simple contention expanded the anti-Fauci, anti-lockdown faction, 
providing a dog whistle for so-called anti-vaxxers.
Although some would stereotype anti-vaxxers as liberals who favour 
alternative medicine, alternative schools and expensive organic food, a 
good proportion are fundamentalist homeschoolers and survivalists 
undesiring of any interaction with the state. Others are part of Trump’s 
base. Beyond vaccination’s purported health risks (which Trump has 
endorsed), these citizens worry that vaccine mandates disregard civil 
liberties – and many believe that they do so in support of profits for 
Big Pharma, in whose shadow the government works. In many minds, 
Big Pharma itself underwrote the creation and spread of SARS-CoV-2, or 
at least exaggerated its dangers, specifically to sell vaccines. Fauci, along 
with Bill Gates and others, supposedly invested in vaccines and so stands 
to profit immensely. Conjoined to this story is worry that vaccines will 
introduce into the body microchips to monitor the population and, in 
some renditions, sap free will.
Seeing common cause, anti-vaxxers not normally associated with 
Trump’s vocal base have been motivated to speak up. As they do, it 
becomes clear that the liberal–conservative dichotomy is false. For one 
thing, both factions would replace the anti-vax label, and the extremism 
it implies, with a focus on informed choice. Both see themselves as 
freedom fighters. Both see Big Pharma as out to get ‘us’, its interest in 
profits potentially opening a door to mandatory vaccination or even to 
vaccine-fuelled enslavement by authoritarian states or a global regime. 
Although each group is somewhat differently anchored in terms of a 
priori social networks, and although the right-wing #FireFauci, ‘reopen 
America’ mandate is ultimately broader than that of the vaccination 
rights or the ‘health/medical freedom’ contingent, current confluences 
in their discourses illustrate how conspiracy theories are leveraged. 
They reveal how alt-right messaging is being deployed by an ‘alt’ alt-right 
– one for which personal freedoms, self-determination and anti-
authoritarianism, are likewise more important than the social good writ 
large. In Krugman’s words, for them, ‘freedom’ references a right to ‘the 
untrammeled pursuit of self-interest’ or ‘sacralized selfishness’ (2020).
Similarities don’t stop there. Like many of QAnon’s prominent 
proponents, many ‘wellness entrepreneurs’ promoting ‘medical freedom’ 
also have built enviable fortunes via conspiracy mongering, for instance 
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through goods and services sold on their websites. Coming together to 
protest state handling of COVID-19 gives all parties access to crossover 
markets (Breland 2020; Satija and Sun 2019). As a key driver of success, 
avarice is a virtue, not a sin, so long as everyone is equally free to take a 
piece of the pie.
Big Pharma, in contrast, is cast in this narrative as wanting the pie 
for itself. Further, Big Pharma is seen as posing as if the final authority 
while, given their emphasis on self-sovereignty, those fusing anti-vax 
interests onto anti-lockdown rhetoric encourage followers to ‘do their 
homework’ and make up their own minds. Encouragement toward self-
education also flows forth from many mainstream US organisations, 
including some corners of orthodox healthcare: savvy consumerism and 
self-determination are that central to US national consciousness. So are 
the concerns regarding corporate duplicity leveraged in conspiracy 
theories. These themes are played to different effect by different factions, 
but their deployment from all sides should not be surprising, given their 
cultural salience.
The world as seen through this conspiracy theory lens ‘is not some 
bizarre parallel universe’ (LaFrance 2020). It is the same universe in 
which most Americans live, shaped by and reinforcing of the national 
ethos. What appears as one conspiracy theory on the surface may contain 
several versions of something proximally the same, but different in terms 
of the ends desired and the lifestyles represented. When surface fusion 
brings separate interest groups closer to their aims, conjoined action will 
not represent a compromise.
Implications
The above conspiracy theories point to perceived ruptures in the social 
contract, sometimes directly articulating ideas regarding what that 
contract should be (‘normative rules’, as per Bailey; also, a collusive lie 
[1991, 35]). Social and political tensions inform these anxious counter-
narratives in ways that ‘put [political] relations to the test’ (Fassin 2011, 
48), giving voice to a demand to mend those tears in the social fabric or 
flouted rules that make the world feel unjust.
But the case studies showed more than political contests. They also 
spoke to political anthropology’s concern with how ‘true-believers’ 
persuade others to forego reason and follow a ‘jack o’lantern’ (Bailey 
2008, 5): crafting messages that resonate generatively with people’s 
locally specific governance-related anxieties is central here (see Lepselter 
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2016). Health – being essential, fragile and fickle – serves exceedingly 
well as a projective screen for such concerns. The theories deployed in our 
case studies also gained leverage through their enmeshment with pre-
existing superconspiracies (e.g. regarding Big Pharma, the Deep State).
This was no coincidence. Not only does history matter to a 
conspiracy’s appeal (see Ryer 2015); known conspiracy theory advocates 
took an active role in ensuring the absorption of COVID-19-linked ideas 
into pre-existing frameworks, elaborating and endorsing the newer 
ideas as further evidence of prior claims against various state formation. 
They also deployed them for gain (e.g. for votes or to sell goods). Extending 
Bailey’s observations regarding witchcraft accusations and other political 
transactions (1994, 1991), the case studies showed that conspiracy theories 
have instrumental utility in addition to expressive value.
Notwithstanding, the conspiracy theories contained some potentially 
hazardous counterfactual assertions, such as recommendations to shun 
COVID-19 vaccinations if and when they arrive. Addressing the existential 
concerns underwriting these directives and the alternative facts used to 
support them, rather than simply endeavouring to provide ‘correct’ 
information, may be helpful in lessening the prospect of harm.
undesired governance
In our examples, four problematic expressions of state power served as 
focal points for dissent. First there was ‘the Nanny State’, which distrusts 
citizens to make appropriate health decisions, and so over-interferes 
through regulation. A Corrupted Nanny State further uses current crises, 
like COVID-19, for its own political gain. A Nanny State in either form 
transmutes into a Police State if force is conjoined to this aim.
Then there was the Façade or Cardboard State – terms borrowed 
from Polish politics. On the surface, a Cardboard State appears as a 
functioning democracy. Yet its façade hides a corrupt and broken system, 
which, while benefitting the elite, is at constant risk of collapse. Such an 
unsustainable state hides things because it cannot keep up; it pretends 
away COVID-19 because it does not have the resources to stem the 
pandemic or because admitting the problem would work against its self-
presentation of successful governance.
We saw also the Shadow State. As Wedel (2011) argues, the Shadow 
State is made of ‘flexians’ – members of corporate boards and think tanks 
who pull governmental strings in service of capitalist profit-making. This 
state fails citizens not through patronising over-interference or ineptitude 
but because it is not calling the shots to begin with.
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Corporations (for example Big Pharma) can run a Shadow State, 
and corrupt politicians can run the Corrupted Nanny or Cardboard State. 
The regular Nanny State is simply overbearing; the Police State, merely 
totalitarian. But the Deep State has highly developed, overtly sinister plans 
with occult origins – plans whose aims extend well beyond simple self-
interest. Sometimes termed the New World Order, the Deep State is not 
tethered to actual government institutions. Instead, like smoke and 
mirrors, it exists to deflect attention from one’s state and its shortcomings 
– but its invocation confirms that shortcomings do exist: government for 
the people is hobbled.
Not all states express themselves in all these ways; and other 
expressions likely exist. Further, expressions vary on the ground. 
Regardless, our comparative work shows that conspiracy theories are not 
a prerogative of some specific political system or a particular historical 
moment (Ryer 2015; contra Marcus 1999). Nor are they simply an 
expression of anxiety over the condition of modernity or globalisation, as 
some have suggested (for example Aupers 2012; Harding and Stewart 
2003).
Their main purpose is articulation of social and political criticism. 
A state described by a conspiracy theory using any of the above guises, 
combined or alone, and however indirectly, has disappointed citizens, as 
our cases demonstrate. This explains how apparently universal tropes can 
express locally particular complaints about the state’s failure to uphold its 
end of the governance bargain.
fact and fiction
This brings us back to the boundaries between conspiracy theories and 
‘genuine’ claims, an issue of concern for health and state authorities 
during this pandemic as well as for social scientists. As Hastrup (2004) 
points out, knowledge is always messy. It is reductive and selective; it 
turns empirical complexity into clear, but therefore limited, propositions, 
and we always disregard some information. Further, people like to doubt 
(Carey 2017). But individual activities in relation to knowledge do not 
occur in a vacuum. Our work helps illuminate the role of the state here, 
even beyond the typology offered.
For one thing, any emphasis on ascertaining the truth value of 
competing ideas forces people to take sides in polarised ways. This 
observation is particularly relevant in relation to ideas about COVID-19 
because so much bureaucratic effort has been dedicated to prioritising 
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certain truth claims over others. And, as Carey demonstrates, the more 
involved the state is with people’s quotidian lives – the more it is 
‘experienced via its apparatus as a complex infrastructure’, the more 
fertile the ground will be for conspiracy theories (2017, 98). The 
intensified structuring role that states have taken in this pandemic, 
coupled with the historical realities that we outlined for Ireland, Poland 
and the US, has helped COVID-19 conspiracy theories take wing. 
As Pelkmans (2013) warned, the collapse of trust in institutions and 
the absence of actual certainty gives the conspiratorial imagination 
free rein.
Moreover, knowledge is always political, and knowledge systems 
are always generating conflicts (Engle-Merry and Coutin 2014). As we 
have seen in the Polish case especially, the boundaries between conspiracy 
theories and legitimate (authorised) theories often blur (see also Bailey 
1994). Further, the designation ‘conspiracy theory’ is always political, 
produced by people in positions of power. Pelkmans and Machold 
highlight the ‘distorting effects of the fields of power through which 
theories travel’ (2011, 77), noting that conspiracy theories begin in an 
unmarked state, as all theories do. The label’s application – or not – 
imposes a definition of the situation favouring those who apply it; and if 
they have more power than conspiracy theory proponents, particularly 
if a conspiracy theory’s truth claims are weak, the label is likely to stick. 
Consequently, the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is both a lumping device for 
dissenting narratives and a reciprocating technology for the production 
of doubt: it denounces as implausible the sceptical views a conspiracy 
theory promotes. It attempts to impose if not reinforce marginalisation 
(see Briggs 2004).
Yet, even labelled as such, conspiracy theories can affect the state, 
inhibiting for instance an effective pandemic response through the 
doubt they sow. Since trust is a relational issue (if you trust me, I trust 
you), the state is not a passive player here: the state’s choice of governance 
strategies makes a difference, adding to or preventing the spread of 
conspiracy theories and further mistrust. Regardless, conspiracy theories 
can offer the disempowered ‘a pretty satisfying approximation [of truth], 
demonstrating how in the modern interconnected world, people make 
sense of the actions and motives of powerful others with reference to old, 
familiar scripts’ (Brown and Theodossopoulos 2003, 334). Particularly in 
regard to COVID-19, conspiracy theories reveal, in superficially universal 
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The 2020 Los Angeles uprisings
Fighting for Black lives in the midst of COVID-19
hanna garth
On Memorial Day, 25 May 2020, George Floyd, a 46-year-old Black man 
was murdered by a white police officer in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Floyd 
was under arrest for allegedly using a counterfeit bill at a local market. 
A witness captured the murder on their phone and the video went viral. 
The officer killed Floyd with a carotid chokehold, pressing his knee into 
Floyd’s neck as Floyd called out for his mama until his last breath. Protests 
began in Minneapolis on 26 May; as people gathered to pay their respects 
at a memorial that formed outside the Cup Foods store where Floyd was 
murdered, people began to demonstrate, and eventually a crowd of 
hundreds chanting ‘I Can’t Breathe’ and ‘Black Lives Matter’ marched to 
the 3rd Precinct of the Minneapolis Police.
Floyd’s murder took place a few months into the COVID-19 
lockdowns and quarantines taking place across the United States where, 
by 26 May, there were over 1.6 million cases of COVID-19 and around 
100,000 deaths. Reporters and media pundits speculated that after weeks 
stuck inside, the Memorial Day holiday weekend and the start of summer 
coalesced to draw people out of their homes and onto the streets to protest 
in greater numbers than ever before. This is a very different take from my 
own. In Los Angeles, I observed the ways in which the protests following 
Floyd’s murder in the midst of the pandemic illuminated longstanding 
connections between white supremacy, structural inequality and poverty 
in Black and Brown communities. The racialised disparities of COVID-19 
are an additional form of state sanctioned violence on top of police 
brutality that Black and Latinx people face, and these two forms of 
violence converged to push people to fight for something better. Months 
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into the pandemic, it was clear that government leadership to control the 
pandemic would not come from the federal level, and increasingly local 
leaders were clear that opening up the economy, not saving lives, was 
their priority. A political system and general social ethos that favoured 
profits over lives would not eliminate the forms of white supremacy and 
structural inequality that undergird the plague of police violence 
in the US.
In Los Angeles, the protests began on 27 May, the day after they 
started in Minneapolis, beginning in downtown LA where protestors 
walked onto the 101 Freeway, blocking traffic. LA County Sheriff 
Villanueva tweeted that he ‘shared the nation’s outrage’ and that ‘police 
brutality is unacceptable under any circumstances’. Protestors returned 
to downtown LA the following day (Pierce 2020). The size and tone of 
these protests were relatively small and subtle. Organisers from the local 
chapter of Black Lives Matter and the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL) 
regularly gathered downtown to protest police misconduct, brutality, 
and ongoing killings and anti-Black violence perpetuated by the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD). For years, organisations like the LA 
chapter of Black Lives Matter, Dignity and Power Now, and Reform 
LA Jails have been relentlessness in fighting against police violence and 
misconduct, and for the removal of the District Attorney Jackie Lacey. 
Since 2013, when the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter movement was 
created by three radical Black organisers in the Los Angeles area – Alicia 
Garza, Patrisse Khan Cullors and Opal Tometi, in response to the 
acquittal of George Zimmerman, the man who murdered 17-year-old 
Black boy, Trayvon Martin – the work of these organisations has been 
mainstream.
Beginning in Los Angeles in 2013, #BlackLivesMatter became a 
national and then a global movement. In 2013, as Garza, Cullors and 
Tometi joined thousands in the streets of Ferguson, Los Angeles, New 
York and beyond, ‘they were armed with the statistic that in the U.S., a 
Black person is killed by a state sanctioned actor every 28 hours’ (Burton 
2015). #BlackLivesMatter, movements for prison abolition and police 
abolition, are not merely virtual mediatised movements; they are serious, 
organised movements that have made and continue to make significant 
progress to interrogate and eliminate anti-Blackness and racial inequality 
(Kelley 2016). ‘The most effective Black political mobilisation since the 
civil rights era’ (Castillo 2020), #BlackLivesMatter has grown into a 
global movement (Smith 2015; 2017; Kerrigan 2015; Vargas 2015). By 
3 July 2020, the New York Times claimed, ‘Black Lives Matter May 
Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History’.1
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The scaled-up iteration of the Black Lives Matter movement in 
response to George Floyd’s death occurred in the midst of the pandemic, 
but it seemed that the protests were not contributing to the spread of 
COVID-19. Instead, the powerfulness of the movement shed light not only 
on police brutality, but also on other racialised injustices, including the 
disproportionate number of cases and deaths from COVID-19.
In the BLM-LA podcast series entitled ‘This is Not a Drill! The Power 
of Protest!’ one of BLM’s founders, Patrisse Khan Cullors, spoke of her 
motivation to continue fighting for Black life: ‘It wasn’t until I had a child 
that the urgency of changing this place felt almost like a desperation’. She 
had long been ‘living with the terror of knowing how vulnerable I am, I 
feel like I could handle something happening to me, but if something 
were to happen to my child. Looking at my child and not ever ever ever 
imagining anyone harming him, no one but Black mothers know that 
kind of agony’. These thoughts and sentiments motivate many involved in 
the M4BL.
I have lived in Los Angeles since 2007, and since 2009 I have 
conducted research on the efforts of food justice organisations to increase 
access to healthy food in South and East LA (Garth 2020; Garth and 
Reese 2020). Although I lived and conducted research in these areas 
during the rise of the M4BL, I was not heavily involved in the movement. 
In July 2013, I watched Zimmerman’s acquittal for the murder of Trayvon 
Martin, and the subsequent uprisings, unfold from my living room, my 
oldest son in my arms. He was six months old, and, without childcare, 
I decided not to join the protests with him. Instead, I donated money and 
was politically supportive of the cause. In May 2020, I gave birth to our 
third child, and with COVID-19 we had been strictly quarantining since 
the birth. So, seven years after the first, I sat in my living room, a baby in 
my arms, watching the uprisings unfold. I sought to keep my composure 
for the sake of my children, who were already under stress from the ways 
in which COVID-19 and quarantining had disrupted their lives. But I am 
not OK (Cox 2020). I fear for the lives and safety of my children and my 
family in the face of the virus, but from the day they were born until the 
day I die I will fear for their lives in the face of state-sanctioned police 
violence.
Following George Floyd’s murder, the scale of protests grew 
significantly. By Saturday 30 May, organised protests had spread 
throughout Los Angeles. I received text messages from the M4BL and 
followed the calls for action on the Black Lives Matter – Los Angeles 
Facebook page. A protest at Pan Pacific Park, located next to one of LA’s 
iconic shopping centres – the Grove – was set for noon on Saturday, and 
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that day Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency and called in 
the National Guard. On 31 May, the city of Los Angeles set a 6 p.m. 
curfew; Santa Monica set its curfew for 4 p.m.; other cities followed with 
curfews at different times. A barrage of text messages came into our 
phones through the emergency notification services, advising of different 
curfew times.
Almost immediately, BLM-LA started organising around specific 
needs for the city and greater Southern California communities. BLM-LA 
set a Zoom meeting with Los Angeles Police commissioners on 2 June, 
demanding action for over 600 police murders committed by LAPD, 
calling for accountability and the prohibition of unnecessary force and 
violence on peaceful protestors. The meeting was open to the public and 
quickly hit the 500-person limit. Local-level organising in the city and 
greater region was well coordinated, with planned protests going out on 
social media accounts in tandem with other M4BL text message updates 
to anyone who had subscribed. The protests dovetailed with demands for 
specific changes to law and policy, including defunding the LAPD and 
eliminating police officers from schools in the Los Angeles Unified School 
District (LAUSD). Beyond the core Black Lives Matter group, organisations 
from across the city began posting statements and creating action plans 
in general support of Black Lives and antiracism, and calling for LAPD to 
be defunded or reformed.
In this chapter, I draw upon the Black radical tradition to analyse 
the links between the 2020 uprisings and the disparities of the COVID-19 
pandemic in Los Angeles. I analyse the ways in which state-sanctioned 
police murder of Black people is linked to health disparities and the 
neglect of Black communities. As Black, Latinx and other Angelenos of 
colour are more likely to serve as essential workers, disproportionately 
exposed to the virus, they are also less likely to have adequate healthcare 
coverage or adequate access to testing. Ultimately, as the rapid spread of 
the virus threatens all Angelenos, the City of Los Angeles made efforts 
(and at the time of writing, is still doing so) to curb the COVID-19 spread 
in predominately Black and Latinx areas of the city, as part of a broader 
campaign to flatten the curve. While COVID-19 comes to the forefront, 
there has been insufficient attention to the problems caused by decades 
of divestment, loss of well-paying jobs and the relentless police violence 
that plague communities of colour. Lockdowns, protests, job loss, 
declining wages, ‘frontline’ jobs, a collapsing healthcare system (which 
was already stretched), ‘underlying medical conditions’, police violence 
and imprisonment combined in a very deadly way in 2020 and in doing 
so, laid starkly bare longstanding forms of systemic racism.
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Histories of violence and corrupt police  
in South LA
Police violence in communities like South LA has been relentless for 
generations, and uprisings have been a critical way of drawing 
attention to these injustices in an effort to create change. The 1992 
Los Angeles Uprisings were a pivotal moment, and particularly 
impactful for South Los Angeles communities. These began on 29 April 
1992 and lasted six days, after a jury acquitted four LAPD officers 
caught on tape beating Rodney King, a Black Angeleno. As in 2020, the 
Army National Guard and the Marines were brought in to try to stop 
the protests. In South Los Angeles, 55 people were killed, over 2,000 
people injured and property damage was estimated at one billion 
dollars.
For many residents, these 1992 uprisings were yet another iteration 
of the Watts rebellion of 11 August 1965, when the Watts area of South 
Los Angeles erupted into protests after an incident of police brutality with 
a Black motorist. On this occasion, there were at least 34 deaths and an 
estimated $40 million in property damage. Again, the National Guard 
was brought in to quell the situation.
During these earlier uprisings in response to police violence against 
Black community members, the damaged property was largely confined 
to majority Black neighbourhoods. Most buildings were commercial 
or retail. In the aftermath of the protests, many local businesses closed 
and never reopened, with consequent job losses and increased un- 
employment.
The 1992 uprisings drew international attention to Los Angeles. 
People worldwide were made aware of the stark inequalities between the 
LA they saw on TV and the LA in which many lived. This attention to 
disparities yielded some good – organisations and money began to go 
toward thinking through how to improve conditions. Nearly 30 years on, 
however, South LA continues to suffer from race-based marginalisation 
and underdevelopment. An estimated 31 per cent of South LA households 
are below the poverty line; 39 per cent of residents have not graduated 
from high school – the highest in the country. Post-1992, there have been 
ongoing problems associated with job insecurity, declining real wages 
and police violence. In the context of the rapid spread of COVID-19, a 
system where access to healthcare is tied to job-based health insurance, 
job insecurity and low wage insecure labour can brew a public health 
disaster in areas like South LA.
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Nearly 30 years later …
In early June 2020, as Los Angeles was in the midst of the BLM uprisings, 
community leader, food justice activist and US Navy Iraq-War Veteran 
Dr D’Artagnan Scorza posted the following on Facebook:2
The civil unrest across the nation and here in our community is not the 
product of an isolated incident. These protests are part of a rebellion 
spurred on by centuries-old racism and oppression manifested in the 
killing of unarmed black men and women. These men and women, 
like George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, died at the hands of those who 
were tasked with protecting and serving them. Their deaths violate 
the social contract between the community and police.
From the 1964 Watts uprising to the 1992 Los Angeles 
uprisings (which I lived through) to today, there have always been 
calls for restraint. But, how can you ask us to restrain ourselves 
when this country has allowed knees to be pressed upon our 
collective necks?
Scorza, a widely respected local leader, is not someone I would describe 
as having very radical politics. However, he has a clear understanding of 
the role that racism and police violence play in his community and in the 
everyday lives of those who live in and near South Los Angeles. He 
continues, connecting the uprisings with his personal story:
As a Black man who leads an organisation supporting the growth 
and development of Black male youth, and as a father of a young 
Black boy, I am anguished and enraged. I’m beyond tired and fed up 
with these cycles of police violence and the promise of change. 
I can’t remain silent because silence equates to consent and I don’t 
consent to what happened to George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and the 
many others who have died at the hands of police who use their 
power to destroy life.
But, I’m tired of the words that I’ve used in the past to try and 
make meaning of what’s happening right now. I’m tired of saying 
‘we need change’, ‘reform the system’, ‘we need review boards’ and 
everything else that comes with calls for change. What we really 
need is to LIVE and do so with the dignity of our lives uninhibited. 
We not only need to Live, but we are demanding the right to Live. 
The right to jog in peace. The right to sit in our homes in peace. The 
right to breathe in peace …
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Here, Scorza openly shifts from a reformist position toward an abolitionist 
position, underscoring that his previous calls for reform and review have 
not worked. He fears for his own life and the life of his Black son. He 
continues:
It is clear that our policing institutions have utterly failed us and we 
need to rethink what ‘protection’, not policing looks like. Much like 
the military, our police need to be overseen by civilians who make 
determinations about when force is to be used. The fact that police 
even have the power to use ‘force’ is a power in and of itself we have 
the right to revoke. No individual should be allowed to make that 
determination on their own.
More so, what we need is solidarity and the complete 
obliteration of White Supremacy. We need to tear down the ideology 
that devalues Black life and Black bodies. America must boldly 
affirm that Black lives matter and in doing so put a knee in the neck 
of police brutality, systemic and institutionalised racism. This is 
not a moment to ‘protect’, we must act swiftly with courageous 
leadership to ensure that White Supremacy dies, not us.
Scorza highlights that the issues that fuelled the 2020 uprisings are the 
long-standing, structural problems of South Los Angeles that derive from 
and build on centuries of racism and anti-Blackness. He notes the lack of 
response to calls for police reform and the urgent need for a system that 
actually protects everyone from harm. This system cannot come from a 
foundation of white supremacy.
From 2000 to early 2020, police had killed 886 people in LA County; 
the majority were Black or Latinx. While many Black activists had long 
understood the connections between white supremacy, structural 
inequality and poverty in Black and Brown communities, the uprisings of 
2020 and the COVID-19 pandemic illuminated these connections for 
many more people. It was clear that at national and local levels, the 
current political system was not going to eliminate white supremacy or 
the forms of structural inequality perpetuated by it that deeply impact 
living conditions in places like South Los Angeles. The problems we were 
seeing more clearly with the spread of COVID-19, and the poor response 
to it, also illuminated some of the core problems that Black Lives Matter 
activists care about: the ways in which our social support systems fail us 
under contemporary capitalism. The healthcare system, school system, 
food distribution system and many others that were essential for the 
wellbeing of all Angelenos, but have been unable to function properly 
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under the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic, are intricately 
interwoven with settler colonialism, racial capitalism, white supremacy 
and the carceral state (Beliso-De Jesús and Pierre 2020; Ralph 2019; 
Speed 2020).
COVID-19 and health inequality
Whitney N. Laster Pirtle has argued, ‘Racial capitalism is a fundamental 
cause of the racial and socioeconomic inequities within the novel 
coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) in the United States’ (2020, 504). The 
epidemiological patterns of COVID-19 have made clear the ways in which 
racial capitalism results in unequal access to basic services in response to 
human needs. This is embodied as differential risk for contracting disease, 
and differential experiences of morbidity and mortality. The problematic 
disparities along lines of race and socioeconomic status were evident 
early in the pandemic. In places like South Los Angeles, it was clear that 
COVID-19 would capitalise on structural violence and vulnerability 
(Manderson and Levine 2020, 368). By 26 April, LA County (excluding 
Long Beach and Pasadena) had 19,516 confirmed cases, with data on 
race and ethnicity for 10,699 cases (LA County 2020): 46.4 per cent were 
Latino, 23.7 per cent were white, 11.5 per cent were Asian, 8 per cent 
were African American. Native Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders had 
the highest population rate of COVID-19 cases (840 per 100,000), 
followed by Latinos (114 per 100,000), African Americans (102 per 
100,000), then white people (78 per 100,000). When some businesses 
were allowed to reopen in late July, these disparities widened. Latinos 
and African Americans are more likely to work in high-risk businesses 
such as restaurants and grocery stores, and are more likely to rely on 
public transportation, so increasing their risk of exposure to coronavirus. 
For these essential workers, ‘social distancing and self-isolation are 
luxuries they cannot afford’ (Polonijo 2020). Lower income areas had less 
testing availability initially, but by early July access to testing in low-
income areas improved. On 9 July, Public Health Director Barbara Ferrer 
reported that ‘Latinos are now more than twice as likely as whites to be 
infected with the novel coronavirus and twice as likely to die. Blacks were 
27 per cent more likely to be infected and nearly twice as likely to die from 
the virus compared to whites’ (Rosenfeld 2020).
By 10 September, African Americans and Latinos were over- 
represented in deaths from COVID-19: African Americans represented 
7.7 per cent of COVID-19 deaths, but only 6.0 per cent of the population. 
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Latino deaths were 48.4 per cent of COVID-19 deaths, but 38.9 per cent 
of the population (CDPH 2020). Jim Mangia, CEO of St John’s Well Child 
and Family Center, commented: ‘When you’re in the middle of a 
pandemic, you really get a sense of where the priorities lie. More people 
got COVID in South L than in any other part of the county. More people 
died of COVID here’. The disparities were not only about the types of 
work and other activities in which residents of South LA might have 
disproportionately engaged. Long-standing structural problems such 
as lower rates of health insurance and a general lack of sufficient 
infrastructure and services in lower-income areas disproportionately 
characterised the lives of Black and Latino residents (Artiga et al. 2020). 
As Barbara Ferrer noted, ‘the most prominent conditions that lead to 
death among COVID-19 patients – heart disease, respiratory illness and 
diabetes – are also more common in communities with higher rates of 
poverty. They are also less likely to have access to care’ (Rosenfeld 2020).
The disparities of COVID-19 and the Black Lives Matter uprisings of 
2020 are inextricably linked, and build upon a foundation of racial 
capitalism and the general devaluation of Black lives in the US. Cedric 
Robinson (1983) argues that all forms of capitalism are racialised because 
the historical development of capitalism was based on the forces of racism 
and hierarchy. Tracing forms of racialised social hierarchy from the 
formation of Europe, Robinson shows the continued entwining of 
capitalism and racialised hierarchy. Racial capitalism has a ‘fundamental 
impact on health inequities’ (Laster Pirtle 2020, 504). LA area leaders and 
politicians are increasingly recognising the links between racism, 
discrimination and health inequities, and are also beginning to see the 
connection to policing and prisons. In early June, Los Angeles County 
Supervisor Hilda Solis opened a news briefing on COVID-19 with the 
statement that COVID was joined by a second public health crisis – 
‘unabated and unaccountable police violence’:
We’ve seen another public health crisis highlighted. According 
to the (American) Public Health Association, addressing law 
enforcement violence should be a public health priority. The root 
cause of health inequities, especially during the pandemic, is 
systemic racism and discrimination (KCET 2020).
In her analysis of the events of 2020 in Los Angeles, Supervisor Solis laid 
bare the connections between racial capitalism, the carceral state and 
health inequalities. Just as jobs were eliminated and real wages declined 
in places like South LA, the state of California significantly expanded its 
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prison system. City budgets were increasingly allocated to policing at the 
expense of healthcare, mental health, housing programmes, healthcare 
and food programmes. As people struggled with job loss and declining 
wages, the social programmes that could have been a safety net were 
eliminated or reduced, and instead residents faced the threat of police 
violence and imprisonment (Gilmore 2007; Ralph 2020).
Abolition as a public health measure
On 5 June 2020, National Public Radio aired a report by Ailsa Chang. 
Chang interviewed three Black men who had lived through multiple 
uprisings as residents of South Los Angeles. Bruce Patton, one of the 
interviewees, told her: ‘There’s no need for a policeman to have a gun. 
That is what gives them the propensity to kill you. It’s their approach to 
the people in these communities that make police officers fear for their 
lives’. Chang summarised Patton’s understanding that his ‘community has 
been fighting back against a problem that never seems to change – police 
violence against black people. And for Patton, at least, the solution to that 
problem is very clear. He says we need to take all guns away from the 
police’ (Chang 2020). Marqueece Harris-Dawson, another native of 
South LA and city councilman, told Chang that while he thought there 
was a use for LAPD and other police departments, the police needed to 
focus on fewer things: ‘We ask police departments to solve homelessness. 
We ask them to solve truancy. We ask them to solve blight, traffic 
problems, pedestrian safety. We ask them to solve a whole bunch of 
problems that they oftentimes are not the appropriate set of individuals 
to do’. Harris-Dawson suggested that instead of (over)funding the police 
to do this, we should spend more money on schools and healthcare. 
Chang’s third guest, Gilbert Johnson, reflected: ‘The community is rising 
up. Right now, we have opportunity. We have a chance to really organise 
and galvanise all this momentum and push it in a positive way. We’re 
going to see a lot more change, and a lot more people are out protesting 
because they want change. So, yes, I see this as a moment of hope amidst 
all the chaos’ (Chang 2020).
Although local residents have varying views on the role of the 
police, Black Lives Matter LA calls for law enforcement, as it currently 
exists, to be completely abolished. In general, Black Lives Matter groups 
carefully craft their messaging so they can maintain abolitionist visions 
of eradicating the police and prisons, but not be seen as too radical for 
progressive uptake and media coverage (Shange 2016). The recent calls 
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have been for abolition to happen through defunding police departments, 
with governments allocating police budgets to reinvest in community 
needs. The abolition of policing as we know it is tied to the abolition of 
jails (local city or county level institutions), prisons (state or federal 
level institutions) and detention centres, which all function together and 
are central to the state enactment of anti-black violence. As the quote 
from Supervisor Solis illustrates, police violence is a public health crisis, 
and addressing this should be a public health priority. One way to do so 
is to completely abolish the law enforcement system as we currently 
know it.
The protests of 2020 were peaceful but forceful, and the protestors 
drew attention on a worldwide scale to the horrors of our carceral 
state and the relentless murders of Black people by law enforcement 
officers. At the extreme end of the 2020 uprisings, people set fire to 
police cars, a few businesses and burned trash to create fires in the 
streets. The protests themselves did not involve much looting, but after 
the protesters moved through the streets of Los Angeles, looters moved 
in. We watched from our living room as dozens of people broke into 
local stores, taking shoes, clothing and pharmaceuticals from a local 
drug store. The local news media focused on the looters, insinuating 
that police force against the protestors was acceptable; the language of 
‘looting’ and ‘rioting’ was used to delegitimise protests in which all 
Americans have the right to engage, and to cast protestors as violent 
and unruly, so justifying even more police violence against them (Bonilla 
and Rosa 2015). The response from law enforcement was disturbing. 
An LAPD SUV drove into a crowd, striking protestors. Tear gas was 
launched at protestors holding the line. And with the nightly curfews, 
whether peaceful or not, protestors were arrested if they were out after 
6 p.m. Like Robin D.G. Kelley (2020), I wondered, ‘what kind of society 
values property over Black lives?’
The initial response from city leadership was chilling. On 1 June, 
I watched LAPD Chief Michel Moore announce at a live press conference, 
as Mayor Garcetti looked on, that ‘the blood of George Floyd’s death is on 
the hands of protesters’. But this marked a turn, and Moore was forced to 
recant, claiming that he ‘misspoke’. Later, outside LAPD headquarters 
Mayor Garcetti joined protestors and ‘took a knee’, an act of kneeling now 
widely recognised as a silent protest against police brutality and racism 
in the US. Soon after, he announced that he would take $100 million 
dollars from the LAPD budget and give it to communities of colour. The 
city later agreed to reduce the police department budget by $1.8 billion, 
a step some viewed as moving in the right direction toward abolition and 
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others viewed as insufficient and inadequate. Things seemed to shift at 
the national level as well. The streets in front of the White House were 
renamed Black Lives Matter Plaza. The officer who killed Floyd was 
arrested and charged. Minneapolis banned police use of chokeholds, and 
(then) presidential candidate Joe Biden asked the US Congress to outlaw 
chokeholds.
This was just the beginning. More text messages came from the 
M4BL; we had to keep going; these small concessions were not enough. It 
is our duty to fight for our freedom. By 4 June, the curfews stopped. On 
Sunday 7 June, protestors danced and sang at the largest gathering to 
date at one of LA’s famous intersections, Hollywood and Highland, near 
the Dolby Theater where the Academy Awards or ‘Oscars’ are usually 
hosted. The protests continued across the city, with people socially 
distanced and masked lining major boulevards, holding signs proclaiming 
Black Lives Matter. It seemed that more white people were turning out to 
support Black Lives Matter than ever before. Those who took their support 
beyond symbolic gestures and actually marched and gave monetary 
support strengthened the power of the uprisings in cities across the 
US and the world. The City of Dallas announced a ‘duty to intervene’ 
rule that requires officers to stop other officers who engage in inappro- 
priate use of force. Statues and monuments celebrating racist figures were 
officially and unofficially removed in cities across the US. Confederate 
flags were removed and banned by organisations nationwide, including 
the US Marine Corps.
State systems, inequality and the Black radical tradition
Using the Black radical tradition to analyse the junctures of the 2020 
uprisings and the disparities of COVID-19, it is clear that the liberal 
capitalist state played a significant role in the state sanctioned killing of 
Black people, both from a virus and from murderous police (Robinson 
1983). The state response to COVID-19 prioritised reopening the economy 
over public safety. Black and Latino laborers had to return to work in 
order for the most fundamental elements of the economy – grocery stores, 
warehouses, public services – to continue functioning, demonstrating 
some of the ways in which racial capitalism and incessant drive for profit 
are lethal for Black and Latino communities under COVID-19 (Dawson 
2018).
Just before the uprisings of 2020, LA had been reeling from the 
effects of COVID-19, in terms of morbidity, mortality and economics. In a 
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population of around 10 million, by late May there were over one million 
unemployment claims filed in Los Angeles County. One article reported 
that only 45 per cent of LA residents were employed in March 2020 
(Wagner 2020). This led to deep concerns about housing and food 
insecurity. Springing into action, community organisations seemed to 
come together around mutual aid, and local organisations were quick 
to pivot their services toward the needs of the COVID-19 era. For instance, 
to mitigate housing loss, on 4 March LA County invoked an eviction 
moratorium, banning evictions on residential and commercial tenants. 
Organisations across the city offered programmes for emergency food 
distribution. The Los Angeles Regional Food Bank ramped up its 
distribution programmes. Approximately 405,000 students, or 72.4 per 
cent of students of Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) qualified 
for free and reduced-price meals, based on their family’s income. These 
children normally eat free breakfast and lunch at school during the school 
year and receive free meals during summer programmes through the 
school district or Los Angeles area Parks and Recreation programmes. On 
18 March, a week after closing the schools, LAUSD – the second largest 
public school system in the US – began distributing food at some of the 
closed school sites and other central locations across the city. Initially, the 
food was only intended for students and their families, but, shortly 
thereafter, it began to be distributed to anyone in need. Smaller 
organisations, like Community Services Unlimited Ltd. in South Los 
Angeles, also quickly developed systems for distributing food in their 
neighbourhoods. These forms of coming together as a community to 
support one another in times of crisis, as Nancy Burke also illustrates for 
Cuba (Chapter 2), are precisely the kinds of futures that Black Lives 
Matter is fighting for.
Under COVID-19, Angelenos started to see the ways in which our 
systems – education, healthcare, food distribution – were still expected to 
be supported by the state, but had long been precarious. COVID-19 was 
the tipping point, causing a complete breakdown of these systems as 
healthcare systems were overloaded with COVID-19 cases and people 
seeking preventative healthcare and ‘nonessential care’ were turned 
away. Grocery store shelves were empty and store managers did not know 
when they would be restocked. Schools closed completely leaving 
hundreds of thousands of kids with nothing but a promise that online 
learning would come soon. The pandemic led to a devastating loss of life, 
and a great increase in inequality and precariousness for low-income 
Angelenos. In realising this, Angelenos came together around fear and 
devastation, but with a sense of hope and an understanding that only 
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through community organising, and not dependence on that state, could 
lives be saved (Sojoyner 2017; Vargas 2010). People started to see the 
connections between school and food, between work and healthcare. 
They questioned what it meant that school closures could lead to massive 
food insecurity, and that schools had long been responsible for ensuring 
that children and their families had enough to eat. Similarly, people 
started to see that if healthcare was tied to work and people lost their jobs 
due to business closures, then millions of people would be without access 
to healthcare. It became increasingly clear how current infrastructure was 
putting people in increasingly precarious situations.
This understanding of how government systems and state infra- 
structures fail us also opened many people to the possibility of abolition 
– abolishing the police and prisons. This did not mean police reform, 
but the full abolition of policing, of corrupt political systems that protect 
law enforcement officers that murder Black people, and everyone else 
who is complicit with this system. The abolition of the prison system 
dovetails with the abolition of policing. The goal to eliminate both of 
these racist systems is part of a broader vision to transform education, 
healthcare and other systems deeply enmeshed in the current economic 
system. These need to be untethered from racial capitalism so that our 
communities can survive and thrive. This was what Black Lives Matter 
LA was fighting for and increasing numbers of Angelenos were joining 
the fight.
Conclusions
On 9 June, George Floyd was laid to rest in Houston, Texas, and, again, 
we watched from our living room as crowds gathered outside the 
cemetery, and stood witness as his casket passed by in a horse-drawn 
carriage. They gathered to celebrate his life, mourn his loss and to mourn 
the violent loss of thousands of other Black people at the hands of the 
police. Some were outraged by the crowds that gathered during a surge 
in the COVID-19 pandemic in Texas. But the political moment, the need 
to gather and physically be present in the fight for Black freedom, seemed 
to outweigh the risk of COVID-19. After all, we may outlive the virus, but 
we will still face the battle against state-sanctioned anti-Black violence. 
Whereas we understand the COVID-19 pandemic to be temporary, police 
violence against Black people is endemic, part of a total climate of anti-
Blackness (Sharpe 2016).
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Thinking of the COVID-19 pandemic and the violence of the 
carceral state as parallel plagues that have differential patterns of 
endangering lives and ending lives across the world, anthropological 
and social theory can help to illuminate their uneven impacts and 
consequences in places like South Los Angeles. The forms of police 
violence and murder that sparked the BLM uprisings of 2020 are 
distinctly racialised and impact Black Angelenos at significantly higher 
rates than white Angelenos. And while the virus does not discriminate 
along racial or socioeconomic lines as it invades and attacks human 
bodies, how the virus attacks the body, and bodily vulnerability to severe 
disease, are the outcomes of pre-existing conditions, access to healthcare, 
workplace conditions and other social and economic factors. The 
COVID-19 virus is loaded onto a long history of inequality and racialised 
state violence.
Yet, as we fight against racialised police violence under COVID-19, 
governments worldwide are enlisting new forms of surveillance and 
monitoring tied to military and policing, as a number of authors in this 
volume illustrate. As militarised surveillance is ramped up to fight off the 
spread of COVID-19, Saiba Varma (2020, 376) reminds us,
COVID-19 offers us something. It raises profound questions about 
our reliance on policing as a catchall solution. Even in an unpre- 
cedented health crisis, the state’s carceral capacities are bolstered 
– in calls to ‘put the military in charge of health care expansion’, 
in surveilling and fining violations of pandemic restrictions, and in 
everyday descriptions of the pandemic as war.
In our highly connected, unequal world, the focus on investing money and 
energy into solutions that bolster the capability of military and police to 
fight disease and kill potential ‘threats’ is also directly tied to the failures of 
governments to provide for people’s basic needs. As tech developers and 
companies profit from surveillance technologies, under racial capitalism 
this likely translates into heightened surveillance and arrests, and 
potentially moves us towards increasing rates of incarceration and death in 
Black communities. The 2020 uprisings and COVID-19 have revealed the 
ways in which the drastic disparities in disease incidence are tied to the 
overfunding of policing at the expense of community services. But while 
the COVID-19 pandemic fuelled a political drive to ‘flatten the curve’ in Los 
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Notes
1 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html.
2 Used here with permission from Dr Scorza.
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The biopolitics of COVID-19 in the UK
Racism, nationalism and the afterlife  
of colonialism
Jennie gamlin, sahra gibbon and  
Melania Calestani
Historical social inequalities continue to shape the epidemiological profile 
of COVID-19, visibilising how some bodies are more exposed than others. 
While there has long been evidence of health disparities among Black, 
Asian and ethnic minorities in the UK, and growing concern with the role 
of racism in perpetuating them (Nazroo 2003), the finding that certain 
communities face a higher risk of contracting and dying from COVID-19 
has newly exposed deep-rooted national divisions. The brutal killing of 
George Floyd in the US in May 2020,1 and the global protest and activism 
led by the #BlackLivesMatter movement, reignited discussion around 
the relationship of racism and life expectancy. By mid-July 2020, as 
transmission steadied in the first wave of the pandemic, the UK had 
reached the highest overall and population level COVID-19 mortality in 
Western Europe, with clear disproportionately high death rates among 
Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic populations. The stark embodied effects 
of racism and inequality precipitated growing public calls to consider how 
colonialism and imperialism continues to have consequences for the 
health of minority communities (Siddique and Grierson 2020). We refer 
to these historically defined patterns and processes, along with the 
presence of colonial structures within the National Health Service itself, 
as the afterlife of colonialism, as they represent the permanence of the past 
in the present.
In this chapter, by analysing the government’s response of putting 
forth policy decisions by a bullish go-it-alone strategy that initially 
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rejected WHO advice and European Union (EU) collaborative pre- 
parations, we draw on anthropological insights to consider the presence 
of Britain’s colonial past in the populations, biopolitics and institutions 
that defined the handling and impact of COVID-19. The over- 
representation of Black and ethnic minority populations in UK2 death 
toll figures for coronavirus tracks the fault lines of social and economic 
exclusions that give continuity to colonialism and its production 
and exploitation of racial hierarchies. We examine how the acronym 
BAME (Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic) has become a proxy for 
social and economic differences and inequalities, while reinforcing 
the othering of specific groups along lines established by colonialism. 
Building upon and extending approaches to power and structural 
inequalities (Farmer 1999; Fassin 2007, 2013) by drawing on Hartman’s 
notion of the ‘afterlife of slavery’ (2007), we argue that ethno-racial 
differences in the epidemiological profile of coronavirus are the afterlife 
of colonialism – the persistence of political domination in the bodies of 
racialised people.
This afterlife also operates at the level of biopolitics through the 
lingering sentiments of Empire and we bring in Franklin’s discussion of 
‘nostalgic nationalism’ (2019) to unpack the post-Brexit management of 
this global emergency. The political moment in which COVID emerged 
coincided with the UK’s departure from the EU, which was itself the 
outcome of a very close referendum result. The Brexit moment on 31 
January 2020 was one of a newfound ideational sovereignty, an imagined 
identity that hinged almost entirely upon a colonially-given political 
superiority, and the subsequent belief in British exceptionalism that has 
proven to endure long beyond the UK’s political dominance. We examine 
these complex intersections with the material politics of epidemic 
response (Lynteris and Poleykett 2018), and the ongoing isolationism 
arising from the UK’s tortured pathway to leaving the EU, particularly in 
the allocation and resourcing of personal protective equipment (PPE). 
Populations and biopolitics also collide in the colonial patterning of care 
provision by Britain’s National Health Service (NHS), the centrepiece of 
the UK’s epidemic response, an institution sustained in large part by the 
combined labour of EU and colonial diaspora communities. Hence the 
afterlife of colonialism is both lived and delivered as a mentality and a 
relational dynamic. These same populations, including first, second and 
later generations of families invited to the UK in the days of dwindling 
colonial power, are also caring for the ill and dying. In association with 
mortality rates, we will reflect upon the ethnic patterning of care provision 
and the coloniality of the NHS.
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Epidemiological histories and contemporary revelations
Through its long history of longitudinal cohort studies, the UK has been at 
the forefront of a global effort to demonstrate the social determinants of 
health. The Whitehall Studies on the health of British civil servants, and 
other epidemiological studies, have provided powerful evidence of how 
social inequalities shape chronic disease morbidity and mortality and 
pattern the social gradient in health (Marmot 2005). While some have 
pointed to the failure of a social determinants approach to fully address 
‘structural inequalities’ (Breilh 2013; Yates-Doerr 2020), a succession of UK 
conservative governments has done little to address the inequalities upon 
which COVID has played. As a result of the policy of austerity that has 
characterised the UK’s health and social policy since the economic crisis of 
2008, inequalities have become more entrenched, increasing alongside 
unemployment and poverty and affecting healthcare services (Stuckler 
et al. 2017); in this sense, unequal morbidity and mortality from COVID-19 
could have been anticipated and expected. Black men were, during the first 
wave of the pandemic, at least three times more likely to die than white 
men, and men and women of Bangladeshi origin were twice as likely to 
have died. As of 30 June 2020, people of Indian, Chinese, Pakistani, other 
Asian and Black ethnicity were 10–50 per cent more likely to have died than 
their white counterparts (PHE 2020).
Racism is causally implicated in health inequalities among minority 
communities and race is increasingly recognised as a ‘social determinant 
of health’ (Williams et al. 2019; Marmot 2020), but there has been little 
work at a national level to analyse the intersections of race with other 
social and economic factors (Chouhan and Nazroo 2020). There are 
significant data gaps on ethnicity and health, with ongoing questions 
about the quality and accuracy of information collected (Aspinall et al. 
2003). Until June 2020, there was no comprehensive disaggregated 
national data about ethnicity on death certificates. In relation to 
COVID-19, this has been described as a form of ‘state negligence’ (Hirsch 
2020). There is no epidemiological research on why generations of 
diasporas with heritage in British colonies still experience excess burdens 
of morbidity, the ‘underlying conditions’ now explanatory variables of 
COVID-19 mortality in the UK. Despite an emerging terrain of epigenetic 
research (Kuzawa and Sweet 2009), the link between present-day health 
and inequality and past histories of exploitation, domination and violence 
has not yet been included in policy-focused research into health 
inequalities. The fact that epidemiologists and the media alike did not 
anticipate excess mortality during a pandemic in the most vulnerable 
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populations is a sign of the naturalisation of social inequalities and how 
entrenched racism has rendered race inequality and health invisible. 
Perhaps, as Davis (2019) suggests, through the stereotype of the afterlife 
of slavery, we have naturalised the idea that non-white bodies are stronger 
and more resilient than white bodies.
The emerging narrative of BAME and COVID-19
Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic – in its acronym form as BAME – has 
become the accepted label to define and sort many different ethnic groups 
by their shared characteristic of not being of white European descent. It 
also defines different peoples whose histories largely return to once 
colonised locations in the Global South. This categorisation of difference 
serves to define the self as much as the other, making it a relational 
identity. This must be historicised in the context of colonial hierarchies 
based on racial and often ‘biologised’ notions of superiority as culture is 
transposed onto race. These diaspora populations and subsequent 
generations who have settled in the UK do not share homogenising 
biological characteristics that differentiate them from white Europeans, 
other than not having whiter skin. This category suggests that non-
whiteness, where ‘whiteness’ is a racialised and privileged social category 
(Echeverría 2016), somehow makes a person more vulnerable to the 
virus. The lumping together of Black, Asian and ethnic minority groups 
under ‘BAME’ is inherently racist as it does not describe who they are, 
their ancestry or heritage, but who they are not, as we discuss later.
The term BAME, while widely used in the UK including by advocates 
within and for ethnic minority communities, is problematic when ascribed 
to social and ethnic groups in relation to health. It suggests that innate 
biological, genetic or essentialised cultural factors are at play. This 
disguises the role of social and political history, the afterlife of colonialism. 
The widespread use of this acronym during the pandemic obscures social 
causality and demonstrates the coloniality of contemporary social and 
political dynamics and their embodiment.
With no national requirement to record the ethnicity of hospital 
patients, the first suggestion that in the UK ethnic minorities were more 
severely affected by COVID-19 came not from demographic data, but 
from anecdotal evidence on nightly news reports and reports of deaths 
and local hospitalisation rates. The first 12 doctors known to have died 
after contracting coronavirus were ‘non-white’ (Siddique and Marsh 
2020). From mid-March, a distorted picture of disease distribution and 
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death began to emerge. According to the 2011 census in England and 
Wales, non-white ethnic minority communities constituted 14 per cent of 
the population, but in April 2020, 35 per cent of almost 2,000 critically ill 
patients were in this category (Intensive Care National Audit and Research 
Centre 2020). Local surveys published in The Guardian and Times 
newspapers in early April suggested that 19 per cent of recorded hospital 
deaths to this date were from ethnic minority communities, with higher 
numbers of ethnic minority residents having higher death rates (Barr 
et al. 2020). The evidence began to grow across media outlets as the 
tributes, memorials and daily roll call of faces and names to those who 
had died from COVID-19 appeared – health professionals, porters, 
cleaners and other key workers such as bus drivers. Here was visible 
evidence of the disproportionate effect on communities by COVID-19.
Dr Ayache was one. Syrian-born Fayez Ayache had treated three 
generations of Jennie Gamlin’s family at the local village practice, retiring 
from full-time employment in 2018. He rejoined the service during the 
pandemic. On 8 April, six days after being admitted to the same hospital 
in Ipswich at which he had given a lifetime’s service, he died, positive for 
COVID-19 (BMA 2020). In a statement made after his death, his daughter 
Layla recalled her father’s dedication to his work and to the NHS:
This is why the NHS was important to dad; because it brought 
people together, it gave a freedom that some had never experienced 
before, and it gave hope and light to those who were wandering a 
darkened path. The NHS is a lifeline for so many that dad felt it his 
duty to serve within (BMA 2020).
By mid-April, the UK government’s rallying call that ‘we are in this 
together’ was increasingly hollow as the unequal impact of COVID-19 
became clearer. Bowing to public pressure and criticism, the government 
launched an inquiry into the disproportionate deaths among BAME 
communities by Public Health England (PHE), led by its National Director 
for Health and Wellbeing, Professor Kevin Fenton. PHE also recommended 
that health workers from BAME communities should be ‘risk assessed’ to 
consider whether their assigned roles placed them at increased risk of 
infection (Kanani and Issar 2020). By early May, comprehensive data on 
ethnicity and hospital deaths began to provide a more robust picture of 
inequalities. One report suggested that between the end of February and 
April 2020, ‘Black and Asian’ people in the UK were 71 and 62 per cent 
more likely to die from COVID-19 than ‘white’ people (Williamson et al. 
2020). Another report by the Institute for Fiscal Studies suggested that 
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even after adjusting for age, sex and geography, the death rate for ‘people 
of black African descent’ was 3.5 times that of ‘white British people’ (Platt 
and Warwick 2020). In early June, PHE confirmed that people from 
Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic communities were twice as likely to die 
as ‘white’ communities if they developed COVID-19. However, PHE did 
not offer explanations or propose any policy interventions to address this 
disparity, leading to immediate accusations that this final section of the 
report, purportedly concerning the need to address structural racism, had 
been censored by the Health Secretary. The report was finally published 
two weeks later after leaks to the press indicated specific mention of 
structural racism. The controversy around this report, which coincided 
with and was informed by widespread activism around the murder of 
George Floyd in the US and the Black Lives Matter movement, opened up 
dialogue on the health effects of institutional and historical racism. We 
return to this later in this chapter.
The specific patterning of care, as the wider context within which 
the British response to coronavirus played out, is itself an afterlife of 
colonialism (Fitzgerald et al. 2020), reflecting the permanence of the past 
in the present through an attitude of nostalgic nationalism. In the 
following section, we explore this further through the idea of ‘heroism’ – a 
description of health and social care workers at the height of the first 
wave of the epidemic – and how this was belied by the UK’s Brexit-fuelled 
isolationist policy.
Occupational health and Brexit isolationism
From mid-March to July 2020, countrywide, ‘Thank you’ signs with 
rainbows for NHS workers appeared in street-facing windows of homes 
and chalk messages on pavements (Figure 6.1). Thousands of people 
came outside their houses to ‘clap for carers’ each Thursday at 8 p.m., 
thanking mainly NHS healthcare professionals for their outstanding work 
during these unprecedented times.
Some healthcare professionals were frustrated with this Thursday 
ritual, arguing that ‘the health service is not a charity and it is not staffed 
by heroes’ (The Guardian 21 May 2020). On Thursday 28 May, as Prime 
Minister Boris Johnson was clapping for carers, a silent protest (‘Doctors, 
not Martyrs’ – The Times of India 29 May 2020) was held outside Downing 
Street, organised by Indian-origin doctor Meenal Viz, who had raised 
more than £53,000 towards a legal battle against the UK government over 
the lack of PPE. Similarly, the previous week, an anonymous NHS doctor 
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Figure 6.1 Handmade banner supporting the National Health Service 
(NHS) in south London in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Photo: 
Sahra Gibbon
wrote an article in The Guardian, emphasising some of the issues at stake 
when analysing the material politics of the UK epidemic response to 
COVID-19:
It would ... be nice to have clarity about many things, from testing 
to isolation to proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE). It 
would also be nice to have worked for the past 10 years in an 
adequately funded NHS, staffed by people listened to by the 
government. It would be nice to see appropriate remuneration for 
the low-paid staff holding the service together, to see that the value 
of immigrants to the NHS is appreciated (Anonymous, The Guardian 
21 May 2020).
The notion of heroism echoes wartime victories, but the underfunding of 
the NHS, and the availability of PPE and virus testing, intersects with the 
politics of the UK COVID-19 response in more complex ways. The WHO 
has emphasised the need to consider how the social determinants 
of health and health inequalities are shaped ‘by the distribution of 
money, power and resources at global, national and local levels’ 
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(Gideon 2014, 31). In the UK, recent and more distant historical 
entanglements, including Brexit and the foundational history of the NHS, 
must be understood as central in shaping occupational health at the time 
of COVID-19 and in understanding the disproportionate rate of deaths 
among ethnic minority NHS employees. Of the initial 119 NHS staff 
known to have died during the first wave, 64 per cent were from an ethnic 
minority background (Cook et al. 2020).
Key workers such as NHS staff, and food supply chain and utility 
workers, continued of necessity to work outside their homes, exposing 
them more to infection (van Dorn et al. 2020). According to the independent 
charity The Health Foundation (2020), in London, ethnic minority key 
workers constitute 54 per cent of the food production, process and sale 
sector (including all food retail and processing) and 48 per cent of the 
health and social care sector; 11 and 13 per cent for areas outside London. 
An NHS Workforce Race Equality Standard Report (2019) emphasised that 
ethnic minority staff members are underrepresented in senior pay bands 
and are overrepresented in band 5 – the lowest band, in which salaries start 
from £22,128 (Royal College of Nursing, 2020).
The majority (44.9 per cent) of ethnic minority health workers are 
employed in NHS trusts, although their role has been marginalised 
(Simpson et al. 2010), overrepresented in the lowest band with more 
difficulties in reaching senior positions. Moreover, a report published in 
October 2020 by East London Care and London Partnership demonstrated 
that their experience as ethnic minority employees is mixed, with the 
COVID-19 pandemic reinforcing health inequalities, racism and 
discrimination. Their current experiences cannot be disentangled from 
the foundational history of the NHS.
Fitzgerald and colleagues describe the NHS as ‘imperially-resourced’ 
(2020, 1169), with today’s NHS an afterlife of colonialism. The first 
significant wave of overseas-trained doctors, many Jewish and other 
Central European refugees from fascist states, entered Britain in the 
thirties (Simpson et al. 2010). In the fifties, migration from the Indian 
subcontinent became important in recruiting doctors, nurses and other 
health workers in Britain. In 1948, qualified nurses were recruited for the 
newly formed NHS, mainly from 16 colonies, particularly the Caribbean 
(Fitzgerald et al. 2020, 9); in the early 2000s trained nurses migrated for 
work from various South Asian and African countries (Mackintosh et al. 
2006). The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s continued 
dominance in global health is another afterlife of colonialism, within 
which an ‘us and them’ pervades in their institution’s name (MacLeod and 
Lewis, 1988).
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Although nationality is not an indicator of ethnicity, today 37 per 
cent of doctors employed in the NHS received their primary qualification 
outside the UK, and the top seven countries of origin of doctors and top 
five of nurses to the NHS are former British colonies – India, Pakistan, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and Egypt (Fitzgerald et al. 2020, 
9). In addition, some 144,000 EU health and care workers in England and 
30,000 doctors, totalling 11 per cent of the 280,000 doctors currently on 
the register, gained their primary medical qualification in the European 
Economic Area (EEA) (Simpkin and Mossialos 2017).
A disproportionate number of ethnic minority NHS staff members 
from various socio-economic backgrounds, including hospital consultants, 
nurses and healthcare assistants, have died as a result of COVID-19. Five 
days before admission to hospital with COVID-19, consultant urologist 
Abdul Mabud Chowdhury appealed for ‘appropriate PPE and remedies’ 
to ‘protect ourselves and our families’ (BBC News, 10 April 2020). 
Dr Chowdhury died on 8 April, one of 1,431 deaths, still (in December 
2020) the highest daily mortality of COVID-19 (Office of National 
Statistics, 12 June 2020). The lack of availability of PPE was documented 
closely in the press as a contributing factor in the death of health workers. 
A shipment of PPE from Turkey did not meet the UK safety standards 
(Rawlinson 2020), further aggravating the crisis. A survey of 3,500 UK 
nurses, conducted early April 2020 (Dean 2020), identified that 67 per 
cent did not have access to sufficient PPE, leaving them terrified. Serena, 
a nurse in her 40s, elaborated on this with the third author, Melania, 
during an interview at the end of April 2020, after relocating to her 
home country in continental Europe.3 She had been in the UK for 
20 years, living in London and working in an NHS high dependency unit 
(HDU). She described how, in the last month of her employment (March 
2020), the health system was ‘under a massive strain’ and she felt unsafe 
at work because of unavailable PPE:
When the first patients came through with ‘query COVID’, that was 
probably February, March already. There wasn’t actually even 
testing provided yet for these patients. I remember one of the first 
patients being tested and it came back as positive. By then I literally 
was wearing my normal uniform and a pair of gloves. That uniform, 
I also took [it] home to wash. That was the first positive case.
Serena continued; after that, scrubs were provided by the hospital and 
staff members were no longer required to wash uniforms at home. 
However, PPE was allocated regionally on the basis of confirmed 
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COVID-19 cases, and there was no standardisation of PPE across different 
units within her hospital or across the NHS:
Only once there is chest compression, intubation, defibrillation done, 
or any invasive or non-invasive oxygen therapy then you get the full 
PPE which is a visor; a facemask; a hair hat; a full gown; and double, 
triple gloving. This is provided in ITU [Intensive Therapy Unit]. On the 
HDU [High Dependency Unit] setting I’ve been working in, this was 
not provided. We would have literally just had a surgical face mask and 
a pinny, which is an apron [with] no sleeves and a pair of gloves.
The lack of PPE also has to be understood in light of Brexit. Following a 
UK-wide referendum in June 2016, in which 52 per cent voted in favour 
of leaving the EU, the government began to withdraw with the aim of 
completing this on 31 December 2020. A key message of the Vote Leave 
campaign during the 2016 Brexit Referendum, which appeared on 
its campaign bus, was We send the EU £350m a week – let’s fund our 
NHS instead, implying that the underfunding of the NHS was due to 
Britain’s obligations to the EU rather than decisions of the Conservative 
government. The promise to fund the NHS was disowned immediately 
after the referendum (Simpkin and Mossialos 2017).
COVID-19 presented the UK’s Conservative government with its first 
opportunity post-Brexit to demonstrate national prowess as a ‘sovereign’ 
nation. Its ‘go it alone’ strategy, driven by the idea of a national past 
characterised by ‘multiple nostalgias’ (Balthazar 2017; Berliner 2012; 
Franklin 2019), had profound negative consequences for healthcare 
professionals’ occupational health. By 12 March, the UK dropped the Test 
and Trace system, claiming that it was no longer feasible due to the level 
of contagion (Mueller and Bradley 2020), although this had been highly 
successful in Germany and Vietnam. Instead, the UK assumed a stance of 
isolationism, reinforcing the government’s determination to present itself 
as independent from the EU.4 In the coming weeks, it emerged that the 
UK simply did not have the testing capacity. On 16 March, it was 
announced that NHS staff could access COVID-19 testing (Moore 2020), 
although it was unclear how this would be implemented. When Serena 
developed a cough after her first patient tested positive, she was not 
offered a COVID-19 test. Neither was another colleague who had attended 
the same patient. Serena explained, ‘it’s not the routine that you get 
swabbed … Unfortunately, staff sickness is very high, so my understanding 
is that the testing is literally for staff to return to work instead of prevention 
from spreading it to anyone else’.
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A strong sense of obligation to work during epidemics/pandemics 
coexists with concerns about lack of protection, lack of testing and the 
welfare of dependents (Shaw et al. 2006). While this affects all health 
workers and others employed in health facilities, it is widely hypothesised 
that people from minority groups are less likely to raise concerns about 
adequate protection (for example PPE) and are at increased risk of 
infection (Kapilashrami and Bhui 2020). For instance, the death of three 
ethnic minority cleaners at St George’s Hospital in Tooting (London) in 
May 2020 led their colleagues to discuss strike action amid claims that 
their own and their families’ health was at risk every time they did a shift 
(Porter 2020) because of the lack of PPE and test provision.
The material politics of epidemiological control, as this concerns 
PPE and testing in the UK, enact and constitute relations of power (see 
Lynteris and Poleykett 2018). The availability of PPE and tests intersects 
in complex ways with the UK epidemic response and the ongoing 
isolationism arising from UK’s withdrawal from EU. The UK government 
missed out on four rounds of procurement of PPE and ventilators launched 
by the EU in late February and March (Wintour and Boffey 2020), leaving 
healthcare professionals, other hospital staff members and their 
respective families feeling unsafe. While key workers played a huge part 
of the coronavirus response, there is continued reluctance to acknowledge 
the historical nature of inequalities, to recognise the UK’s dependency on 
non-British born key workers, or to reward them with good pay and 
conditions and/or preferential access to citizenship. This essentially 
discriminates against foreign workers who pay through their taxes into 
the NHS system, and staff the system, but do not have equal access to it. 
This is clearly illustrated by the UK’s ‘immigration health surcharge’ 
(IHS), created in 2015, which resulted in all migrant workers paying 
twice to use the NHS, both through their taxes and the charge.5
The emerging picture of this injustice filtered through the individual 
voices of migrant health workers using social media. Syrian refugee and 
NHS hospital cleaner Hassan Akkad, for example, filmed himself sitting 
in his car after his work shift and called for ‘fairer treatment’.6 This was 
picked up across national and high-profile social media outlets.7 Akkad 
responded, again from his car, that the support expressed to his first post 
had ‘restored his faith in this country’ adding that ‘Britain is great because 
of you’. While this sentiment reflected the nostalgic nationalism that 
characterised discourse around COVID-19 and the NHS, the public profile 
of social media discourse and the growing pressure from trade unions and 
campaigners, highlighting the moral injustice of the situation, ultimately 
forced a humiliating reversal of the government IHS policy in early May. 
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The IHS, also known as the NHS or ‘healthcare’ surcharge, is a levy on the 
majority of UK visa applications, in addition to other Home Office 
immigration fees. This essentially adds £624 per year per person to the 
cost of a UK visa, or £470 a year for children, students and Youth Mobility 
visas. This fee will also apply to EU citizens after Brexit in 2021. Although 
NHS and care workers are now exempt, critics continue to press for 
further changes, such as extending the IHS exemption to other categories 
of essential workers.
National identity and the underlying  
conditions of racism
The ‘afterlife of colonialism’ acknowledges the legacy of institutional and 
historical racism and its role in the biopolitics of COVID-19 in the UK. This 
was both revealed and compounded by the events that unfolded in June 
2020 in response to Black Lives Matter and the findings of PHE’s 
investigation into COVID-19 and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic groups.
The afterlife of slavery is a ‘measure of man (sic) and ranking of life 
and worth that has yet to be undone … skewed life chances, limited access 
to health and education, premature death, incarceration and impoverish- 
ment’ (Hartman 2007, 6). Adapting this idea to contemporary Britain, we 
use the afterlife of colonialism as a method of reasoning and knowledge 
production that ‘brings the past and present closer together’ by theorising 
how ‘racial hierarchies have been and continue to be replenished’ (Davis 
2019, 13). This illuminates relationships between the British state and 
diverse black and ethnic minority groups, whose bodies are entangled 
with past articulations of empire and white native British superiority, 
specifically through ideas of race and identity as biologically inherited. 
These inequalities are related to social deprivation, often with reference 
to how jobs, work environments and housing make it difficult to ‘socially 
distance’ and because complex sociocultural aspects of working and living 
environments heighten vulnerability, making COVID-19 contagion more 
likely. ‘Underlying health conditions’ such as diabetes, heart disease 
and obesity may also heighten vulnerability to COVID-19 among members 
of these communities. While these chronic ‘underlying’ conditions 
are frequently framed as ‘epigenetic’8 or ‘biological’ factors, they are the 
dynamic outcome and product of embodied social inequalities and 
interactions (Gravlee 2020; Lock 2015).
Afua Hirsch (2020) writes: ‘Racism is a system that kills our bodies’. 
The disproportionate burden of ‘underlying health conditions’ and 
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generalised social inequalities from systemic or structural racism reflects 
the embodied afterlife of colonialism. But also, identities such as those of 
British Black and ethnic minority groups, historically associated with the 
Global South, have now become social locations or positionalities defined 
by colonial history. As Kapilashrami and Bhui state, ‘(e)thnic inequalities 
in the experience and outcomes of illnesses, especially mental illnesses, 
have a long research history of contested explanations and evidence 
[that] fails to capture the complexity of life-course adversity, combined 
with social structures and interactions with pathophysiologies’ (2020, 2). 
For many people who belong to ethnic minority groups, life course 
experiences of social location, defined by a colonial past, continue to lead 
to work stress due to race inequality, racism and discrimination.
Relational identity categories such as BAME are a constant reminder 
of non-whiteness in a white state, making skin colour an identifier of 
national belonging and social location. As Appadurai writes in The Heart 
of Whiteness (1993), nations are not natural facts and the linking of state 
and nation was a tenuous collective project to which a sense of national 
identity was key. This process implied racial hierarchies. In Violence and 
the Body (2003), Aldama emphasises the role of discursive violence in 
reinforcing othering, subalternity and the abjection of those positioned at 
the margins and borders of dominant cultural apparatuses: this social 
location traumatises the interior psyche formation of subjects. The 
‘otherisation’ of certain bodies, central to the process of identity formation 
under colonial domination, is ‘in some cases more extreme and oblique 
under the new social orders of the global economy’ (Aldama 2003, 
5). This otherisation as inferior is the basis of racism as a structural 
determinant of health and the outcome of intergenerational trauma 
(Kuzawa and Sweet 2009; Guthman 2014) that was, and continues to be, 
part of the ongoing process of British national identity.
The idea of a nation-state was aligned to western theories of state 
and involved the erasure of non-European structures of social organisation 
through colonialism. As both western economies and epistemologies 
expanded colonially across the globe, so too, through capitalist expansion, 
nation-states emerged as the only legitimate geopolitical formations 
(Mignolo 2002). Race and the idea of biological inheritance were key, 
defining an imaginary biological origin to attach to the state and national 
identity. In the UK, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic share not belonging 
to a biologically inherited identity (white British), so that the BAME 
category was colonial in origin and is relational in practice. Historians of 
the colonial period, such as Fisher and O’Hara (2009), have demonstrated 
how colonisation effectively created the scientific concept of race. 
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As Laura Briggs suggests (2015, 27), ‘science and medicine made race 
their object’, with the dichotomy of modern and pre-modern contingent 
on racial hierarchies in what Silverblatt (in Fisher and O’Hara 2009, iv) 
describes as a ‘revolution in the possible ways of being human’ that 
attributed different human status depending on skin colour (see also 
Smith 2003; Wolfe 1999).
This fitting together of race, nation and identity, for Britain, hinged 
on creating and maintaining an imaginary superiority and imagined 
inferiority. Yet, as the collective experience of COVID-19 has demonstrated, 
this ideational sense of superiority is detached from Britain’s actual 
performance as a nation. COVID-19 presented an opportunity to 
demonstrate post-imperialist exceptionalism. However, the nativist notion 
of national identity, that plays to a nostalgia for the past, consistently 
harmed the UK’s response. Sarah Franklin (2019) uses the concept of 
‘nostalgic nationalism’ to frame discourse around individual and national 
belonging. At the heart of this is a sense of loss, derived from a loss of 
command power over an empire. Injured white nationalism played a very 
important role in influencing millions to vote to leave the EU in June 2016. 
The campaign slogans of ‘take back control’ and ‘Let’s give 3.5 million to the 
NHS instead’ were hugely influential. Boris Johnson, then campaign leader 
not yet prime minister, was the personification of the specific brand of 
nationalist Britishness that he was selling, inviting film crews to cover him 
eating ice cream cones by the seaside and bringing trays with mugs of tea 
to journalists.
This aspirational nationalism is reinforced by the NHS. As we have 
shown, this is an institution served by Black and ethnic minorities for the 
benefit of a white nation, so mirroring British colonialism and tying 
Britain’s imperialist past to its divided present. The reminder that Britain 
was once an empire reinforces their otherisation in relation to their social 
location as ‘colonised subjects’ (Aldama 2003, 8) or people of empire. 
Without present-day BAME, there can be no coloniser. The NHS helps 
Britain retain this status as a coloniser. The irony of this post-empire 
dynamism is clear in the Brexit–NHS–COVID-19 trilogy. Writing before 
COVID-19 emerged, Fitzgerald and colleagues (2020) argue that Brexit 
must be situated in relation to biomedical policy in Britain in order to 
capture understandings of ancestry and health along with the forms of 
racial inheritance that structure the state and its welfare system. The 
Leave campaign’s appeal to ‘nostalgic nationalism’ led to patterns of 
voting shaped by emotions. The NHS conjures up a similar nationalistic 
sentiment; the offer of exchanging the EU for the NHS, a centrepiece of 
the Leave campaign, generated a similarly emotional reaction.
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The vital roles of EU citizens and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic 
healthcare workers to ensure that the NHS functioned and survived, to 
save the lives of COVID-19 patients, to clean hospitals and drive buses, 
has brought inequality in health outcomes to the fore. It has also 
demonstrated their vital contribution to British society. While the UK 
appeared to have flattened the initial curve of coronavirus infections, it 
did not do so in relation to ethnic diversity: Britain did not become a 
multicultural network of equals, nor a cultural ‘melting pot’, but rather an 
uneven nation of whites and non-whites that extends to more recent 
diasporas of diverse origins. The idea of a category for all non-white 
people creates discomfort, yet the concept of whiteness makes visible the 
privileges that have protected some and made others more vulnerable. 
The COVID-19 pandemic made this starkly visible. Positioning whiteness 
as a category of experience, analogous with the afterlife of colonialism, 
Ahmed (2007) describes how groups of white people ‘take up space’, 
making this a category of experience not biology. ‘Whiteness could be 
described as an ongoing and unfinished history which orientates bodies 
in specific directions’ (Ahmed 2007, 150), a ‘property of persons, cultures 
and places’. Institutional spaces are shaped by their proximity to certain 
bodies. The British National Health Services is a rare outlier, a British 
institution where whiteness does not dominate; the bodies that shape the 
NHS are Black and ethnic minority staff – healthcare providers, support 
and managerial staff, cleaners and technicians. However, this diversity 
has not led to equality – rather, it is evidence of entrenched inequality.
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic has evidenced the inseparability of Britain’s 
imperial past from its divided present, suggesting an afterlife of 
colonialism that undermines the life chances of many, while reproducing 
patterns of racial inequalities. The overrepresentation of Black and ethnic 
minority populations in daily UK death toll figures for coronavirus tracks 
the fault lines of social and economic exclusions that we argue were 
defined through colonialism.
In a global pandemic, critical medical anthropology has the task to 
draw to the surface the social and political origins of illness (Sesia et al. 
2020; Pfeiffer and Nichter 2008). Rather, racism, national identity, 
nationalism and class, and their entanglement, continue to bear down on 
systemic embodied inequalities in the British healthcare system and have 
left specific groups particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. Asymmetrical 
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power structures also dominate global health, so that ‘the contemporary 
health crisis can serve as a reminder that the colonisation of medicine, 
economics and politics remains alive’ (Ghilardi et al. 2020). Understanding 
how social and lived environments shape biological vulnerability without 
newly homogenising or re-stigmatising already vulnerable communities 
in an era of COVID-19 is a profound challenge. In post-Brexit UK, the 
afterlife of colonialism and nostalgic nationalism continues to be relevant. 
The danger comes from long standing and older risks of biologising 
inequality and social difference, where poverty, adversity or lived 
environments permanently mark bodies across lifetime and generations. 
Negotiating biosocial differences in the time of coronavirus is a fraught 
terrain. It provides both the opportunity to reveal the profound extent to 
which structural social inequalities shape health, while risking the ever-
present danger that these differences will be subsumed by rendering the 
biological immutable.
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Notes
1 On 25 May 2020, George Floyd, a 46-year-old Black American man, was killed in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, during an arrest for allegedly using a counterfeit bill (Hill et al. 2020).
2 The term United Kingdom (UK) refers to the union of all four nations, Northern Ireland, Scotland, 
Wales and England. However, Britain (which is the same as Great Britain) only includes Scotland, 
Wales and England. Citizens of the UK all have ‘British’ nationality as well as their individual 
nationality – Irish, Welsh, Scottish or English. Southern Ireland or Éire, is a separate country and 
is not part of the UK or Britain; however, the islands of Ireland and Britain are collectively known 
as the ‘British Isles’, although this does not confer political unity. 
3 The real name has been changed and continental European nationality has been used to protect 
the research participant’s identity, as requested by the interviewee. This interview was part 
of the study ‘Healthcare professionals’ experiences and challenges at the time of COVID-19’. 
The study received favourable ethical approval by Kingston University Ethics Committee 
(REC reference number LR1545). 
4 This was in contrast to the EU response. The European Commission recommended a common 
EU approach towards contact-tracing apps (New European Parliament, 6 May 2020). 
5 This was linked to a slightly different controversy that had excluded particular NHS migrant 
workers such as porters and cleaners from the government’s ‘bereavement scheme’. There was 




7 See, for instance, Gallagher, Paul. 2020. ‘Syrian refugee behind viral NHS video to carry on 
fight for migrants’ rights’. inews.co.uk, 21 May 2020. Accessed 2 August 2020. https://inews.
co.uk/news/hassan-akkad-syrian-refugee-nhs-viral-video-boris-johnson-430090.
8 See, for instance, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/
burden-covid-19-falls-poorer-backgrounds-uk/.
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Coronavirus and the viral vagility of prejudice
Aditya Bharadwaj
The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 pandemic galvanised 
global containment, and prophylactic action centred on the strategies of 
self-isolation and social distancing. These twin procedures of social 
exclusion quickly became the widely accepted intervention against a 
viral load currently evading scientific excogitation. This exclusionary 
approach, undergirding seemingly innocuous global public health 
measures, is infected with a series of discriminatory assumptions built 
into the socio-political architecture of democratic states around the globe.
The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 did more than expose the structurally 
violent and iniquitous stratifications irreversibly scarring lives across the 
globe. The pandemic sanitised and normalised an inherently violent 
mode of pandemic governance inaugurated as a benign prophylactic 
action that rapidly became parasitic on culturally entrenched and 
socially sanctioned stratifications, including most notably caste, gender, 
class, race and religion. These social stratifications became unwitting 
experimental sites for incubating and cultivating alleged herd immunity 
among those who were already socially isolated, politically excluded and 
economically marginalised. For example, in some parts of the world the 
twin prescription of self-isolation and social distancing rapidly exposed 
existing class (and caste) privilege (see Manderson and Levine 2020), 
effectively locking out millions for whom the luxury of maintaining and 
sustaining both distance and isolation turned into an unattainable 
suicidal feat, as I discuss below. This mode of pandemic governance did 
not just unleash a vulgar biopolitics of ‘make live and let die’ (Foucault 
2003; Lemke 2011) but rather a form of crass neoliberal fix that allowed 
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a category of subject-citizens to die for the greater good. This inhumane 
spectacle featuring the untimely demise of an already socially distant 
and economically isolated citizen was consistently reimagined as 
prevention, precaution and protection. The vision of the global governing 
elite – ranging from nation-states to international organisations orche- 
strating the prophylactic intervention – emerged as inherently blinkered. 
These governing elites either ignored or elected to remain ignorant of 
the viral vagility of prejudice already infesting and infecting lives of 
millions around the globe. This is a tragedy not so much because certain 
categories of people disproportionately died, such as the ‘the footloose’ 
labourers in India, the so-called BAME (Black, Asian and Minority 
Ethnic) in the United Kingdom, African Americans, ‘illegal immigrants’ 
and ‘other’ minorities in the United States, and vulnerable and frail older 
people with chronic health problems around the globe. But rather it is an 
unspeakable tragedy because, to borrow from Foucault, the government 
of pandemic could not see these subjugated citizens.1 And when they did 
finally appear from the ground fog shrouding the stratified polity in 
which they existed – in most cases broken, isolated, starving or displaced 
– they were allowed to die for the greater privileged good. A certain 
vitiation of the biopolitical logic emerged. That is, the purported calculus 
behind the calculating gaze of the biopolitical state simply missed seeing 
the many millions assumed to be subjected to its disciplinary logics. For 
example, while the ‘Black Lives Matter’ and ‘I Can’t Breathe’ anti-racism 
protests in the US exposed the state’s ruinous complicity in scarring 
innumerable black lives, the state responded by merely averting its racist 
gaze. The state saw the protests as just another instance of wanton 
lawlessness, a predominant attribute it routinely assigns to a figment of 
its racist imagination: the ungovernable black citizen. This projection 
also allowed the state to recast the anti-racism movement as nothing 
more than a breach of its ‘pandemic demarche’ demanding self-isolation 
and social distancing from law-abiding citizens. However, the state 
hypocritically looked away as its ‘support base’ blatantly violated, often 
with brazen impunity, the same restrictions in the name of freedom 
and liberty.
The philosophical commentaries and critiques that followed 
the emergence of this global emergency were uniquely shaped by the 
ideological attachments of the commentators. Unmistakeably, as a point 
of departure, these musings took the lives, rights and liberties of those 
who could either collaborate with or militate against the disciplinary 
modality implicit in the proposed distancing and isolating interven- 
tions as the norm. Giorgio Agamben (2020) saw the response to be 
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‘disproportionate’ and the resultant state of exception as a normal 
governing paradigm. For Agamben, it was:
almost as if with terrorism exhausted as a cause for exceptional 
measures, the invention of an epidemic offered the ideal pretext for 
scaling them up beyond any limitation. The other no less disturbing 
factor is the state of fear that in recent years has evidently spread 
among individual consciences and that translates into an authentic 
need for situations of collective panic for which the epidemic 
provides once again the ideal pretext. Therefore, in a perverse 
vicious circle, the limitations of freedom imposed by governments 
are accepted in the name of a desire for safety that was created by 
the same governments that are now intervening to satisfy it.
Povinelli (2016) has already shown that terrorism, exhausted or not, like 
SARS-CoV-2, is a virus in the late liberal governance modality. For Povinelli, 
the ‘virus is an active antagonistic agent built out of the collective 
assemblage that is late liberal geontopower’ (2016, 19). Geontopower is a 
‘set of discourse, affects, and tactics used in late liberalism to maintain or 
shape the coming relationship of the distinction between Life and Nonlife’ 
(Povinelli 2016, 4). While the moving balance between life and non-life – 
with the figure of the virus as one of its key embodiments (the perennial 
‘zombie’, neither dead nor alive) – somewhat disrupts Agamben’s running 
battle with the biopolitical state, the limits to Povinelli’s argument are 
perhaps reached in cultural contexts such as India. While outside the scope 
of this chapter, it will probably suffice to say that for millennia Vedanta 
philosophy has mulled over the life and non-life binary as nothing more 
than alternate states suffusing the Universe: jad (matter/unconscious/
insentient) and chaten (alive/conscious/sentient).
Not to be exceeded in the emerging scene of philosophy gone ‘viral’, 
philosophy’s self-styled agent provocateur Slavoj Žižek produced extended 
pamphlets, seeing in the coronavirus epidemic an opportunity to ‘give a 
new boost of life to [reinvented] Communism’ (2020). Esposito’s blunt 
organic analogy painstakingly developed in Immunitas: The Protection and 
Negation of Life, equating the human body’s immune system to (protective 
cover of) law, suddenly became timely and prophetic. Similitude between 
the unfolding pandemic and a search for immunisation against the 
menacing threat, SARS-CoV-2, looped back to the subliminal thesis of 
ingesting poison/danger to neutralise poison/danger or, as in the case of 
COVID-19, vaccine/part virus. Esposito’s philosophical sermon was as if 
proclaiming: immunisation against the other by incorporating the other. 
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Learning to live with the other. Eliminating incompatibility between 
(immunitary) self and (communitary) other. In other words, ‘to concept- 
ualize the function of immune systems in a different way, making them into 
relational filters between inside and outside instead of exclusionary barriers 
… by disabling the apparatuses of negative immunization, and by enabling 
new spaces of the common’ (Esposito in Bird and Short 2013, 6),
However, these philosophical commentaries and others attached 
to (rightly) critiquing the biopolitical state neglected the rampant re- 
emergence and re-enactment of brutal old prejudices. These prejudices 
weren’t exactly state generated, but nevertheless they were efficiently 
mined by the biopolitical state as a governing resource. It was as if the 
SARS-CoV-2 breathed new life into old discriminations and bequeathed 
a certain viral vagility to indifference and prejudice. For instance, in the 
US the pandemic raged like an out-of-control forest fire: on 31 December 
2020, in that country alone, nearly 20.5 million people had been reported 
infected and 355,000 had died from coronavirus. Fatalities were (and are 
still, at time of writing) disproportionately higher in communities and 
neighbourhoods with large African American populations (Zephyrin et al. 
2020). Additionally, as joblessness and economic precarity deepens, taps 
are being turned off because of non-payment of bills ‘even as the CDC 
calls for frequent hand washing’ (Laxmi 2020). In the UK, a similar story 
played out as COVID-19 disproportionately impacted Black, Asian and 
Minority Ethnic people, the so-called BAME. Fatality among doctors and 
care staff was similarly reported to be higher among ‘the BAME’. The virus 
of prejudice, like SARS-CoV-2, exploited underlying biological weaknesses 
and socio-political prejudices. The latter is rather well reflected and 
encapsulated by the use of this offensive acronym, BAME: in one deft 
move all diversity, complexity and experience was reduced to bureau- 
cratised categories, sutured together as a biopolitical convenience sample. 
BAME became an alternative to Other. And as I will show later in this 
chapter, in India the Dalit and other vulnerable groups were singled out 
to face up to centuries’ old persecution, albeit now enjoying a new lease 
of life in the garb of social distancing and isolation.2 The word Dalit (dälit) 
means ‘ground down’, ‘broken to pieces’, ‘crushed’. It seeks to ‘convert a 
negative description into a confrontational identity and to become a 
particular sort of political subject’ (Rao 2009, 1). Treated as untouchables 
for millennia, the postcolonial state in India recognised the historic 
injustice and established the group of Scheduled Castes (SC) within the 
newly established constitution. The Scheduled Castes are estimated to 
include around 170 million people. The practice of untouchability was 
formally banned as the constitution came into force on 26 January 1950. 
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Key remedial initiatives established constitutionally guaranteed policies 
of positive discrimination and affirmative action to better support the 
integration of the SC and ST (Scheduled Tribes, currently numbering 
80 million people). However, the cultural force of prejudice continues to 
vitiate and subvert the constitutionally established principles of equality 
and non-discrimination. This is notwithstanding the fact that the Dalit 
community has emerged as a major political force in the Indian democracy 
(see Rao 2009; Ciotti 2010). It seems the pious utterances enshrined in 
the constitution continue to be an ineffective vaccine against the virus of 
culturally entrenched prejudice.
In this chapter, I do no more than grapple with the viral vagility of 
prejudice in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. In so doing, I meditate 
on the texture of structural violence, exploring how horrific forms of 
social exclusion and marginalisation exacerbated as the pandemic gained 
traction. In pointing out this intensification, I take a literary detour to 
gesture at the ‘already there’ normalised to euphemised forms of violence 
that were amplified as states enjoined the citizens to retreat into relative 
privileged isolation and distancing. Drawing on examples from India, 
I introduce the notion of ‘shroud stealers’ to reflect on the unfolding 
pandemic and to better apportion responsibility, including our own 
culpability as academic spectators and commentators.
Kafan Chor: ‘the shroud stealer’ and the  
pandemic of poverty
The influenza pandemic of 1918 birthed a curious figure in the city of 
Delhi: kafan chor, the shroud thief. Having just lost thousands of Indian 
soldiers in the First World War, the city was suddenly facing the terrifying 
spectre of yet more death. From the account provided by writer–poet and 
scholar Ahmed Ali (1910–94), we learn that ‘filled with anger against the 
inhumanity of man, Nature wanted to demonstrate her own callousness 
and might’ (Ali 1940, 169). Ali vividly captures the unfolding pandemic:
Men carried dead bodies on their shoulders by the score. There was 
not a single hour of the day when a few dead bodies were not carried 
outside the city to be buried. Soon the graveyards became full, and 
it was difficult to find even three yards of ground to put a person in 
his final resting-place. In life they had had no peace, and even in 
death there seemed no hope of rest. A new cemetery was made 
outside the city where people buried relations by the score. 
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The Hindus were lucky that way. They just went to the bank of the 
sacred Jamuna, cremated the dead, and threw away the ashes and 
unburned bones in the water. Many were thrown away without a 
shroud or cremation (1940, 169).
At the peak of the pandemic, Ali describes a ‘gruesome menace’ emerging 
in Delhi in the form of shroud thieves. Stealing shrouds became a quick 
way of ‘procuring bread’ and ‘earning a livelihood’. Ali’s ghoulish 
description is written with the anguished authority of an eyewitness. It 
jolts the reader into sitting up and becoming a spectator – aware but 
unable to act – given the slow unravelling of the human condition:
Many went to the graveyards at dead of night with spades and long 
iron hooks. It was not difficult to dig open the new graves, especially 
because they had been dug and filled up in a hurry. With the help of 
their iron hooks they pulled out the winding-sheets and got good 
money for them. Hyenas and jackals thus found their task made 
easier for them. They could enter the newly opened graves and fill 
their bellies to the full (Ali 1940, 170).
According to Ali, the ‘grave-diggers’ amassed a fortune during the 
pandemic. The scavenging shroud thieves, for the first time in a long 
while, did not do too badly either. The cloth merchants, banias, raised the 
price of ‘line-cloth’ used for ‘winding sheets’, kafan. Those who could not 
afford a proper kafan settled for a cheaper thinner shroud that would 
barely conceal the dead body, and so ‘the person would starve, but spend 
a little more to give his dear one a decent shroud’ (Ali 1940, 171). 
Similarly, the reader learns that the ghassals, whose job it was to wash the 
dead for their final journey, did ‘roaring business’ as they ‘laved the bodies 
with water’ and pocketed gold and silver rings left on the corpses (Ali 
1940, 171).
Ali evokes for the reader a macabre economy that sprang up in the 
height of the pandemic. His account is not a first-person narrative of 
unfolding events, nor is it in any straightforward sense rooted in historical 
evidence. But Ali’s pathos laden commentary is a conjuring of collective 
grief, disbelief transmogrified into memory. It is a traumatic archive of 
source material which summons pensive reflections on the nature 
of precarity haunting the human condition. A disparate cast of characters 
in Ali’s account see opportunity in the pandemic, and in their own unique 
way – digging graves or robbing them, selling shroud or offering ghassal 
– become grotesque iterations of a kafan chor, the shroud stealer.
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The notion of stealing better typifies the suggested debasement in 
Ali’s account as opposed to mere thievery (thief is the literal English 
translation for chor). The very act of stealing the shroud and its many 
surrogate enactments in the figure of the banias and the ghassals, for 
example, are tantamount to stealing human dignity and losing it 
altogether. Whether for profit or livelihood, the shroud stealers offer a 
haunting commentary on human depredation. This theme was elevated in 
the heart wrenching literary evocations of one of the pioneering figures of 
modern Hindi and Urdu literature, Munshi Premchand (1880–1936). 
Premchand wrote over a dozen novels and over 300 short stories describing 
in vivid detail the tribulations of the middle classes and the crippling 
poverty of the socially excluded. In his 1936 story Kafan, the shroud, 
Premchand offers a masterful meditation on dehumanising poverty in a 
stratified social landscape. The story’s main protagonists, abjectly poor 
father (Ghisu) and son (Madho), must face an intractable crisis as Madho’s 
labouring wife, Budhiya, dies in childbirth. The penniless duo neither have 
the money to buy a shroud nor the means to give the dead woman a decent 
funeral. While the father and son manage to beg and cobble together 
enough from the village landlord, merchants and moneylender, they end 
up spending the money on liquor and a minor feast, even as Budhiya’s 
body languishes in the hut unattended and unshrouded. The decline and 
descent into this seemingly ugly self-indulgence is gradual:
‘We need only the shroud now.’
‘Let’s get a cheap one.’
‘Of course. It will be night when the corpse is carried to the pyre, no 
one will look at the shroud.’
‘What an unjust custom! She, who didn’t have even tattered rags 
to cover her body while she was alive, must now have a new shroud.’
‘And it burns to ashes with the corpse.’
‘So it does. Now if we had these five rupees earlier, we could’ve 
bought her some medicines.’ (Premchand 2017, 662)
Premchand suggests that the father and son duo were able to guess 
the other’s weakening resolve. They prolonged their search for the 
perfect shroud into the evening, only to find themselves at the door of 
the wine house. It is here their resolve finally crumbles, and with it, 
the veneer of worldly decorum and appropriacy, the preserve of the 
well-fed rich.
This surface reading codes a paradigmatic commentary that 
Premchand rustles into the storyline, straddling multiple narrative 
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devices ranging from darkly comical to manifestly ironic and cathartic. 
This ‘readerly’ text, to borrow from Roland Barthes (1974), takes one to 
the door of a certain ‘writerly’ complexity. The characters are damned and 
framed as if embodying prevailing societal judgements and indifference. 
The potential judgement implicit in a privileged reading is coded into 
carefully worked up character portraits. Time and again, the author loops 
the surface reading back to the reader, demanding a deeper incredulous 
response. Eventually, the reader begins to detect the literary sleight of 
hand, astutely distilling culturally framed assumptions into the textured 
but wilfully stereotyped characters. Premchand’s characters, in other 
words, reveal the reader’s latent complicity (and by extension society’s 
perfidious culpability) in maintaining structurally violent stratifications 
that the characters must perennially endure. Premchand hides the 
cultural context in the narrative fold to expose multiple seething realities 
haunting the duo. Manifestly, the reader encounters two inherently 
unsavoury characters: indolent, amoral, insensitive, self-centred, callous, 
wretched. The reader also learns that the father and son belong to the 
ostracised Dalit community: in 1936, a Dalit would have been routinely 
brutalised as an untouchable. However, an array of deeper meanings 
continually surface to tangle the syntagmatic thread. For example, the 
protagonists’ financial precarity emerges as a feature of their marginal 
status but equally an element of their everyday resistance practices 
(torpid laziness) that allowed them to eke out a living under the 
exploitative and stratified feudal gaze. The fact that the duo end up 
spending the money for the shroud on feasting and drinking liquor 
doubles up as an allegory for the caste-based violence scarring their lives. 
That is, culturally sanctioned upper caste maleficence deprives them both 
of dignity and of the means to a dignified life. This is also a moment of 
escape from the guilt and unexpressed trauma of sitting helplessly and 
watching Budhiya come to a painful end. The story reveals how grovelling, 
beseeching and snivelling is expediently deployed by Ghisu to extract 
money from an unjust order that owed him much more than money for a 
mere shroud. The disgust and condescension with which the landlord 
obliges, throwing a paltry sum of money at Ghisu, characterises the 
stratified order in which he has evolved to deploy strategic subservience 
as a survival strategy. Ghisu knows when to yield and when to wield ‘the 
weapons of the weak’ (cf. Scott 1985). At one point in the story, Ghisu 
sneers at his guilt-ravaged son who is suddenly confronted with the 
horror of squandering money for the shroud on food and drink: ‘The same 
people who gave us the money [will give the shroud]. They won’t hand 
over the money to us anymore. If they do, we’ll have another feast here. 
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And they’ll pay for the shroud again’ (Premchand 2017, 664). By about 
the end of the story, repeatedly punctuated by innovative theodicies 
justifying their actions, father and son dance and collapse in the throes of 
inebriate stupor. To the bitter end, Ghisu remains confident of his ability 
to extract at least a shroud from the unjust society that barely gave him 
enough to clothe his own existence of bare life.
Premchand paints the unrelenting despoliation of the human 
condition. These are brought about by practices of ritualised humiliation, 
built into the architecture of a hierarchically segregated social structure 
incubating extreme forms of precarity. The feasting and drunken reverie 
becomes an eerie cipher for near schizophrenic lamenting, a death dance 
of the living dead, and an outward projection of the internalised societal 
suggestion that both father and son are at best subhuman. Both Ghisu and 
his son ventriloquise a culturally sanctioned debasement, electing to 
become amplified caricatures of an inhumane society personified by the 
upper caste landlord and moneylender. The need to beg for a shroud by 
gaming the very people who game into existence the violent stratified 
order in which one dies, is perhaps the core message in the story. 
Premchand corrugates into the story the multiple readings of the text; in 
so doing, he forces the reader to confront the shroud-stealing social order 
that Ghisu and his son endure on a daily basis.
Stratified proxemics: vitiated life and structural violence
A baby plays with a shroud covering its dead mother at a station in 
Bihar, in one of the most tragic visuals to emerge from the daily 
reports of migrants stranded by the coronavirus lockdown. In a clip 
widely shared on social media, the toddler tugs at the cloth placed 
over his mother’s body. The cloth comes off but his mother doesn’t 
move; she had died moments before. According to her family, she 
died of extreme heat, hunger and dehydration (Kumar and Ghosh 
2020).3
In March 2020, hundreds upon thousands of migrant workers and their 
families were left stranded as the Indian government ordered a 
countrywide lockdown in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
problem was exacerbated by the timeline of the decision: 1.3 billion 
citizens were given notice of a mere four hours to retreat into self-isolation 
and to ensure social distance. The lockdown rapidly turned into an 
extensional threat for India’s poor who quickly found themselves out of 
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work and with no safe place to harbour in the city (more on this below; 
see also Garimella and colleagues, Chapter 11). It seemed that the 
biopolitical state had no plan. It took, as the norm, the lives and 
circumstances of those who could isolate and participate in tokenistic 
display of solidarity with the state. Relatively privileged citizens were 
summoned to lockdown and called upon to join the state from the comfort 
of their homes to celebrate the impending end of the pandemic. Mirroring 
similar public gestures in other settings, the state invited citizens to 
partake in nightly candle vigils and to beat household utensils, perhaps 
imagined as a ritual to ward off the evil virus, and to show (middle class) 
solidarity from the comfort of their balconies, gardens and terraces.4
Meanwhile, panic ensued in less salubrious neighbourhoods across 
the country as people began making contingency arrangements and 
desperately attempting to stockpile. The suddenness of the lockdown 
particularly hurt millions of ‘footloose’ (Breman 1996) daily-wage 
labourers who, overnight, were without work and money. With infinite 
foresight, reasoning and desperation, workers decided to retreat to the 
relative safety of their homes, often thousands of kilometres from 
megalopolises like Mumbai and Delhi where the majority worked as daily 
wage labourers (EPW 2020). The ILO noted that ‘the lockdown measures 
in India, which are at the high end of the University of Oxford’s COVID-19 
Government Response Stringency Index, have impacted these workers 
significantly, forcing many of them to return to rural areas’ (ILO 2020, 6). 
With no means of other transportation available, workers and their 
families began converging to walk home along national highways. 
Thousands continued the trek on foot; a lucky few persuaded interstate 
haulers to ferry them in the back of their trucks. Hunger, dehydration, 
heat stroke, exhaustion and vehicle accidents claimed many lives. An 
exact account of these fatalities, collateral damage of COVID-19, is not yet 
available.5 Further, India’s surprisingly low death rate linked to COVID-
19, with a case fatality rate of 1.8 per cent, is being questioned (Lancet 
2020a, b); India lacks the capacity to count and certify deaths due to 
COVID-19 using the RT-PCR test (Nature 2020). This is hardly surprising 
given the lopsided nature of India’s vast healthcare system – from state-
of-the-art hubs for medical tourists to decrepit rural healthcare centres 
of questionable quality and few resources. Healthcare in India is 
incorporated under ‘the ‘State’ list of legislation and jurisdiction, different 
from the ‘Union’ and ‘Concurrent’ lists, thus enabling various state 
governments to assume control and responsibility of health provision 
for their populations’ (Bharadwaj 2016, 110).6 The Indian healthcare 
landscape can at best be defined as ‘mixed’, a vestige of its post-colonial 
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mixed economy developmental planning. In the emerging neoliberal 
India of the twenty-first century, however, this mixed approach champ- 
ioning public primary health and private curative healthcare provision 
has further consolidated as a two-tier system skewed in favour of private 
healthcare delivery. It is this mixed-up model that the state’s pandemic 
response scrambled into action. The true extent of the pandemic and how 
it impacted the Dalit and other vulnerable groups in India will probably 
never emerge. This pessimism is only exacerbated by the prevailing state 
of chronic underinvestment and concomitant limited capacity to test and 
trace, and to establish a credible and coordinated, nationwide, pandemic 
surveillance system. 
When the state did finally rouse from its candle-lit vigil torpor, it 
responded to the unfolding tragedy by commandeering special trains and 
buses to transport people home. However, bureaucratic hurdles and 
delays, general confusion and lack of information, coupled with rumour 
and panic, made the task even more arduous. Left wageless and eventually 
homeless, daily-wage labourers and itinerant workers were rapidly 
recapitulated and euphemised – both in government and media discourse 
– as ‘migrants’ in their own country.7 The searing heat and unending wait 
in queues, the overcrowded trains, running often without water or 
adequate sanitation, added to the fatalities – as in the case of a woman 
whose partially shrouded anonymity, thanks to gawking smartphone-
wielding bystanders, momentarily went ‘viral’ on social media (see 
Narasimhan, Chittem and Purang, Chapter 19). The footage was seized 
by local politicians to expediently criticise the sitting administration in an 
election year (DNA 2020; Kumar and Ghosh 2020).
As Breman (1996) showed more than two decades ago, the footloose 
proletariat in India is largely detached from its place of origin, and seldom 
grows roots in the workplaces to which it temporarily finds employment 
(also see Sainath 1996). The bulk of such labour is drawn from the Dalit 
community and other oppressed groups low down on the caste pecking 
order. Emerging data indicate the deepening economic impact of the 
entwining of caste and the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing on nationally 
representative panel data for 21,799 individuals between May 2018 and 
April 2020, Deshpande and Ramachandran (2020) show that far from 
being a ‘great leveler’, the COVID-19 pandemic disproportionately 
impacted lowest-ranked castes due to ‘lower levels of human capital and 
over-representation in vulnerable jobs’. The study found that ‘the rate of 
job loss was three times higher for the SCs (Scheduled Castes) and job 
loss for individuals involved in daily wage jobs, relative to December 
2019, was more than nine times higher’ (Deshpande and Ramachandran 
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2020, 1, 10). While the pandemic and resulting lockdown exacerbated 
pre-existing inequalities, the resulting economic precarity will only 
increase as the pandemic wears on. This is particularly true in the light of 
emerging analysis from the World Bank (2020). The World Bank 
assessment notes that while India has made progress in reducing absolute 
poverty, declining from 21.6 per cent in 2011 to 13.4 per cent in 2015, 
thus lifting more than 90 million people out of extreme poverty, India’s 
GDP contracted (year-on-year in quarter 1, financial year 2021) by an 
astonishing 23.9 per cent because of pre-existing domestic issues and the 
pandemic-linked national lockdown. The sudden collapse has hit poor 
people particularly hard. To date, the ILO predicted that 90 per cent of 
about 400 million workers in the informal economy faced serious risk of 
falling deeper into poverty during the pandemic (ILO 2020, 6).
The pandemic accentuated the scale of social exclusion, margin- 
alisation and discrimination experienced by the Dalit. For instance, the 
National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) in India has actively 
monitored the impact of the pandemic and the subsequent lockdown on 
the Dalit, Adivasi (tribal) and other marginalised communities. A press 
statement released by the National Dalit Movement for Justice (NDMJ-
NCDHR) and data collected by NDMJ show how the pandemic has 
worsened the situation (International Dalit Solidarity Network 2020). One 
can glean from these emerging data sources a clear rise in instances of 
caste-based untouchability, physical and sexual assaults, police brutality, 
reported and unreported murders, inadequate to no PPE for Dalit sanitation 
workers, and rising levels of hunger and deaths during the lockdown period 
(International Dalit Solidarity Network 2020). The NCDHR pointed out 
that the deployment of the term ‘social distancing’ as a safety measure 
simply bled into established upper caste prejudice and the practice of 
‘untouchability’ in both subtle and egregious ways. Dalit activist Ramesh 
Nathan explained:
But what happened was that the Hindu fundamentalist organisations 
gradually started using this to justify Manusmriti (ancient legal 
Hindu text dated 100 ce). They did a lot of propaganda in the social 
media and other media, saying ‘this is what we have been saying’ 
and ‘we should not let people in our homes, we should not touch 
other people, we should not shake hands’. They started to reinforce 
the caste system. For us, the term social distancing has already 
prevailed in our society due to the caste system. The Dalits have 
been presented as unseen-able, unapproachable and untouchable. 
These are the major elements of the caste system. Social distancing 
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reinforced these ideas. We are hurt that the dominant caste system 
is taking advantage of the situation to once again push for casteist 
ideas (sic) (TwoCircles.net 2020).
It has become common at mere mention, even in liberal western media, 
to qualify – often in parentheses – the word Dalit as ‘former untouchables’. 
This is legally accurate. The Untouchability (Offenses) Act, 1955, was 
amended and renamed in 1976 the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 
(PCR Act), in addition to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (POA Act) (see Thorat 2009). But the 
notion of ‘former untouchable’, like the homogenising BAME acronym in 
the British media and policy discourse, is both offensive and inadequate. 
As the lived experience of segregation of over 200 million Dalit 
demonstrates, the practice of ‘untouchability’ remains a festering legacy 
of caste-based social distancing. Thus a well-established prejudice further 
validated ‘distancing’ while singling out the Dalit body as the primary 
source of (COVID-19) contagion.
The spatial separation of individuals and classes in India has a long 
history, marking, maintaining and restricting commensality (Ghurye 
1961). The ideologically policed and scripturally sanctioned separation 
of humans is hierarchically arranged and horizontally divided so as to 
separate ideals of purity from sources of pollution. This is not just a 
simplistic opposition of the pure and impure (Dumont 1970; also see 
Dirks 2001; Jodhka 2018); it is also a feature of a long cultural process of 
reimagining the impure as perennial contagion stalking and staking the 
pure. The impure in this respect does not emerge as a site for pollution 
per se but, more pertinently, as the source of defilement. In classical 
Brahminical puritanism, defilement assumed a certain mobile and 
projectile velocity and ferocity. It encompassed an array of bodily organs, 
discharge and matter, and corporeal contact; even the shadow of impure 
subjects were menacing sources of contamination and defilement 
(also see Fuller 2004). The solution against such a spectral menace 
was reconceived under the modernising impulse of colonial rule (Dirks 
2001). As a form of social distancing, literal and metaphoric, this 
reconceiving disallowed the sources of imagined pollution and abject 
defilement to infect the pristine sociality fenced off for the untouched 
pure. The resultant violence – symbolic and graphic, between the 
untouched and the untouchable – stood for a purity that could not be 
touched by the untouchable ‘super spreaders’ of contagious pollution. 
The dehumanisation that grew out of culturally sanctioned ‘concepts of 
hygiene, purity and contamination’ (cf. Savage 2007) became key to both 
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maintaining distance and enforcing isolation between stratified categories 
of humans. In this respect, the separation of castes was a foundational 
source of violence between the untouched and the untouchable. 
The tropes of purity and pollution emerged as a legitimising justification 
to sustain and contain a violent mode of social control. This structurally 
violent system of stratification, euphemised as the caste system, 
institutionalised inequality so as to contain and maintain social distance 
between humans.
There is a well-documented history of prejudicial barriers and caste-
based dogmas in moments of rupture like plagues and pandemics (see 
Kidambi 2004; Ramanna 2012). For instance, in 1896 the Hindu Plague 
Hospital in Pune was managed by the priestly caste, Brahmins, and 
as British colonial officer Charles Rand reported, it was only open to 
Brahmins and other upper castes (Chamadia 2020). In its inaugural year 
alone, Brahmins formed 62.2 per cent of the total number of patients 
(Chamadia 2020), although they were likely around 7 per cent of the 
population (Plowden 1883, 227). Similarly, Kidambi (2004) described 
how the draconian measures employed by the colonial administration to 
control the bubonic plague of the 1890s repeatedly ran into caste-based 
objections, especially when measures involved coming into contact with 
lower castes or accepting food cooked by a subordinate caste. The upper 
caste preoccupation with the inherent contagious impurity of lower castes 
ironically mirrored not only the iniquitous colonial hierarchy but also its 
unshakeable belief in ‘sanitary disorder’ predicated on an ‘orthodox 
contagionist doctrine’ (Kidambi 2004, 51).
Dr B.R. Ambedkar, the father of the Indian constitution, a Dalit, 
scholar and advocate for Dalit rights, powerfully dissected the rabid 
anatomy of caste and caste prejudice in a paper presented at an anthro- 
pology seminar at Columbia University in 1916. Ambedkar located the viral 
vagility of prejudice in the ‘fissiparous character of caste, as a consequence 
of the virtue of self-duplication that is inherent in it’ (Pritchett 1979, 21). 
In 1948 he further developed the fissiparous character of caste structuring 
untouchability, explaining how and why ‘the Hindu will not live in the 
quarters of the untouchables and will not allow the untouchables to live 
inside Hindu quarters’ (Ambedkar 1948, 22). For Ambedkar, the caste 
system cordoned off territory to create permanent spaces of segregation, 
‘a cordon sanitaire putting the impure people inside a barbed wire, into 
a sort of a cage’ (1948, 22). The untouchable ghetto for Ambedkar was an 
unending and inherently violent form of social distance.
SARS-CoV-2 offers a unique opportunity for reflection, and an 
opportunity to revisit Ambedkar’s life’s work. The virus of caste and the 
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cordon sanitaire imposed by the caste system reproduce the viral vagility 
of SARS-CoV-2 in the here and now. And as some of us spectate and 
protest with anguished horror in privileged quarantine, we must remain 
attentive to our own culpability.
Addendum
We are all shroud stealers now. As we begin to imagine life beyond the 
pandemic, some of us will be forced to reimagine the metaphor of kafan 
and kafan chor afresh. The shroud, kafan, and the thief, chor, are ultimate 
allegories: the former representing peeling away the frayed shards of 
human dignity and the latter typifying profit-making from structurally 
violent contexts overseeing unshrouded demise of vulnerable others. This 
is not mere production of ‘bare life’ under a ‘state of exception’ (Agamben 
1998), for the excluded, the marginal and the poor are often expediently 
included in the project of state formation (see Gupta 2012). The notion 
of kafan and chor reveals the amorphous indeterminacy of structural 
violence. As Gupta rightly reminds us, structural violence ‘is a crime 
without a perpetrator’, that is, it is hard to identify the perpetrator 
(2012, 21). Akhil Gupta argues that ‘one must keep in mind that certain 
classes of people have a stake in perpetuating a social order in which 
such extreme suffering is not only tolerated but also taken as normal’ 
(2012, 21). He further contends that those who disproportionately 
benefit from the status quo are complicit in the violence directed against 
the poor. However, he singles out the agents of such violence ‘in a country 
like India’, as including not only the (ruling and other) elites, but also the 
burgeoning middle class. Vocalising this partial truth in different guises 
is the predominant approach employed by the purveyors of liberal 
critique, so as to diagnose and locate the mêlées elsewhere. The globally 
distributed classes of people who circuitously benefit from insidious 
structural violence (myself and Gupta included) emerge as conscious-
stricken diagnosticians and commentators. This faceless crowd of 
innocent bystanders grows on the margins of a carefully crafted problem 
space that includes the biopolitical state, its crony elites and the vast 
swathe of indifferent middle class. The diagnosis remains partial, 
inherently incomplete and vulnerable to degenerating into sanctimonious 
politics of outrage and condemnation. Thus we, the faceless liberal crowd, 
are kafan chor in two significant ways. First, we wittingly or unwittingly 
obfuscate our involvement in the violence against so-called marginalised 
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people: Dalit, ‘BAME’, Black, Roma, or ‘similar others’ (cf. other 
discussions on race, ethnicity and inequality in this volume). In so doing 
we further feed biopolitical turpitude, forcing inhumane options 
(disguised as choice) on those who seldom experience choice in choice-
obsessed neoliberal formations. Second, we set up home on the margins 
of structurally violent spaces, sometimes literally but mostly meta- 
phorically, so as to live off the life, labour and death of our entrapped 
neighbours. Through our vote or support for the biopolitical state or 
via our schizophrenic relationship to neoliberal citizenship, we remain 
complicit.
In this sense, Premchand’s heart-wrenching literary virtuosity 
forces a certain ethical recognition. Stratified poverty and social exclusion 
dehumanises the very humans it ensnares. More importantly, Premchand 
successfully jolts a reflexive awareness – of the reader’s own moral and 
ethical poverty – into existence. The well-ingrained impulse within us to 
critique the biopolitical calculus of the modern state aside, one hopes the 
pandemic will also unleash a moment of critical self-appraisal of our self-
centred solipsism. After all, the biopolitical state works for us, and its 
egregious overreach is almost always justified, sanitised in our name. This 
is a certain post-pandemic condition in the making: shroud stealers (like 
me and you) mulling innovative theodicies to better understand how and 
why the pursuit of an untrammelled life made us complicit in foisting an 
undignified end on a category of people who, as in life, died without a 
shard of shroud to their name.
The ‘government of pandemic’ working to protect both fragility and 
vulnerability endemic to privilege operates by tapping into vagile 
prejudices of our times. Perhaps we needed a global pandemic so as to 
wake up to the subcutaneous biopolitical brutality lurking under the thick 
skin of the modern state – to reiterate, empowered by us to speak and act 
in our name. This also means that the logic of make live and let die needed 
to appear that much more clearly and show how an exceptional state of 
exception further extended and distended state power to allow a certain 
category of people to perish (as opposed to merely die). But more 
crucially, the pandemic revealed unsavoury truths about us, a faceless 
crowd of shroud stealers, content with merely critiquing the biopolitical 
excesses of the governing elite. And, we are able to do so safe in the 
knowledge that our ends will be shrouded in a modicum of dignity, even 
as our picket fenced life will struggle to obfuscate the ugly, poverty-




1 According to Foucault, government ‘must be allowed the very broad meaning it had in 
the sixteenth century. “Government” did not refer only to political structures or to the 
management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of 
groups might be directed – the government of children, of souls, of communities, of the sick’ 
(2002, 326). 
2 At a cursory glance, class in contemporary neoliberal India may appear to be overtaking caste 
as the primary source of social stratification. In this respect the upper caste poor may now be 
‘outcaste’, to be avoided for fear of contracting COVID-19. However, caste privilege continues 
to dominate; it allows an upper caste person, even in an economically marginal state, to benefit 
from caste-ordained prejudices and suffer none of the culturally sanctioned outcomes a Dalit 
routinely endures (see further below; see also Ciotti 2010). A good comparison is between 
white working-class poor and African American poor in the US. An outcome rooted in economic 
precariousness may be unfavourable for both, but the actual consequence is almost always 
worse if the protagonist is Black. There is little evidence that class privilege fails to guarantee 
a good health outcome because racist prejudices are built into the biomedical view of the Black 
body (Davis 2019; see also Maybank et al. 2020). 
3 At the time of going to press the horrifying second wave is unfolding in India. The appalling 
mismanagement and cavalier overconfidence of the state resulted in severe vaccine and oxygen 
shortages. The daily infection and mortality rates are simply incalculable due to sporadic 
recordkeeping. As funeral pyres burn day and night and the poor who cannot afford cremations 
abandon their dead in rivers or bury the dead in river sandbanks, the state’s complicitous 
silence has become deafening. To add to the horror stories about a gang stealing shrouds from 
crematoriums to sell on the market began circulating in local media (Times of India 2021).
4 It is highly likely that this ‘pandemic ritual’ was inspired by the impromptu balcony concerts and 
community singing in Italy, but in India it was an invitation from the sovereign rather than a 
spontaneous show of solidarity, reducing the ritualised display to mere political theatre. 
5 Even when information is available, reports suggest rampant ‘undercounting’ of COVID-19 
linked fatalities (Pulla 2020).
6 According to Balarajan and colleagues, ‘India’s total expenditure on health was estimated at 
4.13% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008–09, with public expenditure on health 
being 1.10% of the share of GDP. Private expenditures on health have remained high over the 
last decade, with India having one of the highest proportions of household out-of-pocket 
expenditures on health in the world, estimated at 71.1% in 2008–09’ (2011, 4).
7 In India, mass media, particularly new media, is in a state of crisis. A large section of news 
media is criticised as having thrown its weight behind the state. Euphemistically referred to as 
the godi media, literally ‘lap’ or cradling something or someone in one’s lap. A vast section of 
regional and national media is being dismissed by critics in India as compromised or in the ‘lap’ 
of the state. These godi media outlets routinely peddle fake news, often bordering on shrill 
jingoism and bigotry. However, a section of independent news media channels and newspapers 
have asserted journalistic freedom and resisted the ‘godi news outlets’. A growing number of 
people are also turning to these sources for more accurate information and editorial 
assessments. 
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Unprecedented times? Romanian 
Roma and discrimination during  
the COVID-19 pandemic
Cristina A. Pop
Romania has the largest Roma minority in Europe, and here, the COVID-19 
pandemic has revealed a pattern of anti-Roma attitudes that have 
infused the government’s attempts to contain the virus. In this essay, I 
consider two events revolving around the Romanian Roma – the lockdown 
of Țăndărei, a town with a significant Roma minority, and the public 
controversy surrounding the publication on social media of a derogatory 
meme about the Roma stuck in Țăndărei during the lockdown. I examine 
the ways in which the pandemic has intensified and even institutionalised 
racist attitudes against Roma, and I show how the Roma have worked 
around public attempts to confine and ridicule them. While the COVID-19 
crisis raises unprecedented challenges for many around the globe, to 
the Romanian Roma the pandemic may just be the latest in a series of 
instances in which they have found themselves shamed for their 
transnational mobility and subjected to containment. I review two such 
precedents – the swine flu (H1N1) pandemic of 2009–10 and the measles 
epidemic of 2016–18 – to show that, in contexts of heightened public 
concern about confinement and contagion, the Roma have been 
at the same time subjected, and creatively resistant, to biopolitical 
constraints.
Romanian Roma include several heterogenous groups. While many 
Roma live in permanent settlements, either as city dwellers or village 
residents, some are more itinerant, traveling across Romania or back and 
forth between Romania and other countries in eastern and western 
Europe. A minority of the Romanian Roma display their wealth by living 
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in opulent mansions whose intricate and pharaonic architectural designs 
often make headlines in the tabloid press (Dumbara 2016). These 
contrast with Roma communities of people living in extreme poverty 
in decrepit neighbourhoods, sometimes in landfill slums. Many 
Roma have assimilated, to various degrees, with the Romanian majority; 
fewer continue to practise traditional crafts such as tinsmithing and 
coppersmithing. Yet notwithstanding their diversity, most Romanian 
Roma share several potentially unifying ethnic identity markers, such as 
the high value attached to notions of purity, respect and shame, honour 
and family (Pons 1995; Tesăr 2012; Berta 2019). Despite their diversity, 
the majority of Romanians reify the Roma as a monolithic entity, and 
refer to them in stereotypical terms as unlawful, unclean, underclass and 
itinerant, but also as talented musicians and dancers, and family-oriented 
people (Szeman 2018). Fonseca, for example, details various Roma 
communities in Albania, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia and other countries 
in her ethnography about European gypsies, and describes the Romanian 
Roma as ‘the least obedient people in the world’ (1995, 140).
From their first arrival in the fourteenth century into the Carpathian 
territories situated at the north of the Danube river, the Roma (designated 
in the past as ‘gypsies’ [țigani]) were enslaved and used as an unpaid 
labour force, especially in Christian Orthodox monasteries. This 
continued until the mid-nineteenth century when they were liberated 
once a new generation of politicians who had been educated in western 
Europe during the 1848 revolutions came to power in Romania’s historical 
provinces of Moldova and Valachia (Fonseca 1995; Djuvara 2008). 
Between 1946 and 1989, under the communist regime which prioritised 
class struggle over ethnic identity, the Roma were not officially recognised 
as an ethnic group. With notable exceptions, such as the 1977 Plan for the 
Forced Integration of Nomadic Gypsies (Ștefănescu 2020), the communist 
state did not try to assimilate the Roma, and communist policies 
emphasised social emancipation for all classes. Ideas of progress rather 
than ethnic assimilation informed state programmes to force nomadic 
Roma into permanent settlements, discontinue their traditional 
occupations and enrol their children in Romanian schools (Pons 1995; 
Szeman 2018). Like other Romanian citizens, the Roma benefited from 
social welfare and free medical care, but given their resistance to 
assimilationist policies of the communist state, they continued to be 
discriminated against (Pons 1995; Fonseca 1995). Most Romanian 
citizens were denied transnational mobility in this Cold War period, yet 
despite being enclosed behind the Iron Curtain, the Roma managed to 
engage in international travel, often smuggling coveted western 
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merchandise, from blue jeans to contraceptive pills, back into Romania. 
They were border-crossers even at a time when the outside world was out 
of reach of most Romanians. The Roma’s transnational mobility reinforced 
the Romanian majority’s stereotypes about their structural nomadism. 
This established the foundation of their future casting as scapegoats in 
the time of epidemics. After all, people do not travel alone across borders; 
viruses travel with them.
After the demise of the communist regime in 1989, the Romanian 
state formally recognised the Roma as an ethnic group, using the 
ethnonym ‘Roma’ [Rrom]. While most prefer to be called Rrom, some 
would still favour to be called țigan [gypsy], despite the derogatory 
connotations of this former ethnonym. Their official acknowledgment as 
an ethnic group subjected Roma to new forms of marginalisation and 
discrimination (Vincze and Raț 2013), and sometimes to racially 
motivated violence. For instance, the state has differentially targeted the 
fertility of various socio-demographic groups, incentivising increased 
fertility for high-income urban professionals but discouraging it for 
minorities – especially the Roma (Raţ 2009). Universal child allowance, 
introduced in 1993, was only distributed through schools for children 
over seven, although in 2007 the law was modified to allow children who 
did not attend school – the majority Roma – to also receive the allowance. 
Paid maternity leave is available only for a mother’s first three births and 
only for mothers who were employed and had contributed to the public 
insurance fund for at least 12 months before giving birth. These elitist 
family policies have daunted the most fertile categories of population – 
especially the Roma minority – which is also the poorest. In an eugenicist-
sounding comment, political analyst Ionuț Popescu asked the state to 
decide ‘what [type of] natality should be encouraged’. Alluding to Roma 
parents, Popescu cautioned against the commodification of having 
children (Benezic 2011).
The Roma were among the first Romanian citizens to take advantage 
of the post-communist dismantling of previous policies. In the early 1990s, 
with the removal of the Iron Curtain and European borders gradually 
opening up to eastern Europeans, many Roma began to migrate to western 
Europe in search of economic opportunities. Some surrendered Romanian 
citizenship and became stateless persons in the hope, seldom fulfilled, of 
being granted refugee status or western country citizenship (Pons 1995). 
With Romania struggling to attest to its commitment to ‘European values’ 
in preparation to joining the European Union, negative stereotypes about 
the ‘uncivilised’ Roma became more prevalent in public discourses. 
The Roma became the designated scapegoats for Romania’s geopolitical 
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fiascos (Pons 1995; Fonseca 1995). After Romania was finally admitted 
to the European Union in 2007, Romanian Roma joined millions of other 
Romanian citizens in seasonal or, in some cases, permanent economic-
driven transnational migration to other European countries, particularly to 
Italy, Spain, France and the United Kingdom (Berta 2019; Szeman 2018).
For over seven centuries of cohabitation, Romanians have developed 
stigmatising stereotypes about țigani. The dehumanising and margi- 
nalising lens through which Roma are viewed is evident in extensive 
idiomatic expressions, images and stories about gypsies. In general, Roma 
are represented as delinquent, lazy, untrustworthy and dirty. In its form 
as a verb, ‘to gypsy’ (a se țigăni) denotes nagging, bartering or excessive 
negotiating for a minor thing. People speak idiomatically of ‘drowning 
like the gypsy ashore’ (a se îneca ca țiganul la mal) to denote failing a 
project or an endeavour in its final stage; ‘[swallowed food] taking the 
gypsy’s way’ (a se duce pe calea țiganului) to refer to choking; ‘tossing 
death at the gypsies’ (a arunca moartea în țigani) to refer to wrongfully 
blaming someone; ‘moving around, like the gypsy and his tent’ (a se muta 
ca țiganul cu cortul) to denote instability and untrustworthiness. The most 
common ethnic slur that non-Roma Romanians use to refer to Roma is 
‘crow’ [cioară], a reference to the fact that Roma are believed to have dark 
complexions, although many ‘white gypsies’ have very light skin, blond 
hair and light-coloured eyes, and for this reason, are assumed to be 
kidnapped Romanians. As a child growing up in Romania, to ensure that 
I stayed close to my adult family members in a crowded place, I was told 
that țiganii were child abductors. In an ironic twist, it was the ethnic 
majority of Romanians who feared assimilation by the Roma through 
human trafficking. As we shall see, these ethnic slurs acquired new 
meanings during the COVID-19 pandemic.
On 16 March 2020, in response to the emerging coronavirus 
pandemic, the president of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, issued Decree 
195 and declared a state of emergency. The Romanian government 
periodically updated the stipulations of the decree through 11 military 
ordinances, issued between 17 March and 11 May. On 4 April 2020, the 
government issued Military Ordinance 7, which stipulated the lockdown 
of Țăndărei, a town of 12,000 in southern Romania, about 150 kilometres 
east of the capital city of Bucharest (Budușan 2020). A significant 
minority of Roma – 30 per cent of the town’s population – live in Țăndărei. 
As European countries implemented lockdowns and closed borders 
following coronavirus outbreaks, hundreds of thousands of Romanian 
citizens, including Romanian Roma, working in Italy, Spain, France and 
other western European countries, returned to Romania. In a 24-hour 
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period on 25 and 26 March, two Roma men from Țăndărei, aged 60 and 
39, died after testing positive for COVID-19. These deaths, along with 
other cases of people surviving the coronavirus – a total that would 
rapidly escalate to seven deaths and 37 cases by 6 April – were traced to 
a funeral that took place in the Roma community of Țăndărei in mid-
March (Pocotilă 2020). In response to this outbreak, the Romanian 
Minister of Internal Affairs, Marcel Vela, declared on 1 April 2020: ‘The 
main issue is that they [the Roma of Țăndărei] are remaining in contact 
with one another. They don’t follow the rules, they move around and are 
hard to contain’ [my translation from Romanian] (Pocotilă 2020; 
Duminică 2020). In this discourse, Vela points to the irreconcilable 
otherness of the Roma; he insinuates derogatory connotations to social 
values otherwise widely recognised as positive, such as closeness, and 
alludes to the stereotype of the Roma as being obstinate unruly wanderers. 
Three days later, on 4 April, Țăndărei was placed under lockdown by 
police and special forces, as specified under Military Ordinance 7. While 
the lockdown came in response to the increase of COVID-19 cases among 
the Roma community of Țăndărei, the non-Roma majority of the town 
was subjected to the same restrictions. The town reopened on 14 May, 
following the stipulations of Military Ordinance 11.
Days after the lockdown of the town, several Romanian intellectuals 
shared on social media an offensive meme that ridiculed the Roma 
confined in Țăndărei. Vladimir Tismăneanu, professor of politics at the 
University of Maryland (College Park) in the United States, posted on his 
Facebook account a meme that he had received from Denisa Comănescu, 
the general director of Romania’s most well-known academic publishing 
house, Humanitas. The meme, posted on 10 April, was the picture of a 
flock of crows sitting on a wooden fence, with text that read: ‘Țăndărei 
Airport. All flights have been cancelled’. Tismăneanu shared the meme 
with the comment: ‘Super cool, thank you, Denisa Comănescu’. [Super 
tare, mulțumesc Denisa Comănescu.] Tismăneanu, born into a family of 
communist activists, had defected from Romania in 1981 and has been 
living in the US since 1982. A prominent intellectual figure of the 
Romanian diaspora, he is also the director of the Centre for the Study of 
Post-communist Societies at the University of Maryland (College Park). 
Although Tismăneanu deleted his Facebook post minutes after publishing 
it, a public controversy ensued. Sociologist and Roma activist Ciprian 
Necula publicly denounced Tismăneanu’s post as racist. Later the same 
day, Tismăneanu published ‘An error, an explanation’ [O eroare, o 
precizare] on his Facebook page, acknowledging his previous posting of 
the meme, but claiming that he had missed its ‘racist implications’ because 
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he no longer lived in Romania (Necula 2020). He later deleted this 
explanation as well. On 11 April, Tismăneanu posted an apology for 
having circulated the ‘racist, inappropriate, and most importantly, hurtful 
meme’, and admitted that not residing in Romania was no excuse for his 
actions. Romania’s National Council Against Discrimination [Consiliul 
Național pentru Combaterea Discriminării CNCD] filed a formal complaint, 
fined Tismăneanu and notified the University of Maryland. The 
University’s officials acknowledged and firmly condemned the racist 
character of Tismăneanu’s post but did not further sanction their 
professor, on the grounds that he had not displayed any racist behaviour 
prior to this incident. Denisa Comănescu, general director of Humanitas 
publishing house and the original source of the meme, also apologised 
publicly, claiming that she had not realised the racist undertones of the 
image (Păvălucă 2020). The controversy dragged in other prominent 
Romanian intellectuals, among them celebrated writer Mircea Cărtărescu, 
who, in a Facebook post also later deleted, praised Tismăneanu for 
apologising and denounced those who had shamed him as hypocrites 
(Mutler 2020; Dobrescu 2020; Tolontan 2020).
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the ‘crow’ ethnic slur 
acquired new meanings. ‘Crow’ had been previously used to refer to the 
Roma in reference to the stereotype that most Roma have darker 
complexions than other ethnic groups, just as crows are darker than other 
birds. But crows also have the ability to fly, and the picture that Comănescu 
and Tismăneanu circulated showed the birds sitting on a fence. The 
immobile crow became an ironic allusion to the fact that Roma were 
deprived of their stereotypical proclivity for mobility by the forced 
quarantine. The intended humour of the meme depended upon pre-
existing derogatory characterisation of Roma as ‘unruly wanderers’, now 
forced to stay in place. The wooden fence that stands for ‘Țăndărei 
Airport’ can be seen as an intended comic hint to the quasi-rural infra- 
structure of the town.
On 1 May 2020, in response to the Țăndărei lockdown but unrelated 
to the racist meme scandal, the former president of Romania, Traian 
Băsescu, declared on live TV that:
The gypsies have to understand that their way of life cannot be 
tolerated. Romania has to be a country where state institutions have 
control over all territory. No matter how much [the gypsies] protest, 
they have to understand that, neither police nor constabulary, and, 
if necessary, not even the armed forces will ever step back’ [my 
translation from Romanian] (Mihai 2020).
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Băsescu had been Romania’s president for two consecutive terms between 
2004 and 2014, and the COVID-19 pandemic was not the first time he had 
publicly expressed anti-Roma attitudes. Despite being officially recognised 
as an ethic group in 1989, Romania has never officially acknowledged 
that, alongside Jews, Roma were subjected to extermination during the 
Holocaust. In a press release published during Băsescu’s first term on 
the Romanian Presidency website in 2005, the Roma were excluded from 
the Holocaust commemorations. This omission prompted calls from the 
Roma community to review the content of the press release.1 Even if, in 
2010, Băsescu declined to sign into law a nationalist proposal to officially 
replace the ethnonym ‘Roma’ with the more derogatory ‘gypsy’, he made 
repeated racist comments about the Roma, whom he frequently called 
‘gypsies’. In 2014, he was finally fined by the CNCD for his disparaging 
statements.
As often happens during social and political crises, xenophobic 
attitudes are activated by a collective search for a scapegoat. In such 
circumstances, ‘the other’ is suddenly more noticeable and potentially 
culpable. In Romania, the COVID-19 public health crisis granted renewed 
but unwarranted visibility to the Roma (Matache and Bhabha 2020), in 
ways that are reminiscent of how they were treated during earlier 
pandemics and epidemics. Continually socialised into circumstances of 
discrimination, the Roma have previously been quick to work around 
forms of biopolitical surveillance. This is why their responses to 
coronavirus events, including Țăndărei’s lockdown and the public 
controversy surrounding the meme, were neither dramatic nor 
unprecedented. As anthropologists Veena Das and Erving Goffman (Das 
and Goffman 2013) remind us, even though ‘stigma’ and ‘contagion’ are 
‘theoretically distinct concepts’, they ‘tend to slide in each other’ especially 
when ‘stigmatized diseases lead to the drawing of boundaries within the 
domestic and its immediate environment of kinship and village or 
neighborhood community’. To better understand the Romanian Roma’s 
earlier experiences of being subjected to prejudice in the context of 
intense public concerns about contagion and confinement, I consider two 
recent examples: the swine flu (H1N1) pandemic of 2009–10 and the 
measles epidemic of 2016–18.
Romanian medical care facilities, including maternity hospitals, 
were placed under quarantine during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, with 
strict limitations of access for everyone but medical workers and patients. 
In December 2009, as a parturient mother in a public maternity clinic in 
a large city in northern Romania, along with my family members, I had to 
observe these restrictions to access healthcare. While hospitalised in the 
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quarantined clinic, I noticed the presence of members of extended 
families of several Roma women who had given birth. A rumour circulated 
among patients and medical staff that the Roma had bribed the hospital 
doorman to secure access to their parturient relatives. Despite the 
rumours and the disparaging comments about breaking the quarantine 
rules, the medical workers turned a blind eye and the Roma women’s 
family members were not forced to leave the hospital.
As a patient and newly delivered mother myself, I observed ethnic 
segregation in that maternity hospital on four distinct occasions between 
2002 and 2009. Roma women were put together in the room closest to 
the hospital’s entrance, with the least privacy. They were separated from 
Romanians, Hungarians and members of other ethnic groups in a space 
closest to hospital hallway traffic. Two Roma women from a town in 
southern Romania, who I interviewed later as part of a research project 
(Pop 2016), recalled being segregated in the public maternity hospital in 
Romania’s capital city Bucharest where they had given birth. The practice 
of segregating people of Roma ethnicity appears to be widespread in 
Romanian public hospitals, especially in maternity wards, as stated 
in Open Society Foundation and World Health Organization reports 
(Refworld 2015, WHO 2013). Similar practices have also been documented 
in Bulgaria and Hungary, where parturient Roma women are routinely 
placed together in ‘gypsy rooms’ (Iszák 2004).
This concern about segregating the Roma from the other patients 
inside the hospital during the H1N1 pandemic of 2009–10 overlapped 
with the temporary quarantine provision of separating all hospital 
patients from the outside world. Ironically, this confinement within 
confinement created a breaching opportunity for Roma family members. 
Since the practice of segregating Roma patients was already part of the 
default racist setting of the hospital space, the family members of 
the Roma women were prepared to penetrate spatial boundaries and 
successfully used informal payments for that purpose. The fact that they 
were only aiming to visit ‘the gypsy room’ – a quasi-liminal space, already 
separated from the rest of the hospital – may explain why medical staff 
seemed unconcerned that Roma family members were being granted 
access inside the hospital during the flu quarantine. Perhaps Roma’s 
intrusion seemed less real or less important to medical personnel, since 
they only had access to the actual (and metaphorical) margins of care; for 
this reason, there was little risk that they might infect other patients. The 
Roma disregarded the interdiction to enter the quarantined hospital, and 
successfully worked their way around it. In some sense, like the medical 
staff, they may have felt that the quarantine did not even apply to them 
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because they only needed access to a marginalised part of the building, 
which already ensured that they were separated from others in the 
hospital. Roma family members found ways to break access interdictions 
precisely because their previous exposure to quotidian forms of structural 
violence prepared them to expect segregation and discrimination and to 
develop strategies to overcome these instances. While medical workers 
and other patients viewed the informal payments to the doorman as 
bribery – a form of corruption that reinforced the majority’s stereotypes 
of Roma’s unlawfulness – the success of informal contributions raises 
questions about how these perpetuate structural violence and racism 
against the Roma. ‘Bribery’ only worked with the complicity of the non-
Roma majority (represented in this context by the doorman and hospital 
medical workers). The non-Roma rewarded transgressive behaviours by 
granting the Roma family members access to the quarantined hospital 
only to denounce such behaviours as expressions of Roma’s inclination 
toward illicit action. Roma constantly face segregation and marginalisation 
(Vincze and Raț 2013; Szeman 2018), and on a daily basis work around 
formal interdictions. Overcoming barriers to hospital access during the 
swine flu pandemic provides only one example of many that prepared the 
grounds for Roma to not take the COVID-19 quarantine seriously.
During the 2016–18 measles outbreak, the Romanian Roma were 
alleged to have brought the disease from Italy. Measles spread to Romania 
in January 2016 and peaked in 2018. It has continued to spread; according 
to statistics released by CNSCBT, by May 2020, 20,107 cases and 64 
fatalities had been reported. Data from the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control identified epidemic spread in several European 
countries, but Italy and Romania accounted for 34 per cent and 30 per cent 
respectively of all cases by March 2018. With a notification rate of 226.8 per 
million population (compared to the European average of 28.7 per million 
population), Romania was by far the most affected country, with the 
deadliest outbreak among European nations. According to Romania’s 
National Centre for Surveillance and Control of Communicable Disease 
[CNSCBT], the epidemic had started in a rural community from north-
western Romania, whose members, mostly Roma who traded clothing and 
household goods, were consistently travelling back and forth between 
Romania and Italy (Măgrădean and Tobias 2016). Genetic analysis 
established that the B3 strain of the measles virus had been brought from 
Italy and was different from the endemic D4 type that had circulated in 
eastern Europe during past epidemics (CNSCBT 2016).
Measles infection spread rapidly around Romania, and was 
particularly deadly among Roma infants and children. This influenced 
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claims that the Roma had brought the virus from Italy (Măgrădean and 
Tobias 2016) despite the fact that, in 2016, over one million Romanians 
lived and worked in Italy and they too regularly travelled between the two 
countries. The higher measles incidence and mortality among the Roma 
was therefore a symptom of a structural rather than contingent problem.
Designed as a one-size-fits-all national scale programme rather 
than a targeted regional and local project, Romania’s measles-mumps-
rubella (MMR) vaccination campaign failed in its outreach to many Roma 
communities and reproduced old discriminations while creating new 
excluded populations. Community health workers blamed the low 
vaccination rates on Roma’s ‘lack [of] identification papers’ and ‘itinerant 
lifestyles’ (Coman 2017): they argued that many Roma were officially 
registered neither in Romania nor Italy, and therefore fell between the 
national immunisation programmes of the two countries. However, 
investigative journalists who covered the measles outbreak in several, 
mostly poor and rural, Roma communities in southern and western 
Romania found that parents had expressed their intention to vaccinate 
their children, and complained about being forgotten by public health 
authorities. From the Roma’s perspective, the measles outbreak became 
‘an epidemic of neglect’ (Drăgan et al. 2018). Excluded from the 
healthcare systems of both Romania and Italy, some Roma used traditional 
healing remedies against measles. Without access to vaccination and 
allopathic medical care, some Roma community members attempted to 
prevent measles with imitative magic methods, like dressing babies in red 
clothes – a reference to the fact that rujeolă, the word for measles in 
Romanian, designates the colour red. Others used traditional folk 
remedies, such as rubbing the baby’s body with brandy or wine (Simina 
2017). Journalists highlighted the prejudice held by the Romanian 
majority against the Roma minority, reporting the manner in which social 
workers, family doctors and other health providers used ethnic slurs and 
talked about Roma in a condescending manner (Drăgan et al. 2018). 
Ignoring some of the structural reasons for low vaccination rates, a few 
welfare assistants admitted to having used intimidation tactics, such as 
withholding financial aid to low-income Roma parents on the grounds 
that they had not vaccinated their children (Ursu 2018). These people, 
who represented state authority, dismissed the Roma as superstitious and 
ignorant about the benefits of biomedicine. The use of alternatives to 
allopathic medicine only reinforced, among the non-Roma majority, 
clichés about gypsies practising the occult. However, Roma’s resort to 
symbolic magic and traditional prevention can be understood in a more 
pragmatic manner, as an attempt to use the only available resources at 
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their disposal to prevent illness. The structural violence that shapes the 
provision of care to many Romanian Roma explains these alternative 
tactics of prevention and healing.
Even when the MMR vaccination was available, ethnic discrimination 
prevented Roma children’s access to the vaccine. A 2016 study comparing 
paediatric vaccination in Roma and non-Roma children in countries from 
central and eastern Europe, including Romania, found that the odds of 
being vaccinated for a Roma child was 38.6 per cent that of a non-Roma 
child for MMR for the region. In Romania there is a 31.1 per cent gap in 
MMR vaccination between Roma and non-Roma, which places Romania, 
along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the country with the highest 
vaccination gap in the region (Duval et al. 2016). Ethnic origin, lack of 
access to healthcare, socio-economic status, lack of awareness of the need 
for immunisation, and perceived and real discrimination have all 
contributed to this immunisation gap. Overall, the measles epidemic of 
2016–18 exposed the existence of entire Roma populations who were 
omitted from mainstream healthcare because of structural barriers such as 
poverty, racism and discrimination. The epidemic also highlighted the 
centrality of stereotypical narratives in official public health discourses that 
shame the Roma for their transnational mobility.
The systemic forces through which the Roma were singled out 
during the H1N1 flu pandemic of 2009–10 and the measles epidemic of 
2016–18 serve as the background against which we should understand 
Roma’s reactions to confinement in Țăndărei during the early months of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Their resistance to the normative powers of 
biomedicine and the state is more practical than ideological. The Roma 
have naturalised structural vulnerability to a degree that has prepared 
them to effectively elude it. While enclosure in their town was enforced 
by both police and military forces, the Roma live-streamed parties on 
TikTok, to the despair of authorities. One man from Țăndărei recorded his 
coronavirus hospitalisation and healing process. In his vlog, posted on 
YouTube and widely circulated by Romanian mass media, he first speaks 
through a mask, advising people to stay home and take the virus seriously, 
and later emerges from his hospital bed, takes off his mask, and invites 
family and friends to a welcome home party (Literas 2020a, 2020b). 
Although the non-Roma population of Țăndărei was subject to the same 
lockdown measures, national TV aired only footage of the streets of the 
Roma neighbourhoods of the town, with adults and children ignoring 
social distancing requirements and wandering around. This prompted 
several other TV channels to feature footage of the police and armed 
forces patrolling the streets of Țăndărei and enforcing the quarantine 
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under the caption ‘game of cat and mouse between the population and 
the police’ (Știrile PROTV 2020).
Structural violence against the Romanian Roma, in the present as 
in the past, has taken the form of discrimination, segregation, prejudice, 
marginalisation and poverty. These structural forces expand beyond 
Romania, impacting the lives of Roma throughout central and eastern 
Europe. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia many Roma live in extreme 
poverty, in crowded dwellings, with no access to running water, under 
conditions that impede their capacity to adhere to the simplest 
preventive measures. During the COVID-19 pandemic, similar racialised 
anxieties about infection and about the Roma spreading the virus 
were recorded in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia (Neuberger 2020; 
McLaughlin 2020). While Romania is not the only country to witness 
pandemic-triggered prejudice against the Roma, the Țăndărei lockdown 
exposed the full extent of state’s and civil society’s institutionalised 
racism.2
In the last decade, Țăndărei has been repeatedly featured in the 
national and even international news. In 2010, several men among the 
very affluent Roma of Țăndărei were charged with human trafficking, 
accused of taking children from Romania and forcing them to panhandle 
in the United Kingdom. The lawsuit dragged on for almost 10 years before 
the case was dismissed in court in February 2020 due to insufficient 
evidence. The verdict was controversial and allegations of corruption 
circulated in the mass media. Wealthy Roma were suspected of having 
bought the state authorities’ complicity to hide incriminating evidence. 
Though there seems to be no causal link between the accusations of 
human trafficking against the Roma of Țăndărei and the subsequent 
lockdown of the town as COVID-19 gained ground, many Romanians 
connected the two instances (Ștefănescu 2020); they both illustrated a 
perception about the Roma as situated beyond and above the state’s 
regulations. However, some Roma challenged this perception, arguing 
instead that both the human trafficking case and Roma’s civil dis- 
obedience during the lockdown should be understood as examples of the 
government’s inability to punish and discipline the delinquent Roma 
(Baias 2020; Barberá 2020). Roma activist Duminică (2020) argued for 
the need to shift the focus from a particular ethnic group to the state and 
its governance style. In his opinion, the fact that the Roma escaped state 
control both before and during the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated the 
state’s complicity and corruption. The pandemic, then, exposed and 
deepened existing mutual mistrust between the Roma minority and 
Romanian authorities, and reinforced stereotypes on both sides about 
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‘unlawful gypsies’ and the ‘weak state’. The public health crisis produced 
by COVID-19 brought into public visibility old and new assumptions 
about the need to purify the ‘social body’ from ‘corruption’, ‘superstition’ 
and ‘civil disobedience’ (see also Matache and Bhabha 2020).
Locking down entire communities because of COVID-19 was un- 
precedented in Romania. Yet, as suggested by previous instances such 
as the swine flu pandemic and measles epidemic, the discourses that 
circulated about the Romanian Roma among ordinary citizens, 
intellectual and political elites, and authorities during the coronavirus 
pandemic were not without precedent. By successfully – in a pragmatic 
rather than ideological manner – working around discrimination by 
(literally or figuratively) breaking boundaries, the Roma at the same time 
reinforced stigmatising narratives and attitudes held by the Romanian 
majority. The COVID-19 pandemic set the ground for future discrimination 
against Roma.
Notes
1 In fact, Romanian lexicons do not agree with definitions of the Holocaust. In the Romanian 
academy thesaurus (DEX 1996, 463), the meaning of the ‘Holocaust’ is the ‘killing (through 
fire) of a very large number of people’, while in the Abridged Dictionary of the Romanian 
Language MDLR (Breban 1997, 281), the Holocaust is defined as ‘the massacre of the Jews by 
the Nazis’. There are no changes in more recent editions of these lexicons.
2 The only other Romanian area to be quarantined was Suceava, a city of 100,000 people from 
northeast Romania. As stipulated in Military Ordinance 6 from 30 March 2020, Suceava was 
locked down along with eight other adjacent villages, after the public health authorities 
recorded 593 cases. To compare the magnitude of the outbreaks, by the time Țăndărei was 
quarantined on 4 April, there were approximately 30 cases in a town one-tenth the size of 
Suceava.
References
Baias, Ionut. 2020. ‘Cazul Țăndărei, cu 25 de achitări: Nu a existat nicio probă directă din care să 
rezulte în mod indubitabil vinovăția – instanță’. 11 February 2020. Accessed August 2020. 
https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-23655602-cazul-tandarei-25-achitari-nu-existat-nicio-
proba-directa-din-care-rezulte-mod-indubitabil-vinovatia-instanta.htm.
Barberá, Marcel Gascón. 2020. ‘Romania isolates human trafficking hotspot to limit outbreak’. 
5 April 2020. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/04/05/romania- 
isolates-human-trafficking-hotspot-to-limit-outbreak/.
Benezic, Dollores. 2011. ‘Depinde ce fel de natalitate vrem să încurajăm’. 26 January 2011. Accessed 
30 August 2020. https://cursdeguvernare.ro/ionut-popescu-depinde-ce-fel-de-natalitate-ne-
hotaram-sa-incurajam.html.
Berta, Péter. 2019. Materializing Difference: Consumer culture, politics, and ethnicity among 
Romanian Roma. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
Breban, Vasile. 1997. Mic Dicționar al Limbii Române. Bucharest, Romania: Editura Enciclopedică.
Budușan, Iulian. 2020. ‘Ce prevede Ordonanța Militară cu numărul 7. Orașul Țăndărei se închide, 
iar zborurile spre zonele roșii sunt anulate’. 4 April 2020. Last modified 31 August 2020. 
https://www.libertatea.ro/stiri/ordonanta-militara-sapte-text-integral-ce-prevede-2940847.
VIRAL LOADS160
CNSCBT. 2016. ‘Evoluția rujeolei in România, 2016’. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://www.
cnscbt.ro/index.php/informari-saptamanale/rujeola-1/560-evolutia-rujeolei-in-romania- 
2016/file.
Coman, Octavian. 2017. ‘Fatal inaction: How measles made a comeback’. 30 November 2017. 
Accessed 31 August 2020. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/fatal-inaction-how- 
measles-made-a-comeback-11-30-2017.
Das, Veena and E. Goffman 2013. ‘Stigma, contagion, defect: Issues in the anthropology of public 
health’. Accessed 30 August 2020. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5113/ba09191943a 
0234e59f5d5ef37b683d502a8.pdf?_ga=2.257549451.1265060091.1598834583- 
2075407597.1598834583.
DEX. 1996. Dicționarul Explicativ al Limbii Române. Bucharest, Romania: Univers Enciclopedic.
Djuvara, Neagu. 2008. Între Orient și Occident. Țările Române la începutul epocii moderne. Bucharest, 
Romania: Editura Humanitas.
Dobrescu, Petre. 2020. ‘Mircea Cărtărescu îl apără pe Vladimir Tismăneanu și îi numește “farisei” 
pe criticii acestuia’. 11 April 2020. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://www.libertatea.ro/stiri/
mircea-cartarescu-sare-in-apararea-prietenului-vladimir-tismaneanu-dupa-postarea-rasista-
priviti-cum-i-au-sarit-la-gat-toti-fariseii-2950868.
Drăgan, Flavia, Marian Mircea and Ramona Ursu. 2018. ‘Epidemia nepăsării’. Newsweek 1(4): 
13–23.
Dumbara, Ana. 2016. ‘The Romanian town built on British benefits: Mansions bigger than the 
average UK semi and BMWs with British number plates parked in the drives paid for with 
taxpayer cash’. 5 April 2016. Accessed 24 August 2020. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-3518736/The-Romanian-town-built-British-benefits-Mansions-bigger-average-UK-
semi-BMWs-British-number-plates-parked-drives-paid-taxpayer-cash.html.
Duminică, Gelu. 2020. ‘Focarul de coronavirus din Țăndărei n-are legătură cu etnia, ci cu eșecul 
statului roman’. 6 April 2020. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://www.vice.com/ro/article/
dygqwm/focarul-de-coronavirus-din-tandarei-si-statul-roman.
Duval, Laetitia, Francois-Charles Wolff, Martin McKee and Bayard Roberts. 2016. ‘The Roma 
vaccination gap: Evidence from twelve countries in Central and South-East Europe’. Vaccine 34: 
5524–30.
Fonseca, Isabel. 1995. Bury Me Standing: The gypsies and their journey. New York: Vintage Books.
Iszák, Rita. 2004. ‘“Gypsy rooms” and other discriminatory treatment against Romani women in 
Hungarian hospitals’. 15 December 2004. Last modified 27 August 2020. http://www.errc.
org/roma-rights-journal/gypsy-rooms-and-other-discriminatory-treatment-against- 
romani-women-in-hungarian-hospitals.
Literas. 2020a. ‘Literas eduard bolnav de COVID19 la tandarei live din spital live 1’. 2 April 2020. 
Accessed 31 August 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPLxxEIe0V4.
Literas. 2020b. ‘Literas eduard bolnav de COVID19 la tandarei live din spital live 2 vindecat’. 2 April 
2020. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MlaIssIb-8Q.
Matache, Margareta and Jacqueline Bhabha. 2020. ‘Anti-Roma racism is spiralling during COVID-19 
pandemic’. 7 April 2020. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://www.hhrjournal.org/2020/04/
anti-roma-racism-is-spiraling-during-covid-19-pandemic/?fbclid=IwAR1z_7ZLp1bfWmRRC
uP96tuAbydcaYNVo219U7NayFM-QM5Jt-A_X2p_2mw.
Măgrădean, Vasile and Andreea Tobias. 2016. ‘Epidemia de rujeolă. Focarele au apărut în comunități 
de romi din Bistrița. Copiii nu au fost vaccinați’. 22 September 2016. Accessed 27 August 2020. 
https://www.mediafax.ro/social/epidemia-de-rujeola-focarele-au-aparut-in-comunitati-de- 
romi-din-bistrita-copiii-nu-au-fost-vaccinati-15742362.
McLaughlin, Daniel. 2020. ‘Coronavirus pandemic deepens despair and danger for Europe’s Roma’. 
5 April 2020. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/
coronavirus-pandemic-deepens-despair-and-danger-for-europe-s-roma-1.4221540.
Mihai, Alina. 2020. ‘Traian Băsecu reclamat și el la CNCD pentru afirmații incitatoare la ură. Ce a 
spus fostul președinte despre etnicii romi’. 3 May 2020. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://
www.mediafax.ro/politic/traian-basescu-reclamat-si-el-la-cncd-pentru-afirmatii-incitatoare-la-ura- 
ce-a-spus-fostul-presedinte-despre-etnicii-romi-19112378.
Mutler, Alison. 2020. ‘Depiction of Roma as crows exposes deeper racism in Romania’. 16 April 
2020. Last modified 31 August 2020. https://www.rferl.org/a/depiction-of-roma-as-crows-
exposes-deeper-racism-within-romania/30558933.html.
uNPrECEdENtEd t iMEs? roMANiAN roMA ANd disCriMiNAtioN 161
Necula, Ciprian. 2020. ‘Vladimir Tismăneanu, un rasist chiulangiu. Cum a ajuns un professor roman 
din SUA să posteze fotografii cu “ciorile de la Țăndărei”’. 11 April 2020. Accessed 31 August 
2020. https://www.libertatea.ro/opinii/vladimir-tismaneanu-un-rasist-chiulangiu-ciorile-de- 
la-tandarei-2950585.
Neuberger, Eszter. 2020. ‘Europe’s marginalised Roma people hit hard by coronavirus’. 11 May 
2020. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/11/
europes-marginalised-roma-people-hit-hard-by-coronavirus.
Păvălucă, Luana. 2020. ‘Vladimir Tismăneanu își cere scuze pentru meme-ul rasist, dar amintește 
că atunci când el a fost atacat, CNCD nu a intervenit’. 12 April 2020. Accessed 31 August 2020. 
https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/social/vladimir-tismaneanu-isi-cere-scuze-pentru- 
meme-ul-rasist-dar-aminteste-ca-atunci-cand-el-a-fost-atacat-cncd-nu-a-intervenit-1290509.
Pocotilă, Andreea. 2020. ‘COVID-19. Bomba cu ceas din Țăndărei’. 1 April 2020. Accessed 27 August 
2020. https://recorder.ro/covid-19-bomba-cu-ceas-din-tandarei/.
Pons, Emmanuelle. 1995. Les tsiganes en Roumanie: des citoyens à part entière? Paris, France: 
Editions L’Harmattan.
Pop, Cristina. 2016. ‘Locating purity with corruption rumours: Narratives of HPV vaccination 
refusal in aperi-urban community of southern Romania’. Medical Anthropology Quarterly 
30(4): 563–81.
Raț, Cristina. 2009. ‘Disciplining mothers: Fertility threats and family policies in Romania’. In Family 
Patterns and Demographic Development, GESIS Thematic Series on Social Sciences in Eastern 
Europe, Issue 1: 75–86. Mannheim, Germany: Leibniz Institut für Sozialwissenschaften.
Refworld. 2015. ‘Romania: Situation of Roma, including treatment by society and government 
authorities; state protection and support services available to Roma (2011–2015)’. Accessed 
31 August 2020. https://www.refworld.org/docid/563c58104.html.
Simina, Codruța, 2017. ‘Pojarul statului. În focar de rujeolă, copiii sunt daţi cu răchie şi îmbrăcaţi 
în roşu’. 14 May 2017. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://pressone.ro/pojarul-statului-in-focar- 
de-rujeola-copiii-sunt-dati-cu-rachie-si-imbracati-in-rosu/.
Szeman, Ioana. 2018. Staging Citizenship: Roma, performance and belonging in EU Romania. Oxford, 
UK: Berghahn Books.
Ștefănescu, Cristian. 2020. ‘Cazul Țăndarei. Sunteți pe o pistă greșită, dragilor’. Accessed 31 August 
2020. https://www.dw.com/ro/cazul-%C8%9B%C4%83nd%C4%83rei-sunte%C8%9Bi- 
pe-o-pist%C4%83-gre%C8%99it%C4%83-dragilor/a-53056793.
Știrile PROTV. 2020. ’Țăndărei a intrat în carantină. Joc de-a șoarecele și pisica între locuitori și 
polițiști’. 6 April 2020. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
k58yPWzQn9I.
Tesăr, Cătălina. 2012. ‘Becoming Rom (male), becoming Romni (female) among Romanian 
Cortorari Roma: On body and gender’. Romani Studies 22: 113–40.
Tolontan, Cătălin. 2020. ‘Tismăneanu, Cărtărescu și “ciorile de la Țăndărei”. Toate zborurile și toate 
responsabilitățile sunt anulate’. 11 April 2020. Accessed 31 August 2020. https://www.tolo.
ro/?s=Toate+zborurile+%C8%99i+toate+responsabilit%C4%83%C8%9Bile+sunt+ 
anulate.
Ursu, Ramona. 2018. ‘Epidemia nepăsării. “Mica înțelegere”, strategia antirujeolă aplicată în Dolj’. 
Newsweek 1(4): 20–21.
Vincze, Enikő and Cristina Raț. 2013. ‘Spatialization and racialization of social exclusion: The social 
and cultural formation of gypsy ghettos in Romania in a European context’. Studia Universitatis 
Babeș-Bolyai 58(2): 5–21.




Turkey’s Diyanet and political  
Islam during the pandemic
oğuz Alyanak
On 10 January 2020, two months before the first COVID-19 positive 
case was announced in Turkey but anticipating its eventuality, a 
taskforce led by the country’s Minister of Health, Fahrettin Koca, was 
formed to oversee efforts to tackle the pandemic. Like his counterparts 
in other countries, as cases began to be reported, Koca addressed the 
nation regularly on measures taken by the government to contain the 
spread of the virus. Schools were closed on 12 March and a partial flight 
ban was put in place the next day. Leisure venues such as bars and 
nightclubs were shut down and the ban was extended to gatherings in 
mosques on 16 March. All hospitals with infectious disease units were 
transformed into pandemic hospitals, and from the last week of March, 
partial curfews were enforced nation-wide. For most Turks used to 
seeing the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, addressing them 
daily through their television screens, Koca’s regular appearance was a 
somewhat welcome change.
Yet the measures mandated by Turkey’s Scientific Advisory Board, 
which to Koca’s dismay were not followed literally by government officials, 
were insufficient to contain the spread of the virus. In the first three weeks 
of April, Turkey experienced a daily average of 97 deaths and 3,907 cases. 
Then came a rather abrupt change of discourse. Turks started to see 
their president and other state representatives, such as the head of the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı 
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Diyanet hereafter), Ali Erbaş, take the stage to 
comment on the pandemic. Other religious scholars were also invited to 
participate in televised debates. Although these actors were not public 
health experts, they weighed in on the discussion and brought to it a new 
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dimension which had less to do with the pandemic’s biological tenets, and 
more with its moral foundations. But why the change of discourse?
In this chapter, I examine how Turkey’s ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP hereafter) relied on a 
moralist discourse to retain its legitimacy while facing mounting criticism 
amid the pandemic. Reflecting on scholarly conversations on moral 
authority and politics, with a particular emphasis on the notion of 
political Islam, I show how the use of a moralist discourse enabled 
new configurations of state power during the first wave of COVID-19 in 
Turkey. Through the deployment of the Diyanet, which weighed in on 
conversations on the pandemic during its initial peak in mid-April,1 the 
AKP was able to divert attention from any mishandling of the situation, 
such as not enforcing measures to quarantine Turkish citizens, including 
those returning from the Islamic holy sites, as I describe in the next 
section. The Diyanet continued to be an instrumental actor. Rather than 
providing moral guidance on what it considered catastrophe sent by 
Allah, it also pursued a moralist discourse by blaming actors and forces 
that it considered to be behind COVID-19. One such force was the 
neoliberal world order, which, according to the Diyanet, led individuals 
to lose their moral compass, so bringing this calamity onto them. 
Another was one of the AKP’s usual targets: individuals who practise 
non-heteronormative relations, particularly members of the LGBTQI+ 
community in Turkey, who the Diyanet designated the perpetrators of 
COVID-19 in late April.
‘Searching for someone to blame’, Atlani-Dault and colleagues 
argued in a recent paper on COVID-19, ‘is part of the process of making 
sense of any disaster, akin to the phenomenon of moral panic’ (2020, 
e137). However, the act of blaming does more than contribute to growing 
anxieties during epidemics and pandemics. It also plays into the hands of 
public authorities such as politicians who are intent on evading criticism 
while garnering popular support.
Naming the crisis: public health or political survival?
From the first case of COVID-19 documented in Turkey on 11 March, the 
AKP was under attack for failing to take the necessary measures to prevent 
the spread of the virus. First, criticism was levelled at the AKP’s handling 
of pilgrims returning home from Saudi Arabia in mid-March. Rather than 
enforcing the quarantine of those who had returned back from the holy 
sites, which by then were considered COVID-19 hotspots, AKP officials 
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initially advocated self-isolation measures. The second criticism came in 
response to the AKP’s delay in enforcing a suspension of religious services 
such as the Cumas (Friday prayers), which required the temporary closure 
of the country’s 82,000 or so mosques. The failure to institute harsh 
responses in both cases were cited by critics as causing the spike in 
infections in early April (Tremblay 2020). In subsequent months, scholars 
and healthcare workers criticised the government for not taking seriously 
the warnings issued by members of independent scientific councils, such 
as the Turkish Medical Association (Türk Tabipleri Birliği, TTB hereafter), 
which advocated a strict lockdown. A report by regional officers of the 
TTB in late August 2020, for example, indicated that many ICU units in 
COVID-19 wards were running at near-full capacity, raising concerns for 
how hospitals might manage increasing numbers of severe cases 
anticipated in the winter months of 2020–21 (Ahval 2020a).
Critics also questioned the veracity of state-issued COVID-19 
statistics (Evin 2020). Even though, in government’s accounts, COVID-19 
related deaths had not reached numbers comparable to countries like 
Italy or France, the TTB drew attention to the government’s failure to 
disclose data on cases, counting only symptomatic individuals (Reuters 
2020a). In a televised statement on 1 October, Koca acknowledged that 
this was the case, and that since 29 July the country had only been 
reporting data on ‘patients’ with symptoms and had excluded 
asymptomatic COVID-19 positive ‘cases’ from the count (bianet English 
2020a). In response, the World Health Organization issued a statement 
inviting Turkey to report data on all positive cases. Koca rejected this, 
arguing that ‘the current stage of the pandemic justifies shifting the 
emphasis from the number of positive cases to patients’ (Ahval 2020b). 
Backing his Health Minister, Erdoğan went a step further, calling the TTB 
chair a ‘terrorist’ and suggesting the medical group be closed (bianet 
English 2020b).2
In Turkey, according to Kirişçi (2020), COVID-19 was not a public 
health crisis but a crisis of political survival. The AKP had faced numerous 
crises during nearly 20 years in power but, given the scale and direct 
impact on the economy and people’s livelihoods, COVID-19 was seen by 
some analysts as the ultimate blow to its rule (Schenkkan 2020). At its 
first peak in mid-April, the pandemic led to the resignation of Turkey’s 
interior minister, which, although quickly overruled by the Turkish 
president, was perceived as a sign of tensions building within the 
administration (Reuters 2020b). There were also rumours that the 
minister of health was considering resignation (Uğurluoğlu 2020). 
Globally, however, rather than catalysing a crisis of legitimacy, the 
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pandemic presented an opportunity for most autocrats around the world 
to strengthen their rule (The Economist 2020). In Turkey as elsewhere, 
COVID-19 enabled increased authoritarianism, with individuals detained 
over provocative posts on social media (Reuters 2020c). Doctors and 
healthcare workers were probed over statements that contradicted official 
accounts (Human Rights Watch 2020a), and journalists were arrested for 
reporting on cases of infection (Reporters Without Borders 2020).
One part of AKP’s strategy to retain its legitimacy amid the pandemic 
was to suppress critical voices. Another part was to construct an 
alternative discourse, which would resonate with large segments of the 
population and garner popular support. To that end, the AKP shifted 
public discussion on the pandemic from its scientific roots to its moral 
tenets, and in this shift, the Diyanet played an instrumental role. This was 
not the first time that the Diyanet was instrumentalised to overcome a 
crisis. Mosques in Turkey are governed by the Diyanet, and in July 2016, 
following a coup attempt, the Diyanet took on a central role in backing 
the government. By mentioning the failed coup in Friday sermons, which 
would normally concern practical issues pertaining to religious life, the 
Diyanet assisted the AKP in constructing a narrative that exculpated its 
politicians, many of whom were criticised for prior ties to the clique 
behind the coup, thereby directing attention to the enemies within. The 
Diyanet also used its mosques to recite prayers, such as the sela (salat-al-
Janazah) and the ezan (the call to prayer) outside regular namaz times, 
reminding people of its support of government’s policies and inviting all 
Muslims to do the same (Gill 2016).
As positive cases of Coronavirus soared across Turkey from late 
March, the Diyanet used its mosques once again to capture the country’s 
soundscape by reciting prayers outside regular namaz times, and by 
preaching to the public on television, online and in Friday sermons 
(Alyanak 2020). It also assisted the government to initiate a funding 
campaign led by the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services to help 
ease the financial burdens of the pandemic on individuals. On 1 April 
2020, the head of the Diyanet, Ali Erbaş, made a televised statement on 
Turkey’s official news channel, TRTHaber, declaring his institution’s 
support for the Presidential COVID-19 campaign, Biz Bize Yeteriz 
Türkiyem/We Are All We Need Turkey (Biz Bize Yeteriz Türkiyem 2020). 
There, Erbaş pointed out religion’s historical role in overcoming obstacles, 
directly referencing to the coup attempt. He drew on verses from the 
Qur’an to make a case for favourable returns by Allah to those who 
support this campaign. The zekats, or alms, which Muslims are obliged to 
donate throughout Ramadan, could be sent to this campaign, Erbaş 
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stated. By mid-November 2020, over 41 billion liras (US$5.5 billion) had 
been paid to households under the campaign budget.
Political Islam as a public health hazard
In early March, The Washington Post published a trenchant op-ed on 
Turkey. Its author, Can Dündar, a prominent Turkish journalist who 
currently lives in exile, pointing to the Diyanet, argued that political Islam 
was obstructing rational health policy in Turkey. ‘The government’s 
enormously influential Directorate of Religious Affairs, an agency that is 
supposed to regulate the role of Islam, has become one of the key 
institutions in the fight against COVID-19 – and not always for the better’, 
wrote Dündar. He continued: ‘By obstructing science and misallocating 
vital resources, political Islam in Turkey has become a direct threat to the 
health of the nation. Turks now find themselves fighting the virus even as 
they confront the ignorance that leads to bad policy’. Dündar spoke of an 
ongoing ‘tug of war between reason and belief’ in Turkey – a confrontation 
from which the AKP benefited as the majority of its voters were 
conservative constituents. Not only did the Diyanet weigh in on debates 
about the pandemic, but the Turkish president also adopted a discourse 
akin to it, arguing that the pandemic would be overcome through 
‘patience and prayers’ (Dündar 2020). Critics like Dündar found such 
statements dangerous as they saw the need for scientific/medical 
authority to address the pandemic, albeit cognisant of how far the moral 
discourse could go in convincing millions in the country to retain their 
support of the AKP.
Why the Diyanet? To address this question, we need to take a 
moment to clarify the Diyanet’s role in Turkey, and its growing influence 
under AKP’s rule. The Diyanet was established in 1924 not as a ministry, 
but a separate state institution responsible for curbing religion’s 
encroachment in politics by serving as the central authority on Islam. Its 
purpose was to fill the gap left as a result of the abolition of the Caliphate 
and Sharia, as well as the dismantlement of religious institutions 
and foundations (such as tekkes, medreses, zaviyes and dergahs) – key 
institutions of civil society in the Ottoman Empire – following the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire,3 thereby acting as ‘a new structure of control and 
oversight between the state and Islam’ (Davison 2003, 338). Representing 
official Islam, the Diyanet was to take over the role traditionally assumed 
by religious congregations (Mardin 1977). However, it failed in this role, 
as many of these top-down reforms did not resonate with the rural 
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population, and different factions within Turkey’s Islamic movement 
continued to operate in covert ways.
Following Turkey’s transition into a multiparty system in 1950, 
Turkish politicians benefited from de facto links to these religious 
congregations for popular support (Çakır 1990) and used the Diyanet as 
‘an administrative tool to indoctrinate and propagate official ideology 
regarding Islam’ (Gözaydın 2014: 13). Over time, this became known as 
political Islam. Several political parties have been accused of political 
Islamic policies, and some have been closed down for their ties to religious 
congregations. In 2008, the AKP, too, was accused of using Islam for 
political gain and was charged with violating the constitution’s secularism 
clause. The case was shy by one vote for AKP’s closure in Turkey’s 
Constitutional Court. The AKP continued to rely on its allies in Turkey’s 
Islamic movement, most notably, the alleged perpetrator of the 2016 
coup attempt, the Gülen movement. Yet, as relations between the Gülen 
movement and the AKP soured, Erdoğan started to revamp the influence 
of the Diyanet as the official source of moral authority in order to 
undermine the influence of ‘unofficial’ Islamic discourses in Turkey and 
overseas (Bruce 2019). In the last decade, the Diyanet’s budget has 
increased over five-fold. Today, the institution sits on a budget of 
11 billion Turkish lira, exceeding most other ministries in Turkey (T24 
2019). It has its own publications and a television channel and runs a 
fatwa hotline for individuals to consult on practical matters pertaining to 
Islamic doctrines.4 Moreover, the Diyanet acts as a key commentator on 
controversial matters that pertain to public and private life (Mutluer 
2018; Kocamaner 2019). Recent examples include Diyanet’s comments 
equating feminism with immorality on International Women’s Day in 
2008; recommendations extended to single individuals, such as college 
students, to refrain from cohabitation in 2013, to engaged couples to not 
flirt or hold hands in 2016, and to married women to submit to their 
husband even in cases of domestic violence in 2020. A controversial fatwa 
issued in 2018 legitimised a father’s lust for his own daughter; in 2019, a 
fatwa criticised television series considered to promote nonhetero- 
normative and premarital relations, and deemed un-Islamic and morally 
corrupting; and, most recently, the Diyanet linked the coronavirus 
pandemic to non-heteronormative relationships.
The Diyanet’s conservative stance on these issues is not surprising. 
Many religious authorities around the world draw on conservative 
guidelines to regulate affairs pertaining to the family, public morality and 
gender. Oftentimes, these guidelines resonate with certain segments of 
the population while drawing criticism from others. Yet, a legitimate 
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question to ask that is relevant to the pandemic is whether the appeal of 
such views warrants religious authorities like the Diyanet taking a stance 
on issues that are tangential to their mission to enlighten the public on 
religious matters. In Turkey, the Diyanet’s intervention in the COVID-19 
debate came at the expense of resources allocated to battling the 
pandemic. Islamic authority was not used to protect human life, which, 
in Islam, is considered a gift from Allah that should be revered and 
protected (Daar and al Khitamy 2001; Shomali 2008). Rather, it was used 
to exculpate a government that had failed to do so. To illustrate this point, 
I now turn to two critical interventions made by the Diyanet during the 
peak of the pandemic in April.
Blaming the neoliberal world order: Islam’s  
view on disease outbreaks
In late April 2020, the Diyanet committee, Supreme Council for Matters 
of Religion, issued a 56-page document entitled İslam’ın Salgın 
Hastalıklara Bakışı (Islam’s View on Disease Outbreaks). The document 
is structured with 13 chapters, each addressing a question posed and 
accompanied by a lengthy appendix detailing the doctrinal genealogy of 
practical measures, such as the interruption of communal prayers, 
funerary services and possible modifications to the imminent Ramadan 
fasting. Of the 13 chapters, 5 related to questions asking whether 
outbreaks such as COVID-19 were a test or an opportunity for people to 
pull themselves together (Chapter 3); if people had brought onto 
themselves such diseases and catastrophes, and the lessons to be learned 
from them (Chapter 4); whether outbreaks were a warning sign from the 
Divine (Chapter 5); if they were a punishment or torment sent by Allah 
(Chapter 6); and whether they could be read as omens signalling the Day 
of Judgement (Chapter 7).
The theme underlying these chapters was that the pandemic was 
not caused by a virus alone, but by humans due to their own moral 
failures. The virus should therefore be perceived as a lesson from Allah to 
avoid ‘mistakes, denial (of Allah’s omnipresence), rebellion, oppression, 
unruliness, heresy, perversion, and exploitation, which in the past has led 
Allah to destroy certain nations and tribes’ (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu 
2020b, 17). Science and technology are seen not as an aid in overcoming 
hardship, but the cause of such hardship. Greater reliance on science and 
technology, according to the document, has led humans to see themselves 
as independent of their creator, thereby forgetful of the presence of a 
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higher authority: ‘Allah, the Holy, sent a virus barely visible under the 
microscope to the modern human who has forgotten the presence of his 
Creator, who has gone astray from his very raison d’être of being a kul 
[submitting pupil], and started seeing himself as the owner and conqueror 
of all things’ (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu 2020, 20b).
As one of Diyanet’s main missions is to enlighten society on matters 
pertaining to religion, what it can offer best is a religious explanation of a 
disease outbreak. In Islamic discourse, everything experienced on Earth 
– good and bad, fortunate and unfortunate – is willed by Allah. COVID-19 
is no exception. On this point, the document states the following:
One of the major trials of humans is diseases. According to Islamic 
belief, just like goodness and good deeds, diseases and calamities, 
too, are created by Allah, the Supreme, for various reasons … 
Without Allah’s permission, no calamity reaches its destination. It is 
Allah the Almighty who also provides the cure and it is Allah who is 
Almighty (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu 2020b, 9).
Facing the inevitability of Allah’s will, a person of faith is asked 
to contemplate the reasons behind Allah’s doing in dispatching a 
calamity that brings life to a halt: ‘It is necessary to see these outbreaks 
and catastrophes as verses sent by Allah for believers and all humans to 
draw lessons’ (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu 2020b, 10). Yet, the Diyanet does 
more than invite believers to (re)turn to religion. The document also 
claims that the contemporary world order pushes believers to adopt 
choices which run contrary to Islamic guidelines. For the Diyanet, the 
underlying cause behind the pandemic needs to be sought in this world 
order:
On the one side, there is hunger, starvation, drought, and illnesses 
which have not been experienced, and on the other, there is 
exploitation due to brutal capitalism, wars, invasions, migrations, 
injustices etc. which has disrupted the order of our old world, and  
has laid bare once again that humans, as our Creator has stated, ‘are 
of a blood-shedding  and malice-bringing kind’ (Din İşleri Yüksek 
Kurulu 2020b, 20).
A few pages later, the document again invites humans to comprehend the 
order created by Allah on the principles of accident and fate, which differs 
from the order that we abide by today. Those who understand this order, 
and who abide by divine laws, will succeed in it. The caveat with the 
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Diyanet’s advice, however, is that the world order that leads to tests such 
as COVID-19 is also one in which the Turkish state is deeply embedded. 
Not only was Turkey one of the main exporters of personal protective 
equipment throughout the pandemic,5 that is, by Diyanet’s logic, a 
profiteer of Allah’s wrath, it had also been transformed into a largely 
privatised economy that relied heavily on the construction and tourism 
sectors, both threatened by the pandemic. Some critics today view AKP’s 
reluctance to enforce a total lockdown even during the peak of the 
pandemic as a manoeuvre to save the economy (Erdemir and Lechner 
2020). Yet, if the economy matters, then the Diyanet’s critique of the 
neoliberal world order risks harming the very establishment that it relies 
on both financially and politically. To evade such an outcome, the AKP’s 
neoliberal agenda was not criticised. No decision maker in the political or 
economic realm was called to task. Moral failures were described as the 
failure of individuals to break free from exploitative and unjust conditions. 
No explanation was given regarding the political actors in Turkey who 
perpetuate these conditions.
One of the risks in making morally charged statements is that they 
render the agents behind such remarks vulnerable to the criticisms that 
they extend. In this case, although the Diyanet reprimanded individuals 
for participating in a neoliberal world order that prioritises consumption 
over frugality, and worldly temptations over heavenly rewards, over the 
years, both the Diyanet and the AKP had been criticised for the lavish 
lifestyles sought of their own members, such as riding in imported luxury 
cars or living in the newly built Presidential Palace. This left the Diyanet 
in a discursive conundrum. Yet, as I illustrate below, the Diyanet was able 
to invent a way out of this conundrum by fabricating a new culprit. 
Moving beyond its usual judgements pertaining to the moral realm, 
the Diyanet shifted gears and directly intervened in the realm of public 
health where COVID-19 became not only the result of perceived moral 
failures of individuals and neo-liberal structures, but also a disease 
caused by some of these individuals. These were people following non-
heteronormative values.
Reframing the narrative: non-heteronormativity  
as the cause of COVID-19
LGBTQI+ communities around the world have long faced blame 
for disease outbreaks. Same-sex couples, and others engaging in non-
heteronormative practices, have not only encountered severe 
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discrepancies in accessing healthcare due to being posited as perpetuators 
of infectious diseases (Lichtenstein 2003), they have also been directly 
targeted by conservative groups and politicians. Much of the scholarship 
on the stigmatisation of these groups has focused on the HIV pandemic, 
but blame for other disease outbreaks including the most recent COVID-
19 pandemic continues to be attached to marginalised communities 
(UNAIDS 2020). A report circulated by the United Nations Office of the 
High Commissioner of Human Rights in mid-April made this precise point 
by calling on state authorities and stakeholders ‘to speak out against 
stigmatisation and hate speech directed at LGBTQI+ people in the context 
of the pandemic’ (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2020, 8). Despite the call, in several cases LGBTQI+ 
people were accused of spreading the disease. In South Korea, for 
example, where the government’s intensive tracing of the virus resulted 
in public disclosure of patient information, the discussion of nightclubs, 
described in the media as COVID-19 hotspots, quickly turned into gay-
bashing because some of these venues were associated with the country’s 
LGBTQI+ community (Kwon and Hollingsworth 2020).
In Turkey, the backlash against the LGBTQI+ community and others 
living non-heteronormative lifestyles was government sanctioned. While 
there is no body of law that directly targets members of the LGBTQI+ 
community or limits their public presence, Turkey is not a signatory to 
any LGBTQI+ resolutions enacted by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council and the General Assembly, including the 2008 statement on 
LGBTQI+ rights (Human Rights Watch 2008). Same-sex marriages and 
civil unions are considered unconstitutional and remain outlawed. 
Annual Pride parades have been banned since 2016 to ensure the 
so-called safety of Turkish citizens and to protect public order. Here the 
term ‘public’ continues to be defined through a narrow and moralist 
definition that excludes relationships that lie outside a heteronormative 
and conjugal frame. More recently, television channels portraying same-
sex couples or promoting promiscuity or homosexuality have been fined 
for corrupting general morality and the family unit (Muedini 2018, 43–5; 
bianet English 2019). There have also been several attempts to pass laws 
to ban ‘promiscuous’ relations such as zina (extramarital sex/adultery) 
and to regulate cohabitation and unmarried life, as evident in the 
President’s proposal of measures to reinstall the ban on zina that had 
been retracted by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1999 (Alyanak and 
Üstek 2013).
A few days after the circulation of Diyanet’s document on disease 
outbreaks, the head of the Diyanet, Ali Erbaş, made the following 
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statement in his address to the public through the Cuma hutbesi [the 
communal Friday namaz sermon]:
Islam accepts adultery as one of the biggest sins [haram]. It curses 
homosexuality. What is the reason of that? The reason is that it 
brings with it illnesses and decay to lineages. Every year, thousands 
of people are exposed to HIV virus caused by this big sin – 
committing adultery, living out of wedlock, whose name is 
‘unchastity’ in Islamic literature. Let’s take action together to protect 
people from these evils. (DuvaR.English 2020).
It is no surprise to see the Diyanet take a position that condemns non-
heteronormative relations. Like most religious institutions around the world, 
the Diyanet condemns same-sex and promiscuous relations. Its rationale for 
this comes from a particular reading of the Qur’an, whereby relations outside 
of marriage incite Allah’s wrath. The oft-cited example here is the plight of 
Lut (Lot), which is brought up in several surahs (chapters) of the Qur’an. 
According to the story, Lut, the nephew of Prophet Abraham, was sent to the 
people of Lut (Sodom and Gomorrah in the Book of Genesis) to plead with 
them to stop their sexual perversions, such as sodomy, prostitution and 
extramarital affairs. However, the people, including Lut’s own wife, 
dismissed his recommendations. Allah consequently ordered Lut to leave his 
wife and the tribe, and decimated the tribe.
For Erbaş, the story of the Lut has direct parallels to the plight faced 
by humans during the COVID-19 pandemic. But this is not the first time 
that Erbaş had drawn on this story. In 2019, in another hutbe that he 
delivered in a mosque in the Central Anatolian city of Konya, Erbaş 
reminded the congregation of the dire consequences of dismissing Allah’s 
commands in the Qur’an: ‘Our Rabb [Lord] has reminded us that many 
times in history tribes who faced moral decay and perversions were 
decimated’ (Evrensel 2019).
Similar comments are regularly made by conservative pundits in 
Turkey, who – unlike those defending LGBTQI+ rights, who are fined for 
their statements – do not face legal consequences of hate speech. But in 
this instance, these comments came from a religious institution which 
acts within the capacity of an official state apparatus responsible for 
guiding millions of believers in Turkey and overseas. The Diyanet’s 
statement should therefore be read as one that reveals the contours of 
religion as sanctioned by the Turkish state, which singles out a part of the 
population, targets those within it as carriers of disease, and sees them as 
worthy of punishment and decimation.
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A few days after Erbaş made this comment, critics targeted him for 
his hate speech, which is prohibited in the Turkish constitution and 
criminalised under the penal code. The Ankara branch of the Human 
Rights Association in Turkey and the Ankara Bar Association both filed 
cases against Erbaş, asking for his resignation (Human Rights Watch 
2020b). However, rather than finding his assertion discriminatory, the 
Turkish president sided with him. ‘An attack against the Diyanet is an 
attack on the state’, argued Erdoğan. Overnight, hundreds of thousands of 
AKP supporters shared their backing on Twitter by commenting under 
#AliErbasYalnizDegildir [Ali Erbaş is not alone] (Öztürk 2020). Other 
trending hashtags in subsequent days included #YallahHollandaya [Go 
to Holland], suggesting that critics pack their bags and move to the 
Netherlands, which in Turkey is characterised by its liberal politics on 
same-sex relations, and #LGBTIstemiyoruz [We don’t want LGBT]. Other 
actors soon joined this debate. Kerem Kınık, the head of the Turkish branch 
of the Red Crescent, the international non-governmental organisation that 
provides disaster relief, made a claim similar to Erbaş. Using his Twitter 
account, Kınık argued on 28 June, a day after the International Pride Day, 
that his institution would fight anyone who promoted a corrupting 
mentality, spoke of abnormalities as the new normal, or forced paedophilic 
dreams on young minds. In response, the International Red Cross 
Committee, IFRC, issued a declaration disapproving of this comment, 
which led to the head of Communications for the Turkish Presidency 
issuing a denunciation of IFRC (Reuters 2020d). Furthermore, an inquiry 
was opened against the Ankara Bar Association by the Attorney General 
for insulting religious values, and soon after, the Turkish president 
once again took centre stage, targeting LGBTQI+ groups as the hub of 
perversions and spreaders of disease. In his national address on 27 April, 
the Turkish president attacked the proponents of LGBTQI+ rights directly, 
arguing that they were complicit in these perversions and asking the 
Turkish population to take a stance against them.
Seeking blame in LGBTQI+ groups is an easy – and oft utilised – 
political ploy to manufacture consent among the public – not just in 
Turkey but in other countries, too. Similarities with Russia and Brazil, run 
by leaders with authoritarian tendencies, are obvious. So too was the 
similarity with the US under the presidency of Donald Trump. Same-sex 
relationships have long provided an easy way out of political blunders in 
Turkey. Each time governments were accused of corruption or criticised 
for their lack of competency in navigating Turkish national and inter- 
national policy, themes such as family values and same-sex relationships 
have been brought into the conversation. Seen as a danger to moral 
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integrity, non-heteronormative lifestyles were put under the spotlight 
when bills were proposed by government officials to ban these choices. In 
the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, these discussions took a new and 
poignant turn. Not only were extra-marital relations and homosexuality 
seen as moral perversions, they were also seen as epicentres of the disease, 
thereby constituting a public health hazard. As fears among the Turkish 
public heightened over the spread of the virus, overnight discussion 
focused on non-heteronormativity as the source of the pandemic.
What the Diyanet, and the Turkish president, did was more than 
blame a marginalised community for moral decay. Blaming moral ills on 
what these actors consider to be sexual perversions, with the focus most 
notably on same-sex couples, is an unfortunate norm in Turkey that many 
LGBTQI+ institutions are trying to debunk. In a recent Pew Research 
survey, 57 per cent of the population in Turkey still views homosexuality 
unfavourably, and only 25 per cent of those surveyed indicated that 
homosexuality should be accepted by society (Poushter and Kent 2020). 
The Turkish president speaks directly to this 57 per cent, assuring them that 
he shares a similar sentiment by making statements that affirm his belief 
that same-sex relations are a sexual perversion with no place in Turkish 
culture and morals. In the COVID-19 moment, he further spoke of those 
associated with this ‘perversion’ as the main culprit of the disease outbreak, 
emphasising the presumption that sexual ‘perversions’ are more than a 
moral threat. Members of the LGBTQI+ groups in Turkey already face 
many obstacles in the country, and having the Diyanet and the Turkish 
president view them as morally perverse, though terrifying, is nothing new. 
What is different during the COVID-19 pandemic, however, is that the 
Diyanet, and Erdoğan, hold these groups responsible for a disease outbreak 
that continues to agitate the public on a daily basis, and that generates 
uncertainties and fear for people’s very lives and livelihoods.
What really does COVID-19 have to do with non-heteronormative 
relations? Epidemiologically, there are no links between promiscuity, or 
homosexuality, and the coronavirus. From a political perspective, 
however, there is much at stake in creating a link between the virus and 
what is seen as sexual perversity, as it helps to divert attention away from 
the actions and accountability of state actors.
Conclusion
I opened this chapter with the Turkish Minister of Health, Fahrettin Koca, 
and his Scientific Advisory Board, heralding Turkey’s initial response to 
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the pandemic. As the cases and deaths related to COVID-19 began to soar 
from late March, however, we witnessed in Turkey a rather abrupt change 
of discourse propagated by a new set of actors, including the Turkish 
president and the head of the Diyanet. I asked why that was the case. My 
intention in asking this question was not to downplay the social or cultural 
tenets of the disease outbreak. I do not advocate a scientific approach that 
dismisses the contributions of moral authorities to the debate on COVID-
19. However, in Turkey, the contribution of religious authorities to 
understanding and responding to COVID-19 had less to do with devising 
culturally sensitive modes of healing, and more with seeking blame in 
actors who have long been subject to the government’s disciplinary 
measures. Rather than seek morally and biomedically attuned solutions 
to the pandemic, what we saw in Turkey during the first wave of the 
pandemic was religious authorities such as the Diyanet engaging in a 
blatant attack on AKP’s ideological opponents. This explains how political 
Islam hindered the makings of what critics such as Dündar called a 
rational public health policy in Turkey.
The Diyanet’s controversial intervention into the debate also played 
into the hands of the AKP – not only by furthering a repressive political 
agenda that it has adopted over the years, but also by helping change the 
narrative on the pandemic. The Diyanet’s statement was so controversial 
that it alone sufficed to turn public attention to LGBTQI+ groups 
overnight, leading to the tabling of discussions on measures taken by the 
AKP government to tackle the pandemic. Criticism over the government’s 
handling of the pandemic, as evident in its delayed response to returning 
pilgrims and its hesitation to close down mosques, swiftly transformed 
into criticism of homosexuality.
Scholars working on stigma and disease outbreaks have shown how 
certain groups, who are readily marginalised in their specific societies, 
are targeted in the midst of public health crises (Songwathana and 
Manderson 2001; Castro and Farmer 2005; Singer 2009; Gregg 2011). 
While much of this conversation draws on evidence provided by studies 
on HIV, COVID-19 follows this trend. In Turkey, marginalised groups were 
targeted specifically to divert attention from the practical responses, or 
their lack, of the government. Other critics who have pointed out the 
shortcomings of the AKP’s strategy to tackle the pandemic were also 
criticised by Erdoğan as well as by other figures close to the AKP 
government, such as the Turkish chief of the International Red Crescent. 
Can Dündar, a journalist in exile, was one such critic whom Erdoğan 
considers a member of a terrorist organisation (International Press 
Institute 2015). The TTB chair, Şebnem Korur Fidancı, is another figure 
VIRAL LOADS176
whom Erdoğan publicly called a terrorist for having previously signed a 
petition in support of a peaceful negotiation of the country’s Kurdish 
conflict. Yet, this kind of targeting also had a practical impact on the 
livelihood of marginalised communities. By falsely identifying them as 
responsible for COVID-19, the government exposed them to further 
stigma, with the potential to quickly turn into other kinds of violence 
(Yuzgun 1993; Biçmen and Bekiroğulları 2014; Başaran 2014; Özbay 
2015; Yenilmez 2017).
In Turkey, political Islam jeopardises public health, and helps the 
AKP deflect criticism for its mishandling of the pandemic. This strategy 
comes at the cost of the lives of the very people whom the Turkish state is 
meant to protect – not just those who agree with the government’s vision 
of a proper mode of sexual relations and romance, but also those who 
choose to disagree with it. The preamble of the Turkish constitution 
considers the right for all Turkish citizens to lead an honourable life as a 
birth right. This law should apply to all.
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Notes
1 According to the Turkish health minister, Turkey had experienced its second peak in the first 
wave of the pandemic after the Eid-al-Adha holiday (30 July–3 August 2020), with hospitals 
and intensive care units reaching 47 and 60 per cent occupancy rates respectively (Hurriyet 
Daily News 2020). The first peak here corresponds to the initial spike in the number of cases in 
mid-April, when the cases more than doubled (from 2,148 to 5,138) within the first ten days 
of the month.
2 A month later, Fahrettin Koca reverted from his initial stance, and decided to disclose the total 
number of cases in Turkey. On 25 November, 28,351 cases were announced – the fourth highest 
number of daily cases in the world following the US, India and Brazil. The numbers continued 
to climb in the following days (bianet English 2020c).
3 After the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, a string of reforms – known today as the 
Kemalist reforms – was passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which led to the 
abolishment of the Islamic state known as the Caliphate (1924), the sharia courts which relied 
on Islamic law (1924) and numerous religious institutions (1925). The Diyanet was established 
in 1924 to undertake the tasks previously undertaken by these institutions, but due to the 
country’s secular (laik) outlook, its role was limited to the regulation of texts for hutbes, or 
religious sermons (Mutluer 2018, 4). 
4 Fatwa (fetva in Turkish) – religious advice and rulings – are issued by muftis, or Islamic jurists, 
in response to questions pertaining to religious conduct. For example, a Muslim with diabetes 
may ask a mufti whether it is acceptable to take medication while fasting. In response, the mufti 
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would refer to Islamic texts, including the Qur’an, and a collection of Prophet Muhammed’s 
sayings and deeds, known as the hadiths, to pass a judgement on the issue (Alobalan and 
Al-Moujahed 2017). Fatwas can be issued via telephone or email or consulted by going to the 
Diyanet’s Supreme Council for Matters of Religion (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu) website 
(Bruinessen 2018; Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu Başkanlığı 2020a).
5 During the first week of May, with Turkish authorities calling the pandemic in Turkey 
under control, a decree was passed to lift restrictions on the export of personal protective 
equipment to Western European countries. The shipment of PPE had previously led to rising 
diplomatic tensions between Turkey and countries in Western Europe, which were hit hard 
during the first wave, such as Spain, Italy and the UK (Ant 2020; Sabbagh and McKernan 
2020). 
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10
Citizen vector
Scapegoating within communal boundaries  
in Senegal during the COVID-19 pandemic
Ato kwamena onoma
The Ministry of Health and Social Action of Senegal reported the first 
positive test for COVID-19 in the country on 2 March 2020. Thereafter, 
there was a slow but steady growth in the numbers of confirmed cases 
and fatalities, with the Ministry’s Communique No. 198 of 15 September 
2020 listing a total of 14,529 cases, 10,692 recoveries and 298 deaths.1 
Initial cases were all people who were infected abroad and had travelled 
to the country; the first case of community transmission was reported on 
12 March 2020 in the Ministerial Communique No. 11. While the 
metropolitan area of Dakar, the capital of the country, recorded the 
highest number of cases, by September 2020, cases had been reported in 
all 14 regions of the country.
The state adopted an approach which focused on slowing the spread 
of the disease. Early on, it had emphasised an aggressive process of 
contact tracing, hospitalisation of positive cases, and testing and isolating 
the contacts of those who tested positive in specific locations (Faye 
2020b). Measures adopted in mid-March 2020 included the closure of the 
country’s airspace and land borders, suspension of commercial passenger 
flights and interregional travel within the country, and the closure of 
schools, places of worship, bars, night clubs, restaurants and beaches. All 
forms of assembly were banned in public and private spaces, a night-time 
curfew was imposed, and markets were closed on certain days of the 
week to facilitate their disinfection (Faye 2020a). Senegalese social 
anthropologist Sylvain Faye (2020a) has written on people’s resistance to 
some of these measures, many of which were progressively eased from 
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11 May 2020 as the president, Macky Sall, sought to reduce the economic 
impact of the pandemic by encouraging Senegalese to ‘learn how to live 
in the presence of the virus’ (BIG 2020).
The first four cases of disease involved European citizens who had 
travelled to the country. On 11 March 2020, the Ministry of Health and 
Social Action reported COVID-19 case No. 5 to be a male Senegalese 
emigrant based in Italy and visiting relatives in the country. In the days that 
followed, both the Ministry and the media reported more cases of 
Senegalese emigrants returning from Southern European countries like 
Spain and Italy who tested positive for COVID-19. These emigrants, based 
in Southern Europe, are predominantly from the central west and major 
urban areas across the country, and so they include a mix of ethnic groups. 
They started migrating to Italy and Spain in the 1980s, marking a turn from 
earlier migration that originated in the Senegal River Valley and tended to 
flow towards France and other African countries (Fall 2017; Mbaye 2005; 
Riccio 2008; Tall 2008a; Mboup 2000). Popular views on these migrants 
have swayed over time and space, from adulation and glorification to 
vilification and derision (Mbodji 2008; Uberti 2014; Riccio and Uberti 
2013). They are commonly referred to in Senegal as ‘Modou’; ‘Modou’ is a 
shortened form of the name ‘Momodou’, a variant of the name of the 
Prophet Mohammed and a common given name among these migrants. 
The repetition follows similar patterns of double iteration in the Wolof 
language, the lingua franca in Senegal. In this chapter, I use the term 
‘Senegalese emigrants’ because some regard ‘Modou’ as pejorative (Thiam 
2020). I note otherwise when I refer to other migrant populations.
While a number of these emigrants travelled legally to their 
destination countries and then overstayed visas, many more migrated 
illegally, using routes that involved dangerous crossings over the Atlantic 
Ocean, Mediterranean Sea and Sahara Desert (Willems 2008; Tall 2008b; 
Riccio 2008; Tall 2008b; Uberti 2014). Most earlier migrants were 
farmers from rural areas who lacked formal education; those who 
migrated more recently were from urban areas and were informal sector 
workers, unemployed youth, small business owners, and in some cases, 
employed professionals (Uberti 2014; Tandian 2008; Tall 2008a). In their 
host countries they took up diverse employment opportunities, with 
many working as hawkers, farm labourers, and unskilled and semi-skilled 
capacity in manufacturing industry and the construction and hospitality 
sectors (Riccio 2008, 85–7; Tall 2008b). The vast majority of these 
migrants are male. They often leave their wives and children in Senegal, 
partly to maximise the savings they can repatriate back home (Tall 2008a, 
53–4; Uberti 2014).
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The announcement of COVID-19 case No. 5 and media coverage of 
other Senegalese emigrants returning to the country from areas with high 
numbers of COVID-19 cases raised concerns about returning citizens, as 
evident in many other countries across the world (Zeidan 2020; Boda 
2020; Online Reporters 2020). In Senegal, these concerns degenerated 
into scapegoating these emigrants (Faye 2020a). On radio, various social 
media platforms including WhatsApp and Facebook, and in comments on 
news stories, people widely blamed these emigrants for spreading the 
disease in the country. In comments in response to online news stories, 
some Senegalese portrayed these emigrants as negligent or thoughtless, 
unwittingly spreading the disease by refusing to respect the lockdown 
rules in Europe and by not getting tested or self-isolating before interacting 
with people upon their return to Senegal (Gueye 2020a, 2020b, 2020c; 
Seneweb News 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). Other commentators of online 
news stories cast them as unpatriotic and wilful, returning to Senegal 
knowing they carried the virus and intent on spreading the disease and 
ruining the country (Gueye 2020a, 2020b, 2020c; Seneweb News 2020a, 
2020b, 2020c).
In online comments on news stories, people called on these 
emigrants to stay away from Senegal and put pressure on the government 
to suspend commercial flights, close the country’s land borders and refuse 
entry at border posts, thus forcing emigrants to return to their points of 
departure or languish in the desert (Seneweb News 2020b, 2020c; Gueye 
2020c). These online comments mirrored thoughts expressed on radio 
and on social media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp. Across the 
country, people reported returning emigrant neighbours to the authorities 
who proceeded to round up, question, test and quarantine them 
(Dakaractu 2020; Sakhanokho 2020). The Observatory of the Senegalese 
of the Diaspora, a non-governmental organisation created in 2013 
with the stated goal of ‘promoting the interests of Senegalese Diasporas 
around the world by all legal means’, condemned this scapegoating in a 
communique on 13 April 2020 (Thiam 2020). These attacks were so 
pervasive even earlier that on 17 March 2020, the Ministry of Health and 
Social Action decided to reduce the amount of detail it provided in its 
daily communiques to curb the scapegoating of ‘foreigners and emigrants’ 
(Willane 2020).
The scapegoating of migrants during the COVID-19 pandemic in 
many ways mirrored the ways Peul migrants from Guinea to Senegal were 
cast as vectors during the 2013–16 outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) 
that centred on the Mano River Basin countries of Sierra Leone, Liberia 
and Guinea. The difficult days under the first president of Guinea, Sekou 
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Touré, saw large-scale migration of Peul – known as Fulani in other areas 
of West and Central Africa – to Senegal; this flow of migrants has 
continued in a less intense manner since then (Diallo 2009). As the EVD 
epidemic of 2013–16 threatened to spread beyond the borders of the 
Mano River Basin countries, Peul migrants were described as spreading 
EVD in Senegal. Some Senegalese began to call for the country’s borders 
with Guinea to be closed to curb what was portrayed as an uncontrolled 
‘horde’ of Peul migrants entering the country. Others called for Peul 
migrants to be counted and secluded, and for others to avoid physical 
contact with them by boycotting their shops and sitting apart from them 
on public transportation (Onoma 2020a). The diagnosis of the only case 
of EVD in Senegal in August 2014 – a young Peul student who was in 
Senegal to visit relatives – only heightened the scapegoating of this 
community (Onoma 2017).
The treatment of Senegalese emigrants as vectors of COVID-19 in 
Senegal differs from that of Peul migrants during the EVD epidemic in 
important ways. Unlike Peul migrants who were scapegoated in Senegal 
where they were considered as foreigners, Senegalese emigrants were 
scapegoated in their country of origin, a place where they are not only 
recognised as citizens but are also usually celebrated as national heroes 
toiling abroad for the benefit of their families, communities and country 
(Diop 2008, 28; Riccio 2005; 2008; Tall 2002; Fouquet 2008; Mbodji 
2008).
The scapegoating of certain populations during disease outbreaks is 
very common and has been widely studied across public health outbreaks 
including the plague, cholera, yellow fever, HIV, MERS, SARS and EVD 
(Benton and Dionne 2015; M’Bokolo 1982; White 2010; Mason 2012; 
Echenberg 2002; Eichelberger 2007; Markel and Stern 2002; Ngalamulume 
2012; Ginzburg 1990; Eamon 1998). These outbursts usually target non-
citizens, foreigners and those generally cast as ‘other’. People blame these 
outsiders for the origin and spread of diseases, subject them to verbal and 
physical attacks, and advocate their exclusion from the national territory 
or mass seclusion (Onoma 2020a; Benton and Dionne 2015; Monson 2017; 
Eichelberger 2007; Markel and Stern 2002). Motivations for these outbursts 
include concern over their spreading of germs from their places of 
origin, and broader anxieties over what is portrayed as their resistance of 
public health measures (White 2010; Gussow 1989; Echenberg 2002; 
Onoma 2017; Mason 2012; Trauner 1978; Onoma 2018). The process of 
constructing these others as public health dangers is often embedded in 
long-standing processes of identity formation that fashion the civilised and 
hygienic self by distinguishing it from the other cast as uncivilised and 
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insalubrious (Onoma 2017), and anxieties over the potential propagation 
of diseases are enmeshed in concerns over the spread of what are portrayed 
as the less than desirable behaviours and values of these others.
In this chapter, I explore the scapegoating of Senegalese emigrants 
in their country of origin by their fellow citizens to reflect on the extent to 
which communal boundaries shape scapegoating during public health 
crises. I elaborate on the lively debate between Senegalese based in the 
country and emigrants over citizenship and its value, during the troubling 
times of the COVID-19 pandemic. I examine the gap between discourses 
that portray communal boundaries as critical in social interactions, and 
the lived experiences of people who regularly work around these 
boundaries in their quotidian interactions. Pointing out that scapegoating 
during public health crises is not reserved for those portrayed as 
‘foreigners’ adds to the literature on social relations in Africa and beyond. 
This raises questions of the extent to which a focus on these boundaries 
affords an understanding of the intricacies of social interactions during 
times of crisis when such boundaries are most vociferously invoked.
I base this chapter on my analysis of online comments on news 
stories concerning the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic and its 
unfolding in Senegal. These online comments only constitute one facet of 
popular discourses that occurred over radio, social media platforms like 
WhatsApp and Facebook, and in face-to-face interactions. There are clear 
challenges with the use of online comments in social analysis (Henrich 
and Holmes 2013; Taylor et al. 2016), including knowing whether people 
are who they claim to be. Also, the propensity for anonymity to encourage 
people to express their views without censure or restraint makes it 
difficult (for social analysts) to claim that comments online represent 
wider social views. The use of spam bots to comment on online content 
further undermines our capacity to gauge popular views (Schneier 2020). 
At the same time, these comments are readily accessible and perceived 
anonymity may encourage people to share their ‘true’ views (Henrich and 
Holmes 2013; Taylor et al. 2016).
Communal boundaries and social relations
During public health crises, those outside of communal boundaries, 
identified as strangers and foreigners, can become the targets of 
scapegoating and abuse, while those within these lines, defined as citizens 
and autochthones, are spared maltreatment and cast as unfortunate 
victims (Benton and Dionne 2015; M’Bokolo 1982; White 2010; Mason 
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2012; Eichelberger 2007; Markel and Stern 2002; Ngalamulume 2012; 
Ginzburg 1990; Eamon 1998; Onoma 2020a). In exclusionary discourses 
that proliferate worldwide, citizens and autochthones are said to properly 
belong to the territory in which they reside, where they are imbued with 
a plenitude of rights, including to residence, land ownership, participation 
in economic activities and politics, and standing before judicial systems. 
Strangers across the intercommunal line, in contrast, are cast as 
interlopers who have left their own homes to appropriate and settle in the 
territories of others. Their rights to own land, participate in economic 
activities, contest elections, vote and enjoy a peaceful life are challenged 
in discourses that urge them to go back to where they properly belong. 
Such invective is often accompanied by physical attacks and this has 
sometimes led to xenophobic terror, mass expulsion and genocide 
(Mamdani 2002; Onoma 2013; Jackson 2006; Geschiere 2009).
While exclusionary discourses often portray boundaries between 
communities as thick walls that prevent links and interactions across 
groups, the specification of these boundaries is characterised by great 
ambiguity. The idea of origins as deployed in these discourses is nebulous 
and the subject of both manipulation and contestation. Autochthones are 
described alternately as those who have sprung out of their territory, as 
opposed to those who moved there from elsewhere, those who arrived 
first in the territory, those who arrived there before other populations 
against whom they are involved in contestations, and so on (Jackson 
2006; Konings 2008; Nyamnjoh 2015; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000). 
As noted in the literature, the determination of precedence in these 
discourses and disputes is a highly political process to which various 
resources, including force, are regularly deployed (Berry 2000; Murphy 
and Bledsoe 1987).
The specification of territory to which groups belong invokes deeply 
contested geopolitical questions. Actors involved in disputes over where 
communal markers lie and who lives on either side of these boundaries 
regularly switch between geopolitical scales (village, town, district, 
region, nation-state), making these contestations complex and leaving 
very few safe from potential accusations of being strangers (Jackson 
2006; Onoma 2018). While judico-legal citizens of a country may band 
together to expel migrants from another country, citizens belonging to an 
ethnic group may expel their fellow citizens from what is cast as an ethnic 
homeland, demanding that they go back to their own area of the country 
(Eyoh 1999; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Geschiere 2009).
In conjuring neatly bounded communities demarcated by thick 
boundaries, these discourses underestimate the flux and fluidity of (inter)
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communal markers, the politics of borderlines, and the tendency of 
people to cross boundaries and go where they are thought to not belong 
(Nyamnjoh 2016; Jackson 2006; Bauman 1997; Douglas 1984). They 
underestimate the extent to which borders between communities 
constitute zones of encounters and interactions rather than barriers that 
are immutable and able to guarantee absolute separation (Nyamnjoh 
2015a, 2015b; Hay 2014, 2016). Given this, we need to critically examine 
the ability of these boundaries to protect those within their confines from 
indignities and violence, while exposing those outside of their ambit to 
scapegoating and social exclusion during public health crises.
The situation of migrants troubles assumptions about the extent to 
which communal lines serve to protect those within them – citizens – 
from exclusion in their homelands, while exposing ‘strangers’ who have 
wandered away from their homelands to scapegoating. Those who 
discriminate against immigrants and ask them to ‘go back home’ imply 
that these travellers and their offspring only properly belong in the ‘places 
of origin’ that they have left behind (Eyoh 1999; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 
2000; Onoma 2013). The ties of emigrants to and their standing in their 
places of origin are far more precarious than these exclusionary discourses 
suggest. These ties are the subject of constant negotiation and contestation 
(Onoma 2018; Nyamnjoh 2005; 2011). Scholars recognise that the 
extent to which those at home see generations of emigrants as still 
possessing the full plethora of rights that accrue to ‘sons and daughters of 
the soil’ depends on factors that go beyond their ability to prove deep 
family ties to ‘home’ areas. Scholars have cited visits to these home areas, 
financial support of family and friends there, restraint in the face of 
exploitative and abusive behaviour by relatives at home, accessibility at 
all times to those at home, support of community members who also 
happen to be abroad, and participation in local development projects and 
investment in their home country, as determinants of the status of these 
ties (Ferguson 1999; Englund 2004; Tabappsi 1999; Nyamnjoh 2001; 
2005; de Sardan 1999; Lindley 2007; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; 
Onoma 2018; Tazanu 2012). Emigrants who neglect these ‘duties’ 
potentially face sanctions that include insults and name-calling, threats 
of and reported mystical attacks, including through witchcraft and 
marabouts, and ostracism by their families and communities at large 
(Tabappsi 1999; Nyamnjoh 2001; 2005; Lindley 2007; Onoma 2018; 
Tazanu 2012).
Remittances have come to assume a central position in interactions 
between migrants and people left in their home communities, and the 
perceived refusal of some migrants to remit is a central cause of problems 
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with their relatives in home communities (Nyamnjoh 2006; Onoma 
2018; Lindley 2007). But the attitude of home communities to remittances 
is ambivalent, mixing covetousness with concern (Nyamnjoh 2011). 
Remittances, like other forms of external interventions, reshape 
landscapes and reorder hierarchies by favouring and empowering some 
while disempowering and marginalising others. Concern over financial 
remittances also coincides with trepidation over ‘foreign’ values, norms 
and practices that are brought back by migrants from their travels 
abroad (Riccio 2005, 2008; Uberti 2014; Nyamnjoh 2011). Anxiety over 
emigrants bringing COVID-19 to Senegal plays into the tensions between 
gratitude for remittances and apprehension about the invasion of Senegal 
by not only of remittances, norms and practices, but also disease. Fears of 
the spread of COVID-19 by returning migrants capture broader 
preoccupations with the transgression of boundaries and upending of 
social orders by movements and flows, which people at once embrace, 
agonise over and even resist.
COVID-19 and the lightness of citizenship in Senegal
Senegalese emigrants in Southern European countries are widely 
recognised as investing significantly to maintain healthy relations with 
their home communities (Daffe 2008; Tall 2008b; Riccio 2005; 2008; 
Mboup 2000; Tall 1994; Barro 2008; Gueye 2002). Like the Cameroonian 
‘bushfallers’ described by Nyamnjoh (2011), they approach migration as 
going abroad to work, where they amass and repatriate wealth, returning 
back home at the earliest possibility (Tall 2008b). Once they acquire 
residential and work permits, many regularly visit Senegal to spend time 
with wives and children left behind, to see other members of the family, 
to attend religious events, and to establish and monitor businesses that 
many of them create in the retail and wholesale, real estate, transportation, 
agriculture and fisheries sectors. Many are uninterested in integrating 
into the communities abroad where they find themselves, often seeing 
themselves strictly as sojourners (Riccio 2002, 2008; Fouquet 2008).
These emigrants contribute to the livelihoods of their families 
by paying utility bills, covering the costs of schooling, hospitalisations, 
funerals and baptisms, and covering daily expenses on food. They 
contribute to community development projects in their areas of origin, 
including the construction of mosques, schools and clinics, the acquisition 
of ambulances, sinking of boreholes and so on. In addition, they invest 
heavily in many sectors of the Senegalese economy (Daffe 2008; Tall 
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2008b; Riccio 2005; 2008; Mboup 2000; Daffe 2008; Tall 1994; Barro 
2008; Gueye 2002). Senegal is one of the highest recipients of migrant 
remittances in Africa (Diop 2008), and these transfers were estimated at 
US$2.5 billion in 2019 (World Bank n.d.). In a 2001 study, in some 
villages in the Louga Region of Senegal, 90 per cent of household revenue 
was identified as coming from migrant remittances (Tall 2008b, 54).
In this context, the question of citizenship assumed a central 
position in conversations on scapegoating; it was one of the principal 
grounds on which some emigrants and some Senegalese residents 
questioned the legitimacy of scapegoating, because people who were 
targeted were within the ambit of their own communities. One version of 
this argument focused on the space where scapegoating was taking place, 
contending that emigrants could not be scapegoated in Senegal because 
they were Senegalese, were born in the country and had sacrificed 
themselves through travel for the wellbeing of their families, communities 
and country (Seneweb News 2020a). This argument partakes in the 
fetishisation of citizenship that was a feature of early responses to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Border closures that ostensibly sought to curb 
the spread of the virus through international travel were often carefully 
crafted to allow citizens to return ‘home’, including when they were 
infected by COVID-19. This move ignored the fact that many people do 
not call their countries of citizenship ‘home’, and had no interest in going 
to these places to shelter from the pandemic. Further, it elides the fact 
that many people call territories where they do not have citizenship 
home, and that they needed, for various reasons, to return to these places 
during the pandemic (Onoma 2020c). These moves are grounded in the 
territorialisation of identity that ties people to specific geographical 
terrains (Mamdani 2002; Malkki 2009), ignoring the ability and tendency 
of people to fashion temporary and situational ties to multiple homes.
A second argument focused on the perpetrators of scapegoating. 
The contention was that Senegalese could not scapegoat these emigrants 
since they were of the same nationality. One can understand from this 
argument that scapegoating should only occur between people on 
opposing sides of intercommunal boundaries. One commentator, on an 
online news story, exclaimed: ‘Unbelievable! Brothers who are racist 
toward their fellow citizens!’ (Seneweb News 2020a). There were overt 
efforts by some to shift attention to the ‘proper’ targets of scapegoating, 
‘foreigners’. People repeatedly brought up the fact that the first four cases 
of coronavirus infection in Senegal were European citizens, and that 
while news stories proliferated about the threat posed by Senegalese 
emigrants, Europeans infected with the disease continued to enter the 
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country. These Europeans, instead of the emigrants, some commentators 
implied, should be held responsible for the spread of disease. One 
commentator on an online news story could not hide his or her incredulity 
at the ‘misplaced’ targeting of the Senegalese: ‘You people like to lynch 
your own compatriots, but as for strangers, they are just great!’ (Seneweb 
News 2020d). Other online commentators blamed conspiracies that 
shifted blame away from ‘strangers’ and onto Senegalese emigrants as 
perpetrated by European embassies, the Senegalese state and even 
sections of the media (Seneweb News 2020a).
Underlying this incredulity over the scapegoating of ‘fellow citizens’ 
and ‘compatriots’ was a primordialist vision of identity and ties imbued 
with notions of blood and origins. This perspective posits interactions as 
posterior to and almost entirely shaped by ties of blood and common 
origins (Mbembe 2001; Diagne 2002). It strays from the view that 
context-laden interactions are what define ties, which are always tentative 
and evolving.
The urge to respect the law of communal boundaries, by showing 
solidarity towards fellow Senegalese emigrants and scapegoating 
Europeans instead, reflected a global pandemic of xenophobia that 
accompanied the public health crisis of COVID-19 (Zhu 2020; Human 
Rights Watch 2020; Eric 2020), as also occurred in other disease 
outbreaks (Benton and Dionne 2015; White 2010; Mason 2012; 
Eichelberger 2007; Markel and Stern 2002). In Senegal, these calls did 
not always fall on receptive ears. Being a citizen, including one who had 
contributed to the development of the country, their community, and the 
wellbeing of their kin, it was asserted, did not give a person the right to 
endanger the country and those who live in it (Gueye 2020d). 
A commentator on one online story pointed out that ‘(t)he fact that you 
send Western Union or Ria to your family in need does not give you the 
right to contaminate Senegalese’ (Seneweb News 2020b).
People argued that what was important was not which community 
people belonged to, but what threat they posed to other Senegalese and 
to the country. Some argued that Senegalese emigrants from Southern 
European countries posed a greater danger than foreigners on account of 
their numbers, their membership of wider networks in Senegal, and the 
difficulties they faced in self-isolating and practising social distancing 
relative to foreigners (Seneweb News 2020a, 2020e). Sylvain Faye 
(2020a) has written on the challenges with social distancing, self-
isolation and confinement in Senegal. In addition to these challenges, 
people invoked the supposedly ‘uneducated’, ‘undisciplined’ and 
‘stubborn’ character of these emigrants. Faye has also discussed the 
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‘authoritarian’ visions and measures that undergird the tendency to 
denounce, as evidence of stubbornness and indiscipline, people’s efforts 
to balance the imperative of pandemic control and prevention with the 
needs of precarious lives lived in a context where propitiousness for 
these measures are far from certain (Faye 2020a, 2020b). For Senegalese 
emigrants, these characterisations also suggest frustrations over the new-
found celebrity status of formerly unemployed youth, who after high-risk 
voyages abroad, occasionally return with fortunes that better educated 
and formally employed relatives and neighbours in Senegal could only 
dream of.
The focus on xenophobia during epidemics accords with the broader 
view that posits communal lines as overwhelmingly influential on social 
interactions (Ekeh 1975; Jackson 2006; de Sardan 1999; Geschiere 2009; 
Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000). While the literature emphasises ‘others’ 
as the targets of scapegoating during epidemics and pandemics (Onoma 
2017; Benton and Dionne 2015; M’Bokolo 1982; White 2010; Mason 
2012; Echenberg 2002; Eichelberger 2007; Markel and Stern 2002; 
Ngalamulume 2012; Ginzburg 1990; Eamon 1998), the scapegoating of 
fellow citizens in Senegal shows that communal boundaries do not always 
exert determinate influences on social interactions. This insight ties in 
with a wealth of work that questions the extent to which communal lines 
shape quotidian interactions. Nyamnjoh (2015a, 2015b), in his work on 
conviviality, has emphasised the ways in which people and communities, 
including those who emphasise these lines as primordial to social 
interactions, routinely work around these boundaries. The literature on 
the incorporation of strangers in African communities (Guyer 1993; 
Bledsoe 1980; Colson 1970) has emphasised the capacity of people to 
rope those considered as assets into their families and clans regardless of 
which side of the communal line they fell. This same literature underlined 
the limited extent to which belonging on the same side of the communal 
line, including having jural ties, influenced the tendency toward 
conviviality in African society (Murphy and Bledsoe 1987). In my previous 
work on refugee-host relations (Onoma 2013), I have shown how 
belonging to different ethnic groups did not discourage Guineans from 
incorporating refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia during recent civil 
wars in those countries.
In social research on medicine and diseases, Cohn’s reflections 
(2018) on solidarity across communal lines during communicable 
disease outbreaks question the tendency to see periods of epidemics as 
always coinciding with xenophobia. My previous reflections (Onoma 
2020b) on how acts of xenophilia and conviviality persist even during 
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outbreaks of xenophobia further illustrate the tendency to work around 
communal lines, even when people invoke these boundaries most 
vociferously. This work of destabilising the influence of communal 
boundaries on social relations is also evident in Napier’s reflections on 
the implications of advances in the fields of theoretical immunology and 
stem cells, regenerative medicine and epigenetics, for our understanding 
of social relations (2012, 2017). He points at our frequent and almost 
compulsive search for and outreach to the other over lines that bound 
the self, and argues that such outreach is beneficial to the self. Of 
particular importance in the work of Napier is the way in which he casts 
this outreach and its consequences as fundamental to the constitution 
of the self. This raises the spectre that there may not be a well bounded 
and stable self that is anterior to these interactions across lines (2012, 
2017).
Conclusion
This account of Senegalese emigrants who are scapegoated by their 
‘compatriots’ in ‘their own country’ suggests that communal lines do not 
necessarily help us make sense of the social dynamics that are 
characteristic of epidemics. Consistent with other literature on relations 
between migrants and home communities, and the exploitation, 
contestations and tensions that bedevil these relations, I suggest that 
citizenship and being on the ‘right side’ of communal boundaries does not 
necessarily protect emigrants from the indignity of scapegoating during 
crises such as that of pandemics.
In scapegoating Senegalese emigrants based in Southern Europe 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, no effort was made to question their 
Senegalese citizenship, and participants in debates over these emigrants 
displayed their capacity to scapegoat even those who they recognise as 
legitimate members of the Senegalese body politic. People did not claim 
that these emigrants were ‘no longer part of us’. Instead, the argument 
was that ‘they are dangerous so we should keep them at arm’s length even 
if they happen to be part of us’. People did not cast them as other in order 
to scapegoat them. The understanding instead was that certain members 
of the body politic can be dangerous, and the community has a right 
to protect itself by ensuring their distance. Communal boundaries did 
not have a determinate effect on how people pursued what they saw 
as the goal of securing their health, no matter how problematic their 
actions were.
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Note
1 The communiques of the Ministry of Health and Social Action are on the website of the Ministry 
at http://www.sante.gouv.sn/taxonomy/term/14 (accessed 16 September 2020).
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Accounts of hardship among waste-picking communities and sanitation 
workers have appeared intermittently in the print and social media since 
March 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold in India. These accounts 
brought to public consciousness the lack of personal protective equipment 
(mainly gloves and masks) among sanitation workers, and the risks they 
faced in relation to exposure to the virus, in the context of increased 
medical waste, including masks, that were being seen in public spaces and 
landfill areas. There were also accounts of loss of livelihoods because of the 
nation-wide lockdown for three weeks from 25 March to 14 April 2020. 
During this time waste pickers were unable to go out and collect and recycle 
dry waste, and this severely impacted their ability to feed themselves. 
Emerging accounts highlighted the negative impact of measures taken to 
contain COVID-19, while they also laid bare the troubling reality of waste-
picking communities, of lives lived on the margins of societies, with little 
to no recognition and protection (social, income, health and safety 
protections) despite the crucial work they do to keep cities and commons 
clean. For these communities, COVID-19 has intensified the uncertainty 
hardwired into their work, their living spaces and their everyday lives. 
Public health practices around masking, washing hands and physical 
distancing, while necessary to reduce the risk of contracting the virus, have 
little resonance with the living and working conditions of waste-picking 
communities; for these community members, protecting and taking care of 
themselves is extremely difficult (Figure 11.1).
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The word ‘waste’ can be traced back to the Latin word, vastus, which 
means ‘unoccupied, uncultivated’ (Gidwani and Reddy 2011). Gidwani 
and Reddy trace the entry of waste as a political-juridical concept to late-
thirteenth century England, where it was used in the context of 
usufructuary1 rights of tenants. The tenant could not allow the land to go 
to waste if he (never she) were to continue to hold such right. Waste 
therefore originated in the context of property and land. In India, in some 
local contexts, this still remains the case. For instance, in Tamil the word 
poramboke nilam means land which is outside the revenue accounts of the 
government, but literally the term means waste land. Barbara Harriss-
White (2020), among others, has noted that along with the proliferation of 
waste, research on waste and waste work is also rapidly expanding although 
still fragmented. Rarely is the waste economy looked at as a whole.
Waste pickers are among the poorest, most marginalised and 
stigmatised in India (Harriss-White 2020; Doron 2018; Kornberg 2019; 
Shankar and Sahni 2017). Waste makes us uneasy, it reminds us of our 
‘all-too-mortal bodies’; and this discomfort is, as Martha Nussbaum notes, 
‘projected outward onto groups who can serve as, so to speak, the 
surrogate dirt of a community, enabling the dominant group to feel clean 
and heavenly’ (Morrison 2015, 37). Waste pickers mainly come from the 
Figure 11.1 Sifting and collection of recyclables at Naidupeta dump 
yard at Guntur, Andhra Pradesh, India. Photo: Arise Hub, The George 
Institute for Global Health India
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most marginalised castes and communities in India. In his essay, 
‘Untouchability and Lawlessness’, B.R. Ambedkar (Maharashtra 1989) 
writes that under the caste order, ‘the scavenger’s work is beneath the 
dignity of the Hindus’.2 Even today in India, the occupation of handling 
waste, both formally and informally, remains a function of caste (Singh 
2014; Doron 2018). Other sites of inequity operate along with caste 
(Gidwani and Maringanti 2016; Gidwani 1992; Gidwani and Baviskar 
2011). For instance, poor working-class people who migrate to cities 
in search of other work are often absorbed into waste-picking work 
(Kornberg 2019; Shankar and Sahni 2017).
In India, in The Solid Waste Management Rules (SWM), waste 
pickers were for the first time explicitly recognised and defined by the 
government (GOI 2016b).3 A waste picker was defined as:
A person or groups of persons informally engaged in collection and 
recovery of reusable and recyclable solid waste from the source of 
waste generation, the streets, bins, material recovery facilities, 
processing and waste disposal facilities for sale to recyclers directly 
or through intermediaries to earn their livelihood.
Urban India generates around 42 million tonnes of municipal waste and 
the Twelfth Schedule4 mandates local urban administrative bodies to 
maintain the streets and keep cities clean. The formal structures of urban 
municipalities are able to recycle only 30 per cent of the waste and rely on 
waste pickers and existing informal waste collection and recycling 
networks to meet the larger tasks of keeping cities clean. Waste picking 
is informal work, but it plays a key role in waste management. Waste-
picking communities save resources for the municipality by collecting 
over 80 per cent of total recyclable waste and contributing to a substantial 
portion of the waste economy (Harriss-White 2020). The current system 
of waste management in India is built on this informality, and relies on 
the coercive and unequal power relations that arise out of these informal 
arrangements as well as caste-derived ideas of purity and pollution. 
According to the Constitution of India, public health and sanitation are 
state5 matters. However, solid waste management is the responsibility of 
local urban administration. Article 243W of the Constitution refers to 
‘public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management’ as a 
direct responsibility of municipalities. Though waste management is 
a municipal responsibility, it is fast moving away from public sector 
control, bringing ‘private players into confrontations with informal waste 
pickers’ (Shankar and Sahni 2017: 55). No official data are available on 
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the number of people engaged in waste picking, but up to one and a half 
million people are estimated to be involved in this work, accounting for 
up to 10 per cent of waste pickers globally (GOI 2016a; Bose and 
Bhattacharya 2017).
Waste pickers face constant harassment from state institutions and 
are often suspected as ‘thieves masquerading as waste collectors’ 
(Shankar and Sahni 2017: 61) by residents and police.6 Women enter 
the workforce on an unequal footing with men (Sankaran 2013) due to 
the sexual division of labour, and this affects their standing in the public 
sphere as much as in private life.7 Wages for the kinds of work performed 
‘typically by women’ are classified as ‘light work’, thus attracting lesser 
wages than those paid to men (Sankaran 2013). In waste picking, women 
occupy the bottom of the wage ladder, their working conditions differing 
from men even when they pursue similar activities. Shankar and Sahni 
(2017) argue that in the informal waste sector, men occupy the 
‘transactional’ segment of the ‘waste ladder’, while women and children 
are usually at the bottom of the hierarchy and ‘handle waste in its raw 
form’ (Shankar and Sahni 2017: 251). Caste-patriarchy8 shapes the lives 
of both men and women waste pickers.9
The informal waste economy comprises socially, occupationally and 
economically differentiated categories of ‘waste people’ – waste pickers/
collectors, ragpickers, manual scavengers and sanitation workers among 
other categories. This line of work is characterised by the symbolic and 
practical manifestations of caste, religion and gender. Most waste pickers/
collectors are poor Scheduled Castes (Dalits) and Muslims who have been 
systematically forced into this profession because of their status as 
lower caste and low status. Exiting from this occupation remains difficult. 
It is often argued that the labour in waste economies is deliberately 
informalised to contain costs (by paying low wages) and to express 
contempt for Dalits (by subjugating them and suppressing particular 
communities). Increasingly, informal activity has become hard-wired into 
the business model of municipal contracting wherein acute revenue stress 
and practices of new public management have forced the municipality to 
subcontract services, including that of sanitation. Informal labour 
contractors often bring in labourers and their families from adjoining 
states and pay them to work as waste pickers in cities. These migrant 
labourers are often heavily disadvantaged: they are paid abysmal wages 
without any perks, housed on common land in tent-like shacks without 
proper access to water and electricity; they are unable to communicate 
and integrate with the local population; are constantly regarded as 
‘outsiders’; and are further discriminated against because of the nature 
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of their work. Recent governance shifts toward reforming the waste 
management sector through increased privatisation and mechanisation 
threaten to dispossess waste pickers from their livelihoods (Gidwani 
and Corwin 2017). These precarious conditions are manifestations of 
intersectional linkages of hierarchies of gender, caste, class and religion 
interlocking with processes of economic liberalisation, urbanisation and 
migration among others (Butt 2019). Waste pickers’ marginalisation, 
enmeshed in the gender, caste and class axis, is simultaneously associated 
with both the materiality of waste and the ritual and symbolic pollution 
of untouchability, further entrenching their exclusion (Gill 2009; Reddy 
2018).
Despite the social, economic, public health and ecological importance 
of their work, waste pickers are not given due recognition for their role, 
and they continue to struggle under the pressures of poverty, stigma and 
compromised citizenship. In contrast, ‘(w)ithin the waste economy, the 
municipal sanitation workers are considered to be the ‘aristocracy’ 
of waste labour’ (Harriss-White 2017, 421); they benefit from higher 
salaries, better living conditions, job security and health insurance, in 
comparison to informal waste pickers/collectors. But, even for this 
aristocracy: ‘Sanitation for sanitation workers is conspicuously absent; 
the dirtier and more dangerous the work, the lower the pay and the more 
physically taxing the work conditions’ (Harriss-White 2020, 8).
We share preliminary insights from our ongoing work with waste 
pickers in India in the ARISE (Accountability for Urban Informal Equity) 
project in this chapter. We analysed selective policies that were in place 
pre-COVID-19 and additional policies that were introduced during the 
pandemic. In addition, we share what we are learning from ongoing work 
with waste-picking communities.
Policies and what they reveal
In the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, the Indian government announced 
a nation-wide lockdown to start on 25 March, thereby severely restricting 
the movement of individuals across the country. The lockdown was 
initially imposed for 21 days, and it was extended to a period of three 
months. This large-scale restriction on movement was particularly 
disruptive for poor, marginalised and vulnerable sections of population. 
Waste-picking communities found themselves in a situation where they 
could no longer go out and collect waste. The immediate fall out of this 
was the fear of going hungry. Waste needs to be collected and sold on a 
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daily basis to ensure a cash flow in people’s homes and sufficient money 
to buy food to eat.
At the same time as initiating the lockdown, the federal and state 
governments and the courts announced various social security measures, 
some of which specifically focused on the most vulnerable. The scale and 
frequency of these announcements was unprecedented, with many orders 
amended then revoked within hours of their release, and often not updated 
on the official government websites, making it increasingly difficult to track 
these updates. In this light, a group of activists, researchers, lawyers and 
students came together collectively to set up a crowdfunded COVID-19 
India policy tracker called ‘COVIDIndiaTrack’.10 The main objectives of this 
tracker were to make information easily accessible on a real-time basis, 
monitor the implementation of policies, and demand some basic 
accountability. For sourcing policies pertaining to COVID-19, we relied on 
this tool extensively. In addition, we frequently checked the official 
government handles used on social media platforms, especially Twitter, in 
order to keep abreast with the latest announcements.
The policy analysis we attempted involved three stages. First, we 
searched for policies pertaining to waste-picking communities before 
and after COVID-19. Second, we scrutinised these for fit and relevance, 
based on a dynamic and evolving criteria of inclusion and exclusion (see 
Table 11.1, below). Finally we analysed a subset of these policies based 
on Carol Bacchi’s ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ approach 
(2014). The search strategy was split into two streams: pre-COVID-19 
and post-COVID-19. The post-COVID stream was further split into federal 
and state governments (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and 
Karnataka), where the cities in which we work are located. An evolving 
inclusion and exclusion criteria also aided the policy screening process.
The main objective of the policy screening was to identify policies 
of direct relevance to waste-picking communities. However, most of the 
post COVID-19 policies made no explicit mention of ‘waste-picking 
communities’ or ‘waste pickers’. Instead, they used overarching categories 
like vulnerable sections of society, poor persons, homeless and street 
children, to name a few. As a result, we included these policies for analysis 
because these spaces are where the waste-picking communities are located. 
Based on the first round of searches, we shortlisted 150 policies announced 
by the union government and 30, 13 and 6 policies announced by the state 
governments of Karnataka, Himachal Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, 
respectively.
In the first round of screening, we read through the summaries 
that had been drafted by COVIDIndiaTrack and made a quick note of the 
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Table 11.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Social protection/relief: Provision 
of food, relief kits, cash, insurance 
– all the central/state
Test kits
Employment – including 
government officials as contrast
Hospital management
Orders relating to restriction of 
movements
Corporate social responsibility 
(CSR)
Harassment and discrimination Car insurance
Waste disposal including medical 
waste
Violence against healthcare 
workers
Management of dead bodies Transportation of goods during 
lockdown (our focus is on 
movement of people)
Education Migrant workers and labourers
Continuation of existing health 
services: immunisation, 
tuberculosis (TB)
Access to healthcare Fake news
Homeless, street/pavement 
dwellers
Containment – travellers coming 
into India
Pharmaceutical interventions
Personal protective equipment 
(PPE) – only if sanitation workers 
employed in hospitals
Testing – only if experienced
Agriculture/rural areas focus




central topics that were the focus of the policy and relevant to our 
analysis. Based on this screening, we identified 22 policies pre-COVID 
and 97 policies post-COVID: 75 policies released by the union 
government and 11, 7 and 4 policies released by the state governments 
of Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh respectively 
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Figure 11.2 Policy screening flow. Source: authors
(see Figure 11.2). In the second round of screening, we read through 
the shortlisted policies in greater detail and made a note of those that 
would classify for Carol Bacchi’s ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ 
approach and those that would be good for providing background 
information. Finally, 18 policies were selected for analysis. We chose to 
use Bacchi’s framework because it looks at problem definitions and 
solutions as inextricably linked together.
Pre-COVID-19
representation and visibility
The policies that apply to waste picking are located in a sociocultural and 
economic context within which people handle waste to earn their 
livelihoods. Policies are not merely spaces to search for gaps but provide 
insight into how waste pickers and their problems are represented. 
A common thread in pre-COVID-19 policies11 was emphasis on the 
importance of the role of the informal sector as the ‘backbone of municipal 
solid waste management (MSWM) value chain in India’ (GOI 2016b), 
which includes the kabaadi system and waste pickers, and the relevance 
of legal recognition to strengthen the informal systems of collection that 
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are integral to MSWM. In India, the kabaadi system consists a network of 
kabaadiwalas (junk or scrap dealers), itinerant waste collectors and 
buyers. The latter collect recyclables from households (such as cardboard, 
newspapers, glass bottles and plastic) and sell these to scrap dealers at a 
fixed rate per kilogram, depending upon the composition and valuation 
of items collected. The Solid Waste Management Rules (GOI 2016b) 
recognise the role of the informal sector in waste management and 
emphasise the establishment of a system for the integration of authorised 
waste pickers and waste collectors (by issuing identity cards and formation 
of self-help groups) to facilitate their participation in the solid waste 
management system, including door-to-door collection of waste. But 
silence on the issue of caste and its centrality in waste picking remains, 
and to a great extent there are efforts to gloss over the intertwining of 
caste and waste and render it as a managerial issue (Gatade 2015). 
Treating caste and waste as a bureaucratic issue is not new, and Butt 
(2019) has shown in his work on colonial Punjab how the colonial regime 
cemented links between waste work, governance and caste.
For unspecified reasons, different typologies are used to classify 
waste-picking communities in different policy documents. The First 
National Commission on Labour of 1969 (GOI 1969) used the terms 
‘sweepers’ and ‘scavengers’, while The Second National Commission on 
Labour of 2002 (GOI 2002) used all terminologies – ragpickers, waste 
pickers, scrap collectors and waste collectors – interchangeably. ‘Waste 
workers’ as a term was used to refer to all workers who earned their 
livelihoods by dealing with waste, including the municipal sanitation 
workers and ‘manual scavengers’. The National Commission for 
Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector, 2007 (NCEUS) (GOI 2007) 
identified ‘ragpickers’ as self-employed workers; however, the document 
made a distinction between ‘ragpickers’ and self-employed persons 
owning businesses that recycle scrap and junk. The report also positioned 
the ‘ragpicker’ as economically better off than a ‘casual worker’. Until late 
2016, the National Urban Livelihood Mission (NULM) document and 
Municipal Solid Waste (management and handling) Rules refer to them 
as ragpickers, and only in later policy documents was the terminology of 
‘waste pickers’ used more consistently. The impact of these ambiguities on 
the recognition of the work that waste pickers do, on the dignity of their 
profession, and whether a lack of definition impinges on access to social 
security schemes of the government, remains poorly understood.
In the policies, there is some recognition of the vulnerabilities of 
and problems faced by urban poor in general and particular sections 
of the urban population, including ‘Scheduled castes, Scheduled tribes, 
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minorities, female-headed households, persons with disabilities, the 
destitute, migrant labourers, and especially vulnerable occupational 
groups such as street vendors, ragpickers, domestic workers, beggars, 
construction workers, etc.’ (Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs 
2016, 11). These include a lack of social security and lack of access to 
healthcare, and are considered to belong to vulnerable occupational 
groups. Solutions proffered include the initiation of special projects 
to address livelihood issues of the most vulnerable sections of this 
population, including those with physical disabilities, people categorised 
as ragpickers, domestic workers, rickshaw pullers and sanitation workers 
(GOI 2018).
recognition/identity cards
The SWM and PWM rules specifically mandate that waste pickers must 
be provided with identification documents. Because waste picking is an 
informal activity and waste pickers mainly live in informal settlements 
and on pavements, they do not possess identification cards. Not having 
a card means a lack of access to government welfare schemes. In 
addition, waste pickers are subject to harassment by the police and the 
general public. They are commonly assumed to be thieves and tend to 
be the first people to get picked up by the police in the event of theft. 
Many organisations that work with waste pickers advocate that they be 
issued with official identity cards. Reddy and Kumar (2018), for 
example, make the case that ensuring the welfare of waste pickers lies 
in issuing them with identity cards that acknowledge their occupation 
and their right to access, collect and sell waste across their respective 
states. Waste pickers in turn argue that identity cards will benefit them 
in multiple ways, including by increasing their access to waste in both 
private and public areas, and, by giving their occupation legitimacy in 
the eyes of the police and the citizenry, reducing the harassment they 
routinely face. In Karnataka, a project for providing identity cards to 
waste pickers was initiated in 2011 by Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara 
Palike (BBMP), making it the first urban local body to register waste 
pickers in India. Through this project, over 6,000 waste pickers in the 
city were identified and issued identification cards, with another 7,000 
approved and waiting for cards to be issued (Reddy and Kumar 2018). 
However, waste pickers noted that the identity cards also had negative 
impact, since those who were unable to gain these cards, for reasons 
such as being identified as migrants, faced even greater exclusion and 
marginalisation.
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Access to government health schemes
The Unorganised Workers Social Security Act UWSSA (2008) (GOI 2008) 
extends to ‘ragpickers’ and provides for the formulation of welfare schemes 
related to, inter alia, life and disability cover, and health and maternity 
benefits. Under Schedule I of the Act, several schemes have been listed to 
which workers can have access. Among these are the Janani Suraksha 
Yojana (JSY) of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, which is a safe 
motherhood intervention to reduce maternal and neonatal mortality 
through promotion of institutional deliveries among poor pregnant 
women. This federal scheme integrates cash assistance with delivery and 
post-delivery care. There is also the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY) of the Labour Ministry, a national health insurance scheme for 
people living below the poverty line which provides protection from 
financial liabilities that arise out of hospitalisation. This scheme has 
now moved under the aegis of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 
and in 2018 it was subsumed by the federal government scheme 
Ayushman Bharat-Pradhan Mantri Jan Aarogya Yojana (PMJAY), which is 
implemented by states on a cost-sharing basis. This is meant to avoid 
duplication of multiple schemes for the same population group, and to 
reduce the burden of furnishing multiple cards for services by families 
(because coverage is for families). Earlier, poor people found it very difficult 
to decipher and understand which scheme covered what services. Changes 
to schemes aimed to prevent them from having to access multiple service 
providers as well as being denied services due to non-applicability of 
specific schemes in specific facilities. While the intent is commendable, in 
actual practice, the autonomy of states to shape the policies with relevance 
to their context has been curtailed due to the centralised nature of this 
scheme (Krishnakumar 2019;12 The Week 201813). The standing committee 
report on Urban Development14 in 2008, among other things, acknowledged 
the occupational health issues involved with ‘rag picking’ and recommended 
that those involved in such work be provided with ‘personal protective 
equipment like gloves and spectacles and things like that so that they do not 
contract diseases’ (55). But the lack of identity cards remains a gatekeeping 
issue which prevents access to these schemes. In 2013, RSBY was extended 
to ‘ragpickers’ and ‘sanitation workers’.15 The RSBY website claims that 
registration under the scheme is easy. The 2013 notification requires that 
the state government identify ‘ragpickers’ provided that they are at least 18 
years of age; and ‘ragpickers’ must provide a self-declaration confirming 
that they are a ‘ragpicker’, and a document of proof of occupation. Acquiring 
proof of occupation is not easy for waste pickers, however.
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During COVID times
As indicated earlier, a flurry of orders, guidelines and rules were issued by 
federal and state governments to deal with COVID-19 and its impact; this 
remained dynamic to the end of December 2020. Insurance schemes for 
health workers have been announced; these include sanitation workers but 
not waste pickers or waste workers. Sanitation workers are formally 
employed by the city’s administration to clean public spaces including 
sewers and manholes, empty toilet pits and septic tanks, segregate different 
kinds of waste, and operate pumping stations and treatment plants. They 
are tenured or ‘regular’ employees and are given employee benefits such as 
a pension and health insurance. In times of COVID-19, the government 
heralded them as ‘frontline workers’ or ‘frontline warriors’. Schemes to 
provide additional food for the poor were also introduced, but these were 
limited to a three-month period at the beginning of the lockdown. While 
these schemes were welcome initiatives, they built onto existing schemes 
and did not directly address the exclusionary nature of existing schemes. 
This appears to be based on the assumption that problems in accessing 
these schemes are only due to COVID-related disruptions, but they do not 
address the impact of loss of work, hunger and inability to access healthcare, 
nor do they take into account the problems faced by waste-picking com- 
munities in accessing these schemes, even in regular times.
In addition to reviewing policies as part of our ongoing research, we 
conducted interviews with nine waste pickers and sanitation workers 
from Bengaluru, Vijayawada and Shimla. We also interviewed five key 
informants from these cities. Across these sites, we are working with a 
cross-section of waste workers: in Bengaluru, we are working with waste 
pickers who engage in door-to-door collection of segregated dry waste. In 
Vijayawada, we are working with waste pickers in the informal sector 
who are own account workers (Murthy 2020; Saligram 2020). In Shimla, 
we are working with tenured sanitation workers and contractual door-to-
door garbage collectors.
tapestries of wellbeing and ill-health
The interviews revealed a preoccupation with food insecurity and hunger, 
inability to access health services, and the waste-picking community’s 
dependence on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other 
community-based organisations. Some of the interviewees16 spoke about 
complete dependence on NGOs to feed themselves and their families, and 
the difficulties faced by these organisations in delivering medicines to the 
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communities where waste pickers live. Sujatha, one of our interviewees, 
told us that if her family and others ‘had not received any support from 
the NGO, it would have been very, very tough. They gave us one month’s 
provisions and then we got some from the public distribution system 
(‘ration shop’) which helped us “maintain” our lives’. She also went on to 
say that the organisation had offered to supply the medicines. But this did 
not happen, and she does not know why; ‘they had to go to a nearby 
medical store and buy it. But mostly people go to the nearby public facility 
and pick-up medicines’.
Waste pickers depend on the regular flow of cash which they 
generate through picking, sorting and selling on a daily basis to feed 
themselves and their families. Because of the lockdown, their only source 
of income was cut off. People consistently spoke about lack of food, lack 
of money to seek care if needed and the immense stress/distress in such 
situations. Kamal, for example, spoke to us about how food relief was 
necessary and helpful, but it did not resolve other stresses related to cash 
flow. Being unable to access health services was a major source of stress:
Each rupee matters now for a person. Just lentils and rice alone 
won’t run the house, right? But the lockdown … honestly has 
troubled us, no one even has a rupee. We are managing somehow 
but if someone falls ill at home or if some problems arise then 
meeting these costs would be a huge issue. We don’t have money to 
go to doctor, so we go to the government hospital here but for the 
people who work here (indicating migrant workers), their homes 
run because they send money.
Suresh conveyed the stress due to the lockdown slightly differently, 
referring to the inability to work, the role of the police, and her perception 
that the government did not seem to understand their situation:
We are also struggling more now, we are not allowed to go outside, 
the police are not allowing anyone to leave their homes. Two to 
three people are physically challenged; they are not able to do any 
work. Mainly many are depending on begging at door to door in the 
near places. They are completely helpless; this needs to be 
recognised by the government.
People also spoke about feeling distressed at what they were seeing 
around them, but also solidarity in troubled times and looking out for 
each other, as Annie put it:
VIRAL LOADS214
most of the people are facing problems in this pandemic, they need 
some food. Some people are in critical position, kids are crying for 
food. Due to social stigma parents are not ready to ask help. I am 
also facing problems but two times I have prepared food for the 
hungry people. They are not my relatives; I don’t know who they are 
when I helped them.
While some of the issues had an urgency shaped by the challenges of 
managing their lives during the pandemic, the key informants who had 
worked with waste pickers for many years now shared that many issues that 
waste pickers were facing were not unique to the pandemic, but were ones 
that they faced at any time. Indhu, one of our key informants, told us:
The fear is also there, and they also fear that sometimes they are 
diagnosed with something that requires 10 days rest or 15 days rest 
or something like that … they can’t afford that. It sounds like help 
should not be taken for granted but this is the bitter realities that 
these people … there was this one woman … I can give you a lot of 
community examples because this is what we encounter on a day-
to-day basis. She had elephantiasis on her left leg and she just 
refuses to go to doctor because she has seven children to take care 
of and if she loses a day of work what will happen? They won’t have 
anything to eat. So, if there is a community health camp where they 
can go for one hour come back that is all fine, but not where it takes 
days for them and regular follow ups for them. Frankly speaking, 
those who work in the godowns [warehouses] and scrap shops, 
their owners also exploit them in many ways. I won’t say like very 
good and nice things about them because it is true, this exploitation 
still happens even if we associate with them it happens back of the 
hand. So, it’s like a daily wage kind of a thing, you lose one day’s 
work if you go to the hospitals, then there is bill and all that.
Most waste pickers constantly struggle to eat and survive, and seek care. 
While the government has provided welfare and health insurance 
schemes that are expected to meet the needs of poor people including 
waste pickers, to what extent these actually meet their needs remains 
moot. Even when there is a possibility of seeking care, stigma, fear and 
the experience of being treated poorly by health workers means that they 
avoid accessing these services. As another key informant elaborated, a lot 
of hard work and convincing building of trust has to be done before many 
very poor people will agree to access health services, and they are 
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dependent on NGOs and citizen groups to help them. Previously waste 
pickers were reluctant to present for care because of fear of stigma. This 
is particularly so because many belong to Scheduled tribes, and from the 
perspective of key informants, their persistent experience of stigma and 
social exclusion impacts their willingness to access health services. Aman, 
for instance, emphasised the work involved in talking to women about 
institutional deliveries and antenatal care, and allaying their fears about 
going to hospitals. Slowly, he remarked, ‘we are seeing an increasing 
willingness to access government services including medical services’. 
Aman continued:
There are no medical shops, for example, in dumping yards … they 
will have to come to the city. They will have to travel around 12 km. 
And I want to tell you one more thing … with regards to the dumping 
yard, there’s one pregnant woman and they don’t follow institutional 
deliveries … they don’t do that. So, they’d rather … they deliver at 
their houses itself. We spent a lot of time talking to the woman and 
assured her that we will take her to the government hospital where 
she can get good care. When she started to experience labour pain 
she called us and we spoke to her and arranged for an auto to take 
her to the government hospital, we spoke to the doctor and paid for 
her medicines too. So, she, her family and the community were very 
happy that we could help them during this time. And they said … 
this is the first time … in our community … this is the first time … 
this much service and care has been provided to us (Aman).
From these narratives, it is clear that while experiences shared find their 
immediacy in the fallout of COVID-19, these are not unique to the 
pandemic, but rather are issues that waste-picking communities grapple 
with on an everyday basis. Living with and through a pandemic adds 
to their vulnerability; as Bennett and Dewi (this volume) show, the 
pandemic amplifies their marginality and the health consequences of this.
Accountabilities
The slew of policies released by the federal and state governments during 
the COVID-19 pandemic allocated responsibilities for implementation to 
different arms of the bureaucracy. For example, advice on the provision 
of safe and potable water to those residing in urban slums and belonging 
to the poorest strata of society simply reinforced what needs to happen 
with or without the pandemic. Access to safe and potable water for the 
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poor is a longstanding unmet need. The initiation of the lockdown to 
reduce the spread of the disease ended up further stigmatising waste-
picking communities, at a stroke taking away their chances of earning a 
living and feeding themselves. The efforts to provide food to these 
communities were not based on their realities as detailed in policy 
statements, and the exclusions built into public distribution systems 
remained. The interviewees we spoke with elaborated on the negative 
impacts of the lockdown:
Lockdown is a problem. It is tough for people, the labourers like 
waste pickers … we have no salary … it is not that monthly we get 
money then we sleep and that’s it. For us the money depends on 
how much work we do. So, government should have thought about 
us, the sanitation workers on the road who do cleanliness work … 
they do the work of sanitation workers also so government should 
have also thought that the one who uses his cycle to pick up 
materials and sell … whose lives revolve around this … they should 
have thought about people like us. If they have told us ‘okay, you do 
your work don’t create issues’ … if we or someone had said this or 
allowed us to do so, we could have lived better. In such a state how 
will one feel? You tell me. It was not necessary to do this, people can 
maintain distance and work. Doing so it would have been better for 
us, but with lockdown it is like … stay at home like how one has to 
stay in jail. What is the use of it? Instead … People live their lives to 
eat food so if we can’t get food then what will we do? Better than 
this is … we do our work but we maintain distance. People have to 
work, if they cannot work then what will they do? People with 
money can sit at home, what problems do they have? (Kamal)
Others spoke of the inability to gain access to rations supposed to be 
provided by the government. From our own interviews and observations, 
we found that civil society organisations and concerned citizens tried 
hard to fill this gap and supply food and medicines to the waste-picking 
communities in the cities where we work. As one of them told us:
Nothing from either the government or the corporation. The 
councillor from the ward provided support. He gave us two kilos of 
rice each and that is not even enough to last one day (Shalini).
I know this information from the community people, TV news and 
newspapers. And village volunteers also told. They said to us who 
EMBodiEd rEALit iEs AMoNg ‘WAstE-PiCkErs’  iN iNdiA 217
are having ration card, they are only eligible for receiving Rs. 1000. 
In this community, only two or three families are having ration cards 
(Suresh).
Affirming what the waste pickers have shared with us, civil society 
organisations, well-meaning citizen groups, and individuals were the 
ones supplying food and care. Aman, a key informant, narrated how he 
reached out to the municipal commissioner and shared a note about the 
guidelines for sanitation workers during COVID-19. Aman was pleasantly 
surprised when the commissioner responded by asking Aman if he needed 
any help to support the waste-picking community with whom he works. 
Aman immediately brought to the notice of the commissioner that many 
waste pickers did not have ration cards, and although the government 
was supplying food aid without these cards, they were unable to access 
other aid. For example, each family was to get a thousand rupees, but not 
possessing the card meant that they could not get this small financial 
relief being offered. He provided a list of names of waste pickers who did 
not have these cards with the local administration. The following day, 
Aman found that rice and lentils were being distributed to waste pickers 
who did not have ration cards. However, the people who were doing this 
were not local officials, but the wife of the commissioner and her friends 
who were part of Indian Administrative Service (IAS) Wives Association. 
Essentially, the administration lacked the mechanisms to give relief to 
those without ration cards. The inability to access identity cards has 
remained a problem for many of the waste pickers, although some have 
fared better than others:
In my caste, there is no differentiating. But others are facing problems. 
Those who belong to the Yerukula and Pamula communities are 
facing problems. But we are not getting any help from the government. 
I have applied many times for Ration card, Aadhar card and housing, 
and only after a long struggle I got them (Annie).
Discrimination against and stigmatisation of waste pickers practised in 
everyday social encounters and in policy spaces remains a huge barrier. 
Aman spoke of the commonplace discrimination against waste pickers, 
which he has struggled to counter for over a decade working with them. 
Discrimination takes many forms, including in governance spaces like 
municipal corporations. Waste pickers are integrated into waste 
management systems, but are systematically discriminated against 
through entrenched hiring practices, which remain contractual and 
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intensify informality and precarity among waste pickers. This is a direct 
reflection of how little authorities value the work that waste pickers do. 
Although sympathy was expressed and relief provided by individuals and 
groups during the lockdown, Aman remains circumspect about whether 
the realisation of the particular vulnerability of waste pickers will 
translate into lasting positive or less discriminatory change.
Discussion
Drawing on policy discourse analysis and experiences shared by waste 
pickers and key informants working with waste-picking communities, we 
suggest that while the COVID-19 pandemic is in many ways exceptional, 
the policy responses and their impacts in specific contexts are an acute 
manifestation of what is already built into the worlds and everyday lives 
of waste-picking communities. Policy making by design creates and 
defines different masses of bodies for their government, and defines the 
contours of embodiment among individuals and groups. To make sense 
of this, we feel that the concept of ‘debility’, as articulated by Puar (2017), 
can allow us to interrogate the experiences of waste pickers in India. Puar 
articulates debility as a ‘durational death’, a way in which bodies are 
allowed neither to live nor to die. By ‘creating injury’ and maintaining this 
population as perpetually debilitated, and yet alive, this population can 
be controlled and used. Debility differs from disability; it foregrounds the 
‘slow wearing down of populations’ (2017, xiv) rather than focusing on 
the before-and-after of an event that produces disability.
Puar argues that the ‘precarity of certain bodies and populations’ is 
maintained by making them available for maiming. As researchers, we 
are grappling with whether precarity and debility as concepts can be used 
to understand how waste workers are treated to generate a more holistic 
and intersectional understanding of waste picking, its markers and 
the lived realities of those engaged in this work, their families and 
communities. It helps us to understand how waste workers are deliberately 
held in a socially and economically constrained position. Their margin- 
alisation is sedimented in both everyday social and national and local 
policy spaces in order to maintain the status quo, because India cannot 
function as a clean (pure and modern) state without the marginality of 
those charged with the work of cleaning. To extrapolate from Deleuze 
and Guattari, ‘the state apparatus needs, at its summit, pre-disabled 
people’ (see Puar 2017, 63) and, we suggest, needs this precarity to 
continue its claims to cleanliness and purity.
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Puar (2017) argues that the social acceptance of disability relies on 
the obfuscation and deep proliferation of debility. The acceptance of 
certain kinds of understandings of waste work valorise the fact that waste 
pickers contribute around 20 per cent of the work involved in recycling 
waste. This blurs other more obscene aspects of waste work, and 
articulates waste pickers as hard-working citizens who contribute to 
society and therefore need to be rewarded.
The experiences of waste pickers highlight an urgent need to rethink 
overarching governance and accountability structures and systems that 
define ‘waste picking’, and those who make their living from this, to 
provide an accommodative frame of policy making centred on their 
rights. Such re-thinking demands that we develop an emic understanding 
of embodiment with those who are marginalised and oppressed. We need 
to integrate this understanding with discourses of intersectionality to 
move towards a framing capable of transforming power relations and 
redressing the inequalities in the health and wellbeing of waste-picking 
communities.
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Notes
 1 An usufructuary right allows the tenant to use and enjoy a property over a certain period, as 
long as he or she is able to maintain the property, pay taxes, and whatever else may be required 
as per applicable laws of the land. It is not ownership. 
 2 Page 47, https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/amb/Volume_05.pdf . 
 3 Solid Waste Management Rules. 2016. Government of India, Ministry of Environment, Forest 
and Climate Change. Rule 3(1)(58). 
 4 Twelfth Schedule of the Indian Constitution: the Powers, Authority and Responsibilities of 
Municipalities. This schedule has 18 items. The Twelfth Schedule was added by the 74th 
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Amendment Act of 1992. In this chapter we refer to items within the purview of the 
municipalities.
 5 Item 6, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 
 6 ‘It wasn’t uncommon for the police to round up waste pickers for investigation in cases of theft 
in a locality’ (Shankar and Sahni 2017, 255). 
 7 Sankaran (2013) also points out that one of the reasons for the disparity between the wage 
rates of men and women in India is the interplay between the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and 
the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976. 
 8 Women are ‘embraced by multiple patriarchies’ that produce different effects on women in 
different castes and communities (Rao 2003). While there are similarities between the 
oppression(s) women face across castes and communities, Dalit Bahujan scholarship in 
this regard suggests that it is crucial to delineate the differences in order to avoid possible 
erasures.
 9 It is crucial, when thinking of structures of power, to think of not only the ‘victims’ (Andersen 
and Collins 2015). Relying too heavily on the experiences of Black women can erase our 
ability to see race, class and gender as an integral part of everyone’s experiences: ‘What 
intersectionality does rather than what intersectionality is lies at the heart of intersectionality’ 
(Collins and Bilge 2020, 3).
10 https://covid-india.in.
11 Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana – National Urban Livelihoods Mission, Empowering Marginalized 
Groups – Convergence Between SBM and DAY-NULM March 2018, National Urban Policy 








16 We have used pseudonyms for the interviewees to protect their identities.
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Impacts of COVID-19 on sexual and  
reproductive health and rights in Indonesia
Linda rae Bennett and setiyani Marta dewi
Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo declared the spread of COVID-19 a 
national disaster on 13 April 2020. Since this declaration, people living in 
the cities of Jakarta and Yogyakarta have endured extreme flooding, 
multiple dengue outbreaks, a notable earthquake and a full-scale volcanic 
eruption within their provincial boundaries. They have lived daily with 
appalling air, water and waste pollution, abysmal overcrowding in 
informal urban settlements, and, in the case of Jakarta residents, 
knowledge that their home is literally sinking. These circumstances typify 
the ongoing precarity that Indonesians face in their everyday lives, and 
form critical context for understanding the impacts of additional threats 
such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
In this chapter, we offer a contextualised analysis of the ways 
in which COVID-19, and responses to it, have impacted on the sexual 
and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) of vulnerable Indonesian 
communities living in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. The communities we focus 
on are youth, particularly street-dwelling youth, people living with HIV, 
transwomen and female sex workers. We share the recent experiences of 
these communities via the observations of frontline workers engaged in 
the promotion of SRHR both before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Frontline workers are thus positioned as experts on their experiences of 
how COVID-19 has impacted their work, as well as mediators seeking to 
reduce the impacts of the pandemic on the communities they support. 
Half of the frontline workers we have spoken with are also members of 
the communities with whom they work.
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Through our analysis of frontline worker narratives, we trace how 
the pandemic has amplified pre-existing inequalities. The concept of 
amplification has received most attention in the field of risk analysis 
(Kasperson et al. 1988), with a focus on exploring how media reporting 
and public communications about epidemics and other threats shape 
the social construction of risk perception (Masuda and Garvin 2006; Wirz 
et al. 2018). In this chapter, we are not concerned with risk perception. 
Rather we use the term amplification to describe how the concrete and 
often overlapping conditions of deprivation have been intensified within 
the pandemic. We adapt the notion of deprivation amplification as we 
identify how everyday lives that are routinely marked by deprivation of 
income and resources, access to healthcare, and the denial of human 
rights, respect and citizenship, have been rendered disproportionally 
vulnerable to the impacts of COVID-19. By focusing on SRHR, we place 
the larger health footprint of the COVID-19 pandemic at the centre of 
analysis. We track how COVID-19 has amplified the vulnerability 
of marginalised communities to poorer health outcomes more widely.
Frontline worker informants paint a vivid picture of Indonesia’s brittle, 
patchy and under-resourced health system. This image is verified by data on 
health expenditure and sexual and reproductive health (SRH) outcomes, 
which we outline briefly to contextualise recent declines in the provision of 
SRH services. Indonesia’s expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP is 
low, remaining below average in comparison with other middle-income 
countries; last verified in 2017, it was 3.1 per cent of gross domestic product 
(WHO 2021).1 Despite the introduction of the national health insurance 
programme in 2014, the Government of Indonesia’s (GoI) contribution to 
the cost of healthcare remained at 39 per cent in 2017, while out-of-pocket 
health expenditure was estimated at around 61 per cent (WHO 2021). 
Additionally, the health worker to population ratio in Indonesia remains 
lower than recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
(Anderson et al. 2014; Agustina et al. 2019), with a particular shortage of 
nurses and midwives who are crucial for the provision of SRH services.
Indonesia’s performance against key SRH indicators is highly deficient, 
with underinvestment in health and failure to address poverty both 
contributing to poor SRH outcomes. Indonesia’s maternal mortality rate was 
the highest of all ASEAN nations in 2017, with 177 deaths per 100,000 live 
births (World Bank 2020a), and considerable variation between regions, 
impacting especially remote, poor and adolescent women (Nababan et al. 
2018). Unmet need for contraception is estimated to be approximately 
15 per cent among married couples and much higher among unmarried 
people who have no legal access to contraception (World Bank 2020b). 
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Legal access to safe abortion in Indonesia is highly constrained, unless a 
woman’s life is deemed to be at risk. Approximately two million induced 
abortions occur annually, and deaths from unsafe abortion contribute to at 
least 15 per cent of the country’s maternal mortality (Landiyanto 2010). 
Early marriage and adolescent child bearing are still prevalent, particularly 
in remote and low-income communities, where up to 40 per cent of women 
become mothers before the age of 18 (Bennett 2014).
Another indicator of Indonesia’s lack of investment in SRHR is the 
consistent increase in HIV infections since 2012. Heterosexual transmission 
is now the primary mode of new infections, and a gradual feminisation of 
the epidemic is occurring, with younger women most vulnerable (Bennett 
and Spagnoletti 2019). Out of an estimated population of 640,000 HIV 
positive Indonesians in 2018, only 17 per cent were receiving antiretroviral 
(ARV) treatment (HIV and AIDS Data Hub for Asia Pacific 2020) and 
only 15 per cent of HIV-positive pregnant Indonesian women received 
the WHO-recommended regimen for prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission (HIV and AIDS Data Hub for Asia Pacific 2020). The under- 
investment in SRHR and the neglect of vulnerable populations forms the 
backdrop for understanding the additional SRH burden experienced by 
these communities since the onset of the pandemic.
Below we address how COVID-19 has necessitated a shift in research 
praxis, and the importance of resisting closing ethnographic fields in 
times of crisis. We discuss our inclusive definition of frontline workers 
and their holistic approach to supporting marginalised Indonesian 
communities. We establish how access to SRH services for vulnerable 
communities has been impacted during the pandemic, and how these 
impacts have been shaped by long-term inequalities. The concept of 
invisible citizens is then deployed to analyse the systematic exclusion of 
specific individuals from state-sponsored healthcare and emergency 
financial assistance. This brings us to our core argument – that COVID-19 
has amplified inequalities, making it all the more important to ethno- 
graphically engage with vulnerable communities and highlight how 
recent detrimental impacts on their SRHR are embedded in the persistent 
politics of discrimination and deprivation.
Reshaping research praxis and engaging  
frontline workers
International border closures, neighbourhood lockdowns and social 
distancing measures, introduced to slow the spread of COVID-19, inhibit 
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our capacity to enter the ethnographic field, and we do not know when 
these will be removed. However, rather than accepting a forced closing-
off of the field, we chose to adapt, and propelled by the wish to maintain 
ongoing dialogue with valued Indonesian colleagues at a time when their 
voices clearly need to be heard, we extended our research praxis. Through 
online stakeholder consultations we identified several groups particularly 
vulnerable to the impacts of COVID-19 in Indonesia. These groups 
are people living with HIV, youth – including street-dwelling youth – 
transwomen and female sex workers. We then put aside former anxieties 
over how virtual/digital ethnography could potentially lead to the loss of 
intimacy, rapport and trust with research participants, although we are 
mindful (and grateful) that our foray into virtual data collection and 
collaboration is underpinned by decades of ethnographic research and 
practice in the SRH field in Indonesia.
Significant attention has been accorded to the crucial roles of front-
line health workers, and their vulnerability in the context of COVID-19 
(Amnesty International 2020; Nguyen et al. 2020). In Indonesia, very 
high infection and mortality rates among frontline healthcare workers 
have been verified, resulting in pressure on the GoI to better protect them 
(Amnesty International 2020). In this study, we extend the definition of 
frontline workers from such qualified healthcare workers to others also 
actively engaged in the promotion of SRHR. We interviewed a total of 
20 frontline workers who support vulnerable communities in various 
ways: providing counselling and clinical SRH services; facilitating access 
to services and running outreach programmes; providing peer support 
and distributing condoms; providing information about SRH and 
available services; managing or implementing targeted programmes; and 
providing emergency financial assistance.
An eclectic group of frontline workers was purposively sampled to 
provide access to the first-hand experiences of people whose work focuses 
on supporting communities with poor access to SRH services under 
normative (pre-COVID-19) circumstances. Our broad definition of front-
line workers recognised the complex needs of and complexity of working 
with vulnerable communities to address intersecting axes of disadvantage. 
Our informants viewed biomedical solutions to health problems as ‘only 
one part of the problem’ facing their friends and clients. They emphasised 
that efforts to improve SRH among vulnerable communities should also 
include: facilitating access to health services; education and advocacy; 
creating belonging and countering the impacts of stigma; and facilitating 
poverty alleviation. This holistic conceptualisation of their roles resonates 
with the observations of Sarradon-Eck et al. (2014) in their research with 
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frontline social workers and urban homeless populations in France. They 
describe a logic of care (Mol 2008) and support among French frontline 
workers that propelled them to engage with clients in a more holistic way 
than hospital-based health workers (Sarradon-Eck et al. 2014, 260). In 
drawing on narratives from our research, we show how frontline workers 
reveal a consistent logic of care driven by a commitment to provide broad 
support to vulnerable community members. The breadth of their work 
and perspectives enabled us to explore how poorer SRH outcomes for 
vulnerable communities during the pandemic have been produced by and 
through pre-existing and intensified patterns of inequality, not merely 
due to an interruption of routine services.
Our sample of frontline workers included four transwomen, 11 
women, four men and one person identifying as queer, reflecting the 
gender imbalance in the field of SRHR in Indonesia. This gender 
asymmetry also reflects that many SRH programmes in Indonesia focus 
on women as recipients, and tend to employ women as programme 
managers, outreach workers and peer educators/leaders with the 
exception of programmes dedicated to men who have sex with men. 
We acknowledge the limits of our inclusion of voices from vulnerable 
community members (except for the ten frontline workers who were also 
community members) and hope to remedy this when collaborative 
community-based research becomes safe. To protect anonymity, 
pseudonyms are used for direct quotes from frontline workers, and we 
refer to the gender and professional role of informants only as identifying 
features.
Data were collected in June and July 2020 via WhatsApp (for 
recruitment and follow up), email (used for stakeholder consultations, 
sharing plain language statements and clarifying points of interest from 
interviews) and Zoom (to conduct and record virtual interviews). While 
we relied on digital technology to be co-present with our participants, the 
interviews focused on people’s concrete experiences in the physical 
world. Children, pets and partners drifted in and out of focus during 
interviews due to the shared ‘work from home if you can’ situation. We 
were struck by the parallels in atmosphere between the virtual interviews 
and experiences of face-to-face ethnography conducted in people’s 
physical homes. An unforeseen but welcome aspect stemming from the 
infusion of domesticity was an enhanced sense of informality and 
intimacy in our dialogue, and a willingness of people to share their time 
generously. Virtual interviews were conducted with relative ease, as most 
informants were using the chosen communication mediums in their 
professional lives, and had reliable internet access. While these conditions 
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facilitated dialogue with frontline workers, we note that the vulnerable 
community members that our informants support are not all in the same 
position, and many could not be expected to participate in virtual research 
without significant financial and technological assistance. Thus, the field 
in this instance could stretch no further than the boundaries of a reliable 
internet connection and a smartphone with credit enough to run the 
Zoom application for an hour or more. Most interviews took around one 
and a half hours and up to two and a half hours.
Impacts of COVID-19 on sexual and reproductive  
health and rights
While the full extent of COVID-19 impacts on SRH cannot be precisely 
measured during the crisis, Riley and colleagues (2020) have estimated 
that a 10 per cent decline in women’s access to SRH services and 
contraception in low- and middle-income countries during the COVID-19 
pandemic will have vast impacts, including a rapid escalation in maternal 
mortality. In Indonesia, where frontline workers have described 
widespread reductions in the availability of SRH services and the number 
of women accessing those services, shortages of hormonal contraceptives 
and condoms, reduced access to voluntary testing and counselling (VCT) 
and to antiretroviral drugs (ARV), we can expect dramatic increases in 
negative SRH outcomes. With this knowledge, frontline workers are 
legitimately arguing for the GoI to recognise SRH services as an essential 
area of healthcare both during the COVID-19 pandemic and under 
ordinary circumstances.
Maternal health, family planning and safe abortion services
Frontline workers reported a wide range of interruptions to routine SRH 
services in Yogyakarta and Jakarta, stemming from the GoI response to 
COVID-19 and the low capacity of the health system prior to the pandemic. 
Clinical health workers described recent changes in their roles, such as 
being seconded to COVID-19 testing and tracing, and to emergency 
rooms to replace colleagues who were unable to work after contracting 
COVID-19. This redeployment of staff led to decreased opening hours in 
both public and private SRH clinics. Our informants reported that early 
in the pandemic, many clinics were only managing to open one or two 
days a week, when they had previously been open five or six days a week. 
In some districts primary health clinics contracted and offered emergency 
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services only, such as responding to birth complications, but offered no 
other SRH services.
Reduced uptake of SRH services also resulted from communities 
receiving inadequate information regarding which services were 
considered essential according to the GoI response plan. Many frontline 
workers reported that vulnerable community members were confused 
over which clinics were open, during what hours and what services were 
available. The GoI health communication efforts during the pandemic 
firmly focused on messaging related to managing COVID-19 (Hort et al. 
2020) and neglected to provide adequate information about how other 
services have been reorganised.
Melati, who coordinates SRH programmes for youth, explained the 
increased risks women faced without clear definitions of emergency or 
essential SRH services:
For instance, in [location deleted] area … only pregnant women 
having a medical situation [emergency] can come to the health 
service. Well, actually the definition of emergency could be different 
between the providers and also the clients. And it could be very 
dangerous because like when the women experiencing the 
complications and stuff it can lead them to stay away. I mean like, 
they don’t give the parameters on what is considered as an emergency 
or not.
Others reported that primary health clinics where they worked had 
attempted to continue offering a range of basic services. However, the 
definition of essential services by the Ministry of Health did not include 
programmes for hard-to-reach groups, such as youth-friendly services 
and dedicated programmes for sex workers, which were part of routine 
services in highly resourced clinics prior to the pandemic (MOH 2020). 
As a response to the pandemic, primary healthcare clinics shifted 
to offering services only by appointment, and increasingly clinics 
are dictating that appointments must be made online not in person. The 
length of standard appointments shortened as infection spread, and 
whenever possible tele-health appointments were (and are) encouraged. 
These changes represent barriers to participation for vulnerable groups 
without access to the internet or smartphones, or cash to buy phone 
credit.
Our participants confirmed that some primary health clinics could 
not provide women with long-acting reversible contraceptives (LARC) 
such as inter-uterine devices (IUDs) and implants, because these methods 
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must be administered by clinical health workers, many of whom were 
seconded to the COVID-19 response. Participants were also concerned 
about the depletion of LARC supplies at the national level, as Melati 
explained:
In April, BKKBN [the National Family Planning Board] said that 
there will be a stock-out of IUD in the country. And also, we are 
afraid that it will happen to other contraceptive methods like pills 
and injectables. Because like, we import them from India, and since 
India is on lockdown … there is a … shortage in many provinces.
Health workers also expressed concern over their clients’ preferences for 
short-acting contraceptives such as the pill or monthly injectables because 
free access to these types of contraceptives requires regular visits to health 
clinics. Clients were less willing to attend clinics due to fear of COVID-19 
infection, and delayed access to the contraceptive method of their choice 
was assumed to be related to the increasing number of women presenting 
at clinics with unintended pregnancies.
Another consequence of reduced access to free SRH services has 
been higher demand for services in the private sector, because private 
SRH clinics are not obliged to offer COVID-related services as are primary 
health clinics, and thus attending them is perceived as having lower 
COVID-19 risk. However, there has also been a reported reduction in the 
availability of safe abortion services, which many people seek to access in 
the private sector because of the restricted legality of abortion in 
Indonesia. Hati, a SRH phone counsellor, described the ongoing barriers 
to accessing safe abortion during the COVID-19 pandemic:
It’s more difficult [to access safe abortion] for people in a less 
privileged group of course, so … promoting medical abortion [in 
Indonesia] … may be the only choice that we have now [during the 
pandemic]. Because if women go to the surgical clinic it will take 
like … a million rupiah, and then if you want a safe service on 
abortion, if you want to have … a good service on abortion, you 
have to pay … multiple times to a doctor. Ya, because it can only 
happen in a private hospital.
Rising costs of care in the private sector made SRH services increasingly 
accessible only to middle class and elite Indonesians. Rose, who directs a 
CBO supporting street-dwelling youth, described how reduced access to 
free healthcare at primary health clinics at the beginning of the COVID-19 
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pandemic led to higher costs for pregnant women seeking care from 
private midwives: 
What we know at that time [at the beginning of the pandemic] the 
primary health care clinic reached full capacity in offering services, 
these clinics quickly went over capacity. So pregnant women were 
not going to the puskesmas for service. Many decided to visit private 
midwives for their check-ups. But the cost for just one visit is very 
expensive and so they only went once.
Low-income street-dwelling youth who become pregnant are already at 
higher risk of pregnancy and birth-related complications due to age and 
poverty, and their ability to access their four pre-natal visits (recommended 
by the GoI and known as the K4) has been compromised by reduced 
access to free services.
sti and hiV prevention and related services
Routine STI and HIV testing, and mobile testing, stalled in many of the 
urban neighbourhoods of Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Free mobile clinics and 
outreach services offering SRH services to hard-to-reach communities are 
the most accessible services for vulnerable groups, particularly street-
dwelling youth, transwomen and sex workers (Hegarty et al. 2020). The 
cessation of mobile outreach services that offer VCT and free condoms to 
hard-to-reach groups amplified the vulnerability of those groups to poor 
SRH outcomes. Many primary healthcare clinics offering SRH services are 
poorly equipped to offer non-judgemental and non-discriminatory 
services (Waluyo et al. 2015), as Niko explains: ‘In health facilities 
[primary healthcare clinics], young people who are vulnerable are often 
told by a health worker to “stop being sex workers, to stop being gay, and 
to pray more often”’.
With the suspension of mobile clinics and outreach programmes 
specialised in the provision of SRH services, highly vulnerable groups lost 
access to their routine avenues for accessing SRH care. Ari, a peer 
educator with female sex workers, explains the situation for low-income 
sex workers unable to access free condoms due to constrained outreach 
services:
Many people from the [sex worker] community … complain about 
this. Sex worker friends who only make 50 thousand rupiah or 
30 thousand rupiah per customer cannot also provide condoms … 
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So, they [sex workers] really need a free condom, they really need 
it. I have met a lot of sex worker friends whose fees are cheap, 
50 thousand rupiah, yes, some even say that they only get paid 
15 thousand rupiah. Well, just imagine if they have to set aside 
money again for a condom, in one day they will need to increase 
their customers for example from 10 customers to 15 customers just 
to cover the condom cost. It should not be like that huh?
Access to free condoms for sex workers also declined as social distancing 
requirements and funding cuts diminished the capacity of community 
outreach programmes. Madu, an outreach worker in a HIV prevention 
and treatment programme, also noted the shortage of condoms among 
female sex workers: ‘We are still [in June 2020] meeting sex workers who 
have to buy their condoms themselves, they are not receiving them free, 
first because the supply [of free condoms] is depleted, and second because 
peer distribution is interrupted because of COVID’. For most sex workers, 
purchasing condoms is not an option because they are expensive, 
especially when people experience a dramatic loss of income.
Reduced outreach services for people living with HIV also occurred, 
particularly affecting the availability of voluntary testing and counselling. 
Our participants working to support people living with HIV observed that 
the number of people seeking routine VTC in Jakarta and Yogyakarta 
dropped by 75 per cent or more between April and August (when we 
completed our virtual field work), and there is growing concern within 
the HIV positive community and frontline workers about rising HIV 
infections. Utama, a programme coordinator and outreach worker with 
HIV positive Indonesians and LGBTQI+ communities, expressed his 
concerns as follows:
Yeah maybe people can go to the private service, go that way [to 
access VTC], but for the clinic situation, all I hear is that COVID is 
the primary issue, and for now, other issues are getting less 
attention. So I’m worried, yes I’m worried about it [the lack of 
access to VCT] … if VCT access is low now … later we can see many 
new cases, and new cases without a diagnosis. I’m worried … very 
worried about this.
While ARV is a necessary treatment for HIV as a chronic condition, it is 
also an important component to ensure the SRH and wellbeing of people 
living with HIV, to maintain a low risk of maternal-to-child transmission, 
and to lower the risk of transmission to sexual partners. At the beginning 
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of the pandemic, there was expressed concern about constrained access 
to antiretroviral drugs for HIV positive Indonesians (Luis et al. 2020; 
Pangestika 2020). The Ministry of Health technical guidelines for service 
provision at primary health clinics during the COVID-19 pandemic state 
that access to ARV for registered HIV positive individuals should be 
maintained. However, this guideline is accompanied by an explicit caveat 
that ARV should be provided only where ‘stocks are adequate’ (MOH 
2020, 15), which the GoI has been unable to guarantee.
Shortages in the supply of ARV were initially reported in Java, Bali 
and in Ambon and other outer islands of the archipelago between March 
and May 2020 (Ibnu Aqil 2020). Later in the pandemic, supplies of ARV 
stock were (in August 2020) reportedly secure on the island of Java, but 
other locations across Indonesia were still vulnerable to stock-outs, partly 
due to the interruption of domestic and international transport systems. 
This resulted in innovative responses among people living with HIV, 
including sharing limited ARV supplies, making do with out-of-date ARV 
drugs and visiting hospitals more regularly to access ARV – as often as 
every four days (UNAIDS 2020). HIV positive and queer communities, 
international non-governmental organisations and HIV organisations 
across and beyond Indonesia used crowd sourcing to raise funds and 
hired special couriers to deliver ARV to remote areas, put highly visible 
pressure via social media on international suppliers of ARV to increase the 
pace of shipments to Indonesia, and advocated to the Ministry of Health. 
Bunga, a programme director who works with HIV positive Indonesians 
and female sex workers, described lobbying the GoI to prevent future 
stock-outs of ARV drugs:
Another work in progress is to ensure this is not happening again in 
the future [ARV shortages] … The Ministry of Health is only able to 
procure drugs which are included in the e-catalogue. So, we 
advocated to influence a faster process for some essential [ARV] 
drugs to be included in the e-catalogue. Two of them have been 
included in the last month [May 2020].
The health-seeking behaviour of vulnerable groups has also been shaped 
by their responses to COVID-19, which frontline workers associate with 
loss of income stemming from the pandemic. A survey conducted by the 
UNAIDS Indonesia branch in April 2020, measuring the impact of COVID-
19 on the wellbeing of young HIV positive Indonesians, confirmed that 56 
per cent of survey participants had lost their jobs since the beginning of 
the pandemic (UNAIDS 2020). Melati, who coordinates SRH programmes 
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for youth, describes the impact of this on the young people with whom 
she works:
Like for young people … when they lose their job, it makes them 
become vulnerable because it limits their ability to fulfil their daily 
basics. So, I mean like if the daily basics are not fulfilled yet, they 
won’t think that their sexual and reproductive health is an important 
thing.
Reduced mobility, particularly for people who have no independent 
means of transport, has also constrained access to services. Community-
level responses to COVID-19 across Indonesia have varied, with some 
neighbourhoods imposing strict lockdowns and travel bans, further 
inhibiting people’s ability to access SRH care beyond their immediate 
neighbourhoods. Low-income communities have fewer transport options, 
and if they want to access healthcare they must risk exposure on public 
transport. Ira works for an organisation supporting children living with 
HIV and their caregivers, and conveys the pressure this has put on families 
seeking continuity of care for their children:
According to the policy [regarding HIV care for children] they 
should be taken to a doctor first if they are ill, not directly to the 
hospital. So they must take two trips. For them to reach the hospital 
they only have the option of public transport, they can’t use the 
online motorcycle taxi, as this kind of service has declined due to 
social distancing. If they don’t have a motor bike, the other option is 
to rent a car and that is much more expensive.
reproductive cancer prevention and screening programmes
Mobile outreach mammogram services, targeting poor and homeless 
women in Jakarta, were also reportedly paused due to the perceived 
COVID-19 risk related to outreach work and the unavailability of 
healthcare workers to run the mobile units. Again, the same pattern 
emerges: the most vulnerable members of society are the first to lose 
access to essential SRH services, as a result of the GoI’s priorities in 
relation to its COVID-19 response. Community-based outreach screening 
services for cervical and breast cancer also stalled, and are likely to be 
suspended for at least 12 months. This is due to significant government 
funding cuts to community-based organisations providing SRH health 
services for the financial year beginning July 2020 (Spagnoletti et al. 
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2020). Below, Hannah, a researcher in the area of cervical cancer, 
describes the likely impact of funding cuts on cervical cancer prevention:
I just got the news from my colleagues [at a cancer prevention 
service] that their operating budget for the next 12 months is cut. 
They will go from 30 staff down to 15, and even those 15 will just be 
part time. They will only be open three days a week. And they won’t 
be able to offer mass pap smear screenings in the community. There 
will be a significant reduction in free pap smear tests offered [over 
the next 12 months], down from 4000 to 1000. This is because the 
Government decided to focus on COVID-19.
Free human papilloma virus (HPV) vaccination of teenage girls has also 
been deferred, and it is estimated that around 120,000 girls in 2020 may 
not receive their second dose of the HPV vaccine, and thus will not be 
protected against HPV infection (Ramdan 2020). Despite significant 
lobbying for the HPV vaccination to be added to the national immunisation 
programme, there is no commitment from the Ministry of Health to do so.
Home-based schooling in response to COVID-19 also means 
Indonesian adolescents are missing crucial opportunities for SRH 
education that only occur for most in school. Government funding for 
adolescent-friendly outreach programmes, run by primary health clinics, 
has been reduced by up to 70 per cent for the remainder of 2020 due to 
the redirection of operating funds to the COVID-19 response. Ina, a senior 
official in charge of adolescent health programmes at district level, 
describes these funding cuts and their impact:
The original budget for [youth outreach] this year was about 800 
million rupiah … but it turns out we have received only about 200 
million … This changed in the month of March, when COVID 
happened … since April we have received nothing at all, so going 
out for outreach was only possible from January to March this year.
invisible citizens
In Indonesia, identity cards confer rights, and without these cards 
vulnerable communities and individuals are structurally excluded from 
full citizenship. Currently (and prior to COVID-19), people from within 
these communities who have no legal identity are, in effect, invisible. In 
theory, Indonesian citizens are entitled to free healthcare and financial 
assistance to alleviate extreme poverty, both of which are crucial in the 
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context of catastrophic income loss. The financial assistance schemes 
introduced in response to COVID-19 are supposed to operate at district 
and village levels, and provide cash payments of 600,000 rupiah per 
family, per month.2 This equates to less than 50 per cent of the minimum 
wage in Yogyakarta and less than 25 per cent of the minimum wage in 
Jakarta (Yumna et al. 2020). At the time of writing (October 2020) 
600,000 rupiah was equivalent to US$40; the cost of a standard 
appointment with a private midwife in an urban area around 50,000 
rupiah or US$5.
However, a key criticism of the GoI’s COVID-19 response has been 
its failure to ensure that emergency financial assistance reaches the most 
vulnerable communities – those already living below the poverty line 
prior to COVID-19. The increased cost of SRH care has been felt acutely 
within marginalised communities with limited access to financial support 
from the GoI, and dramatic loss of income for those who cannot work due 
to social distancing and lockdown measures. Frontline workers identified 
that a key barrier to those most in need receiving support is their 
ineligibility for financial assistance and free healthcare. The GoI’s COVID-
19 social assistance payments are available only to citizens who can 
produce a current identity card, either the NIK (national identity card) or 
KTP (residents’ card), and are registered as residing in the same locale as 
they seek benefits. Highly mobile populations, including street-dwelling 
youth and families, and sex workers, are frequently unable to produce 
this requisite proof of residence. Because they have no fixed address, or 
proof of residence, they are rendered invisible. Vin, a director of a 
transwomen’s CBO, explained:
The help [financial assistance from GoI] so far is not given just by 
name, right … If you don’t have an identity card in the place where 
you live now, for example, you can’t access it [financial assistance] 
like that. So you do have to have a residence. Not everyone has a 
regular residence and not everyone has an ID card for where they 
live, for example some only have one from where they originally 
come from. Maybe there is a way to access the help via a local 
community leader, who knows who we are, but until now my friends 
don’t know if this is possible.
Loss of income, lack of a secure residence and the absence of a legal 
identity therefore converge to result in deprivation amplification, 
rendering people disproportionally vulnerable to the impacts of COVID-
19 compared to those with legal citizenship and relative economic 
VIRAL LOADS236
security. Vulnerable community members also reported discriminatory 
treatment when seeking to access support designed to protect Indonesians 
during the pandemic, as Anggi, a transwoman activist, described:
Since the COVID-19 pandemic hit the whole of Indonesia and 
especially in [location removed], the impact has been very large on 
the transwoman community and marginal communities in general. 
This impact is due to limited access to what’s it called? … [financial 
assistance], due to considerable levels of pre-existing stigma and 
discrimination. The attention given to minority groups has been so 
drastically reduced it is now almost non-existent. Even those who 
clearly have ID cards in their area are finding they are not registered 
to receive the payment. They are missing from the government 
assistance data base.
Motivated by the introduction of Indonesia’s universal healthcare system 
in 2014, Berenschot and colleagues (2014) documented how Javanese of 
low-income, rural and remote backgrounds might access the new system, 
and identified multiple barriers to accessing free healthcare. They 
observed that ‘social marginalization and bureaucratic unresponsiveness 
– often in vicious combination – generate a gap between rights-on-paper 
and rights-as-realized’ (Berenschot et al. 2018). Six years after the 
establishment of the national health insurance scheme, the situation has 
changed little, but now with the amplifying effect of COVID-19 in play. 
Without a current identity card, it is still impossible to apply for coverage 
under the national health insurance scheme, and so even nominally free 
health services must be paid for out-of-pocket. Moreover, low-income 
communities who experience intergenerational cycles of poverty have 
low rates of registration of births, marriages and deaths in many parts of 
Indonesia (Platt 2017). The absence of birth and marriage certificates 
make obtaining an identity card difficult because this requires an 
application to a civil court, letters from a village or neighbourhood leader, 
and witnesses (with their own identity cards) to verify the identity of the 
person. These processes were described as unnecessarily complicated, 
arduous and time consuming by our informants.
Currently, the health and welfare needs of people under the age of 
18 are assumed by the state to be protected within the family unit. Their 
ability to access services, hormonal contraceptives, condoms and essential 
medicines is understood as contingent on their parents’ approval and 
support. Niko works with vulnerable youth including those who are HIV 
positive, who sell sex and who identify as LGBTQI+. He explains how 
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state regulations are highly problematic for young people without family 
support:
According to the law people under 18 need consent from their 
parents [or guardians] before they can have a test [HIV or other STI 
test]. But in reality these teenagers are not open to their families 
about their behaviour outside the house or their sexual orientation. 
To get access to health services some people under 18 steal their 
family KTP. There is also some confusion around who is eligible to 
be a guardian. Some health [youth friendly] services will allow a 
community worker to act as a guardian, but many of them do not.
Failure to recognise the independence of youth before the age of 18 (or, 
for many, prior to marriage) prevents them from acquiring individual 
identity cards, and this in turn prevents them from accessing free SRH 
healthcare. Moreover, widespread denial and condemnation of youth 
sexuality in Indonesia mean that youth below age 18 are not considered 
sexual citizens and subsequently young people have no legal status as 
consumers of SRH services.
Another vulnerable group with constrained access to identity cards 
is women living in abusive relationships, whose male partners control 
their access to the family identity card and subsequently to healthcare, 
including access to free contraception. Bunga, who works in a HIV 
prevention and treatment programme, noted that others, too, lacked 
proof of identity:
Transwomen and younger sex workers … are most likely not to have 
the ID card … Without the ID card they are then not linked to the 
safety net that is provided by the government. It is common [to not 
have an ID card] among sex workers who are mobile, or living 
within an abusive relationship. So, I have, I observed many cases of 
this … their husbands, their boyfriends keep their ID cards.
Bunga also described that identity cards were increasingly being held as 
collateral by money lenders until such time that debts can be cleared: ‘It 
is now common in Indonesia to have female sex workers who are … 
trapped in a loan, we now have what we call, like online loans, and also 
traditional loans. So, you’re able to borrow money easily, but you need to 
give the ID card [as security]’. Low-income women are more likely to be 
forced into these kinds of debt arrangements than men, because they 
typically lack other forms of capital that can be used to guarantee 
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repayment. Loss of income due to COVID-19, compounded by debt, and 
the loss of access to healthcare and financial support, can create a vicious 
dynamic of deprivation amplification for women.
Conclusion: The amplification effect
Multiple overlapping conditions of exclusion and deprivation, shaping 
the everyday lives of marginalised urban Indonesian communities, have 
been amplified during the pandemic. We have used amplification 
conceptually to capture frontline workers’ assertions that COVID-19 is not 
the root cause of the challenges they are now facing, but rather, that it has 
revealed and rapidly intensified pre-existing inequalities. In Melati’s 
words, ‘We can’t blame it all on COVID’. She further explains, ‘previously, 
the access [to SRH services for vulnerable groups] is not really there 
and because of COVID, like, it’s become more visible’. The pre-existing 
dynamics of under-investment in SRH, the othering of vulnerable 
communities, and the exclusion of individuals from full citizenship, all 
contribute to the amplification of poor access to SRH services and other 
forms of deprivation during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In theory, Indonesia’s comprehensive policy should promote the 
SRHR reproductive rights of citizens, but the implementation of this 
policy has been limited and variable. Underpinning the GoI’s failure to 
implement this policy is the highly selective allocation of resources, the 
neglect of many SRH issues and the exclusion of non-conforming groups. 
Prior to COVID-19, budget allocation and human resources for SRH were 
overwhelmingly directed towards population control via the vigorous 
promotion of family planning (for married couples) and maternal health 
(once a woman is pregnant) (Bennett 2014), perpetuating a narrow 
focus on SRH concerns for married women who are already pregnant or 
who are seeking to limit family size. The consequence is that the core 
operational funds for primary health clinics are delegated to the provision 
of family planning and maternal health services, while other SRH services 
must be met by discretionary funds, which are not guaranteed. Frontline 
workers confirmed that SRH services for groups defined as hard-to-reach 
or most-at-risk in terms of SRH have not been designated as core services 
in the context of COVID-19, and were the first to be cut when the 
pandemic hit Indonesia. The observations of frontline workers are 
confirmed by the priorities in the Ministry of Health’s operational 
guidelines for primary healthcare centres during the pandemic, issued in 
May 2020 (MOH 2020).
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Critical SRH issues that the government excludes from its health 
budget include: access to safe abortion including medical abortion (both 
of which are illegal unless a woman’s life is deemed at risk); access to 
contraception for unmarried people (which is illegal); affordable fertility 
treatment (excluded from the national health insurance scheme); and 
screening and treatment for intimate partner violence including sexual 
violence (guidelines exist but have not been operationalised beyond 
pilots) (Bennett and Spagnoletti 2019). The government continues to 
neglect or underinvest in: access to free HIV and other STI testing, 
counselling and treatment; prevention of HIV3 and other STI transmission 
via condom promotion; comprehensive programmes for PMTC; the 
provision of comprehensive SRH education; access to youth-friendly SRH 
services; access to non-judgemental SRH services; and the prevention 
and treatment of reproductive cancers (Bennett and Spagnoletti 2019).
In mainstream GoI health discourses, the latter group of neglected 
SRH issues is closely associated with practices labelled as deviant, affecting 
only individuals who engage in deviant behaviour. An entrenched culture 
of othering, based on the dominant sexual morality of Indonesian society, 
exists at all levels of the health system from policy and budget allocation 
to the level of service provision (Bennett 2015). Most of our informants 
expressed deep concern over the stigmatisation and othering of vulnerable 
groups, and a small number exhibited discriminatory attitudes towards 
clients themselves. Jupe is a health worker in a primary health clinic and 
she shared the following concern: ‘Mostly, what I regret, is that they 
[clients] have no shame when coming to the health service, they are young, 
unmarried, often having unprotected sex, and they just casually come to us 
for service … this is what I regret’. Jupe’s negative judgement of unmarried 
youth seeking free SRH care at her clinic is not uncommon. In contrast, 
when asked what was required to improve the access of vulnerable groups 
to SRH care, Hati suggested: ‘We need to address stigma and discrimination 
in the system … health workers should be the first group to achieve zero per 
cent stigma and discrimination in their behaviour’.
We have exposed the invisibility of poor, young (under 18) and 
marginalised community members as citizens, and illustrated how the 
lack of a legal identity prevents people from accessing free healthcare 
or financial assistance. The lack of citizenship is a profound driver of 
deprivation, and will continue to amplify the vulnerability of marginalised 
groups over the longer term, cementing pre-existing class inequalities. 
We have demonstrated that it is crucial to explore the intersections 
between economic hardship and health impacts to unpick the experiences 
and patterns of deprivation flowing from COVID-19.
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Indonesia’s failure to include comprehensive SRH services as 
essential services within its COVID-19 response (UNFPA 2020) will result 
in a dramatically larger long-term health footprint stemming from the 
pandemic, in which women, youth, poor and vulnerable groups will be 
disproportionally affected. The increasing visibility of Indonesia’s failure 
to protect the SRHR of its citizens due to global media coverage of the 
pandemic could lead to greater international pressure on the GoI to 
increase its investment in SRH. However, achieving a more inclusive 
health system also requires recognition of full citizenship for marginalised 
and vulnerable groups, including the sexual citizenship of young people. 
Recognition of the prevalence and impact of stigma among health 
workers is also essential to improve the uptake of SRH services by 
vulnerable groups. The government’s failure to adequately invest in SRH 
services as essential, during a state of emergency, is consistent with 
historical trends of under investment in health and a dangerously narrow 
definition of what constitutes legitimate SRH concerns. Longstanding 
politics of neglect and exclusion have been amplified through COVID-19 
responses, reinforcing multiple intersecting barriers to peoples’ ability to 
exercise their rights to health and livelihoods.
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Notes
1 The most recent population-based demographic health survey in Indonesia was conducted in 
2017; the next is due to be conducted in 2022.
2 These schemes are called bantuan sosial tunai (cash social assistance) and bantuan langsung 
tunai (direct cash assistance).
3 Another structural factor shaping access to SRH services for vulnerable groups is the 
outsourcing of this work to international non-governmental organisations and CBOs. For 
instance, in 2016, the GoI dissolved the National AIDS Commission and contracted out this role 
to UNFPA. The strategy of outsourcing does have some benefits for vulnerable communities, 
but also reinforces the notion that these communities are, and should remain, other in relation 
to their SRHR. The outsourcing also gives a clear message that the government does not 
support the promotion of condoms for HIV prevention.
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Vulnerabilities within and  
beyond the pandemic
Disability in COVID-19 Brazil
Claudia fonseca and soraya fleischer
Epidemics affect poor people in disproportional numbers, as illustrated 
for different eras, regions and pathologies. It is no surprise, therefore, 
that the coronavirus pandemic, held to be the greatest global health 
disaster since the 1918 Spanish flu, has not materialised everywhere in 
the same way. The unpredictable meanders of an ‘emerging’ and little-
known disease such as COVID-19 are compounded by the complex 
political, economic and social circumstances of each of its concrete 
manifestations. This complexity is what brings Herring and Swedlund to 
endorse a ‘syndemic approach’ to the study of epidemics – one that 
requires researchers to look:
beyond individual infections to consider how they may be capacitated 
by the presence of other diseases and conditions and sustained by 
social inequity and the unjust exercise of power, which channels and 
sustains damaging disease clusters in disadvantaged populations 
(2010, 5).
At the same time, each new pathogen has its own specific properties that, 
in interaction with the health authorities’ leanings of the moment, elicit 
a certain response. Lakoff (2017), in his analysis of the World Health 
Organization’s reaction to health threats in recent history, reflects on how 
many of the organisation’s authorised experts had come to the conclusion 
that an alarmist reaction to the outbreak of infectious disease could, in 
the long run, be counter-productive. Particularly in the case of countries 
VIRAL LOADS244
in urgent need of improved sanitation and more efficient health systems, 
money channelled toward combatting a momentary epidemic might be 
better spent on infrastructure aimed at attenuating less spectacular 
(although more epidemiologically significant) contagious diseases and 
non-communicable chronic conditions (malaria, diarrhoeal infections, 
diabetes, heart disease, etc.). Specialists had become understandably 
wary lest the declaration of a ‘global health threat’, incurring drastic 
measures, cause more harm than good.
Nonetheless, recognising WHO’s failure to apprehend the seriousness 
of the Ebola outbreak in 2014, its experts revised their stance, once again 
attending to the very real possibility of a global catastrophe. Thus, with 
the explosion of COVID-19 globally in early 2020, and in the absence of 
vaccines or effective medicines to combat the highly contagious and often 
lethal air-borne virus, the organisation was quick to advocate a radical 
measure – generalised home confinement – even knowing it might spell out 
temporary deprivation for a good part of the world’s population.
In our syndemic approach to COVID-19 in Brazil, we thus propose, 
first, to consider how dubious political leadership dovetails with the 
past decade’s neoliberal austerity programmes and budget cuts to produce 
a national calamity in which deaths by COVID-19 are surpassed only by 
those in the US. The disadvantaged population that interests us here is 
people with disabilities, rendered particularly vulnerable by this virus. 
Whereas epidemics of the past are remembered as having affected 
younger, able-bodied members of the workforce, COVID-19 is reputed to 
strike down primarily older people, those with disabilities and people 
suffering from debilitating chronic conditions. Given this context, we 
argue that Brazilian president Bolsonaro’s negationist stand – his refusal 
to heed WHO orientations to contain the pandemic, his tireless combat 
against any change in routine activities, whether school attendance, 
commerce, travelling, tourism and even the use of face masks – could be 
seen as the logical offshoot of his radical neoliberalism (Neiburg and 
Thomasz 2020; Ortega and Orsini 2020). Predicated on the survival of 
those regarded as physically and morally fit, Bolsonaro’s philosophy 
would tacitly condone a sort of culling of unproductive elements of the 
population.
Second, by comparing the present situation with the previous 
epidemic of the Zika virus, which also especially impacted Brazil, we 
underline how a distinct political mood produced a vastly different 
mise-en-scène of expert knowledge, bringing medical researchers 
and health specialists to work in concert with public authorities. 
Furthermore, during the Zika epidemic, those who suffered most from 
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the infection – children born with congenital Zika syndrome – were cast 
not as lamentably expendable, but as victims worthy of special attention.1 
During COVID-19 however, Zika ‘survivors’, most classified as severely 
disabled, live with the spectre of eugenicist discrimination as they vie for 
medical services grown scarce due to the impact of emergency cases of 
COVID-19 on health resources and services.
We then focus on a novel feature of the pandemic’s recommended 
preventive measures. To contain the spread of infectious diseases, in 
the past authorities would typically place only the sick and ailing in 
quarantine – a policy of variable efficacy. With COVID-19, however, when 
infection is for many asymptomatic, global health specialists have strongly 
recommended social distancing for the entire population, raising 
questions of how such a measure is organised and morally framed by 
people living in radically unequal conditions. If, in Brazil, Bolsonaro’s 
most rabid supporters viewed these recommendations as the senseless 
infringement of basic rights that would devastate the economy, other 
observers tended to depict strict adherence as a life-saving civic virtue to 
reduce cases of infection and alleviate the load on overburdened hospitals. 
Here, ethnographic observations2 defy simplistic conclusions that might 
link specific political loyalties to one or other course of prevention. They 
also cast light on community-based strengths as well as structural 
vulnerabilities, exploring contextually conditioned understandings of 
how best – morally and pragmatically – to confront the pandemic.
Politics and negationism in Brazil under Bolsonaro
At the end of the 1980s, Brazil emerged from over 20 years of a harsh 
military dictatorship to a new era of democratic nation-building. The next 
30 years witnessed the expansion of public services, as well as varying 
efforts to diminish the vast gap between rich and poor, the result of the 
country’s long legacy of colonial exploitation and an economy historically 
dependent on slave labour. The election in 2002 of President Luis Ignácio 
(Lula) Silva – heralding into national power the left-leaning Workers’ 
Party government with its avowed platform of minority rights, develop- 
ment and social justice for all – appeared to crown these efforts.
Just how Brazil came to plunge in so short a time from Lula’s term 
in office into the elected presidency of Bolsonaro – an obscure, far-right 
politician with no particular party base – has been the subject of myriad 
analyses (see, for example, Neiburg and Thomaz, 2020). What interests 
us here is how, in the wake of economic recession, relentless media 
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scandals on corruption at every level of government, and the impeachment 
of Lula’s anointed successor (the country’s first female president, Dilma 
Rousseff) for minor infringements of budget laws, the country’s electorate 
was polarised between two radically opposed blocks. Voters who saw a 
more egalitarian income distribution, the expansion of quality public 
services and the promotion of human rights as priority issues, continued 
to support the Workers’ Party. On the other hand, those most concerned 
by violent crime, the erosion of ‘traditional’ family values and political 
corruption, opted for what they saw as a strong-arm candidate with 
military sympathies: Jair Bolsonaro.
During Bolsonaro’s first year in government, 2019, under the firm 
hand of a minister of economy trained at the University of Chicago, his 
administration passed through Congress major institutional reforms that 
diminished job stability and downsized pension benefits, while it quietly 
worked toward the privatisation of banks, utilities, universities and other 
government-run institutions. The Public Health System (Sistema Único de 
Saúde, better known as SUS), that attends over 80 per cent of the country’s 
population, was particularly hard hit by austerity measures. Although 
guaranteed by the 1988 Constitution, and inaugurated in 1994, the free 
and universal system of healthcare was slow to gain momentum. High-
complexity services are to this day concentrated in the state capitals 
where ailing patients could be routinely seen forming enormous lines in 
front of the major public hospitals. The lack of basic equipment, 
technology, medications and medical specialists has been steadily 
denounced in newspaper headlines for decades. Never completely 
satisfactory, in recent years SUS has suffered more than ever from 
successive financial cuts, structural downsizing and political attacks 
dictated by the government’s openly neoliberal and capital-oriented 
policies. As a result, patients desperate for treatment have increasingly 
resorted to juridical procedures to guarantee their constitutional right to 
health (Biehl, 2016). The system, already ill-equipped to deal with 
routine sickness and disability, would be pushed to the verge of collapse 
by the disaster of COVID-19.
The first official death by coronavirus – that of a domestic worker 
who had caught the virus from her employer recently returned from a trip 
abroad – was registered on 16 March. Within days, the Minister of Health 
(Luis Henrique Mandetta, a medical doctor) had confirmed community 
transmission throughout Brazil. Although after taking office in early 2019 
he had done little to reverse the decline of the deteriorated public health 
system, his prompt reaction to the threat of COVID-19 earned him the 
respect of most Brazilians. While Bolsonaro followed the example of his 
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idol, US President Donald Trump, referring to COVID-19 as a ‘paltry flu’ 
that did not warrant sacrificing economic routine, Mandetta vigorously 
promoted policies of social distancing that would curb transit across 
international borders, limit inter-city transportation, suspend school 
attendance and rein in the activities of most ‘non-essential’ public and 
commercial services. While the president adamantly resisted wearing 
face masks (even after 22 members of his entourage tested positive for 
COVID-19), his Minister of Health consistently recommended their use. 
And, countering Bolsonaro’s claim that (hydroxy)chloroquine was a 
miracle treatment for the disease, Mandetta (in keeping with the position 
of WHO and mainstream medical research) firmly resisted endorsing a 
protocol to encourage the drug’s use.
Regardless of their political leanings, a growing number of state and 
municipal executives appeared to side with the Minister of Health over 
the president. Overriding presidential objections, the Supreme Court 
itself condoned the right of local governments to impose emergency 
restrictions – closing schools, shutting down non-essential businesses 
and imposing individual fines on people who refused to use face masks 
in public. In response, the president and most his cabinet resisted 
acknowledging the seriousness of the threat. Bolsonaro continued to 
decry physical distancing, attending rallies throughout the nation where, 
maskless, he would shake hands and embrace supporters in the crowd. 
After the president joined protesters calling for military intervention to 
combat the ‘anti-democratic’ policies of social distancing imposed by state 
and municipal authorities, 20 state governors released an ‘Open letter to 
Brazilian society in Defence of Democracy’. Their call for national union 
against a common enemy, coronavirus, under the guidance of science-
based medicine, failed to convince the president.
Given such tensions, it was no surprise when on 16 April – with an 
explosion of COVID-19 casualties welling on the horizon – Bolsonaro 
fired his health minister. Mandetta’s low-profile successor (also an MD) 
fell from grace barely a month later. The new minister (the third in five 
weeks), a military general who openly admitted he had no experience 
whatsoever in the field of health, began work in mid-May, promptly 
issuing a protocol to promote the use of chloroquine for all stages of 
COVID-19 and intensifying the use of army infrastructure for the 
medicine’s frenetic production.3 As to other demands posed by the 
pandemic – such as expanding the availability of diagnostic tests and 
rationalising the distribution of much-needed basic hospital supplies – 
the new commander of national health exhibited relatively modest 
interest.
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Already at the end of April, it was evident that, in many regions, 
the precarious conditions afforded by the country’s run-down public 
health system fell far short of the challenges posed by the pandemic. 
Especially in poorer areas, decentralised and sporadically funded health 
administrations encountered untold obstacles in their attempts to find 
and stock test kits for adequate diagnosis, build and equip quality field 
hospitals, purchase functioning ventilators or even procure routine 
protective equipment for health workers. Manaus, capital of the State of 
Amazonas and an important crossroad for a good number of indigenous 
groups, proved to be one of the first hard-hit capitals. By the second half 
of May, the town was crawling with national and international reporters 
anxious to broadcast this worst-case scenario of ill-equipped hospitals, 
overrun ICUs and a sky-rocketing death toll that required mass burials. 
The deaths by COVID-19 of indigenous leaders and the pandemic’s 
devastation of their tribes, alongside the government’s blind eye to illegal 
miners and religious missionaries (major vectors of the virus) within their 
traditional territories, would all come to reinforce the accusation of 
genocide which, at time of writing (December 2020), is pending against 
Bolsonaro in the Hague’s International Criminal Court.
With the number of cases of infection rising throughout the country, 
Bolsonaro flailed about for new ways to justify his negationist stance. 
Among other tactics, he intensified his attacks against news reports 
and statistics on the disease’s high lethality. While observers noted a 
considerable rise in pulmonary-related deaths compared to previous 
years and argued that COVID-19 deaths were being underreported, 
Bolsonaro insisted that their number had been blown completely out of 
proportion by a conspiracy of journalists, global health specialists and 
leftist intellectuals out for ‘political gain’. Right up to one of the worst 
moments of the pandemic, with deaths at over a thousand a day, the 
president insisted that misinformation about the pandemic had caused 
much panic and promised that the ‘true’ facts would soon be known.
Aside from his disregard for mainstream science, what most 
disturbed journalists and a good part of the general public was Bolsonaro’s 
apparent lack of empathy for victims of the pandemic. When pressed by 
journalists to comment on the country’s rising death toll, he displayed an 
indifference bordering on cynicism: ‘I’m not a gravedigger, OK?’; ‘It’s a 
shame, but what am I supposed to do about it? I may be Messias [his 
middle name, meaning “Messiah”], but I don’t perform miracles’. Citing 
the opinion of specialists, that eventually 70 per cent of the population 
would inevitably be infected, he insisted there was ‘no running from 
truth, everyone has to die sometime’.
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Bolsonaro’s pronouncements echoed that of a small contingent of 
authorities around the globe who, at the start of the pandemic, had 
predicted that COVID-19 would prove fatal for only a small percentage of 
the population – principally the elderly, the disabled and people suffering 
from debilitating chronic illness. The prognostic supported those decision 
makers who favoured letting the virus run its course, with economic and 
other activities in full steam, until the population reached ‘herd immunity’. 
Loss of the population’s more fragile members could be minimised by 
‘vertical segregation’, that is, by having those categorised as vulnerable 
remain homebound, while the younger, hale and hearty masses would 
go about business as usual. Some deaths would be inevitable, but, from 
this typically ‘ableist’ point of view, individuals who deviated from the 
corporeal standard of the perfect specimen could be considered not fully 
human (Ortega and Orsini, 2020). Shocking though it may appear, this 
view has the merit of elucidating a philosophy of government that 
tolerates the idea of ‘letting die’ a certain portion of a country’s population 
which, even in normal times, could be seen as a burden on the economy. 
As a British financial journalist suggested, ‘from an entirely disinterested 
economic perspective, COVID-19 might even prove mildly beneficial in 
the long-term by disproportionately culling elderly dependants’ (Warner, 
2020).
The social Darwinist undertones of this discourse have understand- 
ably received colossal criticism (Ecks 2020; Butler 2020; Queiroz 2020). 
We would add that, in the Brazilian context, with the country still coming 
to grips with the previous epidemic of Zika – and the tide of neurologically 
disabled children left in its wake – they take on particularly problematic 
connotations.
Living with disability during successive epidemics
Coronavirus is, of course, far from the first epidemic to cause alarm 
among Brazilian authorities. From leprosy and syphilis arriving with the 
first Europeans to epidemics of smallpox, plague and cholera that would 
periodically erupt in the country’s major ports, doctors have worked for 
centuries alongside government authorities in an attempt to contain 
damage. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, with European and 
North American attention turned toward yellow fever and other tropical 
diseases that threatened colonial endeavours, Brazil became an 
international centre of medical research. By the early twentieth century, 
in close collaboration with their overseas counterparts – including 
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specialists from the Pasteur Institute and the Rockefeller Foundation – 
Brazilian medical researchers were going beyond treatment, applying 
their research and translation efforts to the systematic prevention of 
disease (Castro et al. 2010; Lowy 2017).
Over the next decades, a new philosophy of public health, developed 
in institutions such as Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (with flourishing centres 
in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador), played a fundamental role in the 
promotion of not only vaccines, but also – especially after the Spanish flu 
– sanitary reforms designed to clean up the vectors of infectious diseases 
(rats, mosquitoes, bacteria-ridden waste products) that plagued urban 
areas. Aside from developing and deploying a vaccine against yellow 
fever, national authorities organised effective campaigns against the 
Aedes aegypti mosquito, which was and is responsible for three other less 
lethal infections: dengue, chikungunya and Zika (Segata 2017). But 
although these diseases were considered of lesser significance, worries 
appeared in 2015 as medical observers began to suspect links between a 
perplexing spate of children born with the severely debilitating condition 
of microcephaly and the Zika virus (Diniz 2017).
The way President Dilma’s administration confronted the Zika 
epidemic, in comparison with the present national government’s 
treatment of COVID-19, yields insights not only into the ways political 
leadership can shape the alliance between public health and science but 
also into the experience of the most vulnerable potential victims rising to 
the challenges of care and prevention. Zika, like COVID-19, was a 
relatively unknown entity when it first caught the attention of authorities. 
A first generation ‘Zika mother’, living in one of the country’s poorer 
northeastern states, commonly went through her entire pregnancy with 
no inkling of any serious health threat to herself or to the baby in her 
womb (Diniz 2017). Primary care centres where most women had 
prenatal check-ups were generally not equipped with ultrasound 
technology, and the sonogram was not part of routine protocol. Only 
those women willing to pay for the exam (motivated, for example, by the 
desire to know the baby’s sex) would have discovered signs of foetal 
anomaly. For the most part, mothers and their medical attendants were 
taken by surprise at the arrival of an infant with severe disabilities, and 
often ill-prepared to deal with the particular risks (for both mother and 
child) involved in such a birth.
Even during the following year’s ‘second generation’ of victims, 
including those in Brazil’s more prosperous southeast, the imprecision 
of diagnosis4 and delay in test results did little to assuage the anxiety of 
women who had experienced Zika-like symptoms during pregnancy. 
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Foetal prognosis, plagued with uncertainty, was of little help in a woman’s 
reproductive decisions – whether she should think about a legally 
questionable abortion (more common in the upper classes) or prepare 
home and family for the care of a disabled child. In other words, although 
they were eventually able to tie the significant number of newborns with 
neurological anomalies to congenital Zika,5 researchers acknowledged 
they knew little about the disease – whether concerning its vertical and 
sexual modes of transmission or its long-term consequences.
In the case of both COVID-19 and Zika, there was an urgent demand 
for medical research to provide answers. Articulations around the idea of 
science, however, were of an entirely different order. When Zika first 
became an issue, President Dilma Rousseff of the Workers’ Party was 
under heavy political siege that would soon bring about her impeachment. 
Nonetheless, under the slogan ‘A mosquito is not stronger than our entire 
country’, her government embraced the combat against Zika, organising 
campaigns to eradicate vectors, publicly expressing solidarity with its 
victims, and using financial and administrative incentives to promote 
university-based research on the disease’s various facets. Aside from local 
scientists, researchers from abroad flocked to the epidemic’s geographic 
epicentre in hopes of mapping the as yet uncharted social and medical 
territories of the disease. Mothers allowed their bodies (and those of their 
babies) to be repeatedly scrutinised, their blood samples gathered and 
stocked, in the hope of accelerating medical discoveries that could 
eventually help their children lead better lives (Fleischer 2019).
Some women may have been frustrated by the lack of feedback and 
the discontinuity of interest in their cases; many would lament the 
inadequacy of available health services. However, neither they nor 
medical staff, nor even the general media, ever expressed doubt about the 
validity of the scientific endeavour. The contrast with the present 
government’s reaction to COVID-19 could not be starker. By the time the 
coronavirus pandemic struck, Bolsonaro and his Minister of Education 
were systematically denigrating the country’s major public universities, 
cutting funds and downplaying the science produced at mainstream 
research centres. In the case of COVID-19, the president and his Minister 
of Health further confounded onlookers by apparently denying the results 
of any study (on chloroquine, for example) that did not confirm their own 
preconceived ideas.
During the worst moments of both epidemics, people looked to 
government for measures that would help minimise suffering and death. 
In the case of COVID-19, this care was designed to keep affected patients 
from dying – hence, the rush to multiply intensive care units and to procure 
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respirators. In the case of Zika – not in itself a particularly lethal disease – 
the ‘victims’ that demanded the most energies and investments were the 
babies born to women infected during pregnancy. Even though medical 
care had guaranteed survival, these young children inevitably suffered 
sequelae from the disease that left them particularly vulnerable to 
complications from COVID-19. Yet, to the desperation of their caregivers, 
at no time were these children included in the pandemic’s ‘populations at 
risk’, much less singled out to receive priority at hospitals and ICUs.
With general immunodeficiency caused by Congenital Zika 
Syndrome, these young children lack resistance to colds, and are at 
heightened risk of eye and ear infections, bronchitis, pulmonary allergies 
and other childhood diseases. Because of neurological complications, 
they have difficulty in swallowing. With food and saliva leaking into their 
lungs, they require frequent hospitalisation for pneumonia and other 
forms of respiratory intercurrences. Constantly bombarded with 
analgesics, antibiotics and other medicines, they are also in danger of 
developing problems linked to overmedication: resistance to certain 
drugs, liver intoxication and other iatrogenic syndromes. To access high-
cost medicines, the children need new prescriptions from doctors every 
month. And, as they grow, periodic interventions are required to refit 
feeding tubes, adjust prosthetic devices and perform reparative surgeries 
(Lima and Fleischer 2020). Yet, faced with hospital services completely 
flooded with victims of COVID-19, these children find it increasingly 
difficult to get the routine treatment they need.
During the pandemic, the mothers’ fragile hopes – that their 
children not only survive but lead meaningful lives – have grown dim. 
Without a regular supply of pharmaceuticals, there is no way to assuage 
their children’s chronic pain, nor regulate their sleep (so as to allow other 
members of the family some rest). The children are at constant risk of 
convulsions that may set them back months in terms of cognitive and 
motor skills. As hospital services have been cut to a bare minimum, 
suspended altogether, or, at best, gone shakily online, some sectors have 
posted short videos on social media so that women themselves can give 
the necessary neuro- and physiotherapy to their toddlers at home. 
However, many women do not feel competent to replicate rehabilitation 
exercises on their own. Some may not have access to digital resources; 
and, even when they do, results may be frustrating, either because older 
children, now involved in online schooling, monopolise the computer 
or because, given the mother’s already heavy load of domestic chores, 
she simply cannot find the necessary time to learn and practise new 
therapeutic techniques.
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Today, even for critical situations, these ‘micro mothers’6 ask 
themselves if it’s worth braving public transportation, waiting long hours 
in hospital corridors and exposing their children to the risk of infection 
by coronavirus – especially when they are unsure of the reception they 
will get. During the first years of the Zika epidemic, the babies’ need 
for intensive professional care was recognised as a legitimate cause, 
thanks largely to collective political action, including street marches and 
demonstrations in front of government offices. In the present situation of 
generalised quarantine caused by COVID-19, traditional forms of political 
organisation are restricted, and the efficacy of online activism (webinars, 
interviews and podcasts) remains doubtful. The mothers have thus joined 
a growing number of ‘vulnerable’ categories of people in Brazil who, 
following the example of similar groups around the globe, elaborate 
online manifestos to reiterate the right of all patients – no matter what 
physical or mental health condition – as equally worthy of attention in 
any medical emergency. Nonetheless, under the shadow of Bolsonaro’s 
macho style of government, patients are left wondering if, in their case, 
the financial trimming of public services does not spell out the moral 
withdrawal of state concern.
Social distancing in a setting of inequality
As with Zika and other health emergencies, the pandemic exposed glaring 
inequalities Brazil’s citizens have lived with for decades. The disease 
wreaked havoc particularly in urban peripheries and rural townships – 
those regions peopled largely by poor, Afro-Brazilian and indigenous 
groups (Gragnani 2020). In these areas, with lack of basic infrastructure 
(piped-in water, city-supervised sewers, routine garbage collection), the 
vectors of infectious disease proliferate. In this context of ‘environmental 
racism’ (Carvalho, 2017), even the simplest measures recommended to 
avoid COVID-19 (for example frequent handwashing) appear of doubtful 
application. As to treatment of those infected, most well-off Brazilians 
have private health insurance which – at least in the past – has guaranteed 
them adequate hospital care. The rest of the population (i.e. the vast 
majority) is used to facing crowded public health facilities, praying 
they will find professionals and equipment available to cure their 
ills. Acknowledging not only regional differences but also these class- and 
race-based disparities, one medical specialist after the other, when 
interviewed about coronavirus, repeats the evidently consensual verdict: 
in Brazil, there exist many different pandemics.
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The apparently democratic preventive measure of social distancing 
also plays out differently in the various socio-economic groups. On the 
one hand, individuals from the moneyed sectors may barricade 
themselves in their relatively comfortable homes. Those lucky enough to 
have a guaranteed end-of-the-month pay check are able to stock food, 
construct their home gym and enjoy reliable internet services to make 
their confinement slightly less trying. The other half of the economically 
active population – those who are precariously employed and autonomous 
workers of the informal labour market – is aware that if they do not keep 
working, they will be unable to maintain even the most modest mode of 
existence.7 The few months of emergency aid (just over US$100 dollars) 
provided by the federal government allowed for some relief, but as the 
pandemic progressed and lockdowns were extended (or renewed), it 
became clear that the respite afforded by stop-gap solutions would be 
short-lived. In such conditions, staying home does not necessarily spell 
out staying healthy (Yates-Doerr 2020).
The sensitive ethical dilemma between survival and contagion is 
further complicated in homes including a person with a disability, where 
the coordination of multiple caregivers must occur while striving to avoid 
the danger of contamination. Such is the case of Taina’s family, an 
Afro-Brazilian household on the outskirts of Porto Alegre (southern 
Brazil) that revolves around a spritely pre-teen who, since early infancy, 
has suffered from an acute form of fibromyalgia. Despite seizures of 
unbearable pain often accompanied by epileptic-type convulsions that 
have caused her to miss months of class, when the 2020 school year began 
(in March), Taina was a well-appreciated eighth-grader at the nearby 
public school. To some extent, her family is luckier than those of most of 
her friends whose parents – many of them cleaning ladies and janitors – 
were laid off with no financial compensation. To complement his 
minuscule retiree’s pension, her father does odd jobs and at the time was 
being paid to renovate a neighbour’s house. Her mother, Aline, works 
with a nearby NGO, where she supervises extra-curricular activities for 
around 50 local children. During this period of confinement, however, 
Aline pays a heavy toll to keep her job, attending simultaneously to 
household chores and professional obligations (now conducted entirely 
on WhatsApp) for which she remains on call literally for 12 hours a day.
Given her daughter’s needs, Aline now also stands in as physio- 
therapist, providing twice-daily massages to diminish the frequency of 
Taina’s seizures. The public hospital service attending Taina since her 
birth suspended activities in mid-March, announcing shortly afterwards 
it would not reopen, and Aline is still searching for a new facility willing 
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to care for Taina in the event of a life-endangering crisis such as those she 
has suffered in the past. Lacking the support of a specialised service, 
mother and daughter have fallen back on their neighbourhood’s vastly 
overburdened primary care unit. Another problem the family must 
confront is how to guarantee the costly medicine needed to assuage 
Taina’s bouts of intense pain. Public services designed to facilitate 
the endless bureaucracy required to access government-subsidised 
medications are all downtown, a good distance away, and many have 
operated only sporadically during the pandemic. Meanwhile, Aline takes 
on piecemeal work as a seamstress to cover the higher price she pays for 
medicines at the local pharmacy.
Perhaps the greatest challenge the family must face during the 
pandemic is to coordinate the care network that surrounds Taina. At any 
moment she might have a life-threatening convulsion, and her parents 
have long since decided she must never be left alone. However, the 
network they normally rely on, composed of different members of their 
extended family, has grown tenuous. Taina’s grandparents live in their 
own home at the far end of the back patio, but they are no longer available 
as before. The grandmother, being treated for diabetes and heart disease, 
is so worried about contagion that she will not share dinnerware with 
her near 80-year-old husband because he refuses to give up his job as a 
doorman at an apartment complex downtown. Aline’s sister, owner of a 
small food store where she attends customers from morning to night, has 
stopped coming by for fear of contaminating her relatives. Another 
brother – a delivery boy, now completely swamped with work that 
constantly exposes him to risk of infection – has reduced contact with his 
family to an occasional phone call. To keep Taina company, her mother 
has to rely on the girl’s two older siblings – young adults who have not 
given up their sociable routines.
A closer look suggests that none of the girl’s hands-on caregivers 
follow the rules of social distancing to the letter. Aside from chores 
(bill payments, health check-ups) that regularly take her outside the 
home, Aline is frequently involved in volunteer work. In these times of 
exceptional hardship, she spends Saturdays at the community centre 
distributing parcels of food and clothes to her students’ families and, 
twice a week, she helps a neighbour ladle out soup (made with food 
donations) to members of the area’s neediest families. The fact that few 
of their ‘clients’ wear masks does not appear to deter the volunteers’ 
enthusiasm. Asked if she isn’t worried about contamination, Aline 
answers with an unequivocal ‘of course’, but it would seem the moral 
injunction of neighbourhood solidarity overrides even such a fear.
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As the pedagogical slogans urging people to stay home gain impetus, 
debates on the public scene often seem to frame adherence to quarantine 
as a question not only of personal health and civic morality, but also of 
party politics. Circumstances conspire to paint a person’s free transit in 
public byways as a proclamation of pro-Bolsonaro political leanings 
(Canzian 2020). Yet, the alacrity with which observers tend to see those 
who fail to adhere to total confinement as scientifically illiterate and 
politically conservative may be ill-advised. True, those shopkeepers 
constantly lobbying to open commerce apparently adhere to Bolsonaro’s 
cost-benefit evaluations that put the country’s economic health above 
people’s lives. The same might be said of the crowds of beautiful people 
at tourist sites, teenagers herding through the shopping malls and 
bohemians out for a pick-me-up at their favourite bar. But for the majority 
of people passing through the streets of working class neighbourhoods 
where it would appear business carries on almost as usual, our experience 
suggests that attitudes are characterised more by ambivalence than firm 
conviction. Observation of the various strategies deployed by working-
class families such as Taina’s to get through this period of crisis leads us 
to believe that the class-based parameters of many of our instruments of 
evaluation do not begin to describe the complex package of acute 
perception, conditions of possibility and imperatives of social solidarity 
that permit people to forge meaningful existences during the pandemic.
Conclusion: Coronavirus and culling in  
the neo-neoliberal age
Our syndemic approach to COVID-19 in present-day Brazil is meant to 
underline the highly variable ways that the disease plays out in different 
contexts. Political circumstances that conspired to put a ‘negationist’ 
president in power, together with the chief executive’s consistent 
undermining of public trust in science, have no doubt been responsible 
for a percentage of the country’s high death toll (at 31 December 2020). 
The survival-of-the-fittest philosophy openly avowed by Bolsonaro has 
also had consequences. On the one hand, it explains the federal govern- 
ment’s refusal to elaborate a coordinated plan to contain the pandemic. 
On the other hand, it has caused many people who are vulnerable – the 
chronically ill and disabled – to doubt their entitlement to basic 
constitutional rights. Finally, the colossal number of under- and irregularly 
employed workers obliged to eke out a daily living renders the major 
prevention measure against COVID-19 – social distancing – awkward if 
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not entirely unfeasible for a good part of the population. Threading its 
way through all these contextual particularities, we find the overriding 
issue of structural inequality.
The neoliberal cut-backs taking place in Brazil, as well as many 
other countries throughout the world, have been branded by certain 
scholars as a form of necropolitics (Ortega and Orsini 2020; Yancy 2020). 
The term is meant to highlight the usually implicit tenets of regimes 
whose social policies appear to separate ‘grievable’ from ‘ungrievable’ 
lives, that is, those people ‘who should be protected against death at 
all costs and those whose lives are considered not worth safeguarding 
against illness and death’ (Butler 2020, 3). COVID-19 may have 
exacerbated this trend, but tacit forms of ‘culling’ the population are not 
particularly new. As Manderson and Wahlberg (2020) point out, in many 
parts of the world – especially where resources are scarce – health workers 
have long been sorting out which patients should receive priority 
attention.
In Brazil, black, indigenous and poor people – those most likely to be 
found in the public health facilities – are suffering a mortality rate from 
COVID-19 many times that of middle-class whites. But how can one forget 
that in ‘normal’ times the average life expectancy of an individual from 
these disadvantaged groups is years shorter than that of their white, 
middle-class counterparts? Between chronic unemployment, structural 
racism, police violence, miserable work wages and inadequate and poorly 
resourced health facilities, one might conclude that the mechanisms that 
lead to a de facto hierarchy of more and less worthy humanities were 
operational long before COVID-19.
Recognition that Brazilians have learned to live with chronically 
precarious institutional support expands our focus beyond the present 
pandemic to the informal means through which most people routinely 
manage to hold home and hearth together despite adverse conditions. 
Our observations in this chapter on the care-giving networks of young 
children with disabilities point to the importance of local forms of social 
organisation in facing new, acute ordeals within a context of economic 
and institutional precarity. We would suggest that the strategies mounted 
by extended families and neighbourhood associations appear to work, at 
times, even better than many of the state and humanitarian interventions, 
exactly because they are based on established relations of cooperation 
and interdependence ensconced in day-to-day tasks (Bersani 2020, 13; 
see also Ennis-McMillan and Hedges 2020). This sort of spontaneous 
mutual aid, found in the lower-income urban periphery and isolated rural 
areas throughout Brazil (as well as in many other regions of the world), 
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may be of limited scope and patchy duration. But so are many of the social 
programmes organised by public authorities. Any sort of coordinated 
effort to contain the pandemic and minimise suffering must take into 
account these community resources as well as local modes of existence. 
However, if concern with the present catastrophe does not extend to the 
reformulation of policies for ‘normal’ times, and the development of long-
lasting infrastructures that guarantee wellbeing for the population as a 
whole, further tragedy is bound to ensue.
Notes
1 These reflections are the result of an ethnographic study under the coordination of Soraya 
Fleischer, conducted from 2016 to the present in Recife, with parents and family members of 
children born with congenital Zika syndrome (Fleischer and Lima 2020). In early 2020, the 
research team branched out from an interest in the everyday challenges faced by these families 
to contemplate the influence of COVID-19 in this scenario. Funding for this research comes 
from CNPq and the University of Brasília. 
2 Claudia Fonseca has carried out fieldwork on the outskirts of Porto Alegre over the past two 
decades. Material for the present article was collected through telephone interviews in May 
and June of 2020 with members of the community organisation Coletivo Autônomo do Morro 
within the framework of ‘Living with Disabilities’, a research project funded by the Newton 
Foundation (British Council) and CNPq. 
3 Notwithstanding the existence of an abundant national supply, the country received not long 
afterward a colossal shipment of the product supposedly sent by US President Donald Trump 
himself.
4 Until 2016, the only existing laboratory tests were for dengue. 
5 To date, authorities have tabulated approximately 4,000 children born with what they label 
Congenital Zika Virus Syndrome (CZVS). Since 2016, numbers have tapered off, leading WHO 
to pull the disease off the list of immediate epidemiological concerns (Lakoff 2017), but – 
especially with the detection of a new strain of virus in June 2020 – the disease is still very 
much on the map of Brazil’s public health concerns.
6 ‘Micro family’, a term coined by the mothers themselves, refers to the major visible symptom of 
microcephalic babies who suffer from the foetal syndrome.
7 While the officially unemployed fluctuated at somewhere between 11 and 13 million, by late 
June, surveyors were talking of some 75,000,000 Brazilians outside the job market. 
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‘You are putting my health at risk’
Genes, diets and bioethics under COVID-19  
in Mexico
Abril saldaña-tejeda
On 27 March 2020, as rates of infection were rapidly escalating worldwide, 
the Mexican government reported 717 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 
12 deaths. For some at least, this suggested that the country would avoid 
the worst outcome of economic collapse and devastating numbers of 
fatalities. But due to undertesting and underreporting, many saw these 
figures as underestimating the problem (Gobierno de Mexico 2020a). From 
the beginning of the pandemic, Mexico had one of the lowest testing rates 
in the Americas, with only 2,350 per 1 million residents examined. Some 
argued that the government’s strategy of testing only serious cases made 
it difficult to develop appropriate interventions (Agren 2020). Others 
suggested that public health officials followed the only strategy possible in 
a country within which 41.9 per cent of its 126.2 million population lived 
in poverty (Coneval 2018), where 56 per cent of the working population 
were in informal employment (INEGI 2020).
From late February, the government offered daily televised briefings 
on the pandemic; to the time of writing in mid-September, these were 
continuous. The briefings were held and hosted by the Undersecretary of 
Health, Hugo López-Gatell Ramírez, an epidemiologist with an impressive 
academic record and robust experience in health crises, an engaged 
public speaker able to captivate the public in a way no previous health 
authority had before. During the first months of the ‘stay at home’ 
campaign, in daily briefings, Gatell and his team covered important issues 
related to lockdown, including domestic violence and mental health. 
Gatell also dedicated special briefings to answer questions from children 
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and mothers on their respective national days, taking advantage of 
the state’s presence to promote awareness of self-care practices under 
COVID-19 and ‘healthy lifestyles’. In some ways, these briefings were key 
to promote an image of Gatell as caring representative of the state. 
Children and mothers were asked to send their questions through home-
made videos; questions were carefully selected and some widely 
commented in social media. Gatell also aligned with many other social 
justice agendas; he started to use green ties and later, green facemasks to 
promote the decriminalisation of abortion in the country.
Soon after the briefings started, Gatell began to be presented as a 
sex symbol. WhatsApp stickers circulated with Gatell’s image, and he 
was reported to be trending in Twitter, ranked the third most popular 
epidemiologist in the world (Ojeda de la Torre 2020). By mid-April, 
piñatas of him were on sale in the streets. In Mexico, being made into a 
piñata is proof of iconic status, reflecting political and social views of 
approval, mockery or national indignation.
Gatell made the most of his popularity and high rates of approval to 
address another public health challenge that, before COVID-19, had ignited 
heated legislative debate. Gatell had been spearheading the national 
campaign to legislate the use of warning labels on processed foods and 
sugar sweetened beverages. The new law, passed just before the country 
entered into lockdown, required processed food companies to provide easy 
to understand, correct, direct, simple and visible nutritional information on 
their products, especially those high in sugar, sodium and saturated fats. 
This small but significant victory of public health over profit was celebrated 
by many activists and non-governmental organisations. The COVID-19 
crisis seemed the perfect setting to publicly sustain the need to continue 
to successfully address excessive weight gain and obesity, something 
that the country had attempted, with little success, since the early 2000s.
In early April, the media drew attention to comorbidities among 
COVID-19 patients: up to 85 per cent of deaths caused by COVID-19 
were associated with cardiometabolic disease, including obesity (Torres 
2020). The risk of death due to COVID-19 among those living with obesity 
increased by 78 per cent, 73 per cent with diabetes and 38 per cent with 
hypertension (Solís and Carreño 2020). By late July, there were 370,712 
confirmed cases and 41,908 fatalities by COVID-19. Some 67 per cent 
of fatalities had suffered from at least one comorbidity of diabetes, 
hypertension, obesity and cardiovascular disease. Up to 17 per cent of 
confirmed cases and 43 per cent of deaths were among people who 
suffered from hypertension; 17 per cent of confirmed cases and 38 per 
cent of deaths among those living with diabetes. Finally, up to 18 per cent 
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of confirmed cases and 25 per cent of fatalities were reported as obese 
(Gobierno de México 2020b).
In this chapter, I explore Mexico’s public health campaign against 
obesity prior to and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and 
document the increasing stigmatisation of fatness as a result of con- 
temporary discourses of vulnerability and risk. I first look at genetic and 
epigenetic approaches to obesity rates among Mexican mestizos before 
COVID-19. I briefly expose concerns regarding the potential racialising 
impact of the new life science, and question the tendency among epigenetic 
studies to place women’s reproductive bodies and their consumption 
choices at the centre of social interventions designed to improve the health 
of future generations. Through a review of Mexico’s long obsession with 
diets and foodways from colonisation to the eugenic movement of the 
twentieth century, I argue that a new focus on diets and ‘healthy choices’ is 
highly problematic under COVID-19. A renewed focus on individual 
responsibility continues to occlude major structural problems that would 
better explain Mexico’s food landscape and why people eat what they do.
Second, I look at public and medical discourses that identify a genetic 
advantage among Mexican mestizos. I argue that the continuous use of 
genetic profiles as substitutes for national representation converges and 
supports the resurgence of old eugenic tropes of foodways and diets as 
ways of enhancing the nation’s population. Such obsession with the ‘truths’ 
invested in the body – its genetic makeup and its power to ‘heal’ the nation 
through social intervention and self-care – silence the (evident) social 
factors behind the heath disaster that we are witnessing today due to 
the pandemic. I expose the stigmatising effects of the state’s war against 
obesity and how such effects have materialised in misinformation and 
discrimination. Finally, I look at the bioethical guide of extreme triage in 
Mexico and the heated debate around it. I show how the impact of the war 
against obesity goes beyond fat stigmatisation to directly affect individual 
possibilities of survival. I argue that notions of vulnerability and risk 
associated with COVID-19 are materialised in public health policy, and 
public health debates and policies seem to fuel fatphobic messages and 
practices that might have a direct impact on people’s notions of risk under 
COVID-19 and on patients’ willingness to seek help when needed.
Obesity in Mexico: genetic vulnerabilities and strengths
In Mexico, according to the National Health and Nutrition Survey 2018 
(NHNS), seven out of ten adults (aged 20 and older) suffered from 
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overweight and/or obesity (75.2 per cent), along with three out of ten 
children between the ages of 5 and 11 years old (35.6 per cent) and 
almost four out of ten adolescents between the ages of 12 and 19 years of 
age (38.4 per cent) (INSP 2018). During the last decades, these rates 
have caused great concern for the government, and public health officials 
have consistently warned against the ‘anti-evolutionary essence’ of 
obesity and the threat it represents to the ‘viability of the nation’ 
(Secretaría de Salud 2013, 7). These concerns have underpinned 
substantial private and governmental funding to research the genetic 
basis of obesity.
From its foundation in 2005, backed by substantial private and 
governmental funding, the National Institute for Genomic Medicine 
(INMEGEN) engaged with a series of international collaborations to 
explore the genetic basis of diabetes and obesity. Mexican mestizos were 
found to be especially susceptible to obesity due to their Amerindian 
origin (INMEGEN 2014; SIGMA Type 2 Diabetes Consortium 2014). 
Official and media outlets were swift to interpret and circulate these 
findings, strengthening the idea that Mexicans were predisposed to 
obesity and ‘carried it in their genes’ (Olivares 2012; Forbes 2013; Ruiz 
Jaimes 2013), with obesity predisposition often linked to the Thrifty 
Gene Hypothesis (TGH) (see Saldaña-Tejeda and Wade 2018). In simple 
terms, this hypothesis supports the idea that where ancestral populations 
lived in a harsh environment, the natural selection of a thrifty gene 
allowed them to store energy for times of famine (Neel 1962). In a 
modern environment of food abundance and sedentary lifestyles, the 
continued storing of energy explains obesity population clusters. These 
genetic hypotheses were soon accompanied by epigenetic explanations 
of obesity that stressed the role of environmental factors to regulate 
gene function and modification. Epigenetics offered the opportunity 
to escape the criticism of genetic determinism, while accommodating 
well to public health agendas by focusing on state interventions that 
might modify the genetic makeup of the nation. An epigenetic approach 
backed up the idea that genes could be ‘switched’ off and on through 
environmental (often dietary) interventions and foetal developmental 
programming, often targeting intrauterine environments and therefore 
women’s reproductive bodies (Sharp et al. 2018; Warin et al. 2015). In 
the last decades, the state has consistently recommended further 
investment in genetic and epigenetic research and the development 
of a genoteca del obeso, that is, a biobank of samples from obese patients 
from public clinics and hospitals (Secretaría de Salud 2013). Critics of 
genomic medicine based on ancestry highlight its potential as a ‘racialised 
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science’ or a ‘backdoor to eugenics’ (Duster 2003; Smedley and Smedley 
2005; Koenig et al. 2008). Epigenetic approaches do not escape 
such criticism, given their tendency to focus on the actions of self-
disciplining citizens (often poor and/or negatively racialised mothers) 
and their power to somehow reverse problematic global health rates 
in future generations (Saldaña-Tejeda and Wade 2019). Epigenetic 
studies of foetal exposures often centre around the ‘abnormal’ dietary 
‘choices’ of mothers, positioning women as the main vehicles of poor 
intergenerational health (Manderson 2016; Pentecost 2018; Yates-Doerr 
2015; Saldaña-Tejeda 2018).
Mexico has long seen diets and foodways as pathways to enhance 
the racial makeup of the population and convert souls to Christianity. 
From early Spanish colonisation, European foods were presented as 
morally and nutritionally superior (Earle 2010). Indians were advised to 
eat ‘that which the Castilian people ate’ to become ‘strong and pure and 
wise’ (Burkhart 1989, 166). After independence, political elites continued 
to blame indigenous diets for the ‘underdevelopment’ of the population 
and favoured the consumption of processed, industrialised foods that 
signalled a modern, Mexican nation (Pilcher 1998; Aguilar-Rodríguez 
2007). Ideas on health and heredity eventually materialised in the 
eugenic environmentalist measures of the twentieth century. Diets, food 
practices and hygiene – along with moral values – were believed to be the 
root of all national problems and were the basis of interventions that 
targeted Mexican families, particularly indigenous and other poor 
mothers (Aguilar-Rodríguez 2007; Vargas Domínguez 2017).
Under COVID-19 and its known comorbidities, diets and ‘healthy’ 
food choices became again the focus of public interventions. As with 
genetic and epigenetic approaches to chronic diseases, the focus on 
individual responsibility worked to silence major structural problems that 
would better explain Mexico’s food landscape and why people eat what 
they do. As Galvez (2018) shows, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) signed in 1994 by Canada, the US and Mexico 
changed Mexico’s food systems and resulted in a deep transformation 
of the welfare state. Market-based ideas about how to solve society’s 
problems (i.e. chronic diseases) began to frame citizens as consumers 
able to make rightful choices in the marketplace. In this frame, the 
medical gaze centred on the need to educate consumers, overlooking 
the social determinants of health and the effects of neoliberalism 
on the country’s food systems (Galvez 2018). The transformation of 
Mexico’s peasant cooperatives into urban communities is only one 
example of such effects.
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Created after the 1910 Mexican Revolution, peasant cooperatives 
known as ejidos were the centre of an agrarian reform that lasted 
60 years. Designed to allocate and redistribute land in order to provide 
a subsistence base for millions of peasants, ejidos historically entailed a 
set of obligations for beneficiaries such as working the land and living 
in villages. However, from the 1980s, socioeconomic processes that 
led to NAFTA resulted in the commodification of communal land that, in 
2017, amounted to 51 per cent of Mexican territory. The use of land for 
agricultural activities was gradually replaced by mining industry, 
activities linked to ‘flex crops’ (for example, corn and soybeans, able to be 
used for food, feed, fuel or industrial material) and logging. As Torres 
(2019, 73) states, ‘all around Mexico, ejidatarios (ejido holders) are 
selling, renting, or leasing their lands; they have become a new kind of 
individual owner, with many rights over the ejido plots but without the 
obligations towards families or communities that they used to have’.
These systemic changes altering the food landscape converged with 
years of governmental failure to address extreme poverty and food 
insecurity. For instance, in 2013, when the National Strategy to Prevent 
Obesity and Diabetes was launched, the administration of Enrique Peña 
Nieto (2012–18) announced its signature policy, the Crusade Against 
Hunger. This programme aimed to alleviate extreme poverty by giving a 
basic allotment of staple food consisting, ironically, largely of processed 
foods, so increasing the exposure of low-income families to a commoditised 
food economy (Galvez 2018). Mothers also received cash transfers from 
the government that, like previous social assistance programmes, were 
conditional on them attending multiple ‘training’ sessions to ‘learn’ how to 
make healthy choices for their families. The programme failed. In the 
end, it reached only 0.1 per cent of its initial intended beneficiaries and the 
population living under extreme poverty increased by up to 13 per cent 
from 2014 to 2018 (Cruz Vargas 2020). In August 2019, a media 
investigation revealed that the Crusade Against Hunger was involved in 
one of the most notorious corruption scandals in the country’s recent 
history. Rosario Robles Berlanga, the head of the programme, was 
prosecuted for participating in a large corruption network that diverted 
some US$263 million dollars of public resources from the Crusade (Nájar 
2019).
With a renewed focus on genes and/or diets to address COVID-19 
and its major comorbidities, the body was, again, placed at the centre of 
the discussion. Diets, genes and prescriptions of ‘self-care’ converge to 
leave the state’s failures unaccountable for the devastating effects of 
COVID-19 so far. As Mendenhall (2012) shows for diabetes, a syndemic 
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framework on chronic diseases helps to unveil the ways that adverse 
social conditions (for example, poverty, stress, lack of healthcare) weaken 
a population’s defences, exposing it to a cluster of health disasters such as 
those in Mexico today. In the case of obesity, diabetes and COVID-19, 
disease clustering is deeply linked to adverse syndemic interactions 
(Singer 2020). However, an incessant focus on genes, diets and individual 
choices obscures the social and historically situated dimensions of COVID-
19 and creates new barriers and challenges for those defined as the source 
of the problem.
Mestizaje under COVID-19: from strong national  
genes to sinful bodies
When the first cases of coronavirus were identified in Mexico, the 
narrative of genetic health risks associated with mestizaje gave way to a 
hopeful idea of national genetic strength. At the beginning of the 
lockdown, a widely-read national newspaper, El Universal, published a 
column by García Soto (2020) in which he described a special meeting 
between President Manuel López Obrador and the health team 
coordinating the national COVID-19 strategy. According to García Soto, 
the president was informed that the country could expect up to 2,000 
deaths by COVID-19, but:
due to genetics, the Mexican race was more resistant to this type of 
virus than other races, such as the European. It was argued that 
[resistance] was linked to the Mexican genome and with mestizaje, 
it was expected that [race] was going to positively affect the impact 
of the new coronavirus among the Mexican population.
A few days later, Julio Granados Arriola a renowned Mexican immuno- 
geneticist, spoke out in support of this supposed advantage, stating that 
‘genetic admixture and not the purity of our populations (was) providing 
strength in this global crisis’ (Gilet 2020). He challenged the idea that we 
are all exposed to coronavirus in equal ways, and dismissed the idea that a 
genetic strength among racially mixed populations in Latin America was ‘a 
colonial mechanism’ that denied the situated experiences of Mexican 
mestizos.
Under the COVID-19 Host Genetics Initiative, phenotypes around 
the world are being investigated to determine major genetic risk factors 
for the virus across populations (2020). Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and 
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Chile have collaborated with the initiative to study the effects of national 
genetic profiles in the severity of the virus in Latin America. As in Mexico, 
Chile’s media circles and scientists have stressed the need to have their 
own genetic component represented in the initiative, as clinical outcomes 
could be unique due to indigenous ancestry (Valenzuela 2020). The 
increasing use of genetic profiles as substitutes for national representa- 
tions seems to have prompted the resurgence of old eugenic tropes of 
foodways and diets believed to be associated with the racial ‘betterment’ 
of populations.1 For instance, in a column supporting Mexican’s genetic 
advantage to navigate the virus, Gil Gamés (2020) explained that 
ancestral food practices were behind what he called ‘gene modification’ 
among Mexican mestizos and that food was the basis of Mexicans’ genetic 
strength; he echoed eugenic ideas of heredity and evolution, and the 
power of foodways and other environmental factors to ‘improve’ the racial 
profile of the nation (Weismantel 1989; Stepan 1991).
The idea of genetic strength linked to mestizaje as protecting against 
coronavirus was shattered by the rapid increase in confirmed cases 
and fatalities in Latin America, as naïve ideas in genetic capital were 
confronted by the social and biological reality of viral encounters. By the 
first week of July 2020, Latin America, with only eight per cent of the 
world’s population, had accounted for half of COVID-19 global deaths 
(Tharoor 2020). By 18 May, around 20,000 cases of COVID-19 had been 
confirmed among indigenous peoples from the Amazonia region and its 
2,400 territories across eight countries (Martin 2020). Black Brazilians 
were said to be 62 per cent more likely to die from the virus than whites 
(Genot 2020) and migrants, refugees and displaced people were left 
without basic needs to navigate the virus as borders shut down (Segnana 
2020). In Mexico, people treated at a private hospital were reported 60 
per cent less likely to die by COVID-19 than those in public health units 
(Solís and Carreño 2020). Up to 71 per cent of COVID-19 fatalities were 
among people with an educational attainment of primary school or less 
(i.e. incomplete primary school or no formal education); up to 46 per cent 
were retired, unemployed or part of the informal economy (Hernández 
Bringas 2020). As this suggests, race, class and other social factors are 
tightly tied to the devastating effects of COVID-19. Nonetheless, public 
attention focused on what Foucault would call ‘truths’ invested in the 
body, the strength of the national genetic makeup to resist the virus, and 
the strength of character of its citizens to assume responsibility for their 
individual and collective survival.
The current obsession with the body, which because of shape and 
weight has been publicly deemed as ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ of COVID-19, draws 
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on and produces misinformation and stigma. Messages and caricatures 
began to circulate about the virus and people living with excessive weight 
gain and obesity. In its Twitter account, the national newspaper, La 
Jornada, published the image of a fat man sitting on a couch, watching TV, 
gorging on junk food, transmogrifying into the virus and dying (La Jornada 
online 2020). In another image, a morbidly obese man carries an oversize 
bottle of Coca-Cola and angrily states ‘Gatell is killing us’. The man is 
accompanied by the iconic little white bear that represents Mexico’s 
number one high-caloric and processed food label: Bimbo (Figure 14.1). 
The bear responds to the man: Gatell is irresponsible. In another cartoon, 
a morbidly obese woman wearing a facemask angrily decries a ‘normal 
weight’ young woman for not doing so. ‘You must wear a mask’ she says. 
‘You are putting my health in danger’ (Figure 14.2). People living with 
obesity are caricatured as angry, lazy and irresponsible, bad citizens, and 
embodied obstacles to the government’s strategy to address the pandemic 
and save the nation. The idea is promoted that people living with obesity 
are the only ones at risk, the only ones expected to wear facemasks.
On 5 November 2020, President Manuel López Obrador announced 
a government strategy to address obesity and stated that the majority of 
deaths by COVID-19 was linked to this condition. The president stated 
that obesity was caused by bad eating habits and presented a cartoon 
(Figure 14.3) to be distributed among 30 million households in Mexico. 
In the cartoon, a young thin girl educates an overweight boy about the 
dangers of junk food. ‘You have a junk body’ says the girl, as the boy shows 
Figure 14.1 Caricature about obesity circulating in social media, 
source unknown
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Figure 14.2 Caricature about obesity circulating in social media, 
source unknown 
her the food items he has brought for school lunch. The cartoon depicts 
fat children as obsessed with junk food, ignorant and unable to control 
themselves. It shows the boy eating from a trash can to suggest that junk 
food is trash, it accuses people diagnosed as overweight or obese as a 
burden to the state and to taxpayers, and finally (Figure 14.4) it warns 
against COVID-19’s comorbidities and explains other countries’ better 
Figure 14.3 Caricature designed to educate children on the dangers of 
obesity and junk food. Commissioned by Mexican Secretariat of Health 




Figure 14.4 Caricature designed to educate children on the dangers of 
obesity and junk food. Commissioned by Mexican Secretariat of Health 
and authored by Rafael Barajas (El Fisgón) Source: Gobierno de México: 
https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/590444/CPM_
Campan_a_nutricio_n_folleto__05nov20.pdf 
outcomes through lower rates of obesity among their population. ‘COVID 
is less lethal’ in countries where people eat better and exercise. The 
cartoon has been widely criticised for stigmatising fatness, promoting 
fatphobia and strengthening the idea that people’s health is the outcome 
of individual choices and responsibility.
In April 2020, a joint international consensus statement, written by 
a multidisciplinary group of experts, criticised the gap between 
stigmatising narratives around obesity and current scientific knowledge 
(Rubino et al. 2020). At stake were long-lasting effects of stigmatisation 
on the mental health of people living with obesity and their right to 
medical care. Le Brocq and colleagues (2020) also pointed to the all-
consuming fear, anxiety and uncertainty that COVID-19 had caused 
among people diagnosed with obesity in the UK. Respondents worried 
about not getting medical support if they were admitted to hospital, 
either because of lack of proper equipment or because of stigma or 
extreme triage guidelines. The authors warned against such stigma 
leading to people’s reluctance to seek healthcare, with the potential of 
worsening COVID-19 outcomes. This was especially relevant as many 
identified as particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 were already being 
denied regular care as hospitals were overwhelmed by emergency 
admissions of people with COVID-19 (Manderson and Wahlberg 2020).
As always in the normalisation of privilege for certain kinds of 
bodies (i.e. by race, gender or ability), stigmatisation is often materialised 
in practices and policies that directly affect people’s possible survival. As 
I illustrate below, the war against obesity as a public health and political 
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strategy extends beyond fat stigmatisation. COVID-19 has forced many 
countries to swiftly develop bioethical guides to allocate limited medical 
resources. These guidelines illustrate how notions of vulnerability and 
risk manifest in public health policy, and how a focus on obesity as risk 
may extend beyond stigmatisation by conditioning people’s possibilities 
of receiving the care that they deserve and to which they have a right.
Bioethical guidelines of extreme triage under COVID-19
Assuming a shortage of medical resources, many countries in Latin America 
have discussed or already established bioethical guidelines, referred to as 
extreme triage, for resource allocation in cases of public health emergency 
such as COVID-19. Under the principle of social justice, these guidelines 
propose to allocate resources to save as many lives as possible. Chile, 
México, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and Uruguay have developed triage 
guidelines to administer scarce resources (Carvajal 2020; Woites 2020; 
Moreno Molina 2020; Giordano 2020). Although these guidelines were 
drafted independently and not through a regional initiative, they coincided 
on the main criteria for critical medical care allocation: evaluating the 
possibility that a patient will improve and survive, with or without 
comorbidities, and in light of their age, in other words, ‘years of life to be 
saved’. In a brief on ethics guidance on the use of scarce resources for 
critical healthcare during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Pan American 
Health Organization stressed the need to treat all people equitably. 
However, the document also highlights the need to save the greatest 
number of lives and to prioritise those most likely to survive treatment 
(PAHO 2020).
An emergency resource allocation strategy involves abandoning the 
Hippocratic Oath, the idea of  equality between people, and the sacredness 
of life. In a crisis as presently experienced with COVID-19, health pro- 
fessionals require direction to proceed in the face of limited resources. 
In April 2020, Helen Ouyang (2020), a New York emergency department 
doctor, vividly described her experience during the first outbreak of the 
pandemic, as hospitals were flooded by patients, dead and alive. She 
argued the need for bioethical guidelines of extreme triage for those at 
the front line, physically and emotionally exhausted by attending to the 
flow of COVID-19’s patients and potentially risking their own health and 
lives to save others. However, it is possible to support the need for triage 
guidelines while also questioning the criteria used to evaluate and decide 
how to allocate critical medical care.
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Triage guidelines sparked a heated debate across the globe (Del 
Missier 2020). Bioethicists were accused of ‘playing God’ by deciding who 
deserves the chance to live and who not. In many countries, public 
opinion forced bioethicists to rewrite and retract recommendations for 
limited medical resource allocation. In some Latin American countries, 
the most prominent voices pointed at age discrimination. In Mexico, 
critics compared the guidelines with Nazi atrocities against people 
perceived as old or ill (Miranda 2020); in Argentina, bioethicists 
questioned age as a criterion to determine outcome, given that a young 
individual could suffer from more severe pathologies than an older one 
(Woites 2020). Others pointed to increasing evidence that structural 
factors and comorbidities were more sensitive than age at predicting the 
lethality and severity of COVID-19 (Bello-Chavolla et al. 2020).
The guidelines also recommended limited resources be allocated in 
light of patients’ ‘past situation’, that is, ‘the presence of pre-existing 
comorbidities that might impact on the patients’ expectation to benefit 
from treatment’ (Consejo de Salubridad 2020, 11). Pre-existing diseases 
were therefore used to evaluate a patient’s eligibility to receive medical 
care. Vulnerable populations were mentioned throughout the guidelines, 
but these were narrowed to ethnic minority groups, people who are 
unemployed, pregnant women, other women and people working in 
the health sector. The label ‘vulnerability’ was avoided, so referring 
to patients’ comorbidities suggests that vulnerability implies protection. 
In contrast, the term ‘situation’ allows the guidelines to recommend 
exclusion from medical care without appearing contradictory.
However, as Barnes and colleagues suggest, ‘care always has a past 
and how we respond to past injustices is one of the largest ethical questions 
we need to face’ (2015, 11). In the area of research ethics and public health 
ethics, vulnerability first appeared in the 1979 Belmont Report, in which 
populations in need of special protection are described. Some populations 
– ethnic minorities, people economically disadvantaged, the very sick and 
those without capacity for free consent (i.e. persons confined to institutions) 
– were entitled to protection. Other landmark documents in research ethics, 
including the International Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects (1982) and the Declaration of Helsinki (2000), also 
address questions of vulnerability and vulnerable populations (Luna 2019). 
The former identifies three groups of vulnerable populations that, linked to 
their social or physical conditions, were ‘relatively (or absolutely) incapable 
of protecting their own interests’ (CIOMS 2002, 69). Lack of power was 
therefore the main criterion defining certain subpopulations as vulnerable 
and in need of protection.
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This lack of power has been at the centre of debates regarding the 
notion of vulnerability. For many, the notion of vulnerability contains the 
risk of reducing politics to care, complicating the possibility of a vulnerable 
political subject (Ferrarese 2016, 157). Such risks derived from the 
tendency to reflect on vulnerability as embodied and historically are 
seen as unworthy of the political sphere. Embodied vulnerability, tied to 
capability/capacity, strengthens the perceived incompatibility between 
politics and the expression of suffering and needs. The long negligence of 
the body, as opposed to mind and reason, as a subject of investigation 
in philosophical thought and sociology, maintains the idea of the body 
as located in the private realm (Malacrida and Low 2008). Thus, the 
current focus on the body operates as a mechanism to leave the state 
unaccountable for the political and social roots of health inequalities, and 
keeps the individual body in its place through notions of self-care and 
individual/private responsibility. The body as private or apolitical could 
also be behind the stigmatisation and condescending practices that often 
occur when labelling whole groups as vulnerable (Luna 2019). For 
instance, a private amusement park in the city of Monterrey, northeast 
Mexico, announced that older adults, children and people with obesity 
were forbidden entrance for their own protection from coronavirus 
(Zuñiga 2020). The park did not specify how staff would ‘diagnose’ 
someone as obese nor clarify if measures would be implemented to avoid 
discrimination. People have been reported being denied entrance into 
casinos if perceived as obese for ‘their own protection’. People with 
other comorbidities, less easy to diagnose by sight, such as diabetes or 
hypertension, are allowed to occupy these spaces freely. A national 
newspaper, Animal Político, reported that since June 2020, companies 
started to refuse hiring people with chronic diseases, over 55 years of 
age, or with other ‘risks’ linked to COVID-19 (2020). According to an 
unemployed man interviewed for this chapter, COVID-19 had resulted 
in discrimination against those suffering from known comorbidities 
(Casasola 2020). This leads us to ask who or what are these businesses 
‘protecting’? What forms and meanings does the notion of ‘vulnerability’ 
take in these cases? Although, as Ferrarese (2016) argues, the discourse 
of vulnerability is already fully political through the polemics to which 
it gives rise, we must be attentive of the ways that both ‘vulnerability’ and 
‘risk’ are used, as these terms are heavily charged with complex and, 
sometimes, contradictory meanings.
During their daily briefings, public health officials never referred to 
obesity as a vulnerability to COVID-19, and instead, spoke of risk when 
referring to chronic diseases. While vulnerability invokes the need for 
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special protection, risk demands accountability and personal responsibility. 
This idea of risk works to justify labour and other forms of discrimination. 
As Kippax and Stephenson (2016) show in the case of HIV prevention, a 
turn to ‘vulnerable populations’ rather than ‘risky individuals’ focused 
attention on the social and cultural ‘drivers’ of vulnerability; vulnerability 
could work to deny the power of collective action and agency over social 
and cultural structures. Social practices instead of individual behaviours 
might better account for how peoples’ actions contribute to change.
COVID-19 raises how and when languages of vulnerability and risk 
are deployed, and how these narratives impact people living with obesity. 
Such narratives have political implications, with potential impact on the 
health of individuals and possibilities for collective action. We must also 
acknowledge the agency of those whose bodies are insistently labelled as 
‘at risk’ of infection or ‘a risk’ (to others) of transmitting infection. The 
perceptions and experiences of people living with known conditions must 
be taken into account in any action and public health strategy (Le Brocq 
et al. 2020). Garland-Thomson et al. (2020), disability bioethicists, 
remind us of the need to transform medical subjects into political ones. 
They denounce as unethical and illegal the way in which extreme triage 
guides under COVID-19 allocate resources unequally on the basis of 
ability. Eugenics, they remind us, was also a scientific gaze to categorise 
human variation in order to create ‘a better future’ with the ‘best’ kind of 
people.
Conclusions
Bioethics must go beyond procedures such as informed consent and 
ethical committees to account for the political nature of health policies 
and scientific endeavours (Hernández 2019). We must explore the 
political implications of new public health discourses and policies on 
peoples’ situated experiences. In this chapter, I have illustrated that 
narratives around obesity increase stigmatisation of fatness, as the 
government’s war against obesity has become a war against people with 
excessive weight gain and/or obesity. Through an analysis of the guide, I 
argue that avoiding the notion of vulnerability in relation to COVID-19, 
and instead using the term ‘past situation’ to justify the denial of critical 
medical care to some people, neglects social factors linked to health 
inequalities and social injustice. This implies that people with serious 
cardiometabolic disease – obesity, diabetes and heart disease – are at risk 
of being denied care since they are at risk either of not responding to care 
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and dying anyway, or surviving COVID-19 with compounded com- 
orbidities and reduced life expectancy.
Attention must be given to other forms of vulnerability to COVID-19 
beyond known comorbidities. This is urgent as democratic action gives 
way to the imposition of state emergency measures in order to care, 
surveil or discipline those deemed ‘at risk’ and ‘a risk’ (see Manderson and 
Levine, Chapter 3). For instance, in Mexico, Giovanni López, a 30-year-
old bricklayer, was beaten to death by police officers for not wearing a 
face mask in public. Police brutality is a pre-existing condition, but it 
complicates the implementation of state measures to care for the wider 
population. Similarly, domestic violence has taken a toll on women during 
lockdown. In Mexico in March 2020 alone, when the ‘stay at home’ 
campaign started, 115,614 emergency calls linked to sexual and physical 
violence against woman were reported (SESNSP 2020). Violence is also 
a pre-existing condition that impacts women’s possibility to survive 
the pandemic. Similarly, as elsewhere in the world, people working in 
Mexico’s food system have been severely affected by COVID-19 (Gross 
and Yates-Doerr 2020). By early June, more than 1,000 workers in the 
country’s largest food market, the Mercado de Abastos, had tested positive 
for the virus (Gómez 2020a). Farmers’ organisations warned of an 
unprecedented social crisis due to the lack of social protection and 
sanitation standards in agriculture (Gómez 2020b). In addition, there 
is a risk that people may avoid food markets and revert to the processed 
food that the government is so fiercely fighting to eliminate from 
people’s diets.
What these ‘past situations’ show is the importance of acknowledging 
the complex and intricate shapes that vulnerability and risk assume under 
COVID-19. Language is never neutral, and narratives around COVID-19’s 
comorbidities must be revised with caution to avoid concrete and long-
lasting effects upon the people living with these conditions. The current 
language of risk strengthens fat phobia in a country that has recently 
started to study the extent of weight discrimination (Soto et al. 2014). 
The focus on obesity might also produce misleading information (for 
example, the relative risk to infection of people with obesity) while 
justifying a public health strategy to tackle COVID-19 that many perceive 
as disastrous. People living with obesity have been easy targets to blame 
for the states’ pre-existing negligence and failures, including the appalling 
condition of its healthcare system. COVID-19’s comorbidities could be 
understood as embodied palimpsests not of past situations but past 
injustices. In the case of obesity, these exist in the colonial erasure of 
traditional diets in favour of western food practices and in reproducing 
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racial and gendered ideas of heredity and care. This past must be revised 
to make reparations and allow us to imagine a more just and ethical 
future for all.
Note
1 To read more about the creation of Mexican national genome see Vasquez and Deister (2019).
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Bangladesh reported its first confirmed case of COVID-19 on 8 March 
2020; thereafter infection spread significantly. However, with inadequate 
testing, the statistics fail to capture the extent of coronavirus infections 
and deaths. Public health restrictions, such as the national lockdown – 
loosely referred to as a ‘general holiday’ deliberately to avoid mentioning 
coronavirus – meant that many poor people returned to their villages 
from cities, thus spreading the virus widely. Those who remained in 
Dhaka and other cities, where the cost of living was already very high, 
experienced catastrophic economic consequences. Moreover, despite 
government and private sector responses, the pandemic overburdened 
the country’s fragile and under-resourced health system (Anwar et al. 
2020).
Bangladesh, a country of 165.6 million (2.2 per cent of the global 
population) (BBS 2020), is currently the eighth most populous country 
in the world; 27 per cent of this population (41 million) lives in cities 
(BBS 2016). United Nations International Children’s Education Fund 
(UNICEF) Bangladesh estimates that around 3.5 per cent of the 
population migrates internally every year, mostly to urban areas (UNICEF 
Bangladesh 2020). Further, between 1996 and 2005, the Centre for 
Urban Studies estimated that the total population of Dhaka’s slums more 
than doubled, from 1.5 to 3.4 million people (Gruebner et al. 2014), and 
given the rate of migration into the capital, an estimated 5.3 million now 
live there (Hossain 2020). Many urban migrants live in slums with 
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heterogenous communities, with varying structures and services. Slums 
are often squeezed around the periphery of the city or along railway lines, 
under bridges and elsewhere near factories or near waste dumps, and are 
characterised by congested living spaces, poorly maintained housing, 
vulnerability to monsoon rains and floods, and lack access to sufficient 
water and sanitation facilities, and little rubbish collection, street cleaning 
or related services (UNICEF Bangladesh 2020). With few rights and 
agency, and weak informal governance structures, slums tend to be 
hidden spaces for crime, gang violence and drug trade. Life is precarious, 
with sudden evictions and thousands of families often displaced overnight 
(Rashid 2004; Islam et al. 2009). In addition, although Bangladesh 
has improved the availability of food due to increased production over 
recent decades, 40 million people – one-quarter of the population – 
remain food insecure, and 11 million people suffer from acute hunger 
(WFP Bangladesh 2018). These figures will worsen with the impact of 
COVID-19 (bdnews24.com 2020).
The closure of businesses between 26 March and 31 May led to huge 
income losses for the working poor, with hardships continuing even after 
many businesses re-opened in June (Shawon 2020). Around 86 per cent 
of the workforce in Bangladesh, the majority women, depends on informal 
sector activities (ILO 2013). Around 3,596 garment factories actively 
operate in Bangladesh, employing 3.5 million people (Ovi 2018). Another 
3.5 million work as construction workers on sub-contracts, and thousands 
as domestic workers on monthly or no-contracts (Double Repression 
2020). Millions of these informal workers – street peddlers, domestic 
workers, factory and construction workers, and more, the majority 
women – lost their jobs during lockdown (Ovi 2018; Double Repression 
2020). Most of those who lost employment live in Dhaka’s slums.
Adolescents from poor urban slums are vulnerable because of their 
age, gender, lack of life experiences and other vulnerabilities which result 
in exploitation and abuse. The proportion of adolescents in secondary 
schools in Bangladesh is the lowest in South Asia (Haider 2019). Young 
adult and adolescent boys from very poor households are more likely than 
girls to start earning to contribute to their families (Ovi 2018). They start 
working informally, with short-term or no contracts, in order to support 
their families, rather than going to school or college. They often work in 
the most hazardous jobs, conditions and circumstances (UNICEF 2020), 
in work that is mainly unregistered and outside of state regulation and 
labour laws. Adolescent women also drop out or cannot continue their 
studies because of the complex interplay of poverty, crime and social 
pressures to marry early (The Daily Star 2014). As we describe, poor 
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adolescents and young adults working in the informal sector have been 
directly and adversely affected by the pandemic and state policies 
(Acharya et al. 2020).
Methodology
In this chapter we draw on narrative phone interviews collected from 12 
individuals (5 males, 7 females; adolescents and youth) living in urban 
slums, conducted from late March to the end of June 2020. The first 
author has long-term and trusting relationships with the respondents 
through volunteering, support and research interactions since 2006, and 
has a critical understanding of their contexts and relationships. This 
addressed any challenges emerging from phone interviews with respect 
to positionality, building trust and the mediation of power (Au 2019).  
Qualitative inductive thematic analysis was conducted drawing on 
multiple theoretical frameworks based on critical medical anthropology 
(Singer 2004), structural violence (Farmer 2009) and intersectionality 
(Tolhurst et al. 2012). We examined affect as the mental and physical 
response to the emergency, while we considered how resulting emotions 
are externalised through relational social practices and materiality; we 
view feelings as a product of the interactions between self and the world. 
By understanding how emotions or affect can have practical implications 
for the lives of urban youth, we were able to deeply consider the impact 
of distress and persistent worry caused by the pandemic. The analytic 
frameworks on which we drew supported analysis of the interactions of 
varying forms of violence (physical, economic, political and social), 
which, as illustrated by intersectionality theory, are often mediated by 
more ‘micro’ level characteristics. These are in turn shaped by meso and 
macro structures of power, making visible the levels of social injustice 
faced by young people in slums. We discuss how the materiality 
experienced by poor people is not simply one of a materiality of poverty: 
adolescents and young people in the slums use material forms to creatively 
make and remake their social identities and communities, and try to 
transform their socioeconomic situations and lives. As in many places 
where poverty is endemic, the situation is complex and nuanced, and 
young people are not a passive homogenised group; they exert agency 
despite the structures and constraints of their environments (Bönisch-
Brednich and Trundle 2010). We need to see beyond the view of low-
income residents as oppressed in power relations, and instead, as 
Cresswell argues (2004, 27), appreciate the ‘entangled processes relating 
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to power’ that occur in slums, where people may act in ways to resist, 
change and challenge existing spaces, in ‘subversive ways,’ in order to 
survive.
The sudden loss of income with economic contraction as a con- 
sequence of the lockdown brought a sense of desperation and panic about 
impending hunger, and distress associated with the pressures of providing 
for one’s family and household. The enforcement of lockdown by the 
police, who are greatly feared, and constant insecurity of the future, 
resulted in much trauma and anxiety. Unlike in rural areas, where most 
people own their own homes, renting is common in urban slums. Basic 
services are erratically available, and utilities are shared among numerous 
families in different areas of the slums. Below, we illustrate the everyday 
lived experiences, emotions and feelings of young people, and show how 
their existing precarity and the struggles that they face were magnified by 
the lack of state support in response to COVID-19.
Where are the jobs? Desperation sets in
With lockdown, adolescents and youth who sold wares on the street 
were suddenly left without work, generating emotions of desperation, 
fear, frustration and powerlessness. Among some of the adolescents 
interviewed, the uncertainty of the lockdown resulted in sleeplessness, 
lack of appetite and palpitations, and arguments in the household with 
family members.
Shiuli’s life on the streets, selling small towels, books and paper 
fans, began nearly 10 years ago. She now has 3 children, after eloping at 
the age of 14 with her unreliable husband, who is in and out of jail and 
frequently disappears. While Shiuli (21) has the support of her mother, 
the pandemic has left her helpless and she was increasingly apprehensive 
about her children’s future. In April and May, despite lockdown, Shiuli 
and other street peddlers, wearing masks, surrounded the few cars still 
on the streets, begging. ‘I am surviving on what people give when they 
come outside to buy something; not every day they can give me money or 
food’. Most passers-by did not hand out any cash for fear of contact and 
consequent transmission. As lockdown continued, Shiuli increasingly felt 
hopeless, ‘begging on an almost empty road, when everything is closed … 
when you have no other source of getting money or food and you have 
no idea when the situation will improve or become normal like before. 
I pass every single minute thinking, when will someone come and give me 
something?’
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Similarly, Hanif (17) had previously sold flowers on a busy road in 
Dhaka city, but overnight, his income disappeared and he had no savings. 
He lives with his mother, siblings and a cousin in a one-room space in 
Badda, where most accommodation is less than 45 square feet with 
occupancy of up to six family members. Many mothers of respondents 
lost their jobs as housemaids in the homes of middle class and wealthy 
residents, due to their own fears of transmission and infection. All 
members of Hanif’s household, except for his mother, had work prior to 
lockdown, earning small amounts of money from informal jobs. When 
flower selling was no longer possible, Hanif was disheartened, but one 
day, taking matters into his own hands, he convinced his neighbour to 
rent him a rickshaw on credit so that he could work as a taxi driver. Within 
a few days, however, local regulations related to the lockdown were 
changed to prohibit rickshaws from operating. While adolescents in 
solvent families adjusted to remote learning and spent the rest of their 
time with their families, young people like Hanif carried the entire weight 
of managing households on their shoulders: ‘My life is not like others who 
are staying in their flats and maintaining physical distance. I have to find 
a means of earning to look after my family’. Paying the rent (approximately 
US$35 per month) was a constant reminder to Hanif of his responsibility 
as a son, so out of desperation he borrowed money from the owner of a 
neighbouring electronics shop, an informal loan provider. He now has the 
additional stress and ongoing anxiety of repaying this money with 
interest.
Meena (19), whose husband was ill and unemployed, worked up to 
10 hours every day without any weekend breaks, even during the initial 
stage of the nationwide lockdown, as they relied on her income as a 
domestic aid to manage the household and meet the needs of her two 
children. She spoke of constant exhaustion due to her long hours at work, 
but it was regular income and provided her with a level of security. When 
she saw the police patrolling the streets, she was frightened and asked for 
temporary leave, but was only given a few days off. However, as the 
lockdown continued, her employers fired her, forcing her to manage on 
loans. She defied the lockdown and walked to nearly 30 houses and flats 
in affluent residential areas in search of a new job. She explained that the 
guards would turn her away, because ‘no one is employing anyone now 
because of the pandemic. Everyone is too scared of transmission of the 
virus (from poor people)’.
Adhering to public health restrictions and the lockdown put 
adolescents in a precarious economic situation. Faruq (19), who lost his 
informal job, spent the first week of lockdown sitting inside the room he 
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shared with his mother, attempting to maintain physical distance despite 
the fact that this was a near impossibility for him and others living in an 
extremely congested slum. During the second week his mother asked him 
to get some rice. Faruq, quite despondent, reflected: ‘If I stay at home 
sitting idle, I risk facing starvation, and if I go outside I risk contamination. 
I finally decided to go outside and pull a rickshaw’. On his first day of 
pulling Faruq earned BDT 400 (c. US$4.73), but soon after the police 
confiscated the rickshaw. Faruq regained it a few days later by bribing the 
police.
Mukta (21) and her work colleagues experienced momentary hope 
in April when announcements were made that garment factories would 
re-open in May, but their hopes were dashed when, instead, lockdown 
was extended until 31 May. The closure of factories also meant that 
promised unpaid salaries could not be accessed. Like her colleagues, 
Mukta knew the risks of crowding together to claim her unpaid salary, but 
she had run out of money and as fears of hunger and panic grew, she had 
no option: ‘If the factory remains closed, how will we manage our rent, 
buy food for the rest of the days? We now eat twice a day. The rice we have 
will run out soon’.
Research in Mumbai has revealed how the middle classes depict 
slums as ‘filthy, dirty and noisy’ to justify the segregation and exclusion of 
and discrimination against slum residents (Chandola 2010). As we have 
already illustrated, Meena was turned away by guards in well-to-do 
suburbs for fears of spreading the virus, and police confiscated rickshaws 
and harassed poor people who broke the rules of wearing masks and 
defied lockdown. These acts of everyday exclusion reveal how young 
people’s lives were constantly under scrutiny and threat. However, they 
were determined to manage and were entrepreneurial in trying to find 
alternative sources of income, exhibiting certain levels of agency and 
resistance to the obstacles and challenges faced.
The Bangladesh government announced a stimulus package of 
US$8.657 billion in April to compensate people for economic losses 
caused by COVID-19 (Foyez 2020). This included US$595 million for 
salaries and allowances for garment workers and employees (Hossain 
2020). However, adolescents, young people and adults living on the 
margins did not get any benefits from this social safety net as the 
programme targeted elderly populations; widows, destitute and deserted 
women; and people with disabilities (World Bank 2019). Workers who 
labour on the streets, in office buildings and factories, in grocery shops 
and households, rickshaw pullers and daily labourers, were all excluded. 
Those younger than 18 years old did not have access to a NID (identity 
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card) and so were not entitled to support, and participants older than 18 
years with ID cards also often felt betrayed when they did not receive any 
relief materials, such as rice and other dry foods, if they fell into other 
categories of exclusion. Young women were especially vulnerable, as 
most were employed in the informal sector with low pay, and had less 
security and protection in their jobs than their male counterparts. They 
were also more likely to live in working poverty before the pandemic 
(Rashid et al. 2020a). 
Informal networks (both reciprocal and supportive, and exploitative) 
are a key part of settlement life, and it was through these networks that 
young people from poor households were able to gain access to informal 
credit in the absence of formal systems of support. Little is known yet about 
how the pandemic has impacted on money-lending and borrowing 
behaviour; however, from past crises such as sudden floods, we know that 
Dhaka slum-dwellers rely on social capital and networks to survive. The 
congested living conditions in slums create diverse close-knit communities, 
within which members have strong trusting relationships with each other. 
This allows members to request financial support from each other, simply 
and informally, in the form of small credits (Aßheuer et al. 2013). Among 
the 51 participants reported in our March 2020 study, ‘residents mentioned 
that they had received food from different non-government organizations, 
local politicians, some well-off families in the locality, and from their 
employers’ (Rashid et al. 2020b). However, 16 of the 51 did not receive 
food support at all. However, as the pandemic continued and insecurity 
increased in many households, there was an increasing risk that support 
would wane, and residents were increasingly worried about how to 
pay rent, pay back loans, purchase food and feed their families. Uncertainty 
of how long the situation would last added a new level of powerlessness, 
frailty and a sense of vulnerability: ‘We have lost control of everything. 
Our lives remain in God’s hands now’. Despite these statements of despair, 
most persisted in exploring options to manage their livelihoods and support 
their families.
Hunger, insecurity and panic: a bleak future lies ahead
For adolescents and young people, including most of our respondents, 
the fear of having no money at all, going without food and losing their 
homes, was very real; hunger, not the pandemic, was the greater concern. 
This was experienced most harshly in slums where vulnerable and low-
income groups like food vendors, the majority women and youth, were 
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disproportionately affected by lockdown with massive job losses and 
income constraints affecting access to food (Corburn et al. 2020). To add 
to these worries, they had to manage and placate younger children, 
including siblings, who were unaware of the full impact of the pandemic. 
Their anxiety and despair were palpable in interviews.
Rubel (18) lives with his mother, younger brother and several others 
in a one-room space in one of the largest slums in Bangladesh. He used to 
work in a plastics factory before lockdown, and, like others, he received 
no salary following the unexpected shutdown of the business. He does not 
know when he can return to work, or how he and his family will deal with 
the economic crisis they are already in. They are on the brink of starvation: 
‘We have already run out of our supply of rice. I am panicking! I have no 
idea how we will manage if things go on like this.’ Rubel, as a male, with 
no father in the household, is responsible for providing for his family but 
feels incapable of doing so.
Poverty also means that many women are taking on these respons- 
ibilities in the slums. For example, Meena, with no job, no money and a 
sick husband, was desperately hungry. She broke lockdown to walk one 
mile with her baby to receive a relief package from her mother. ‘I can’t 
afford a mask, so I used my scarf to cover my mouth and walked with my 
baby because my mother called me to say she had some rice to share with 
me.’ She was stopped by police, but they felt sorry for her and did not 
reprimand her as she was female and they realised she was hungry.
Many adolescents and young people interviewed for this research 
had heard about government relief materials being distributed and were 
hopeful that this would tide them over until the country opened up. There 
were reports that government officers had gone around slum areas 
collecting information about NID (national identification cards), but, as 
noted above, no respondents received food aid. Although Kabir, Jewel, 
Meena and Shirin (21, 20, 19 and 20, respectively) placed their names on 
the official list as entitled to food support, internal bureaucracy and 
corruption within these local offices prevented them from receiving aid. 
‘My landlord gets relief for himself and his tenants, but he doesn’t distribute 
anything to us.’ Numerous reports have detailed the mismanagement of the 
distribution of resources, which favoured certain groups, and there is 
limited coordination between different bodies responsible for distributing 
state-funded food and/or cash aid programmes (Rashid et al. 2020a).
When Khokon (18) and his colleagues were not paid their wages 
from various informal jobs, for example in shops and garment factories, 
they took to the streets to demand food and relief. Law enforcement 
officers had anticipated such action and were ready to punish protestors, 
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but even so, protests continued in various parts of the city through April 
(Arab News 2020). Chance (2015) refers to this as a ‘public drama’, in 
which poor residents collectively mobilise and identify with each other, 
creating a form of ‘living politics’, thereby moving beyond the boundaries 
between the home and city to make themselves seen and heard, in a place 
hostile to their needs. Through these demonstrations poor people try to 
gain rights, resources and recognition of their plight.
When the lockdown ended in May, people rushed back to their jobs, 
placing themselves at possible risk of infection. For many, the trade-off 
was either death from the virus or death from starvation. Nearly all 
respondents made repeated phone calls to people in their social networks, 
trying everything they could to gain access to cash to buy food. Young 
people turned to informal social connections to learn of sporadic labour 
opportunities, and drew on existing relationships to buy food on credit 
from street vendors, to negotiate with their landlords for waivers, and to 
sell various goods in the city, despite the lockdown. Kabir and Jewel spoke 
about selling their wives’ and sister’s only jewellery (one gold chain 
and two silver chains). Loans were taken out in the early stages of the 
pandemic, sometime in May, only two months into lockdown, as people 
began to exhaust their networks and as their anxiety escalated about 
being caught in a cycle of debt. 
Many of the adolescents, despite their age, continued to experience 
enormous pressure to provide for their families as heads of households 
(Figure 15.1). Kabir, for example, had taken on the responsibility of 
looking after his unmarried younger sister and younger brother after they 
lost their parents at a young age. His brother recently passed year 10 
school, and Kabir reflected: ‘Now with this corona, we are in a bad way. 
No one is happy and I couldn’t even feed the neighbourhood sweets to 
celebrate that my brother did so well in his exams’. For poor people, 
education is valued greatly and is seen as an eventual path out of poverty, 
although the reality is quite different. Kabir was unable to continue to 
support his brother’s education, and this ‘left him restless and awake most 
nights’. Shirin (20) recalled how she and her sister had recently relocated 
from one slum to another with better housing and facilities. Before 
COVID-19 and lockdown, both young women were working in a garment 
factory and their mother was a housemaid. However, soon after lockdown, 
all three became unemployed, forcing them to live on their meagre 
savings. When their landlord came to demand cash for rent, they used 
their savings to pay him for the month of April. Shirin worried that she 
did not have any income to pay him in May. During Eid (religious festival), 
Shirin bought her younger siblings some clothes as per the customary 
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rituals of Eid. She wanted them to have nice things and was distressed to 
see them unhappy. ‘They are young and don’t understand … we couldn’t 
deny them, although we didn’t buy anything for ourselves’. Kellett (2002, 
28) states that those who are poor are conscious of their low social 
position, and their attempts to aspire for more and to live better suggest 
that ‘their efforts can be interpreted as a “striving for dignity and respect”’. 
As Perlman argues (1976, 242–3), contrary to the assumptions of the 
urban poor as ‘disorderly’ (as is commonly portrayed in Bangladeshi 
media and narratives), ‘most are socially well organised’, and aspire to 
better lives, education, housing and upward mobility in employment. 
However, they face insurmountable barriers to realise their dreams.
The narratives of young people living in Dhaka indicate the depth 
of suffering that many urban residents experienced and the adversity they 
faced, even though they managed to survive. Despite their ingenious 
ways of trying to manage the world of social, economic and political 
hierarchies, the situation placed large amounts of stress on adolescents 
and youth. They have had to shoulder enormous burdens by taking on the 
responsibilities of adults. Most of those interviewed were already married, 
had children and were supporting their siblings and other family members 
financially, despite their youth and that they struggled emotionally, 
Figure 15.1 An adolescent prepares snacks in a slum in Dhaka city, 
Bangladesh. Photo: Farzana Manzoor/BRAC JPGSPH  
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mentally and physically to take on these expectations. The emotional toll 
and feelings of distress impacted on the young respondents, particularly 
as their situation became increasingly uncertain.
Gatekeepers and fear
As the above examples indicate, adolescents and young slum residents 
had to deal with various gatekeepers and powerful individuals, inside 
and outside the slums, including angry and demanding landlords and 
aggravated law enforcement officers.
In Meena’s case, the tenants in her block of slums decided to 
confront the landlord with examples of other landlords waiving rent for 
residents. Yet, when the landlord arrived, most tenants got cold feet and 
pleaded for more time instead. Kabir and Shiuli were fortunate, as their 
landlord knew them as long-time tenants and he did not insist on 
payment. While the situation varied therefore based on people’s (pre-
pandemic) relationships with their landlords, all of them experienced 
heightened anxiety and panic, as they worried about convincing their 
landlord to give them more time for rent payments. At the same time, 
landlords whose sole income came from rent were also beginning to 
struggle. With around 50,000 slum-dwellers returning to their villages to 
avoid paying rent, landlords faced the constraints of demanding rent and 
risking the tenant leaving, or giving tenants extended time to pay so that 
they remained (BRAC 2020). At the same time, most adolescents were 
born in Dhaka or had lived in the city for most of their lives, and did 
not consider that returning to their natal or parents’ village was an 
option. Further, options to return to a rural village were limited with 
the introduction and enforcement of a government travel ban on 
passenger travel via water, rail and on domestic air routes from 24 March, 
and restrictions on road public transport from 26 March until 31 May 
(Kamruzzaman and Sakib 2020a; Kamruzzaman and Sakib 2020b).
The police and army patrol officers acted as another set of gate- 
keepers, causing terror among residents if they left the slums during 
lockdown. Kabir spoke with us of breaking the lockdown rules and selling 
mangoes in the streets: ‘A crowd was gathering near us … the police 
started coming at us with sticks to beat us. I ran and hid in a corner … We 
grabbed a few of our mangoes and just ran. Luckily I was not hit by the 
police.’ Likewise, Jewel explained his panic when being confronted by 
the police: ‘I was walking to work (when lockdown restrictions had eased 
up) and I had my mask with me, but not over my face/mouth. The police 
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started yelling at me, asking why I didn’t have my mask on properly. I just 
put on my mask quietly and didn’t say anything.’ Shahnaz explained some 
of the contradictions of interacting with the law:
Usually the police come to our area and take money from the local 
shopkeepers and smaller drug stores. Now with the coronavirus 
they harass us to stay inside, but over the last few months, we see 
them less and less. In a way it’s good because they don’t take money 
from our local people anymore. They are scared of the virus.
Newspapers reported that police threatened low-income people who had 
to defy lockdown to earn their livelihoods (Sajid 2020), beating them and 
enforcing humiliating punishment, for instance, forcing men to do sit-ups 
while holding their ears. Many people view the police as the ‘enemy’, as 
holding excessive power, and as corrupt and abusive. Crime and insecurity 
tend to be rampant in slum settlements, and usually the police are paid 
off, with little recourse to justice for poor residents. For adolescents, being 
confronted by a police officer is traumatic and a stark reminder of their 
lack of power. However, in this chapter, we follow Lombard’s (2014) call 
to focus on ‘the everyday’ and analyse adolescents and youth as ‘more or 
less autonomous actors who creatively engage with, and shape’, and give 
meaning, to the places and spaces they inhabit. This allows us to see 
young slum residents not simply as passive subjects with little agency in 
the face of overwhelming poverty; in both subtle and overt ways many 
challenged the regulations imposed by the state.
Distrust and fear of the police, and general lack of trust in law 
enforcement bodies, has been documented in other epidemics, such as 
Ebola (Van Belle et al. 2020). Effective and transparent urban governance 
that enables and promotes trust in communities is needed for effective 
emergency responses. In slums this is absent. Without formal governance, 
non-state organisations and resident-led informal governance mechanisms 
stepped in. For example, in Dhaka, the few landlords who owned their own 
compounds introduced rules to increase physical distancing as much as 
feasible among the tenants when using shared facilities (Rashid et al. 
2020b).
Faith in times of pandemic
For most participants, religion offered some solace. In late March and 
early April, despite the lockdown, many people were still congregating for 
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prayers. Rubel (18), Hanif (17) and Faruq (19) went to the mosque on 
a regular basis during the early weeks of lockdown, and explained: 
‘COVID-19 is a consequence of people’s sin and a punishment from Allah, 
because people no longer pray as much as they should’. The pandemic, 
they argued, was evidence of wrath from the divine for peoples’ perceived 
lack of morality and sin. Hanif informed us that he had heard that those 
who perform ablutions five times before prayers were protected from the 
virus, because it ‘keeps them clean’. Meena shared how in her despair, 
she needed immediate comfort and went to pray in the woman’s section 
of the mosque; when leaving, she placed 10 BDT (UA$0.12), not a small 
amount for her, into the box for donations. As poor as she was, she felt 
compelled to donate a small amount, hoping that her prayers for salvation 
from her current circumstances would be heard.
Where institutions, systems, communities and even families failed 
to provide the required support, and trust was shaken, many residents 
were left with only their faith to cope with overwhelming feelings of 
helplessness. Places of worship also became sites of temporary solidarity 
and meeting places in the slums, although primarily for men. Local 
mosques encouraged people to continue to attend Friday prayers until 6 
April 2020. Until then, according to those interviewed, soap was available 
for hand washing and people practised some physical distancing inside 
the prayer rooms. Moreover, for most people, the mosque was viewed as 
safer than other sites such as crowded markets, because it was considered 
a sacred space, leaving some to assume divine protection against 
transmission of the virus. The comfort and security of meeting others in 
the mosque also overrode any fears of infection. Religious beliefs and 
faith in the divine were viewed as a protection against COVID-19, and this 
theme was repeated by the majority of our respondents (Rabbani 2020).
Conclusion
Deep structures of vulnerability and structural violence shaped the 
conditions of everyday life during lockdown for young people living in 
slums, and produced multilevel challenges. As we have illustrated, an 
intersectional approach highlights how, during the pandemic, different 
social axes (here, youth, gender, class, poverty, sources of livelihood) 
intersected with social location (here, Dhaka’s slums) through time, and 
were shaped by interconnected systems, structure and processes of power, 
oppression and domination to shape all aspects of people’s lives. We have 
also illustrated the importance of affect: that is, people experienced 
VIRAL LOADS294
emotional vulnerabilities in response to the economic and social 
constraints that characterised the COVID-19 pandemic and its unfolding.
We have described the heterogeneity of slum residents and depicted 
how young people’s lives were (and are) enmeshed in struggles with 
powerful and diverse interest groups, yet their narratives attest to their 
continued resilience and inventiveness to manage multiple constraints. 
When officials declared a state of emergency and imposed sudden 
restrictions, young people, already in a precarious situation, were affected 
emotionally and materially by the scarcity in their lives. The rules, 
imposed by the state and the police who were regulating spaces and 
COVID-19 related behaviours, receive limited attention in public health 
discourses. The lockdown threatened people with starvation, and 
addressing this required that they acted in ways that contravened 
with the precautions to prevent the spread of the pandemic – staying at 
home and maintaining physical distance. The role of the police force, the 
extensive curtailing of employment opportunities, restricted movement, 
and economic and home insecurities, disrupted social relationships and 
gendered expectations. All presented challenges beyond the control of 
individuals, and required resources and infrastructure to mitigate them 
(Coetzee and Kagee 2020).
However, within conditions of deprivation, young people immediately 
tried to remake their local and social worlds. They made independent 
decisions in the light of the limited options that were available. They 
frantically explored all kinds of existing and new networks for support to 
cope, irrespective of restrictions, looking for alternate income sources, 
taking loans, exploring social relationships, negotiating and navigating 
with powerful actors, and turning to faith to manage anxiety and distress. 
Driven by panic, desperation and the need for quick action for survival, as 
they grappled with physical hunger and daily mental anxiety, adolescents 
took risks with the police, landlords and loan agents, when normally they 
might be fearful or reluctant to engage with them. Their actions showed 
resilience as they attempted to create a semblance of normalcy in a world 
turned upside down. We do not wish, here, to romanticise or overstate the 
agency of adolescents and young people in slums in Dhaka, but most young 
people tried to transform or navigate, in whatever ways were possible, 
existing relationships of domination, oppression and exploitation 
(Cresswell 2004, 29). Sharp and colleagues (2000, 20) argue that power is 
messy and not simply one of a binary model of domination/resistance. It 
must be understood as ‘an amalgam of forces, processes, practices and 
relations, all of which spin out along the precarious threads of society and 
space’ (Sharp et al. 2000, 20).
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The narratives of adolescents and young people show us how slums 
are sites of complex social interactions. Cresswell (2004, 11) states that 
the focus on the everyday, lived experiences of the poor highlights the 
complicated ‘interplay of people and the environment’ as it is continually 
constructed and co-constructed. Simone (2004, 14) argues that by 
highlighting the struggles and negotiations in which people in poor 
communities actively engage, these narratives make ‘visible urban 
possibilities that have been crowded out or left diffuse or opaque’ in 
debates that often essentialise the identities of settlement dwellers.
COVID-19 brings new challenges to existing structural violence, 
deepens this violence, and sharpens the vulnerability of young people 
and their families. The structural, social, economic and political realities 
interact to leave young people and their families marginalised and at 
risk, not only from hunger and malnutrition, but at risk of catastrophic 
economic losses with long-lasting repercussions. As their lives unfolded 
during the pandemic, it became clear that the unequal distribution 
of power and wealth across class, gender, age and location created 
and perpetuated power inequalities and inequities. Critical medical 
anthropology combined with intersectionality can help make visible 
varying forms of structural violence (physical, social, economic, political), 
and illustrate how these are often mediated by more ‘micro’ level 
characteristics and unique circumstances of identity and lack of power 
and privilege. Poverty and patriarchal gender norms shaping early 
marriage, norms related to male rice-winners, and lack of voice, for 
example, interact to shape individual experiences in varying ways.
Definitions of vulnerability tend to exclude young people as they are 
often viewed as resilient and able to recover, and so they remain among 
the ‘invisible’ poor. But in our research, the lives of many young people 
have been ones of missed dreams and lost opportunities as they transition 
into social adulthood quickly, taking on roles and responsibilities while 
still very young. The reality is that they do not lament this loss, for they 
have no choices or options. Their micro worlds are ones of survival and 
resilience, and this is the familiar terrain they have navigated since they 
were very young. They are pragmatic about the circumstances of their 
lives. Being confronted with illnesses and death is an everyday reality for 
many poor adolescents living in Dhaka’s slums. In this context, COVID-19 
was yet another addition to an already long list of health and other 
challenges that they faced (Rashid et al. 2020a).
There has been limited discussion on the impact of COVID-19 on 
youth in marginalised contexts, and our research makes visible the 
experiences of adolescents and young people in urban slums, amplifying 
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the urgency to address the levels of social injustice that exist. Authorities 
must rethink their engagement with young people living in slums, and 
respond and recognise the links between governance, health and equity 
(Arab News 2020). Young people in slums can support mitigation strategies 
for the short- and long-term impacts of COVID-19, if they are engaged 
with and participate in shaping responses. The voices and perspectives of 
adolescents and youth presented here are common among most urban poor 
populations in the city. Their struggles, however, are largely invisible.
It is not enough to understand why young people live in such 
deprivation and how they manage and cope. We need to closely examine 
who is most affected by this pandemic and how to promote justice. The 
distribution of wealth in the country, and the discrepancies in resources 
within the population, shape the risk of infection and its outcomes. But it 
would be myopic to create a national policy to mitigate the impact of 
COVID-19 without also addressing the unique challenges faced by 
younger populations. We need to critically reflect not only on the failures 
of the local state, but also on existing global policies and politics. All 
combine to impact adversely on the lives of those who are most vulnerable.
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COVID-19 and the improvisation of  
care in the UK and US
Ellen Block and Cecilia Vindrola-Padros
COVID-19 has disrupted all aspects of healthcare delivery across the 
globe. The novel coronavirus has upended both the expectation of relative 
stability in care and service delivery in the Global North and the assurance 
that providers and patients will have access to – and knowledge about – 
the best ways to treat disease. The pandemic has forced healthcare 
workers (HCWs) to contend with limited knowledge about a disease, 
uncertainty about the best treatments and practices available and a crisis 
of faith in the system and in their own ability to provide care. As a result, 
significant improvisation has occurred at both an institutional level and 
at a microlevel of everyday practice. Based on data from qualitative 
interviews with healthcare workers in the United States (US) and United 
Kingdom (UK), in this chapter we examine the striking similarities in 
improvisational strategies and techniques that healthcare systems and 
HCWs have employed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such improvisation 
has resulted in structural institutional changes as well as microlevel 
changes as a response to resource shortages, risk reduction strategies 
and lifesaving techniques. This improvisation in the UK and the US 
demonstrates the flexibility of seemingly rigid institutions. At first, the 
crisis conditions that led to such improvisation appeared to flatten 
inequalities by mimicking the precarity and uncertainty of practising 
medicine in resource-poor contexts. Ultimately, however, the COVID-19 
pandemic – like all catastrophes – merely serves to reveal the fault lines 
of inequality and the fractures of healthcare systems.
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Context and methods
The COVID-19 pandemic set unprecedented demand on healthcare 
systems globally. Emerging research from multiple countries has included 
reports of HCW fatigue, distress and anxiety as well as positive emotional 
responses (e.g. ‘growth under pressure’) and helpful coping mechanisms 
(Liu et al. 2020; Song et al. 2020; Sun et al. 2020). In the US, the largely 
inadequate response to COVID-19 has been widely publicised, and as of 
this writing (December 2020), the country continues to lead in both cases 
and number of deaths globally. Responses to the pandemic, however, vary 
widely by state, by city and by hospital system, everywhere deeply 
entrenched in local politics. Because there is no national healthcare 
system in the US, there is no centralised system of personal protective 
equipment (PPE) acquisition, no standard way to deal with suspected 
COVID-19 patients when they show up at the emergency room (ER) and 
no formal coordination of communication channels to share emerging 
research and best practices. Instead, each hospital or hospital system, 
sometimes based on directives from the local and federal government and 
sometimes based on directives by hospital administrators, has developed 
its own strategies to manage patient flow and the reorganisation of 
hospital space, COVID-19 testing, medical student and junior doctor1 
training and PPE acquisition. HCWs have learned from others’ experiences 
through informal channels and grassroots movements.
In the case of the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic impacted a public 
healthcare system, the National Health Service (NHS), already struggling 
with workforce issues including high vacancy and low retention rates 
of staff, limited bed capacity and funding cuts (Dayan et al. 2018). In 
March 2020, the UK went into lockdown with social distancing policies 
implemented across the population to reduce the transmission of COVID-
19 and the burden on the healthcare system. By April, the NHS had put 
in place protocols across the system to manage the flow of COVID patients 
and reduce the volume of non-COVID patients in their hospitals, including 
suspending a range of services. While there was some variation in how 
different hospitals responded, national-level recommendations on the 
expansion of critical care capacity, cancellation of elective care and 
workforce redesign were made available and followed in most cases 
(NHS 2020).
Hospitals and HCWs in both countries were unprepared for the 
needs of patients and staff as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Early in 
the pandemic, it became clear that there would be a need for improvisation 
both at the institutional level and at the level of everyday practice in order 
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to manage the changed flow of patients and reduce risks to patients, 
families and frontline workers. Despite vast differences between the 
US and the UK, the kinds of responses in institutional structures and 
healthcare practices were strikingly similar in both contexts, indicating a 
similar sense of uncertainty, global sharing of knowledge and a disease 
which applies pressure in similar ways, resulting in similar improvisational 
strategies.
Both studies were designed as rapid appraisals (Vindrola-Padros et 
al. 2020). The US-based study consisted of 55 hour-long semi-structured 
interviews conducted between April and September 2020 with healthcare 
workers from 18 different states, including doctors, nurses and advanced 
care providers.2 Findings were analysed using MAXQDA. The UK study 
combined a review of UK healthcare policies (n=70 policies), mass media 
and social media analysis of frontline staff experiences and perceptions 
(n=101 newspaper articles, n=146,000 posts) and in-depth (telephone) 
interviews with frontline staff (n=123 interviews). The findings from all 
streams were analysed using framework analysis.
Improvisation and instability
The uncertainty of COVID-19 lies both in its emergence and its complexity. 
The rapid appearance of COVID-19 created many uncertainties socially, 
economically and medically. For HCWs treating COVID-19 patients, 
medical uncertainty centred on the unknowns surrounding infectious- 
ness risk, treatments, symptoms and COVID-19-induced complications. 
Treatment recommendations for COVID-19 and best practices for 
supportive care changed rapidly during the first year of the pandemic, 
especially during the first few months. The widely publicised early hopes 
for the benefits of drugs such as hydroxychloroquine were quickly 
dismissed (Self et al. 2020) as clinical trials for more effective drugs such 
as remdesivir were underway (Beigel et al. 2020). In Wuhan, China, Italy 
and New York City, three places hit hard by early waves of COVID-19, 
poor patient outcomes quickly led to changing supportive care practices 
such as more consistent use of proning (placing the patient on their 
stomach) and delaying intubation (Coppo et al. 2020; Rola et al. 2020). 
However, in the early stages of the pandemic, while HCWs gained a better 
sense of supportive ventilation strategies and gained confidence in the 
approach to hypoxia in COVID-19 patients, adaptations were largely 
anecdotal, and did not address uncertainty about long-term outcomes. 
This led to constantly changing guidelines on the clinical management of 
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patients, the reorganisation of the infrastructure for care delivery (from 
acute care to rehabilitation) and, considering the use and reuse of PPE in 
the context of fluctuating equipment stock, the establishment of adequate 
standards for infection control (Hoernke et al. 2020; Vindrola-Padros 
et al. 2020).
Additionally, at the beginning of the pandemic very little was 
known about COVID-19 complications, as countries rapidly battled to 
save lives as a first priority. Some months into the pandemic, it became 
clear that COVID-19 is a multisystem disease, affecting the gastrointestinal, 
nervous, musculoskeletal, endocrine and cardiac systems (Kakodkar et al. 
2020; Zhang et al. 2020). However, knowledge about long-term outcomes 
has been gradual as clinicians and scientists have had to wait for 
complications to manifest within their patients and for research results 
to be published. This has caused considerable uncertainty surrounding 
the delivery of rehabilitation care for the varying and complex needs 
of patients.
As a result of the rapidly changing information and availability of 
resources, healthcare workers and hospital administrators have adapted 
both by changing institutional protocols and structures at the macro 
level and improvising at the micro level to improve patient outcomes and 
keep frontline workers safe. For institutions that are typically rigid in both 
their organisational structure and their daily practices, the level of 
uncertainty, the rapid pace of change and the need for improvisation was 
both unprecedented and unsettling. In many ways, the provision of care 
in the early days of the pandemic mimicked care provision in resource-
poor contexts, where healthcare providers have to contend with a lack of 
evidence-based treatments, limited resources including both drugs and 
PPE, and the need to shift, tinker and adapt to rapidly changing and 
unpredictable contexts.
It is not surprising, then, that comparison can be made between the 
challenges of providing care during the COVID-19 pandemic and 
ethnographies of medicine stemming from the Global South where 
resources, space and human capital are habitually limited. Such resource-
poor hospitals often show the ‘fluid, experimental, and improvised 
nature of biomedicine’ (Street 2014, 16). At first, the COVID-19 pandemic 
resembled these contexts in how they wrought uncertainty and 
necessitated improvisation. In writing about improvisation in a public 
cancer ward in Botswana, Julie Livingston observes the ‘daily imperative’ 
to ‘improvise new options from the resources available – material and 
social’ (Livingston 2012, 181). The urgency and precarity that requires 
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such improvisation was felt by HCWs in the US and the UK, particularly 
at the start of COVID-19 before best practices had been established and 
when it was uncertain how long resources would last. While, as Gawande 
(2002) points out, doctors have always had to contend with a gap between 
what they know and what they aim for, HCWs in the US and the UK 
are unaccustomed to having to improvise at the speed or scale that 
COVID-19 required.
Many healthcare workers said that meetings and communications 
noting changes were occurring daily, and they had trouble keeping up. 
HCWs were patching together information and supplies, from making 
their own PPE, to joining social media platforms with doctors from all 
over the world to learn about emerging best practices. For doctors in the 
Global South, decision making has long been constrained by structural 
and resource limitations, and such improvisation and flexibility is 
standard. In Malawi, Wendland shows how doctors cobble together ‘social 
networks, material goods, short-term opportunities and ideas to craft ad 
hoc solutions to the problems they faced’ (2010, 154). In Dewachi’s 
powerful ethnography of post-war Iraq (2017), after years of United 
Nations sanctions, healthcare infrastructure was crumbling and HCWs 
could not access the supplies they needed to treat their patients and care 
for themselves. Doctors reused PPE, improvised by replacing catheters 
with nasal tubes and sterilised disposable gloves, strategies strikingly 
similar to those used by our interlocutors. As in the context of COVID-19, 
while not ideal, these ‘improvised practices became essential to saving 
lives’ (Dewachi 2017, xxi). However, unlike those contexts of entrenched 
poverty, protracted post-war situations and chronic structural 
vulnerability, the need for improvisation in responding to the uncertainties 
of COVID-19 in the US and the UK are temporary. And yet, many of the 
HCWs in this study alluded to the hospitals feeling like a war zone. The 
difference between the experience of practising medicine – and receiving 
care – in the US and UK early during the COVID-19 pandemic, and in 
these other contexts of precarity and war in the Global South, is that the 
war-like conditions or long-term structural conditions that lead to 
entrenched precarity do not resolve quickly. Nonetheless, COVID-19 
reveals how improvisation can become necessary in a time of crisis, even 
among wealthier nations and relatively resource-rich healthcare contexts. 
Given the high likelihood of future pandemics or disasters that require 
nimble healthcare responses, much can be gained from analysing the 
efficacy of improvisational strategies employed by HCWs in response to 
COVID-19.
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Improvisation at the institutional level
One of the most surprising areas of improvisation and adaptation 
during the COVID-19 pandemic has been at the institutional level. Large 
institutions tend towards both homogeneity and intractability (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). Hospitals and health systems have historically been 
extremely rigid and slow to change. While HCWs are typically able to 
nimbly respond to changes in medical practice, such as new treatments, 
hospital and healthcare reform is notoriously challenging, particularly in 
public hospital settings (Edwards and Saltman 2017). Yet, as a result of 
massive global disruption, hospitals and health systems have had to adapt 
quickly. In both the US and the UK, hospitals and healthcare systems have 
made massive shifts in organisational structure and protocols, putting 
into place new systems and changes that might normally take a decade to 
implement.
As healthcare workers and hospital administrators in the US and the 
UK watched COVID-19 devastate parts of China and Italy, they began to 
prepare for the inevitable onslaught on their shores. In both locales, one 
of the first changes to be implemented was to restructure the physical 
space of the hospital. Elective surgeries were suspended, emergency 
departments quickly altered their triage processes to identify those who 
might have COVID-19, and many hospitals chose to segregate those 
patients until their infection status was confirmed. In the US, different 
hospitals had vastly different approaches: some kept patients for longer 
in the ER until they knew their infection status; some sent any patient 
suspected of COVID-19 or with respiratory issues to COVID-designated 
floors until their status was confirmed. In the UK, in order to increase 
capacity across hospitals, in April 2020, the NHS announced the priori- 
tisation of cancer treatments and suspension of all non-urgent elective 
surgery for three months. Operating rooms were repurposed and private 
facilities were commissioned for NHS services (Willan et al. 2020). 
Strategies to address workforce gaps included: the redeployment of staff; 
the reintegration of recently retired staff into the active workforce; and 
early graduation of medical students (Song et al. 2020). In addition, 
changes were rapidly made to the hospital infrastructure, as critical care 
units needed to expand to other areas of the hospital and staff improvised 
space to set up new beds and equipment and the electrical sockets and 
connections required to power the ventilators.
These changes not only required changing the triaging system, but 
also required considerable physical changes in the space of the hospital. 
While some hospitals created zones for COVID and non-COVID patients, 
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converting paediatric intensive care units (ICUs), surgical wards and 
private facilities into spaces for COVID patients, others tore down walls, 
erected tents and installed HEPA filters to the windows creating negative 
pressure rooms. In the UK, the Nightingale Hospitals (referred to by the 
general public as ‘pop-up’ hospitals as they were built in a matter of days) 
were created to help London hospitals deal with the surge in patients 
requiring hospitalisation. In New York City, one of the hardest hit locales 
in the US, a Navy ship was parked in New York’s harbour to handle patient 
overflow, the convention centre was converted into a field hospital, and 
a pop-up tent hospital was erected in Central Park to accommodate 
coronavirus patients. One hospital system in a midwestern city in the US 
converted a long-term acute care facility into a COVID hospital in less 
than a week and began sending COVID patients from all of their partner 
hospitals to that location. Kieran, a doctor and quality officer for that 
hospital system, reflected on that time: ‘It was very intense. Within, you 
know, literally a week or two we got that whole thing up and running and 
that provided a mental model for how we could co-locate all our COVID 
patients into one location and really begin to standardise our approach to 
their management’. The completion of the physical rearrangement, which 
required intensive work by construction workers, engineers, infectious 
disease experts and environmental service specialists, was necessary 
before the work of figuring out how to care for patients could really begin.
One of the most frustrating things for healthcare workers was the 
pace of change. Daily calls, system-wide email directives and meetings 
after hours informed HCWs of a new approach to patient care or a new 
way of organising hospital space, only to be changed again a week later. 
This occurred in relation to testing guidelines in the UK, as Rachel, one of 
the nurses working in the ICU, indicated, ‘at one point we were told we 
might not get tested even though one person in the team had confirmed 
COVID-19, which seemed to go against previous suggestions’. Some 
hospitals tried out a cohort model, segregating COVID-patients to a 
certain area, but quickly realised there was too much spill over of COVID 
patients into non-COVID units. Because of the experimental nature of 
improvisation at a structural level, the guidelines were not always 
evidence based, and sometimes they simply did not work. Dave, a chief 
medical officer for a large urban public hospital in the US said, ‘Just the 
tolerance for change, and, you know, basically shutting an entire 
ambulatory and surgical system down to only essentials and trying to 
restart it for 7000 employees … it’s been challenging. It’s been a lot of 
long hours and I would just say it’s been emotionally draining’. Laughing, 
he added, ‘It’s like change management on steroids’.
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While the pace of change was stressful, it was not impossible, as 
hospital administrators might have guessed. Some changes were borne 
out of necessity. For example, in the US and UK, telemedicine implement- 
ation and adoption ramped up very quickly (Car et al. 2020; Alexander 
et al. 2020), and thus avoided some of the bureaucratic slowdowns 
that would occur under normal circumstances. In the UK, the NHS 
implemented telemedicine in order to support patients and avoid them 
visiting their general practitioners or coming into hospital, so reducing 
the risk of the spread of COVID-19 (Leite et al. 2020). Telemedicine in the 
UK was also used to monitor patients waiting for surgical procedures 
and identify any potential cases of deterioration that would need to be 
escalated to emergency care. John, a cardiothoracic surgeon in the UK 
who was redeployed to critical care, explained: ‘One change we had to 
make is that every patient who has been deferred an [elective] operation 
will receive a phone call each week to monitor symptoms and triage 
patients at home. We can then see who is deteriorating and ask them 
to come to the emergency department’. William, a nurse practitioner 
in the US, said: ‘The nice thing that COVID did was instead of slowly 
implementing telehealth and trying to work through all the kinks in it 
slowly over months at a time, kind of all the resources got put into it’. 
While these kinds of rapid systemic changes created overwhelming waves 
of new protocols and procedures for HCWs to learn, they were grateful 
for the extra communication.
Additionally, several HCWs said the difficulty of the situation 
brought their colleagues closer together. Dave, a chief medical officer in 
the US, described in detail some conflict he was having with colleagues 
over PPE directives. But, he added:
Despite these interactions, overall, we were much more on the same 
page. I could have never gotten thirty-five senior leader physicians 
to get on a call every night. There’s no way in hell. I couldn’t even 
get them on a call one night, and now they’re calling in every night, 
faithfully. And everybody’s pitching in to try to help each other out. 
And I’m like, oh, my God, this is great. We can leverage this success 
onward.
Robert, a chief information officer in the US, was also surprised by the 
flexibility in implementing massive structural changes at his hospital, and 
noted: ‘So that’s good to learn that we can be pretty nimble, we can make 
adjustments pretty quickly and succeed’. David, a doctor in the UK, 
associated the speed of changes with the reduction of barriers encountered 
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pre-COVID-19. He said, ‘[The pandemic] demonstrated that change can 
be done quickly, what normally takes a year can be done in [a]week, less 
red tape. We are able to do more in a short time’. Whether these changes 
are lasting beyond this pandemic is of course unknown.
Improvisation as resource scarcity
Much improvisation also occurred as a result of scarcity or the fear of 
future scarcity, particularly regarding personal protective equipment. In 
the UK, HCWs reported several adaptations to delivering care in order to 
preserve PPE, such as the use of verbal prescriptions, open bays with 
multiple COVID-19 patients, limiting visitors and fewer HCWs seeing 
patients on ward rounds. Some HCWs resorted to privately purchasing 
PPE and some NHS units received donations of PPE, including 3D printed 
masks and visors. Extreme examples from the media analysis included 
HCWs improvising PPE out of children’s safety goggles, cooking aprons 
and bin liners.
In the US and the UK, PPE shortages varied from place to place, as 
did administrators’ and HCWs’ responses to shortages. In some places, 
HCWs were directed to use a certain number of masks, gowns and face 
shields per shift. In others, PPE was used for a certain number of patients 
or certain types of patients. For example, Julie, a paediatric ICU nurse in 
Chicago, received one N95 mask per shift but a new surgical mask to put 
on top of it with each patient. In addition, each room had a designated 
face shield which nurses shared when they entered the room, which, Julie 
noted, ‘was kind of gross’. Melissa, an ER doctor in the US, explained how 
she tinkered with the order of patients to preserve PPE:
We didn’t have enough of the outer yellow gowns, so we were trying 
to use them in a wise way. If I had a COVID rule-out patient, I saw 
them first. And I could put another gown on for anyone that had 
COVID plus MRSA or Pseudomonas, one of these other contagious 
infections. And then I’d get rid of those. And then I would have a 
new set that I’d wear for COVID only patients but since they already 
had COVID you could just wear the same gown in each room. In the 
end it meant that you’re wearing this yellow gown for eight patients 
or ten in a row trying to preserve it because the floor was running 
out of them, and was trying to keep them for the nurses who had to 
go in and give medications and bring meals and all these other 
moments of contact.
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Melissa’s creative strategy was not implemented as policy, but providers 
shared such strategies with each other in order to ensure adequate PPE 
for the whole team. In the UK, there were similar examples of rationing 
and individual processes of negotiation led by HCWs who believed the 
measures implemented in their hospital were not safe. Janet, a healthcare 
assistant, explained:
They were saying that we were the ones that really should be using 
[PPE] and anyone who was in the room but is further away doesn’t 
need it, because they’re not at the mouth of the patient … you were 
begging to have more … you’d have to really make a stand and say 
well, ‘everybody in my team is wearing it’.
In both countries, several HCWs mentioned that this type of coordination 
and communication brought their team closer, and in some instances broke 
down hierarchies between doctors, nurses and other frontline workers.
One of the most frustrating and disconcerting things about PPE 
shortages were the constantly changing recommendations, which were 
both hard to keep track of and undermined HCWs’ confidence that they 
were able to protect themselves adequately. At first, some HCWs were told 
they only needed to use a surgical mask when seeing a COVID-19 patient, 
unless performing an aerosolising procedure such as an intubation. 
However, as Quinn, an ER doctor in one of the early US hotspots noted, 
the HCWs pushed back on this recommendation because it felt unsafe: 
‘Everyone was like, that’s total bullshit and not based on science but just 
based on the lack of supplies. And that’s not appropriate’. After HCWs 
organised in protest, their hospital changed its recommendation to allow 
use of N95 masks with all COVID-19 patients. In the UK study, frontline 
staff found it difficult to follow national-level PPE guidance when there 
were shortages, leading to re-use and improvisation of personal protective 
equipment (Hoernke et al. 2020). Linda, a charge nurse, said:
Some staff felt messages of what PPE is required, in what situations, 
that there was a little bit of distrust … If the advice keeps changing, 
are we getting the right message? And is this message safe? Which 
caused a bit of worry and anxiety for some of the staff because at the 
same time they were hearing on the press that colleagues in other 
hospitals were getting sick.
Josh, a junior doctor in his last year of training in the southern United 
States, reflected on the fact that he was being told to use PPE in ways 
contradictory to everything he had learned in medical school:
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I gotta say, it was really funny to have something that the infection 
prevention people have always trained you so very well on and then 
all of a sudden we’re in this pandemic, and the masks are no longer 
one time use, right? Because they anticipated that if we did that, we 
would run out of masks. I think some places around the country did 
run out of masks. Now, we didn’t. But if you consider the fact that 
we were reusing masks, I kind of consider that as having run out of 
the masks because they weren’t being used the appropriate way 
they were initially intended.
In other words, the only reason hospitals had not completely run out of 
PPE is because they were using it inappropriately. While most interviewees 
in both countries said they had not yet completely run out of PPE, 
HCWs’ experiences with PPE protocols provides a stark reminder that 
inappropriate PPE usage is a dangerous form of shortage as well, because 
its effectiveness is unknown.
To preserve PPE, healthcare workers also had to creatively improvise 
storage, preservation and cleaning techniques. HCWs stored N95 masks 
in paper bags or rested them on styrofoam cups so they would not touch 
anything while not in use, while some treated them with UV lights or 
hydrogen peroxide to try and kill any virus particles on them. In some 
cases, hospital administrators came up with a system for sending PPE 
away to be cleaned. But, as Josh noted, clean does not necessarily equate 
with effective: ‘Maybe it comes back clean but there’s also a question of 
does it lose effectiveness? Its filtration, does that lose effectiveness? 
Because, even if it comes back clean, great it’s clean. But after how many 
uses does the material itself start allowing more stuff through?’. In both 
countries, HCWs reported foregoing food and water during their shifts in 
order to preserve PPE and avoid risk of infection. In the UK, there were 
several cases of dehydration among HCWs who were using full PPE; in 
many cases, this was because HCWs were not taking the recommended 
hydration and bathroom breaks because they did not want to ‘waste’ PPE. 
Peter, a junior doctor explained: ‘So, there were times, for instance, where 
you needed to go to the loo, but you didn’t want to waste PPE’.
While PPE was the primary target of resource scarcity management, 
HCWs in the UK and the US feared a shortage of ventilators as well, which 
led to the redistribution and improvisation of machines. In some cases, 
HCWs used backup ventilators and transport ventilators normally used in 
ambulances when supplies were low. In most places, hospitals restricted 
the use of non-invasive ventilation strategies that utilise positive airway 
pressure such as CPAP and BPAP machines, due to the risk of aerosolising 
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particles (Pirzada et al. 2020; Arulkumaran et al. 2020). However, HCWs 
made creative adjustments to use these non-invasive strategies in order 
to make use of them. Leo, a junior doctor in the US, explained how his 
colleagues adjusted bag valve masks to avoid release of aerosolising 
particles:
Technically we’re not allowed to use a bag valve mask right now. 
Some of my colleagues have come up with some clever ways to 
insert a viral filter into the rest of the system and use these one-way 
valves and shut off different pieces so you can say, look, you could 
probably use this as a bag valve mask, and this is probably compliant 
with the wishes of those above us.
These tactics both avoided intubating patients for whom intermediate 
positive air support was sufficient and preserved ventilators for patients 
who needed them. In the UK, HCWs used anaesthetic machines for 
ventilation because, although these were not fit for the purpose, they felt 
that they had to ‘make do with what they had at the time’. Like many 
tactics used to address resource shortages, these stopgap measures and 
improvisations were informal and their effectiveness unexamined.
Improvisation as risk reduction strategy
In addition to PPE, HCWs and hospitals implemented many micro and 
macro changes to reduce the risk of acquiring and transmitting COVID-19 
between patients, themselves and their families. In both the US and the 
UK, most hospitals administered temperature checks and symptom 
monitoring for all HCWs arriving at work (although the consistency of 
these practices varied by hospital). HCWs also reported taking additional 
precautions upon entering and leaving the hospital to protect their family 
members at home. Kristen, a nurse working in a COVID unit in the eastern 
US, was particularly diligent because her husband, who worked from 
home, was fearful she would contract the virus and bring it home to him 
and their three young children. She explained:
On the way to work, I put everything in the canvas washable tote 
bag. I only bring my wallet in. I leave for work in my scrubs, but 
when I’m coming home, I take my scrubs off at the hospital, put on 
pants and a t-shirt. I have a tracker thing where my husband has me 
share my ETA on my way home. He likes to get the washing machine 
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going, and the thing is already open and the water and soap already 
in so I don’t touch anything. The basement door is open, everything’s 
ready to go. So I leave my shoes in the car I come inside. I put the 
t-shirt, the pants, my scrubs and the canvas tote all right in the 
wash. I have a bleach spray for my phone. And then I have to run 
upstairs naked, take a shower and then he’s fine.
While on the extreme end of cautiousness, most HCWs in both the US and 
the UK had some kind of rigorous routine, which added a significant 
amount of time and effort to their already long workday.
One primary strategy that both served to preserve PPE and reduce 
risk of infection was to limit the number of people and times one entered 
the room of a COVID-19 patient. In the UK, to reduce the risk of infection 
and respond to concerns about mask shortages, HCWs were told ‘if a 
member of staff does not need to go into the risk area, they should be kept 
out’. Leo, a junior doctor in the US, said:
For a while there we were having some shortages of PPE. So we tried 
to come up with clever ways of getting around that. Let’s count one 
person and put them in the room and then we’re just going to pass 
you in stuff, you’re just going to sit in there for an hour, because 
we’re just going to see if there’s anything else we need to do.
Leo also described what he called an intubation box, a plexiglass box some 
doctors had made, which they would place over the patient’s head and 
reach into to perform intubations. He marvelled, ‘The level of ingenuity of 
emergency room doctors, I think, is very, very high. They’re always looking 
for clever things to do to solve problems that don’t have easy solutions and 
I definitely have seen that kind of stuff’. Jeff, an American ER doctor, and 
his colleagues developed similarly creative strategies:
Pretty early on we realised we had to try to minimise the number of 
times you have to go into a room so we were trying to batch care. So, 
don’t trickle in orders for labs like that so the nurse has to go in once 
an hour to get new lab draws. We tried do all that at once so they 
just have to go in one time … I’ve heard of pretty innovative things 
in ICUs where instead of putting the IV pumps on the bed right next 
to the patient, they’ll actually run a really long IV line through the 
door to the nurse’s station. So it probably looks crazy, just huge long 
IV lines running across the floor but it keeps the nurse from having 
to go in.
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The combination of PPE shortages and uncertainties around the 
transmission of COVID-19 created a scenario ripe for innovation. The 
constant need for innovation and the uncertainty of these measures 
created both a sense of solidarity among HCWs and an ever-present 
reminder that the infection could be anywhere, which was also a source 
of stress (Block 2020).
Improvisation as a lifesaving technique
At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular in places hit hard 
early on, case fatality rates were high and severely ill patients had poor 
outcomes (Fan et al. 2020; Horby et al. 2020). In the absence of evidence-
based approaches, HCWs improvised based on anecdotal experience, 
communication with personal networks and social media message boards 
aimed at medical professionals (Chan et al. 2020). While it takes time for 
randomised controlled studies and clinical trials to go from study design 
to publication, healthcare providers sought ways to share information, 
including improvisation strategies. At first, HCWs were troubled by their 
own lack of knowledge about managing COVID-19. For example, 
Jonathan, a senior clinical site manager in the UK interviewed early in the 
pandemic, said:
The thing with COVID that’s, I think, been troubling the most 
people, and definitely for me, is the lack of knowledge, and so you 
can read everything and I’ve been listening to the NHS podcast 
every week, I’ve been reading everything that’s available online. I’ve 
been doing everything I can to keep myself as up to date as possible 
but there’s just not a lot out there. And so that’s been quite scary, as 
a healthcare professional, certainly for me, you arm yourself with as 
much knowledge and practical application as possible. But when 
the knowledge is in deficit all you’ve got is some kinds of application 
and very little knowledge.
Matt, an ER doctor in the US, expressed similar sentiments in June 2020, 
just as the first infection peak was subsiding:
Doctors like to think we’re so damn smart, we have all these tricks 
up our sleeve that we can do to get people better … And we just do 
not have that with this virus. It’s like, we don’t know why some 
people get so sick and others don’t. We don’t know if any of the 
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things we’re doing are working or have no impact or are harming 
people. So I think that’s the most infuriating thing about the virus 
… I just feel totally powerless.
As HCWs gained experience caring for COVID-19 patients, they shared 
anecdotal information about supportive care practices that seemed to be 
working to support the patient through the disease (as opposed to treating 
it). Some key practices, including delaying intubation, which has now 
been studied (Rola et al. 2020), were first communicated through these 
informal networks. Jeff, an American ER doctor, described how this 
information improved his approach to patient care:
It’s definitely been a boom of creativity in terms of how we can do 
this more efficiently and safer, a big sea change, and I think probably 
it will be seen later in clinical studies that the mortality has gone 
down. Initially they were saying, you need to put a breathing tube 
down and intubate the patient once they hit a certain threshold of 
oxygen, which is pretty standard for most of our patients. But we 
found, [COVID patients] kind of paradoxically tolerate a lot lower 
oxygen saturations than most people. So the clinical decision to 
intubate them was really pushed further down the line over the last 
couple of months, and those patients have actually done pretty well. 
So it turned out that, for whatever reason, keeping them off  
the ventilator as long as we can has really hopefully saved a lot of 
lives. Initially I’m not sure what was going on in Italy and China, but 
that wasn’t recognised. So that the fact that that could be recognised 
and changed within about a month was pretty amazing. And that 
was from a lot of the work in New York. So, just that kind of flexibility 
to change practice patterns and change what people have been 
doing for the last 50 years was pretty impressive because medicine 
can be pretty intransigent in terms of, you know, taking 20 years to 
change and things have been changing week by week, especially 
early on.
The medical research on COVID-19 is being published at a feverish 
pace, and HCWs’ experience in caring for and treating COVID-19 patients 
has also increased. As a result, the need to improvise as a lifesaving 
technique is becoming less necessary. However, managing long-term 
complications for COVID-19 patients and the complex needs of patients 




During the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in the US and the UK, 
improvisation – and the conditions that have necessitated it – in many 
ways flattened inequalities between wealthy and poor communities, 
nations and healthcare systems. Healthcare workers were over- 
whelmed with patients, lacked evidence-based treatments and supportive 
care practices, and experienced acute shortages of PPE and medical 
devices needed to treat severe respiratory illnesses. COVID-19 patients in 
wealthy nations, such as Italy and the US, have had astonishingly high 
mortality rates and deaths (Livingston and Bucher 2020; Johns Hopkins 
Coronavirus Resource Center 2020). Yet, as the first acute crisis phase of 
the virus passed, and HCWs learned from each other and from emerging 
studies, patient outcomes improved (Fan et al. 2020). As the war-like 
conditions subsided, it became clear that COVID-19 disease and all the 
reverberating effects, like other major disasters, only served to reveal the 
fault lines of inequality both for HCWs and for patients. While in theory, 
anyone is at risk of contracting and dying of COVID-19, in reality race, 
poverty, occupation and living conditions are risk factors for both 
infection and death (Patel et al. 2020; Bowleg 2020; El-Khatib et al. 2020; 
Pan et al. 2020; Abedi et al. 2020).
Josh, an ER junior doctor in the US, explained the living conditions 
and working conditions that might lead to poor patient outcomes:
It’s a lot easier to social distance when you have a family of four in 
4000 square feet in your suburb and have a bunch of yard space 
between you and your neighbour, than when you are in a row home 
in an urban area with a multi-generational household. And there’s 
also an economic strain where you might have to go out in the 
community to do the work you have to do … And you know there’s 
baseline health status even with chronic disease … It’s honestly a 
structure of racism that persists, that is really apparent and really 
disheartening.
Matt, an ER doctor in the US, described a Latinx woman who was 
intubated for COVID-19. Upon being extubated, she learned that her 
husband and son had died of COVID while she was hospitalised. He 
added, ‘We are not seeing that from wealthy white folks in the suburbs 
going through that problem’.
Inequality also exists for healthcare workers, both in terms of 
workplace conditions and vulnerability to COVID-19. In the UK study, 
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research participants highlighted that HCWs of lower seniority, females 
and ethnic minorities faced greater barriers accessing PPE than their 
colleagues during times of shortages. Female HCWs expressed concerns 
regarding the lack of small-sized masks and reported having to deliver 
care despite failed fit-tests for N95 masks. During the 2015 MERS 
outbreak in Korea, female HCWs experienced similar difficulties, with 
oversized coveralls impairing clinical skills and large masks not adequately 
sealing around their faces, raising concerns about both patient and HCW 
safety (Kang et al. 2018). Despite only making up 21 per cent of the NHS 
workforce, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) HCWs have been 
overrepresented in the proportion of HCW deaths from COVID-19 in the 
UK, accounting for 63 per cent of nurses and 95 per cent of medical staff 
deaths (Cook et al. 2020). Supporting the concerns raised by our 
participants, lack of access to PPE was perceived by BAME HCWs as a 
major contributing factor to the higher death rates (see also Gamlin, 
Gibbon and Calestani, this volume Chapter 6).
Conclusion
In the US and the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated improvisation 
both at the institutional level and at the microlevel of everyday clinical 
practice. In a matter of days and weeks, hospitals rearranged their 
physical spaces and drastically changed their flow of patients to deal 
with the influx of people and the insidious infectiousness of COVID-19. In 
light of the uncertainty they were facing, healthcare workers tinkered and 
adapted to improve patient outcomes, protect themselves and their 
patients, preserve PPE and respond to broader resource shortages in 
providing supportive care for COVID-19 patients. While in the early stages 
of the pandemic, as tropes about being ‘in it together’ and emphasising 
everyone’s susceptibility to COVID-19 abounded, rates of infection and 
clinical outcomes clearly demonstrated the ways that pre-existing and 
intersecting structures of inequality play out in this context as well.
Ethnographies of medical improvisation have typically been located 
in resource-poor contexts where protracted conditions of poverty and 
conflict necessitate creative tinkering and adjustments (Livingston 2012; 
Street 2014; Dewachi 2017; Wendland 2010). Yet, the flexibility and 
adaptability demonstrated here suggests that perhaps improvisation is 
not merely a reflection of the conditions brought about by war or 
intractable poverty. The ingenuity and creativity of healthcare workers in 
both the US and the UK speaks to their ability to adapt to extremely 
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challenging situations and reveals the surprisingly versatile nature of 
healthcare institutions and healthcare workers to effectively mobilise at 
both the institutional level and in everyday care in response to a crisis.
Perhaps healthcare as practised always requires improvisation – 
a constant working around the exigencies and emergencies of the 
present – from the prioritisation that occurs on the fly during ordinary 
triaging, to the constant titration and experimentation that occurs with 
treatments, dosages and prescriptions. As many of our interlocutors 
noted, particularly those who work in emergency medicine, a high level 
of uncertainty and the need to respond to people in crisis is precisely 
the job they signed up for. As Josh, an American ER doctor, explained, 
‘[COVID] probably has just highlighted things that were already there … 
I think people who are drawn to emergency medicine like the idea that 
they feel that they’re able to help people no matter what their complaint 
is with limited to no information.’ Quinn, another ER doctor in the US, 
said, ‘For me [COVID] just kind of reaffirms my identity of, you know, 
when there’s an emergency, you’re there. And you have the skill set to 
be there and help out.’ Healthcare workers always have to think on their 
feet and to quickly act on their best judgement when faced with a person 
in crisis. Yet, healthcare systems in the US and the UK typically mask this 
improvisation through protocols, procedures and evidence-based 
practices in an attempt to homogenise treatment and minimise risk, 
adverse events and litigation. Unlike most emergencies, HCWs had 
not initially internalised the appropriate series of steps they needed to 
take with this novel coronavirus, so acting on their judgement and 
expertise felt like a novel form of improvisation. But the fact that such 
nimble change was possible is noteworthy and undermines the supposed 
rigidity of such institutions and provides important lessons for future 
medical crises.
Notes
1 In the UK, a junior doctor is the equivalent to a resident. 
2 Advanced care providers include nurse practitioners and physicians’ assistants. 
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COVID-19 and the reworking of  
‘stable illnesses’ in welfare state Denmark
sofie rosenlund Lau, Marie kofod svensson, 
Natasja kingod and Ayo Wahlberg
On 11 March 2020, Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen 
addressed the nation through a televised press conference. Flanked by 
Health Minister Magnus Heunicke and infectious disease experts, she 
announced that Denmark would be going into lockdown. Images of 
overflowing hospital wards and overworked healthcare workers in Italy, 
and an expected spike in COVID-19 cases as people returned from skiing 
holidays in the Alps, prompted Frederiksen to be one of the first heads of 
state in Europe to send everyone home from work and school and to close 
national borders. Armed with a cardboard prop, Heunicke animated why 
‘flattening the curve’ was necessary by contrasting the (by now) 
internationally recognisable red peak that inevitably bursts through a 
black dotted line representing national hospital capacity with the 
smoother green hill that remained within capacity (see Figure 17.1). For 
Denmark to remain green, strict stay-at-home measures, physical 
distancing, sneezing and coughing into elbows, and scrupulous hand 
hygiene were essential. Drawing on what was becoming clear from 
outbreaks in China, Italy and Spain, the prime minister emphasised that 
people living with a range of chronic conditions and older people were 
especially ‘at risk’ of hospitalisation and death from COVID-19. These 
groups were advised to self-isolate, while others would be allowed to 
leave their homes for shopping, pharmacy visits and outdoor leisure, 
albeit while adhering to strict physical distancing and hygiene 
requirements.
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In the meantime, behind the scenes, the National Health Board was 
instructed to urgently devise a plan to ensure that Danish hospitals were 
ready for an influx of COVID-19 patients who might require intensive 
oxygen therapy and in some cases respiratory care. While time was of the 
essence, it was imperative to raise the dotted black line on the Health 
Minister’s ‘flatten the curve’ chart as high as possible in order to avoid 
overwhelming the healthcare system. The Prime Minister insisted that 
this was one of the most important objectives of Denmark’s national 
lockdown:
We need to prevent the collapse of our healthcare system. Should 
that happen, it would have consequences for everyone’s lives. … We 
are demonstrating our samfundssind [Danish; ‘social solidarity 
mentality’]. And we stand together in looking after those who are 
most vulnerable. Yes, in fact, we are standing together in caring for 
our society. … Right now we are seeing the value of the strong social 
contract that we Danes have with each other (Statsministeriet 
2020a).1
Two days later, on 13 March 2020, the National Board of Health drew up 
a ‘Memo on reduction of hospital activity in connection with COVID-19’ 
(Board of Health 2020), and sent it to all hospitals in the country. 
Figure 17.1 Health Minister Magnus Heunicke urging Danes to ‘flatten 
the curve’. Photo: Martin Sylvest/Ritzau Scanpix
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Alongside plans for how to increase numbers of beds in intensive care 
units, hospitals were instructed to free up staff to look after an expected 
influx of hospitalised COVID-19 patients: ‘The Board of Health deems 
that this can be achieved by reducing outpatient activities in a number of 
clinical specialities [since] all forms of outpatient check-ups for patients 
with a stable illness can be postponed or redirected’ (Board of Health 
2020, our emphasis). Likewise, diagnostic and treatment ‘guarantees’, 
which had been enshrined in law in 2002 to ensure that serious diseases 
were detected earlier and treatments commenced as quickly as possible, 
were suspended in order to reroute resources (see Manderson and 
Wahlberg 2020). In these ways, Denmark’s healthcare agenda was 
transformed overnight from a decades-long focus on chronic conditions 
to a focus on a singular infectious disease. While this exceptional focus on 
COVID-19 subsided during the summer with fewer confirmed cases, with 
winter approaching, by late 2020, doctors were warning that a ‘second 
wave’ influx of patients was leading to cancelled elective operations and 
fewer outpatient visits (Møller and Goos 2020).
In this chapter, we explore the ways in which COVID-19 unsettled 
not only Denmark’s universal, tax-funded healthcare system, but also the 
lives of those living with chronic medical conditions. Although fears of an 
overwhelmed hospital system never came close to materialising in spring 
2020, and we have yet to see the full effects of Denmark’s ‘second wave’, 
the knock-on consequences of shifting resources and political attention to 
a single infectious disease has already and will continue to impact on the 
lives of those with chronic conditions, not least since, as the prime 
minister commented, Danes will have to ‘learn to live with the virus’ 
(Frederiksen 2020).
Chronic conditions emerged as the premiere focus of Danish 
healthcare policy from the early 2000s. We describe how a series of 
‘carescapes’ (policies, services and programmes determined by nation-
state, local government and employers, aimed at providing care for 
‘deserving citizens’) coalesced and stabilised around some of the most 
prevalent chronic conditions within Denmark’s welfare state, in 
conjunction and at times in tension with various ‘caringscapes’ (forms of 
informal care carried out by family members and loved ones) (Bowlby 
and McKie 2019). Henriette Langstrup (2013, 1010) has argued that it is 
exactly through and around both formalised and informal forms of care 
that ‘chronic care infrastructures’ arise, encompassing the medications, 
knowledge and equipment that allow for the work required to manage 
disease over time and distribute it between various actors and locations. 
Within such infrastructures of chronic care, the emphasis has been on 
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encouraging and teaching patients to ‘live with’ their (multiple) medical 
condition(s) in order to ensure that they remain as independent as 
possible and able to lead ‘normal’ lives. Danish healthcare and interrelated 
eldercare has come to promote self-care and rehabilitation together with 
enabling treatment and support interventions under slogans like ‘help for 
self-help’ and ‘as long as possible in one’s own home’ (Kjellberg et al. 
2011; Christensen 2020). At the same time, however, a string of reports 
from healthcare authorities in the past decade (most recently in 
September 2020) have drawn attention to glaring health inequalities in a 
welfare state that claims to provide universal healthcare for all: People 
with limited education experience more illness, suffer greater 
consequences from their illnesses, and die earlier than people with a 
higher education (Board of Health 2020). Reflecting this, in Denmark’s 
fourth largest city, Aalborg, people living in well-off neighbourhoods in 
the western part of the city live a staggering 13 years longer on average 
than those living just a few kilometres to the east (Board of Health 2020). 
Despite declared goals of universal access to and equal provision of high 
quality care to all citizens, socioeconomic inequalities continue to shape 
both ‘carescapes’ and ‘caringscapes’ in Denmark in ways that render 
chronic care infrastructures more or less accessible and relevant for those 
living with long-term conditions.
Only a few weeks into the national lockdown, general practitioners, 
cardiologists and oncologists began warning that the ‘massive corona-focus 
can cost lives’ (Nielsen 2020), as clinicians experienced a worrying fall in 
numbers of appointments and referrals.2 These numbers might well reflect 
the result of government officials’ appeal to Danes’ samfundssind, which for 
some meant ‘holding off’ on using the healthcare system for routine 
purposes (GP visits, dental care and outpatient check-ups), albeit others 
were wary of infection risks in hospital and clinic settings. Whatever the 
cause, healthcare providers felt a need to use national media outlets to 
appeal to the general public to not refrain from seeing a doctor if 
experiencing symptoms that could indicate any serious condition, not least 
since early detection was essential for the best possible outcomes.
But what of those already living with and managing a known 
chronic condition? In this chapter, we build on our long-term fieldwork 
engagements in Denmark, well before the COVID-19 pandemic, with 
families living with congenital heart defects, persons living with type 1 
diabetes and ‘frail’ seniors. We explore the kinds of disruptions and 
concerns experienced by people living with medical conditions other than 
COVID-19 during Denmark’s national lockdown, calls to self-isolate and 
shifts of healthcare resources away from ‘stable illnesses’. In addition, we 
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explore how these families experienced receiving information and advice 
on being particularly ‘at risk’.
Over the past six years, though engaged in individual ethnographic 
projects, we have collectively explored how novel forms of chronic living 
have been taking shape in welfare state Denmark. Working together with 
the Danish Heart Foundation, Marie Svensson has carried out fieldwork 
among families living with congenital heart defects to gain insights into the 
everyday challenges they face in the years following the birth of a hjertebarn 
(heart-child) (Svensson et al. 2020). Based at the Steno Diabetes Center 
Copenhagen, Natasja Kingod has developed new forms of online–offline 
ethnography to explore how people living with type 1 diabetes use peer-to-
peer online platforms – especially the Facebook groups function – to 
exchange experiences and tips with people who share the same diagnosis 
(Kingod 2018; Kingod and Cleal 2019; Kingod and Grabowski 2020). 
Sofie Rosenlund Lau has worked with home carers to examine how 
multimorbidity and resultant polypharmacy are managed in home settings 
through regular visits by healthcare professionals (Lau 2020). In addition, 
Ayo Wahlberg has been leading a five-year collaborative ethnographic 
study of chronic conditions, designed to characterise chronic living in the 
twenty-first century (Wahlberg 2018).3 While the pandemic continues to 
progress at time of writing (December 2020) with hospitals experiencing a 
second influx of COVID-19 patients and numerous restrictions currently 
being reimplemented in Denmark, our empirical insights were gathered in 
spring 2020 as COVID-19 disrupted the everyday lives of Danes for the 
first time.
The birth of ‘kronikere’ in Danish healthcare
In the 1980s and 1990s, Danish healthcare authorities were preoccupied 
with what was considered a somewhat embarrassing vital statistic: on 
average, Danes were living significantly shorter lives than citizens in 
neighbouring countries like Sweden or Norway (Juel and Kamper-
Jørgensen 1989). In response to this anomaly, in 1992 then Health Minister 
Ester Larsen established a Life Expectancy Commission to investigate why 
‘Danish life expectancy is not advancing as gainfully as in other countries’ 
(Ministry of Health 1994, 1). Two years later, their conclusion was clear: 
lifestyle – especially smoking – was to blame. Consequently, a series of 
public health initiatives were developed under a collective banner of KRAM 
(an acronym for the Danish words for diet, smoking, alcohol and exercise, 
which also means ‘hug’, an important part of pre-COVID-19 Danish sociality 
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when meeting friends and family). Sine Knudsen and Peter Triantafillou 
have argued that these developments amounted to a ‘lifestylisation of the 
social’ in Denmark, leading to the consolidation of an extensive ‘lifestyle 
dispositive’ (2020, 3). Within such a dispositive, ‘although health and 
illness are the products of the sum of social and environmental influences, 
it is our lifestyle – made up by our consumption of tobacco, alcohol, 
accidents, physical exercise and diet – that constitutes the primary cause of 
… disease’ (Frandsen and Triantafillou 2011, 212). To address this, a series 
of initiatives targeting individual health behaviours (KRAM campaigns) 
were launched (Vallgårda 2011). By the turn of the millennium, healthcare 
officials had proclaimed success as life expectancy was again catching up 
with neighbouring countries, albeit unequally so, not least because 
Denmark’s record in diagnosing and effectively treating cancers continued 
to lag behind neighbouring welfare states (see Bergeron-Boucher et al. 
2019). At the same time, as elsewhere in the world, increasing life 
expectancy had ushered in a new challenge – how to improve the lives of 
those who were now living with lifelong chronic conditions:
In recent years, average life expectancy has increased significantly 
more in Denmark than in those countries we normally compare 
ourselves to. … But health is not only about length of life. At least as 
important is quality of life. … We [must] focus much more than 
hitherto on both length and quality of life, not least quality of life in 
the years after working life when major diseases are more prevalent 
(Government of Denmark 2002, 6).
And so, alongside the ‘lifestylisation of the social’ in Denmark, we have over 
the past two decades witnessed what Ayo Wahlberg and Nikolas Rose have 
described as a governmentalisation of living ‘in the course of which the 
social and personal consequences of living with disease come to be an 
object of political concern, and made knowable, calculable and thereby 
amenable to various strategies of intervention’ (2015, 60). As a direct 
consequence of these more recent developments in Denmark’s universal, 
tax-financed healthcare system, the figure of the ‘kronikere’ (a Danish 
neologism used to designate those living with a chronic condition) has 
emerged as an object of concern (Wind and Vedsted 2008, 7–8) around 
whom chronic care infrastructures have coalesced. In Henriette Langstrup’s 
work on chronic care, such infrastructures are defined as ‘made up of 
various inconspicuous elements (medication, standards, control visits, 
doses, daily routines, sheets of article for registration and more) that tend 
to sink into the daily practices of patients and professionals’ (2013, 1010).
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These chronic care infrastructures allow for what the Board of 
Health, in its COVID-19 instructions to hospitals, described as ‘patients 
with a stable illness’. Yet, as we consider below, describing people in this 
way unwarrantably overlooks the many forms of ‘illness work’ (Corbin 
and Strauss 1985, 1988) or ‘chronic homework’ (Mattingly et al. 2011) 
involved in keeping an illness stable, the costly resources that make 
chronic care infrastructures possible (not to mention extending these to 
people across the community), and the grave inequalities that can render 
such illness work more or less impossible ‘independently’. In what follows, 
we show how, by identifying those living with chronic medical conditions 
as particularly at risk and by asking them to self-isolate, Denmark’s efforts 
to control the COVID-19 pandemic amplified and highlighted the often 
laborious work involved in keeping illnesses ‘stable’, the challenging ways 
risk is negotiated by those already ill, and the often unrecognised efforts 
of individuals, families and ‘auxiliary’ care workers to (self-)manage 
chronic conditions. We now turn to three ethnographic descriptions of 
how families experienced their new-found and unsolicited status as 
‘particularly at risk’ of COVID-19 and its complications.
In and out of risk – living with a complex congenital 
heart defect in a pandemic
‘I think the guidelines on what hjertebørn [heart-children] should do have 
been confusing and conflicting … one day almost isolate and the next day 
not at all’, Anita wrote in an email at the beginning of May 2020, when 
asked how her heart-child, 10-year-old Mikael, and the rest of the family, 
were coping during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Denmark, around 16,000 
children and youth under 18 years live with a congenital heart defect 
(CHD) (Hjerteforeningen n.d.); worldwide, this is the most common major 
birth defect (Linde et al. 2011, 2241). CHDs encompass a broad spectrum 
of defects from ‘simple’ (without symptoms or need for treatment) to 
‘complex’ and life-threatening (requiring surgery soon after birth coupled 
with lifelong follow up) (National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute 2017). 
In Denmark today, as in other countries with well-resourced healthcare 
systems, even some of the most complex CHDs have been transformed into 
chronic conditions (Jacobsen et al. 2010, 40; Lüscher 2017, 2021).
However, as children with CHDs live longer, it is becoming increa- 
singly clear that many live with risks of complications, deteriorations, 
further surgical interventions and reduced long-term survival compared to 
the background population (Larsen et al. 2017; Lüscher 2017, 2021).
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For Anita and Mikael’s father, Ole, risks related to Mikael’s CHDs 
have been all too clear since his birth. Anita and Ole thought they had 
welcomed a healthy baby boy to the world, only to learn that Mikael had 
a complex CHD, needed surgery urgently and might not survive. Mikael 
has so far undergone three heart surgeries that have completely rebuilt 
his heart, but this is a temporary solution, and he may require a heart 
transplant in the future. The risks and high stakes of Mikael’s CHD have 
taken a detrimental toll on Ole, who has struggled with his mental health 
since the diagnosis, leaving it very much up to Anita to care for Mikael 
and his younger sister, Maja, as well as provide an income for the family.
Like most families living with CHDs in Denmark, Mikael’s family try 
to de-emphasise the risks of CHDs in their everyday lives. This is encouraged 
by healthcare providers who urge families to focus on the positives of the 
present rather than on their children as sick, limited and with a future full 
of risks. For Mikael’s family, living with his health risks is a routine aspect 
of everyday life. He is vaccinated against influenza and pneumonia and is 
kept at home if there is much illness in his school, and Mikael, according to 
his mother, pointed out to a classmate visiting for a playdate, ‘in this house, 
we sanitise our hands!’ The outbreak of COVID-19 accentuated such risks 
and moved them to the forefront of everyday life. It was, in fact, the hand 
sanitiser that made Anita aware that ‘there are actually people who are 
starting to panic’, as the pharmacy was unable to fulfil her routine order of 
hand sanitiser at the end of February. Fourteen days later, the Danish 
government announced a national lockdown, which was, as we noted 
above, to a large extent directed at so-called ‘vulnerable groups’ such as 
people with chronic conditions and the elderly.
In the following weeks, it became apparent to Anita that she needed 
to find out whether Mikael was ‘particularly vulnerable’, and especially 
whether he could return to school once the lockdown ended. This proved 
difficult, as it was for many parents. Calls to The Danish Heart Foundation’s 
‘heart-line’ doubled during March–May 2020, and many sought peer 
advice on the Facebook page of the Foundation’s children’s club in 
the same period (around 50 posts with over 1,200 comments). In these 
early weeks of the pandemic, families came to rely on and expand their 
caringscapes, as priorities within the national healthcare system shifted 
towards COVID-19. At first, Mikael’s GP deemed him ‘at particular risk’, 
much like Anita had interpreted the general guidelines. However, things 
changed rapidly, and Anita ‘panicked when one day it was said [in the 
guidelines] by both the pediatric cardiologists and the Board of Health 
that he was at ‘particular risk’, and then the next day he wasn’t!’ More 
phone calls ensued, first unsuccessfully to Mikael’s current cardiologist, 
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and then to his former cardiologist, who agreed with the GP. However, 
Mikael’s social worker decided that the decision on whether Anita would 
be granted compensation for lost earnings, so that she could home-school 
Mikael, had to be made by a medical consultant who did not know Mikael. 
As the family had previously experienced collaboration with municipal 
social workers as rather cumbersome, like many other Danish parents to 
disabled or chronically ill children (For Lige Vilkår 2019, 2), Anita was 
quite surprised when she was granted financial compensation.
Each month a new assessment arrives, and Mikael could suddenly 
fall out of risk in the eyes of the Danish welfare system. As sole provider, 
this would force Anita to assess whether Mikael’s risk of infection 
from COVID-19 would outweigh the financial risks were she to take 
unpaid leave from her job as a nursery teacher, which Anita felt made her 
‘particularly exposed’ to infection. Coupled with stories of doctors’ 
experiences of complications from COVID-19 flooding the media, such as 
blood clots, she and Ole were left extremely confused and worried.
Yet, keeping Mikael at home was not without risks either. Anita had 
already been forced to defend to colleagues why Ole’s mental health 
problems meant that he could not home-school Mikael. Anita and Ole 
also had to leave conversations about the pandemic until moments where 
‘small ears are not listening’, as Anita phrased it, because ‘it is just difficult 
for him, when it is something that makes him feel sick’. Mikael’s check-
ups, for example, would cause such unwanted attention to his heart 
defect every six months. Now, the reminders were daily. One and a half 
weeks into isolation, Mikael got sick – out of fear Anita thinks. While he 
vomited, he told her that he was scared. Unfortunately, Mikael’s therapy 
sessions, originally initiated to help him deal with psychological and 
social problems at school, were also paused. Furthermore, the risks he 
had so far evaded concerning his ‘underlying’ CHD now surfaced. When 
he started therapy again after the lockdown, he told his mother bluntly 
on the way home that ‘you are super lucky that I have survived all of this 
[e.g. three heart surgeries], because there are not many who do!’ Home-
schooling, however, relieved Mikael of long school days that often left 
him physically exhausted. He was also comfortable with less socialising, 
as his social interactions with peers after school were already limited due 
to exhaustion but also because he struggled with forging friendships. Yet, 
Anita realised while home-schooling Mikael, ‘he is fine with just sitting on 
his own. It’s not because there is anything wrong with that, but you can 
get a little weird by just being on your own’. So, although she feared the 
consequences were he to contract COVID-19, Anita realised that keeping 
Mikael at home was a ‘balancing act’. It involved ‘[keeping] several balls 
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in the air in terms of when you are doing the wrong or the right thing, and 
it is the kind of thing you can only know in the future’.
For Mikael’s family, this balancing act had to be done in the midst of 
a dramatic shaking up of the carescapes and chronic care infrastructures 
on which they normally leaned. Mikael’s current cardiologist was 
impossible to reach; previously routine precautions to avoid infections 
now caused panic (hand sanitiser) or proved impossible (staying home 
from school sporadically when there were bouts of influenza); the 
struggle for compensation for lost earnings was an everyday (uncertain) 
reality rather than a short-term solution during hospitalisations for 
surgery; therapy was paused when Mikael perhaps needed it more than 
ever; and guidelines on CHDs were constantly changing. Their situation 
exemplifies how depending on what struggles already surround the 
chronic condition, COVID-19 affects families differently. For this family, 
exacerbated social isolation, financial problems and mental health issues 
posed a particular risk that added to those related to Mikael’s physical 
health.
Many children with CHDs were, unlike Mikael, placed outside of 
risk groups, or were categorised as ‘at risk’ but still advised to attend 
kindergarten and school. However, for those ‘at risk’ isolated at home, the 
Danish government’s attempts to shield people with chronic conditions 
created a heavy extra burden of risk. Ina, mother of Julie, aged 15 and 
with a moderate CHD, reflected on the consequences of the COVID-19 
pandemic, writing:
I don’t think that the fear will ever recede. … Now it is not just the 
congenital condition that is a risk, now there are also external risks 
that I cannot regulate or control. No matter how much I look after 
my child and keep distance, it can come to us and ruin an entire 
family. We cannot shut ourselves in for the rest of our lives, but how 
do we move on?
Navigating noise in online type 1 diabetes  
communities during COVID-19
As with congenital heart defects, uncertainty surrounding COVID-19 has 
been evident within several Danish Facebook communities for people 
living with type 1 diabetes. News about the unfolding pandemic made it 
to Danish television in early 2020 and gave rise to new communities on 
Facebook, where people shared their fears and concerns in the wake of 
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the global lockdown. To meet rising demand for information from 
the public, doctors created their own Facebook community to take the 
pressure off clinics and to provide reliable and evidence-based answers to 
the many questions on COVID-19 from the public. Offshoots within the 
larger patient-driven Danish online diabetes communities emerged 
around COVID-19 where interpretations of the government’s guidelines 
were shared and debated: are we at higher risk of contracting COVID-19? 
Do we experience more severe complications if infected by COVID-19? 
The flood of information from both news media and from peers within 
Facebook communities made it difficult for lay people to distinguish 
between health misunderstandings and facts.
With the rise of social media in the 2000s, and the opportunity to 
create interest groups on Facebook in 2010, the classical ‘field site’ has 
become ever more fragmented and its boundaries fluid (Hine 2015). At 
the same time, although they are a convenient 24/7 space to share 
important information, tips and knowledge on how to live with a chronic 
condition, online peer-to-peer communities have not replaced traditional 
‘in real life’ conversations (Kingod et al. 2017; Borkman 1976). In times 
of uncertainty and despair when living with a chronic condition that 
involves complex self-care management regimes, mobile technologies are 
a valuable part of everyday chronic care infrastructures that enable 
patients to seek out peer knowledge through a single tap on their 
smartphone. Hence online caringscapes have come to supplement the 
support of loved ones through their offers of reciprocal informal care 
(Kingod 2020).
In Denmark, people living with diabetes co-create and tinker 
with different types of knowledge both from peers within communities 
on social media channels and from more conventional authoritative 
guidelines (Kingod 2018). Tinkering occurs to fit self-care technologies to 
bodies and medical guidelines to daily living with type 1 diabetes. With 
the complex chronic homework that goes into keeping type 1 diabetes 
‘stable’, patients seek inspiration from peers online on how to interpret 
and adjust medical guidelines with the purpose of living a better life with 
the disease (see also Mattingly et al. 2011). This type of patient-to-patient 
knowledge is based on everyday embodied experiences that reach into all 
corners of daily life.
Lisa, mother to an 8-year-old daughter with type 1 diabetes, was 
confused by the initial authoritative statements in relation to COVID-19 
risk for those living with type 1 diabetes. As she explained in a text-based 
conversation in a restricted Facebook community for mothers of children 
with type 1 diabetes:
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I don’t know if I should let her [daughter] go out at all. I talked to the 
Danish Diabetes Association and they told me that I should keep her 
at home and not send her to school. They even wrote that as a relative 
to a person with diabetes you can work from home to reduce the risk 
of catching the virus. But then I can see within other Facebook 
communities that there are great misunderstandings and differing 
understandings about these guidelines. First, the Ministry of Health 
said that people with diabetes were at high risk, then they changed it 
to people with poorly regulated blood sugar and then they were 
suddenly not at risk at all. Now the Diabetes Association has suggested 
my girl is at risk again. What should I believe in and do?!
Lisa is referring to contradictory information from Danish health authorities 
and other government spokespeople that flooded news channels and were 
recirculated on Facebook in the early weeks and months of the pandemic. 
Initial information placed people with diabetes in a category of ‘high risk’ 
in relation to catching COVID-19. While all citizens are at risk of contracting 
COVID-19, people with diabetes were given a double ‘at risk’ status, not 
only in relation to catching the virus but also to developing severe 
complications. For many people self-managing type 1 diabetes, being at 
health risk while immunologically and clinically vulnerable does not 
necessarily create feelings of being sick (see also Jauho 2019). Still, 
although the risks were unclear, many people with diabetes self-isolated at 
home during the first months as the pandemic spread. Lisa’s daughter has 
lived with type 1 diabetes for several years, and Lisa sees her as perfectly 
normal and capable of doing the same everyday life things as her friends. 
This is confirmed at quarterly check-ups at the clinic where her daughter 
receives her long-term blood sugar measurement, a haemoglobin A1c test 
that indicates her average blood sugar level over the past two to three 
months. Lisa uses this number as an indication of how well her daughter is 
managing her type 1 diabetes; for several years, this number has been 
within the ‘normal’ range.  
Lisa is an active member of several Facebook communities. These 
have become an important part of her family’s caringscapes and have 
enabled her to emotionally cope with the heavy burden of receiving her 
daughter’s diagnosis years ago. She remembers that she was terrified and 
devastated, harbouring ‘forbidden feelings’ about her daughter as ‘broken 
and fragile’. By lurking in a larger community on Facebook and belonging 
to a smaller private group, she experienced support from like-minded 
mothers with children at the same age. For years, Lisa was a member of a 
closed community targeting the specific insulin pump brand her daughter 
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uses. She is also a member of a community that encourages and advises 
people on how to ‘hack’ their insulin pumps with complicated algorithms 
in order to fit the technologies to bodies and daily lives (Gavrila et al. 
2019).
With the first cases of coronavirus, the government quickly closed 
institutions and schools; only grocery stores and pharmacies remained 
open. Lisa found a good rhythm in home-schooling her daughter, and she 
felt safe with the recommendation to distance her family from other 
people. When the government announced that primary schools would be 
the first institutions to re-open, Lisa felt unsure what to do. Confused 
about the different categories of risk in relation to diabetes, she joined a 
newly established Facebook community, ‘My child should not be a guinea 
pig for COVID-19’,4 which quickly gained more than 38,000 members. 
She checked the online activities of this community several times a day to 
receive support and guidance in her own decision-making processes 
about whether or not to send her child to school. Navigating an online sea 
of information was not easy, as posts turned into long threads with 
contradictory answers on governmental restrictions and guidelines. 
Online noise is a side effect of the bombardment of information on news 
and social media channels (whether contradictory or not) that people 
living with type 1 diabetes in Denmark must process, interpret and attune 
their lives to (Kingod and Cleal 2019). With the strength of aligned voices 
of parental fear, Lisa concluded that her daughter should stay home for 
another 14 days, so she could see whether the situation in Denmark had 
stabilised, with infections and hospitalisation rates declining. Lisa would 
lurk within the large community, and then discuss answers from this 
community with members in the closed group. Members of this smaller 
group have known each other for several years and they meet offline, and 
Lisa feels safest in expressing her concerns among peers that she knows 
and trusts. Lisa and peer mothers remain unconvinced about the safety of 
the situation. They keep themselves and each other updated online, share 
news feeds within the group, and discuss school and governmental 
guidelines. The category and presence of double risk will stay with them 
for a long time. Further, they have become increasingly exposed to the 
noise of massive amounts of health information. With changes in 
caringscapes and carescapes, in terms of the growing availability of peer-
to-peer exchanges on social media between quarterly check-ups at the 
clinic and the shifting of resources towards COVID-19, many forms of 
type 1 diabetes care, formal and informal, moved online. Lisa and her 
peers were placed in yet another ‘at risk’ category – the uncertainty of 
how to evaluate health information they found online – and so she 
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devised a strategy of discussing it with other mothers in a smaller 
Facebook group.
Cancelled appointments – disrupted social care among 
‘frail’ seniors
‘Up we go’, announced Wicky, the home care worker, as she raised Viggo’s 
elevation bed to her hip level. It was 8:15 a.m. on a cold Monday morning 
in February 2020 as news of a ‘mystery virus’ that had devastated Wuhan 
and since spread to Italy and Spain was making headlines in Denmark. 
Wicky was there to wake Viggo and help him get washed and dressed. 
Viggo contributed as best he could by taking off his shirt and following 
Wicky’s guidance. They chatted a bit during the work. ‘So, did your family 
visit this Friday?’ Wicky asked. ‘Yeah, my son was here. He brought 
fastelavnsboller [cream buns]’, Viggo recalled with a wide smile. ‘Haha, 
you should have seen the blood sugar’, he continued. Wicky laughed. She 
helped him get dressed and moved his 100 kg body to the wheelchair.5 
Viggo was diagnosed with diabetes in 1991. Years of uncontrolled blood 
sugar had damaged the nerves in his feet, and eventually a wound on his 
heel resulted in untreatable gangrene. Four years ago, he lost the leg. He 
stayed for a short time at a rehabilitation centre, and had difficulty 
adapting after he returned home. His house was not fit for a wheelchair, 
and, despite daily home care visits, he was alone and had no one to help 
him on a regular basis. One morning, struggling to reach something on a 
shelf, he fell and broke his remaining leg. Afterwards, he was granted the 
penthouse senior apartment in a new multi-storey building and received 
more intensive home care.
Viggo had grown up, with four siblings, in a small apartment in a 
rough neighbourhood of southern Copenhagen. After primary school, he 
joined the Danish Railway Network and worked for 40 years as a train 
conductor. When he was diagnosed with diabetes, he was, in train 
terminology, ‘dropped off’, and took early retirement. Besides the diabetes, 
Viggo suffered from chronic pain and depression, and took medicines for 
raised blood pressure, raised cholesterol, oedema and vitamin deficiency. 
In total, to manage his various conditions, he took 17 pills per day.
During the last two decades, therefore, as with nine other inter- 
lucotors in a project on ‘frail’ elderly and medicines, Viggo intimately 
experienced health inequalities as someone from a particular socio-
economic background living with a multitude of illnesses (Lau 2020). As 
a result of their ‘lifestyles’ through many decades, these elderly are aging 
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‘unhealthily’; when the COVID-19 pandemic struck, they were already at 
risk of functional decline and early death. These seniors are all dependent 
on help from a variety of social and healthcare institutions, including 
home care – a comprehensive, yet strictly standardised, carescape made 
possible by the Danish welfare state (Tufte and Dahl 2016) – and, due to 
high levels of multimorbidity, their daily living is primarily centred 
around and shaped by chronic homework (Mattingly et al. 2011). For 
Viggo, as for most seniors receiving daily home care services, every day 
looked more or less the same. A helper from the home care team woke 
him up in the morning. Twice a week, Monday and Thursday, he was 
provided an assisted shower. Afterwards, he ate his breakfast and drank 
his coffee while listening to the radio. At 10:00 a.m., the nurse called him, 
or dropped by to monitor his blood sugar and give him insulin injections. 
Afterwards, Viggo went on an outdoor trip; most days this included some 
kind of visit to a health clinic. Twice a week, he rolled himself down to the 
nursing clinic, where the pressure bandages on his leg were replaced. 
He went for regular checks at a diabetes clinic, an eye clinic and a foot 
therapist. Some trips included assisted transport, which required a lot 
of waiting time and often took the entire day. On other days, he brought 
himself across the parking lot to visit his general practitioner, the 
physiotherapy clinic or the pharmacy. In the afternoon, he often stopped 
at the grocery store at the ground level of his apartment building to buy 
bread, cold cuts and condiments for his breakfast and lunch. Dinner was 
provided by a private distributor commissioned by the welfare state, 
responsible for delivering microwaveable meals twice weekly. He ate 
most meals alone at home, but occasionally his daughter and her partner 
would drop in and prepare dinner, or his sister would take him out to eat 
at a local cafe. In the evening, Viggo called his children or sister and 
watched a movie while waiting, first for the nurse and his nightly insulin 
shot, then for the home care worker to help him back to bed.
In summing up these daily routines of chronic living that shaped 
his everyday life, Viggo’s caringscape seemed mainly connected to the 
chronic care infrastructures related to addressing his medical conditions 
and preventing decline. But it would be a great mistake not to include the 
social interactions embedded in these infrastructures: it was exactly these 
interactions which constituted enough enacted togetherness (Nyman et al. 
2012) to create meaning in Viggo’s daily life, hence to keep a lurking 
social death at bay. Viggo thrived in the company of others and suffered 
in his homely solitude. To counteract feelings of loneliness, the radio or 
the TV was constantly turned on. Viggo used his phone frequently and, 
despite deteriorating sight and fine motor skills, used Facebook and other 
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social media. However, what counted most in ‘keeping up spirits’, as he 
framed it, were the daily trips out of the apartment. He always dressed 
up, even for the short strolls down to the nursing clinic. His hair was 
combed and he wore a fancy flat cap, giving him a slightly modern look. 
Viggo cared about his appearance. For some time, it had bothered him 
that he wore a slipper on his remaining foot, as it was almost impossible 
to find a nice and tidy shoe that would fit his oedematous ankle. He was 
full of joy the day the local shoe store finally brought him a tailored shoe. 
Appearance was important because Viggo used his outdoor trips to get in 
contact with other people. These trips meant so much to him, because, as 
he said, he needed the conversations with others to ‘feel alive’. The trips 
were pivotal to Viggo’s everyday life; they allowed social interactions and 
provided meaningfulness; when returning home in the afternoon, he felt 
he had accomplished something that day; he had seen and talked to other 
people.
For Viggo, the lockdown and self-isolation that came into force on 
11 March 2020 dramatically altered these daily routines and disrupted his 
already confined social life. Viggo was, like other so-called vulnerable 
persons, told to stay at home as much as possible. Previously daily trips out 
of the apartment were reduced to a minimum, and instead substituted with 
more movies and, for Viggo, unhealthy solitude. Visits from family and 
friends were restricted. No more coffee chats or cream buns. His family kept 
away to minimise the risk of bringing the virus into his home, as an act of 
caring. Yet, for Viggo, the cancelled appointments changed the foundation 
not only of his chronic care work but, more essentially, of social care. As 
COVID-19 changed Viggo’s carescape in terms of the availability of clinical 
and social resources in his daily life, it automatically altered his caringscape 
and subsequently Viggo’s ability to care for himself.
Despite these efforts to keep Viggo out of harm’s way, on 23 March 
2020 Viggo died from coronavirus infection and its complications.
Care interrupted
Three weeks into Denmark’s lockdown in late March, just as Viggo’s 
passing had added yet another COVID-19 casualty to the climbing daily 
mortality numbers published in newspapers and online media, Prime 
Minister Frederiksen held another of her regular press briefings, this time 
with a special message for those ‘vulnerable groups’ who had been 
advised to self-isolate: ‘It pains me to say this to our elderly and most 
vulnerable: you will need to adjust your lives against your risk of 
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contracting COVID-19. We are asking the weakest to be the strongest. 
This is a harsh message’ (Statsministeriet 2020b). While Denmark 
emerged out of its ‘first wave’ relatively unscathed when compared to 
Italy, Brazil and the United States, we have seen here through the 
experiences of Mikael, Lisa and Viggo, their families and the healthcare 
professionals on whom they rely, how COVID-19 has generated new 
forms of chronic homework, concern, worries and in Viggo’s case, his 
death. As we have shown, in the past two decades, Denmark’s healthcare 
system has come to be reconfigured around kronikere who lead lives 
with what the National Health Board calls ‘stable illnesses’. Yet, as the 
disruptions brought on by COVID-19 have shown, speaking of ‘stable 
illnesses’ belies the complex efforts that go into maintaining stability, and 
masks the genuine concerns that the pandemic brought as families 
struggled to come to grips with what it meant to be ‘particularly at risk’.
The navigation and interpretation of risk in relation to COVID-19 
has become an extra burden for people with chronic conditions and 
their families. These families were already leading lives with many forms 
of risk related to their medical conditions and their socio-economic 
conditions, and COVID-19 added to already existing anxieties and 
difficulties. While the National Board of Health retracted its call for a 
massive rerouting of resources to address the pandemic, and COVID-19 
units were closed down in a number of hospitals due to a lack of patients 
during the summer months, Denmark’s ‘second wave’ took hold towards 
the end of 2020, again leading doctors and nurses to warn of the knock-on 
consequences and necessary reprioritisations that rising hospitalisation 
rates entail. Likewise, the worries that a circulating novel coronavirus 
have generated for people living with (multiple) chronic conditions have 
not dissipated and will not do so any time soon.
Chronic conditions do not disappear because a pandemic arrives. 
While these ‘other’ conditions are (however provisionally) moved to the 
bottom of the healthcare agenda and prioritisation lists within healthcare 
systems, disrupted treatment and monitoring, calls for self-isolation and 
designating the chronically ill as ‘vulnerable groups’ who are ‘particularly 
at risk’, all serve to move ‘stable’ chronic conditions to the forefront 
of everyday life for patients and their families, much more so than in 
‘non-pandemic’ times. The chronic care infrastructures, carescapes and 
caringscapes that had coalesced around people living with conditions like 
congenital heart defects, type 1 diabetes and multiple chronic conditions 
have been unsettled by a pandemic that has raised questions about how 
healthcare systems should be financed and organised in the coming years 
and decades, not least in the face of looming austerity. In the months and 
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years to come, we will learn how a communicable condition like COVID-
19 has reshaped care- and caringscapes, hence complicated and unsettled 
the chronic care infrastructures and chronic homework routines aimed at 
keeping chronic conditions ‘stable’.
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Notes
1 Throughout this chapter, we have translated quotes from Danish politicians, policy papers and 
interlocutors, which originally appeared or were in Danish.
2 A December 2020 study from the Danish Cancer Association confirmed these fears, showing 
that there were 2,800 fewer cancer diagnoses from March to May 2020; an early indication of 
knock-on consequences when resources are shifted in such a massive way (Munch 2020).
3 Each project was ethically approved by relevant authorities nationally and at the University of 
Copenhagen.
4 Original in Danish: Mit barn skal ikke være forsøgskanin for covid-19.
5 For empirical insights from Viggo’s daily life and passing, see also Lau, Kristensen and Oxlund 
(2020).
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Care within or out of reach
Fantasies of care and connectivity in  
the time of the COVID-19 pandemic
Earvin Charles Cabalquinto and tanja Ahlin
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have become an 
integral part of contemporary society. They are fundamental in forging and 
sustaining everyday interactions, as mobile phones and online channels 
enable a sense of co-presence (Licoppe 2004; Baldassar et al. 2016), 
intimacy (Vincent and Fortunati 2009) and care practices (Ahlin 2018) 
across geographic distances. Individuals can choose from a range of mobile 
devices, online channels and mobile applications, which give shape to 
different polymedia environments (Madianou and Miller 2012). With the 
COVID-19 pandemic, smartphones, social media channels and a wide 
range of mobile applications have served as lifelines. As the ongoing health 
crisis constrains people’s movements and social interactions because of 
distancing requirements, travel bans and lockdowns, ICTs have been key to 
sustaining relationships in already networked societies.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, global technology corporations 
have adopted the language of care to promote digital connectivity. For 
instance, Facebook launched its spectrum of care-themed reactions, and 
thematic ‘we are all in this together’ stickers have been embedded in 
Facebook Messenger. Instagram, also run by Facebook, introduced a 
sticker signalling the call to ‘stay at home’ to encourage people to self-
isolate and practise social distancing. The impulse and imperative to care 
crystallised in the form of a ‘care emoji’, a smiley face hugging a heart, 
launched by Facebook in April 2020. Such digital objects reflect one of the 
many ways through which online platforms highlight virtual connection 
as a form of self and social care.
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In this chapter, we critically examine how selected online platforms 
appropriate the notion of care and its provision as key in promoting 
digital communication during a pandemic. We focus on how Facebook, 
Google, YouTube and Instagram deploy discursive strategies to reiterate 
the importance of digital practices in the delivery and access of care – 
individual, social and corporatised. We chose these platforms, which are 
global, although most popular in Anglo-American and European parts of 
the world, to provide a snapshot of how commonly used online channels 
reconfigure and position their services during a crisis.
Our inquiry is guided by three steps. We first consider how online 
platforms have adopted and framed the rhetoric of care thus far during 
the pandemic. Second, we describe various digitally mediated activities 
that online platforms promote and mobilise as a form of care. Lastly, we 
interrogate how the articulation of ‘staying connected and informed’ in a 
health crisis context facilitates digital surveillance, profit accumulation 
and digital exclusion in a networked society. In the study that informs this 
chapter, we conducted a textual analysis (Flick 2011) of the community 
guidelines of online platforms from April to May 2020 by paying attention 
to how the vocabulary of care was used in online texts and narratives. 
Scholars have previously used this method efficiently to analyse the 
deployment of discursive and emotionally charged contents to promote 
online platform use among dispersed individuals (Peile 2014; Cabalquinto 
and Wood-Bradley 2020). We then contrasted care-related themes 
that arise from our textual analysis of the online platforms’ community 
guidelines to several studies on the benefits and limits of digital con- 
nectivity as expressions of care.
Social media channels are not only created to facilitate sociality and 
connectivity. Rather, business protocols and a system of governance 
established by technology companies shape the operation of online 
platforms. An individual’s online interactions and activities are recorded, 
segregated, stored and even sold to third parties (Helmond 2015; van 
Dijck 2012, 2013). Online platforms use convenience and connectivity to 
conceal the lack of transparency in collecting and manipulating data to 
amplify profit and individual control (van Dijck 2013). Additionally, 
through targeted and effective advertising, online platforms become 
essential tools for profit accumulation and mobility control (Andrejevic 
2003). In this chapter, we engage with these key issues on the operations 
of online platforms, particularly pinpointing how technology companies 
frame and legitimise digital connectivity during the pandemic.
Overall, our focus is on how social media platforms exploit care to 
achieve their business goals. We examine how technology companies 
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utilise various mechanisms to promote digital connectivity as a ‘lifeline’ 
in enabling a secure and safe way of managing one’s wellbeing, and 
sustaining intimate relationships during the COVID-19 pandemic. We 
argue that the strategies of the four examined online platforms, in 
positioning social media use as ‘essential’ in dealing with the pandemic, 
necessitates a critical investigation. Such an inquiry is crucial because the 
practices of technology companies are often embedded in the realms of 
entrepreneurship, data governance and digital inequalities. In the 
following sections, we highlight how Facebook, Google, YouTube and 
Instagram promote a digitally connected, equitable and safe environment 
– accessible to some but a fantasy to others.
Digital care in pandemic times
ICTs have played an important part in supporting care well before the onset 
of the pandemic. This includes the role of ICTs in care in studies of 
transnational families. Baldassar and colleagues (2007, 2014, 2016), for 
example, have shown how the use of mobile phones and online channels in 
caregiving at a distance is informed by family obligations, individual 
(financial, practical and other) capacities and the negotiation of 
commitments. To explicitly emphasise how technologies influence care at 
a distance, ICTs in transnational family care have been further analysed 
through a theoretical approach grounded in science and technology 
studies. Within this approach, care is described as something that is enacted 
through practices in which people, social systems and technologies are 
involved (Mol et al. 2010). Thus, care is enacted within ‘transnational care 
collectives’, which include people and non-human actors: mobile phones, 
webcams and online platforms (Ahlin 2018). The impact of ICTs on family 
care practices has been described as detrimental in some cases (Turkle 
2012; Wajcman 2015) and positive in others, particularly at times of crisis 
(Horst and Miller 2006; Brown 2016). In the context of crisis, dispersed 
individuals enact ‘crisis caregiving’ (Baldassar 2014) by increasing both 
cross-border mobility and digital communication. Such studies have shown 
that digital technologies play an essential part in shaping what care comes 
to mean and how it is practiced when physical distance is introduced 
among people.
In our analysis here, we add a third party to the mix of people and 
ICTs in care, namely the technological companies that provide the 
infrastructure for ICTs to function. We critically interrogate the nuances 
of mediated care by focusing on how technology companies deploy 
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various strategies in promoting their online services as key in the transfer 
of care during a crisis. In the context of a global pandemic, how are care 
practices articulated, represented and deployed by online platforms?
We approach the discursive articulation of mediated care as a 
by-product of the socio-cultural, economic and political structures of online 
social platforms (Light et al. 2016). These platforms operate through 
business protocols and systems of governance that capture, analyse and 
commodify the personal data of individual users (van Dijck 2013). To 
ensure the continued use of online platforms by individuals and 
corporations, companies frame connectedness through digital media as 
inevitable in maintaining personal relationships (Helmond 2015) and 
highlight how sharing one’s personal experiences on social media is a form 
of caring for valued individuals (John 2013). At the same time, the 
architecture of online platforms (which includes easy-to-code likes, shares 
and emoticons), facilitates the processes of collection, value making and 
commodification of personal data (Wahl-Jorgensen 2018). Technological 
companies that own online platforms rationalise their collecting, storing 
and processing of personal data through the rhetoric of convenience (van 
Dijck 2013). Yet scholars such as Andrejevic (2003) have critiqued such use 
of the notions of comfort and connectedness, arguing that enterprises 
deploy such rhetorical mechanisms to subject individual social media users 
to commodification and control.
In reflecting on the politics of care rhetoric appropriated by 
technology companies in their operations during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
we draw on the conceptual frame of ‘fantasy production’ (Tadiar 2004). 
Tadiar (2004) proposes this concept as a fruitful notion for her analysis 
of various texts, discourses and strategies of the Philippine government 
in sustaining and advancing its economy through privatisation, 
international partnerships and global connections. For Tadiar, fantasy 
production denotes the imaginaries of those in power to reinforce the 
regime of profit accumulation, domination and marginalisation. For 
instance, the ideals of modernisation or security are often articulated 
through the mutual partnerships of an elite and oligarchic government 
and multinational corporations and international companies. In this 
arrangement, individuals in privileged positions implement various 
mechanisms to realise visions of advancement, including the privatisation 
and deregulation of social welfare services. As a result, these individuals 
and their institutions accumulate profit while those with limited or no 
resources struggle to achieve a good life (Tadiar 2004). In the Philippines, 
people from lower socioeconomic classes often have no access to a stable 
income due to the privatisation of public services and social welfare 
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systems; consequently, this leads them to migrate abroad in search of 
work opportunities.
Ultimately, the fantasy of production reveals that the imagination of 
conditions or outcomes of those in a privileged position remain an 
aspiration for those with limited resources, living in poor conditions. This 
proposition, we argue, echoes the contemporary visions, operations and 
strategies of business-oriented technology companies in promoting 
digital connectivity as a powerful means for survival and safety, and for 
sustaining a business-as-usual modality.
The economies of a digital lifeline
The data from the four online platforms that we examined show that 
technology companies have been consistent in communicating values of 
connectivity, convenience and support during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The language of ‘being there’ for the consumers serves as a strategy for 
technology companies to position themselves as supportive and ‘caring’. By 
communicating the relevance of services during challenging times, 
corporations develop and even improve their ability to sustain the 
relationship between their services and the target market, leading to the 
accumulation of profit (Hyken 2017). In our close and critical reading of 
the community guidelines of Facebook, Google, YouTube and Instagram, 
we uncovered three key categories through which online platforms 
communicate care: (1) a space for enacting digital wellness, (2) connected 
communities and (3) a credible digital resource hub in a pandemic. 
We found that through the rhetoric of care, the prescribed activities in 
online spaces link to surveillance, profit accumulation and digital 
inequalities. Through these findings we flesh out the fantasy of care in the 
digital realm.
Prescribing digital wellness
The online platforms that we examined each highlighted the importance 
of staying connected to family members and friends while being at home 
during the pandemic, framing care in ways that showed how digital 
corporations articulate ‘caring about’ their users in turbulent times. 
To start with, online platforms developed phrases such as ‘stay close’ 
(Facebook Messenger), ‘keep people safe and informed’ (Facebook), ‘stay 
connected and informed’ (Google), ‘stay home with me’ (YouTube) and 
‘Keeping people informed, safe and supported’ (Instagram). Such phrases 
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highlight the vital role that online platforms are seen to play in supporting 
people to cope, while simultaneously promoting physical distance, safety 
and knowledge. Further, effective taglines often involved prescribing 
digital activities for care. For instance, Facebook promoted the importance 
of chat, voice and videocalls to generate a sense of closeness while 
practising physical distancing: ‘Call friends and family to hear a familiar 
voice. Make a video call to feel close when you’re not together’ (Facebook 
2020a). YouTube (2020) emphasised physical distancing through a wide 
range of ‘timely tips’ in the form of playlists to highlight for various indoor 
activities, such as working out, cooking, crafting and so on. Here are some 
examples (YouTube 2020):
Workout with me – At Home #WithMe: Turn your home into your 
personal gym with these exercises that require just a pair of dumbbells 
or no equipment at all.
Cook with me – At Home #WithMe: Join creators in their kitchens to 
chop, sauté and cook up a feast with these videos made to accompany 
you during your own meal prep.
Plant with me – At Home #WithMe: Exercise your green thumb by 
repotting, watering, and online shopping for new plants.
With such campaigns, the online platforms illuminate a broad range of 
digital activities in which their users could engage from the safety of their 
homes while physically distanced from others.
Further, online platforms incorporated emotionally laden features 
(Wahl-Jorgensen 2018) such as care-themed digital artefacts. For instance, 
Facebook Messenger introduced an augment reality filter, GIFs, stickers, 
emojis and other features (Facebook Messenger 2020). Facebook (2020b) 
also allowed individual users to use the #SafeHands profile sticker. 
Instagram (2020) promoted the stay home sticker for stories and YouTube 
(2020) introduced the hashtag #WithMe, which content producers could 
use to categorise recorded videos. Google urged people to ‘stay home and 
save lives’ through an especially designed Doodle (Google 2020a). These 
digital designs primarily promoted ways of managing one’s wellbeing and 
showing care for others by staying at home. Such practices are grounded 
in the idea of networked connectivity, a notion which suggests that 
individuals enact an imagined and ambient co-presence with distant 
others (Madianou 2016). Ultimately, the creative features of Facebook, 
Google, YouTube and Instagram promoted intimate, personalised and 
ambient connectivity during the pandemic, in the context of prescribed 
physical distancing associated with lockdowns and travel bans.
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Connected communities
Online platforms commonly employed the word ‘community’ in promoting 
digital connectedness, and they specifically referred to education-based 
communities, business communities and local communities. For instance, 
Facebook Messenger (2020) promoted the use of group voice and video 
calls for educators, free messaging tools for business customers, and 
messenger for communities of faith, civic organisations or activity groups. 
The following examples are from the Facebook Messenger (2020) website 
entitled ‘Here are some ways that Messenger can help you stay together 
during the pandemic’:
Educators: Messenger can help you stay connected with your 
community even when you can’t be together in person. Communicate 
updates or check in on each other with group voice and video calls.
Local community: Whether it’s a community of faith, civic 
organisation or activity group, this climate of uncertainty has made 
maintaining personal connections with those in our community 
more important than ever.
Facebook (2020b) also encouraged users to use the hashtag #Healthy 
AtHome and #SafeHands. For the former, individuals were encouraged 
to record and upload a video of their healthy household activities to the 
World Health Organization’s social media channels using the hashtag 
#HealthyAtHome. For the latter, individuals were invited to record 
themselves while washing their hands and to share their video to social 
media channels using the hashtag #SafeHands. YouTube (2020) 
encouraged individual users to engage with a community of ‘creators’ who 
presented different skills, activities and performances, and, if they wanted 
to create a video, to use the hashtag #WithMe (YouTube 2020). Google 
highlighted the ‘Stay Home. Save Lives’ campaign, mapping out the five 
ways to ‘help stop coronavirus’: (1) Stay home as much as you can, (2) Keep 
a safe distance, (3) Wash hands often, (4) Cover your cough and (5) Sick? 
Call ahead (Google 2020b). Google also highlighted the use of training 
resources and Google Hangout to enable remote working, learning and the 
development of skills, career or business (Google 2020b). Lastly, Instagram 
showcased the video chat feature, allowing connectivity among different 
individuals online (Instagram 2020). Further, the ‘Stay Home’ sticker was 
added and users could opt to include this sticker in their Instagram story. 
The sticker promotes the act of staying at home and performing social 
distancing (Instagram 2020).
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Credible digital resource hub
Digital corporations marketed their online tools and services as credible 
sources to deal with and combat the effects of the pandemic. Technology 
companies forged partnerships with health organisations to promote and 
legitimise social media use. Both Facebook and Google, for example, 
established partnerships with the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
national ministries of health across various countries (Facebook 2020a; 
Google 2020b). Thus, these two companies served as launch pads for the 
production and circulation of relevant and verified health information. By 
controlling what kind of information is shared through their platforms, 
technology companies countered the spread of misinformation and 
disinformation in an effort to combat a ‘coronavirus infodemic’ (Ali and 
Kurasawa 2020; Skopeliti and John 2020). For example, both Facebook 
(2020a) and Google (2020b) promoted handwashing tips or observing 
proper hygiene, as evident on Facebook Messenger (2020), Instagram 
(2020) and YouTube (YouTube Help 2020). Through partner- 
ships with the WHO, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and 
national ministries of health, Facebook launched the Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) Information Centre (Facebook 2020b). Health experts 
utilised videos to present accurate information produced by the WHO. 
Further, the Centre alerted people to stay safe and avoid scams online, 
such as unapproved medical treatments or false fundraisers (Facebook 
2020a, Facebook Messenger 2020). Instagram emphasised the 
‘educational resources’ in Instagram search, connecting individuals to 
resources from the WHO and local health ministries (Instagram 2020):
People who search for information related to the coronavirus or 
COVID-19 on Instagram will start to see an educational message 
connecting them to resources from the World Health Organization 
and local health ministries. We are working quickly to make this 
available globally over the coming weeks. … Over the past few 
weeks we’ve added a notice at the top of feed for countries affected 
by COVID-19. The notice includes reliable resources from expert 
health organisations. In addition, we’ve been highlighting resources 
from these organisations when people view related hashtags.
In some cases, online platforms employ strategies to also manage the 
spread of health misinformation. For instance, Instagram (2020) added 
special stickers to promote ‘accurate information’ posted by ‘credible’ 
health organisations. Similarly, Facebook Messenger (2020) highlighted 
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‘verified accounts’ – particularly WHO as the only credible source of 
information on COVID-19 – and issued the following instructions on how 
to recognise misinformation and refrain from spreading it:
Verify facts with trusted official sources, and watch out for 
people running scams such as unapproved medical treatments 
or false fundraisers. If you aren’t sure that something’s true, don’t 
share it. …
Prevent the spread of misinformation. Verify the facts with 
other trusted sources such as the World Health Organization or your 
ministry of health. Look for forward indicators that alert you when 
you are receiving a forwarded message, which helps you know 
when a message that you received was not created by the person 
who sent it. If you’re not sure if something is accurate, please don’t 
forward it.
By assuming the role of gatekeeping, online platforms significantly shaped 
the public discourse on COVID-19. Yet, as the pandemic continues, it remains 
unclear which sources are more accurate than others and who should make 
a final decision on this issue. Experts are in continuous open disagreement 
about measurements such as compulsory face masks, limitations of personal 
contact and restrictions on various types of events (Nicholds 2020). In 
imposing measurements, different national ministries draw on different 
analyses. By contrast, online platforms are transnational, which makes 
the prescription of one single guideline challenging if not impossible. 
Organisations such as WHO may base their recommendations on scientific 
research, but in the past several months, scientific research on COVID-19 has 
been published faster than usual to solve the many puzzles of the virus. Some 
of these studies, published in prestigious academic journals, have already 
been retracted (Boseley and Davey 2020). Moreover, the very notion of an 
infodemic, which refers to an overabundance of (mis)information, is 
predicated on social media platforms that are difficult to tame, as they remain 
a source of all sorts of contradictory information. The effort to provide 
accurate information on online platforms may thus be little more than lip-
service, while technological companies behind them profit from their users 
engaging in debates that arise from contradictions and controversies.
Framing online platforms as credible sources of information was 
paired with philanthropic endeavours. Facebook started the COVID-19 
Solidarity Response Fund to support the WHO’s global efforts to combat 
the pandemic, support frontline workers, assist patients, and support the 
fast development of the vaccine and treatment by matching the first 
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US$10 million donated (Facebook 2020c). Google.org will match up to 
$10.5 million to benefit the COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund of WHO 
(Google 2020c). These practices demonstrate how progress and security 
are envisioned to be achieved through partnerships on a global scale. The 
strategies are operationalised by providing medical protective equipment 
to medical workers and donations to those hit by COVID-19 (Jin 2020). 
Through such actions, technology companies position themselves as 
socially responsible and caring. Yet, building on their increasing userbase, 
these companies simultaneously also reinstate their dominant position in 
a global and digital market. In the context of fantasy production (Tadiar 
2004), positive images of partnerships are highlighted, which may then 
conceal and reinforce existing hierarchies and divides within and between 
societies.
Care and surveillance
In the discursive practices of care on social media, technology corporations 
aim to create an over-arching impression of care. Through the use of 
stickers related to the prevention of COVID-19, and by sharing health 
resources deemed credible by online platforms, users are enacted as 
caring for each other, their families, friends and the wider community. At 
the same time, through providing healthcare advice, regularly updated 
information on government regulations and tips on how to survive and 
thrive during the quarantine, for example through YouTube’s (2020) 
‘At Home #WithMe’ campaign, the online platforms appear as caring 
towards their users.
However, on the online platforms the boundaries between ‘we care 
for you’ and ‘we are tracking you’ are blurred; the practices of care and 
exploitation are interrelated. Online platforms are operated through 
business protocols that collect users’ data, which may then be sold for 
various purposes, including data mining for research and targeted marketing 
based on personal information and captured mediated interactions, and 
targeted promotion to businesses (Kennedy 2016). For example, Facebook 
Messenger (2020) issued the following message targeting business owners:
Messaging helps businesses stay connected to customers when they 
can’t be there in person. Leverage free messaging tools to provide 
customers with important information and consider setting up 
automated responses to frequently asked questions such as shop 
closures, opening hours and more.
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Since Facebook receives nearly all its revenue through advertising, such 
strategies have undoubtedly contributed to increases in profits (Swartz 
2020). Through such ‘care for business’, the users of online platforms are 
simultaneously enacted as consumers and providers of data that translate 
into corporation profits. Thus, while encouraging their users in various 
care activities both online and offline, technology companies generate 
profit by attracting advertisers and investors. Facebook, for instance, had 
a daily average of 1.73 billion users for March 2020, which translated into 
an increase of 11 per cent profit (Facebook 2020d). In the first quarter of 
2020, Facebook (2020d) earned more than US$17 billion based on 
advertising and other sources.
Moreover, the data that users share on online platforms are surveyed 
with the aim of tracking the spread of COVID-19. The platforms share 
such data with governments and researchers. Google and Facebook are 
among the companies with the largest amount of non-public data that can 
be tapped for disease tracking (DeChiaro 2020). During the COVID-19 
pandemic in China, ‘sick posts’ that users published on Weibo, a popular 
local social media platform, were used to identify outbreaks (Holder 
2020), and content that users post on online platforms can be used 
for broader law enforcement and control. In Europe, the data shared by 
users on such platforms has been used to assess whether or not people 
are abiding the quarantine rules. In Italy, more than 500,000 profiles on 
Instagram were scraped to identify people violating quarantine 
(Ng 2020a). This raises privacy concerns, but around the world, privacy 
commissioners have encouraged such practices, lifting data restrictions 
to enable more efficient tracking of people (Ng 2020b). Under pressure to 
reach the end of the pandemic, and despite intense ethical debates of 
digital tracking (Klar and Lanzerath 2020), government agencies are 
increasingly allowing technology and private companies to legitimise the 
harvesting and monetisation of people’s data (Manokha 2020).
Exclusive care
The four online platforms that we examined target a particular audience 
of digitally literate and networked individuals. Who, then, is excluded 
from the use of online platforms during a pandemic? The most obvious 
excluded group are those who lack the finances to access a digital 
technology and a stable internet connection. According to the 
International Telecommunication Union (2019a), 3.6 billion people in 
the world are offline, mostly in low income countries. This digital divide 
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results from the inaccessibility of digital devices and services, poor 
telecommunication infrastructures or nationally regulated access to 
social media, and limited access to data (Hargittai 2002; Brandhorst 
2020; Cabalquinto 2018a, 2020; Ahlin and Li 2019). The divide may also 
be a result of people’s limited technological literacy, including older 
people and others who have only recently accessed digital technology 
(Cabalquinto 2018b; Wilding 2006; Ahlin 2018; Baldassar et al. 2007).
In the platforms that we examined, the omission of elderly people 
was especially obvious in terms of who was addressed through the 
content promoted on the platforms. The audiences were commonly young 
adults and families with school-aged children. For example, in its 
campaign ‘Get Digital’, Facebook (2020e) provided a range of resources 
specifically targeting (1) youth, (2) parents and caregivers, and (3) 
educators:
Get Digital in your online communities! Bring digital citizenship 
and wellbeing into your online world. Our engaging activities are 
expert informed and reinforce and expand on the digital skills you 
are learning at school and at home.
Get Digital at home! You and your child can improve your 
digital citizenship with resources created in conjunction with online 
safety experts. The easy-to-use tips and tools are designed to help 
you start a conversation with your child to build and reinforce their 
digital skills.
Get Digital in the classroom! Bring digital citizenship into your 
classroom with the Get Digital programme. These ready-to-use 
lessons provide educators with tools and resources to help young 
people learn digital citizenship and wellbeing skills.
From such content, Facebook emerges as a platform oriented towards 
young people, especially children and their parents, and those who work 
with children professionally. By contrast, none of the content we analysed 
on Facebook and the other three platforms under study addressed digital 
citizenship and wellbeing for people who do not belong to any of these 
categories. Older people remain invisible users of online platforms, despite 
their increased use of digital technologies worldwide (Todd 2018).
Further, in our analysis the users that the online platforms address 
were presumed to have a home, which indicates specific socioeconomic 
status. The calls for donations and fundraisers promoted, for example 
through Facebook Messenger in the form of ‘Donation stickers’, imagine 
a user who is able to give away money to others. Yet, around the world, 
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homelessness is a widespread phenomenon and homeless people have 
been identified as among the most vulnerable populations for COVID-19 
(Tsai and Wilson 2020). Even for those with homes, the conditions to 
safely remain in shelter are shaped by their access to a range of resources. 
For instance, in the European Union in 2017, more than 20 million 
workers lived in households at risk of poverty (Eurofound 2017). People 
from such households may continue living at or fall below the poverty 
threshold, and such low-waged, often contract workers have been among 
many ‘essential workers’ during the COVID-19 pandemic (O’Connor 
2020). The structural forces, such as living in inadequate and temporary 
housing, also contribute to an individual’s risk (Team and Manderson 
2020).
In many countries across the globe, economic inequalities are 
strongly shaped by race and ethnicity, which is further reflected in health 
disparities (van Dorn et al. 2020; Manderson and Levine 2020). This has 
led to critical anthropological discussions of the ‘Stay Home’ message 
(Yates-Doerr 2020). Besides the issue of socioeconomic class, the 
assumption behind this message is the fantasy of familial and other social 
relations as essentially ‘good’ and unproblematic. Through maintaining 
the particular fantasy of home and family as a safe haven, the online 
platforms in our study gloss over the dramatic increase of domestic 
violence and (sexual) abuse across various types of relationships, 
especially against women and children, during the COVID-19 pandemic 
internationally (Usher et al. 2020; Khaddari 2020). Yet, the online 
platforms we examined offer few campaigns to support those who are 
suffering at home from isolation and violence.
Finally, beyond stickers, the texts published on online websites we 
examined, dedicated especially to the COVID-19 pandemic, promote a 
sense of ‘digital wellness’, particularly through video calling. Facebook 
(2020a), for example, has published suggestions such as ‘Call friends and 
family to hear a familiar voice. Make a video call to feel close when you’re 
not together’. Calling through digital technologies has been described as 
a form of care practice available to people who are physically separated 
from each other (Ahlin 2020; Arnold 2020). However, calls can also 
create tensions among family members and may be emotionally 
disturbing. Here, digital media use becomes both a burden and blessing 
(Horst 2006) in enacting mediated caregiving. For example, Facebook 
use may help to enact co-presence at a distance, but it also makes people 
acutely aware of the physical distance between them. This contradiction 
becomes palpable when physical contact is impossible online or when 
internet connection is interrupted (Cabalquinto 2018a). Nonetheless, 
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promoting digital connectivity, exclusively in positive terms, is thus 
another layer that adds to the fantasy of care through digital media.
Conclusion
Social media platforms have appropriated discourses on safety, connectivity, 
care and social relations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our examination 
of four selected online platforms illustrates how care is articulated through 
digital technologies. First, to enact and experience digital wellness, one 
must access a wide range of online and credible resources, which relate 
to personal activities and lifestyle. Second, the notion of care is framed 
through connectedness in a community, encompassing an education, 
business or locale setting. Lastly, the online platforms we examined 
showcase connectivity as crucial for coping with the pandemic. They 
position themselves as caring for a digitally connected society through their 
partnership with WHO and national health institutions and through 
philanthropic projects. This approach contributes to gaining trust among 
individual users. In a sense, digital corporations embed online platforms as 
a way to express ‘caring about’ by prescribing certain practices, such as 
labelling and posting ‘accurate’ information, and providing digital tools and 
resources that enable those practices. Further, the partnership between 
online platforms and health institutions creates an accessible space for 
educational or business purposes or managing one’s wellbeing.
We have in this chapter presented a snapshot of how selected social 
media channels frame their services during the pandemic. Future 
research should also examine how other online platforms promote digital 
connectivity during and after the pandemic, including perhaps how 
digital platforms contribute to questions of vaccination. Such an approach 
would provide a point of comparison on the diverse strategies of social 
media channels as shaped by economic and political agendas. Further, 
future studies can explore the implications of the partnership between 
government agencies and tech companies on data privacy, capitalism and 
democratic processes in post-pandemic futures.
Online platforms produce and maintain a particular fantasy of care, 
family and social relations. As we have critically reflected, care is complex 
and heterogenous, often differentially performed and experienced 
depending on people, technologies and social structures. As Tadiar 
(2004) notes, fantasies also create opportunities for profit making, 
domination and marginalisation along various lines. As the possibility to 
care is shaped by finances, time, social capital and health, the ideals of 
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safety, security, care and connectedness tend to remain in the imaginaries 
of those who are in power and/or privileged (Tadiar 2004). The textual 
and visual deployment of these ideals on online platforms may deepen 
the gap between people of different socioeconomic status. Those who are 
relatively privileged remain in the safety of their homes and post ‘Stay 
home’ stickers on each other’s virtual walls, and they are able to engage 
with the benefits of connectivity, yet what such practices seem to 
contribute to is increased disconnection from the realities of many people 
around the world. By appealing to emotions – as fear and uncertainty 
become glossed over with fantasies of care – the corporations that own 
online platforms tap into shared data as a way to enhance their profits and 
increase surveillance. The crisis of COVID-19 offers an opportunity to 
reflect on the politics of care embedded in the consumption of online 
platforms and the consequences that are triggered by their use.
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Pandemic times in a  
WhatsApp-ed nation
Gender ideologies in India during COVID-19
haripriya Narasimhan, Mahati Chittem  
and Pooja Purang
In India, going ‘viral’ is a matter of prestige, attention and popularity. Lots 
of things go viral, not just COVID-19. YouTube videos, TikTok shots and 
WhatsApp memes all circulate in the public sphere, virus-like, on and on, 
with no end in sight. As the nation struggles to deal with the coronavirus 
pandemic, a look at other ‘viral’ circulations yields interesting and 
(sometimes worrying) concerns. In this chapter, we focus on one such 
phenomenon very specific to COVID-19 experience in India.
A simple search on Google about mobile phone distribution in 
India illustrates the enormous growth of information technology and 
internet and cell phone communication in the last two decades. In a 
country in which less than 1 per cent of the population was covered by 
landline phones in the late 1980s, the population latched on to cell 
phones (mobile phones) as soon as they reached India’s shores. India 
today is one of those countries that is perpetually on the phone. Some 
15 GB (gigabytes) are consumed per person every month in the country, 
with some 26 per cent of the population said to own smart phones 
(Ericsson Corporation 2020, 13). This is a country with a population of 
1.2 billion. Working from home during COVID-19 lockdown has only 
increased this consumption.
The increase in mobile phone usage in India was well documented 
by Roger Jeffrey and Assa Doron (2013). They had seen the futility of 
making and receiving phone calls in India through landlines from the 
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1960s to the 1990s, and keenly recognised the first decade of the new 
millennium as a revolution in communication. Now one could call another 
person on a phone and not worry about either the cost of the call or 
getting cut off. As they discuss in another piece (Jeffrey and Doron 2011), 
a lot of effort from the state and the corporate world went into making 
India a cell phone nation. In 1987, only 0.3 per cent of the population had 
access to phones. By 2010, this increased to an incredible 60 per cent, 
mostly through cell phones.
In 1991, the Indian government introduced an economic policy to 
open up the economy; the economic growth stimulated by this has been 
well documented (Fernandes 2000). So has the emergence of what 
came to be known as the ‘new middle class’ in India (see Fuller and 
Narasimhan 2014). Some of the features that distinguish this middle class 
from the older ‘Nehruvian socialist’ middle class include a desire for the 
consumption of goods and technologies, if not necessarily ideas that 
challenge inequality and hierarchy, a significant feature of Indian society, 
as Aditya Bharadwaj illustrates in Chapter 7. Mobile phones were a 
commodity that captured the attention not only of the upwardly mobile 
middle classes, but also of a much wider cross section of society.
Projections abound about how smartphone and mobile phone 
subscriptions will grow exponentially in India. One claim is that by 2026, 
this will reach 1.2 billion phones (Ericsson Corporation 2020, 13). With 
a population of over 1.35 billion people at time of writing (December 
2020), this is almost one phone per person. Such calculations can be 
dismissed as the fanciful or ambitious claims of large corporations. 
Nonetheless, the significance of access to mobile phone technology, 
particularly in India, cannot be dismissed. We argue that it is essential to 
understand people’s access to and interactions with digital technologies 
to get a sense of what is happening in contemporary India.
The mobile phone is of course not just a technology. It is an enabler 
and disruptor of socialities (Nakassis 2014; Venkatraman 2017). As 
recent anthropological studies illustrate (Jeffrey and Doron 2011, 2013; 
Venkatraman 2017; Tenhunen 2018; Rangaswamy and Cuttrell 2012), 
mobile phones take on various meanings beyond their materiality. 
Tenhunen (2018) showed how women in rural Bengal used the newly 
arrived mobile phones in the first decade of the millennium to seek 
support from natal families against violence and other forms of inequality 
in their affinal residences. The power that mobile phones afforded to 
women became a point of contention in rural Tamilnadu, where boys and 
young men had far more access to mobile phones than did their sisters 
(Venkatraman 2017), and only marriage and the desire to keep a check 
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on their daughters’ welfare led parents to buy mobile phones for their 
married daughters.
Mobile phones became increasingly common not only in rural areas, 
but also among working class people of urban areas, who used the phones 
to compete successfully in the highly competitive business environment. 
Young men used Facebook as a medium to engage in romantic 
relationships, albeit brief and often unsatisfactory (Rangaswamy and 
Arora 2016); mobile phones provided access to Facebook for people 
who still had little access to laptops and personal computers. This 
contrasts with the US, where young college students have been frustrated 
with Facebook for leading them to constantly monitor their own and 
others’ lives (and selfhood) online (Gershon 2011). Daniel Miller (2012) 
some years ago alerted us to the importance of looking at digital 
technologies as cultural sites. The newly emerged subdiscipline of digital 
anthropology has until now confined its focus mostly to social network 
sites, as evident in the vast multi-site project undertaken by Miller and 
others, ‘Why we post’.
WhatsApp is a major form of communication in India, and this 
motivated us to examine the circulations on that medium more closely. 
The extended lockdown that India experienced resulted in an already 
active public sphere going wild with images, videos and texts, including 
information (often wrong or alarming) about COVID-19, and about its 
impact on our everyday lives. It is here that we intervene to argue for a 
closer look at forms of viral circulations, and to pause and engage with 
cultural notions that emerge anew or are refreshed via mobile phones in 
a country that is constantly online. The ubiquity of mobile phones in India 
means that memes circulate in various languages across vast distances, 
and are talked about in the mainstream press and in people’s homes. 
WhatsApp has come to take such an important place in Indian public 
discourse that the derisive term ‘WhatsApp University’ has emerged to 
discredit spurious and sometimes dangerous information circulating on 
the medium.
Studying memes in anthropology
In order to understand memes from an anthropological perspective, we 
have to look to scholarship from the fields of media, communications and 
journalism (Denisova 2019). Pointing out the inadequacy in Richard 
Dawkins’ 1976 definition of memes, emerging from biological sciences 
and genetics, Denisova (2019) cites more useful interpretations such as 
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those by scholars Esteves and Miekle (2015), who see memes as a form of 
story-telling. Denisova herself defines memes as ‘context-bound viral 
texts that proliferate on mutation and replication’ (2019, 10). As she 
elaborates, memes gather meaning only with ‘audience’ participation. As 
texts or images, the meaning is only half-done. Those who read, ‘forward’ 
and comment when receiving a ‘WhatsApp’ bestow meaning to the meme. 
This is related to the context in which the memes are born and sent 
forward.
Memes related to COVID-19 can be seen as ‘biosocial experience of 
an infectious disease pandemic in the age of internet’ (Marcus and Singer 
2017, 342). They symbolise the churn happening inside the homes of the 
middle class in India pertaining to expected gendered behaviours and 
their (imagined) upending due to the pandemic. In that sense, they are 
‘cultural artifacts’ (2017, 342). To borrow again from Marcus and Singer, 
memes circulating during the pandemic are a ‘noteworthy social response 
to a lethal epidemic in the digital age’ (2017, 342).
In this chapter, we examine memes that emerged in the context of 
the national lockdown announced by the central government of India, 
which lasted from 24 March to 31 May 2020. These memes were 
circulated on WhatsApp and appeared in newspaper articles and online 
in social media. We juxtapose these with first-hand narratives in two 
different timelines during the lockdown. The experiences of women with 
children, both with paid employment and without, against the backdrop 
of the lockdown, provides an opportunity to separate the ‘imagined’ 
realities of lockdown life for men, and the actual ways in which it played 
out for women.
Our methods were as follows. HN observed memes circulating on 
WhatsApp from April 2020 onwards. These memes were shared in groups 
to which she belonged, both of friends and family, and co-residents in the 
gated community in which she lives. HN also looked at some memes in 
online newspaper articles. These data were analysed in juxtaposition 
with interview data, generated by MC as part of a study on mothers’ lives 
during lockdown. We used a longitudinal design with qualitative 
interviews at three time points: at the start, during and after the 
lockdown. Interview questions asked at the first time point focused on 
(i) women’s thoughts and views on COVID-19 and the lockdown, (ii) their 
relationships with household members (e.g., husband, children  
and elderly relatives), (iii) self-care behaviours, including diet, exercise 
and sleep), (iv) experiences and challenges of working from home, and 
(v) their aspirations and concerns for themselves and their families 
during and after the lockdown. Data from the first time point T1 (i.e. 
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second week of lockdown) were analysed by all of us and helped frame a 
semi-structured interview schedule for the second time point during the 
lockdown (T2 – weeks seven and eight of lockdown). These in turn 
informed the interviews which were conducted at the third point (T3 – 
early 2021). Informed consent was collected from every participant for 
each interview. Demographic data (e.g. age, type of marriage [arranged 
or love marriage], occupation of mother and father, number of children) 
were collected during the interviews. Transcribed interviews were 
analysed using thematic analyses.
Lockdown in India: a brief history
Little was known in India of the SARS-CoV-2 virus – the novel coronavirus 
– at the beginning of 2020. Through January and February, news about a 
virus causing numbers of deaths in China appeared here and there, but at 
least to the larger public, the first indication that something might be 
seriously wrong came only in March. Holi, the spring festival which 
occurred in the first week of March, was relatively subdued. On 19 March, 
the prime minister Narendra Modi addressed the nation, informing 
people of the dangers of the virus and asking for co-operation for a whole 
day curfew – a ‘Janata curfew’ (people’s curfew) – on 22 March. On 25 
March, an extended lockdown was announced, to take effect four hours 
later. This lasted through various phases until 31 May. From June 
onwards, the country was expected to ‘unlock’ in stages; regulations that 
guided this were released by the central government and, to an extent, 
state governments.
The short duration between the announcement of the lockdown 
and its implementation meant that many people were caught unawares 
and could not move out of their homes. Many were stranded in places 
they were visiting. Flights, trains and all forms of intra- and interstate 
transport were cancelled, as were private cab and bus services. Offices, 
schools, colleges, restaurants, malls and entertainment centres closed. 
Economic and social activity came to a complete halt, except for essential 
services. This was reflected in photographs of millions of labourers, 
migrants to industrial hubs in western India such as Mumbai and Surat, 
making their way back to their homes, mostly by foot, in the east and the 
north, in states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Heartrending scenes of 
small children walking barefoot with their parents, with little to eat 
except for biscuits and water, since roadside eateries called dhabas were 
closed, were given front page coverage on newspapers and were broadcast 
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widely on television. This huge wave of internal migration, an unexpected 
effect of the lockdown, was documented by photographs, videos, cartoons 
and memes. In this chapter, we do not include memes on migration, but 
it is impossible to discuss the lockdown related to COVID-19 without 
referring to this migrant labour crisis.
Among those who could not go to work because of the lockdown 
were domestic helpers, called ‘maids’ in middle class India. The majority 
of these helpers are women, although it is not unusual to find male 
helpers in some parts of the country. The number of women employed in 
this sector is hard to estimate. The National Sample Survey Organisation 
(NSSO) suggest that four million women work as ‘domestic workers’ 
(Press Information Bureau 2019); unofficial estimates suggest that the 
number is closer to 50 million (Viswanath 2020). Many lost their jobs 
during lockdown because their employers did not feel it necessary to pay 
them. How these women from very poor households survived through 
those nine weeks has yet to be described.
Ray and Qayum’s seminal study on domestic help in the eastern 
Indian city of Kolkata (2009)1 traces the origins of present-day domestic 
labour in the colonial period. The authors refer to this phenomenon as a 
‘culture of servitude’, to denote the institutionalised and normalised form 
it takes in the Indian context. It is assumed to be usual for middle class as 
well as rich households to have ‘servants’ in India; it is also expected that 
domestic work is undertaken by others, with the distribution of tasks 
predicated on inequality and subservience.
Sara Dickey (2013, 2016), in her recent work on domestic workers 
in south India, points to the heavy dependence of middle class women on 
their domestic helpers. Helpers who have worked in households for many 
years are treated at times as part of the family, although at other times 
they are expected to ‘know their place’ and observe distance. In either 
case, both domestic helpers and their employers are acutely aware that 
the former are indispensable for the functioning of the household. This is 
particularly so when women work outside of the home, usually in jobs 
that do not involve manual labour; such women have domestic helpers 
who come to their houses every day, to sweep and mop floors, wash 
dishes, and wash and sometimes hang clothes to dry.
Domestic helpers are different from a ‘cook’, whose job is confined 
only to the kitchen and to cutting vegetables and meat. Some domestic 
helpers stay permanently with a family and are referred to as ‘live-in 
maids’. Most women in our respective cities, in Mumbai and Hyderabad, 
worked in several households in one neighbourhood, where the quantum 
of work might differ from one household to another. At time of writing 
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(December 2020), these ‘essential workers’ still faced problems in 
returning to pre-COVID levels of employment. In the gated community 
where HN lives, many domestic workers had been replaced by electric 
dishwashers, with one dishwasher maker reporting a 400–500 per cent 
increase in sales (Koshi 2020). Until then seen as a luxury good owned 
and used only by the rich, COVID-induced lockdown prompted middle 
class women to turn to electrical appliances for household chores. There 
was also continuing concern about disease spread by domestic workers, 
consistent with the concept of lower class and lower caste bodies as 
polluting (Dickey 2000; Bharadwaj, Chapter 7, this volume; Garimella, 
Murthy, Whittaker and Tolhurst, Chapter 11, this volume).
Lockdown in meme
Although men and women were both at home during the lockdown, men 
were not expected to do household chores. In many parts of India, there 
is a strong taboo against men touching a broom or a mop. However, 
popular memes circulated during this time showed a parallel universe 
where men were engaged in backbreaking household work while women 
were relaxing. The video we discuss below (see Figure 19.1), circulated 
on WhatsApp, is a perfect example.
A man is seen lying in bed and reading a magazine. Suddenly his 
hair flays, as happens in movies and TV serials, indicating the appearance 
Figure 19.1 When ur maid comes back after lockdown. Facebook, https://
www.facebook.com/officialspwrites/videos/2068890199923609/
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of a romantic interest nearby. The ‘maid’ comes running through the 
streets, with her anklet-adorned feet and slippers, her right hand holding 
a bag drawn over her right shoulder. The man tosses a towel, in cotton, 
the kind of usually seen on characters who play ‘servants’ in movies and 
comes running towards the front door. In his hand, he holds a bucket of 
water, a mop stick and a broom. He looks eagerly at the landing and turns 
away disappointed. Suddenly he stops and turns to see the woman 
stopping to catch her breath at the landing. She points her fingers at him 
teasingly. She then asks him … He does an aarti (brief welcome ritual) 
with the bucket, welcoming her home, as one would do to a new bride 
entering her in-laws’ house (sasuraal). He gives her the bucket of water 
and the mop (jaadu-pocha), gestures as if to touch her cheeks, and then 
makes another affectionately dismissive gesture. He has tears of joy in his 
eyes as he watches the woman go inside.
This video suggests a sexual tension inherent between a male 
employer and a female worker. It also sexualises and objectifies the 
woman worker, negating the labour of her work and identity. The same 
Figure 19.2 With wives burdened, men want helpers back. Twitter feed, 
Samar Halankar. Accessed 3 May 2020
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apparent anxiety with which men wanted domestic workers back in their 
homes is captured in the newspaper article in Figure 19.2.
In this article, men point to their wives’ good mood being dependent 
on the availability of a domestic help. Without her, the wife is cranky, and 
she takes it out on her husband. One man complained about having to 
take on specific household chores, such as cutting onions, which most 
men did not do, pre-COVID. The comments from men stem not from their 
realisation of the drudgery, boredom and backbreaking nature of 
household work, which in India involves considerable manual work. 
Their woes have more to do with the fact that with a helper around, their 
wives complain less and allegedly prepare more (and better) food for 
them. Moreover, when a paid helper – a ‘maid’ – is available, men are not 
asked to undertake household chores.
Another characteristic of lockdown was an explosion of images 
of people cooking, trying out new recipes and resurrecting old ones.
This has been remarked upon by many commentators around the 
world; it is not unique to India. The WhatsApp memes targeted women 
specifically, however, either as those who should be cooking enormous 
amounts of food, or as those who have not done so and have therefore 
abandoned their dutiful wifely behaviour. The meme in Figure 19.3 
follows this trajectory of provoking a woman who is clearly not 
interested in cooking.
The meme in Figure 19.3, using a popular line – kab khoon khaulega 
re tera – from the cult film Gangs of Wasseypur (2012), shows the character 
played by actor Richa Chadha, the wife of gangster Sardar. Her son Faisal 
(played by actor Nawazzudin Siddiqui) asks her when her blood will boil, 
that is, when will she get angry and jealous enough to copy other women 
and cook delicious dishes for her family. During lockdown, without maids 
and cooks, middle class women took to cooking enthusiastically. While 
many women (including HN) admitted to searching online and trying out 
new recipes, these memes articulate something else – an arena of 
competition among women to outdo each other at a task routinely tied to 
gendered roles.
In a lengthy article in The Telegraph, published in Kolkata, the 
gendered implications of lockdown were discussed (Sarkar 2020). In 
households where both men and women had paid jobs, the stress was 
depicted in a number of cartoons in the piece. A more relaxed atmosphere 
was said to prevail in those homes where the woman did not have paid 
employment, and therefore had no meetings to attend on Zoom or phone 
calls from work to answer. One meme shows a woman informing the 
prime minister Mr Narendra Modi (referred to using the respectful 
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Figure 19.3 When your mother is not cooking various dishes during 
lockdown. https://humornama.com/memes/when-your-mother-is-not-
cooking-various-dishes-during-lockdown/. Meme artwork: Rishav Sen 
Choudhury 
address of ‘ji’) not to lift lockdown, since she has domestic help from her 
husband and is under no major inconvenience.
Subarna Ghosh, mentioned in another article, was left angry 
during the lockdown, when she found herself working a lot more than 
usual while her husband and children went on with their lives 
nonchalantly (Pandey 2020). She started a petition on change.org, 
calling on the prime minister to speak to men about undertaking 
household chores in his monthly radio address, Mann ki Baat (the voice 
of the heart), which he made to the citizens of India. Pertinent to our 
discussion here, apart from Ms Ghosh’s unhappiness, is the ‘maid’ whose 
absence increased her workload and made her realise how little 
housework was undertaken by others in her home. In her words, 
‘domestic help also helps maintain peace in our homes’. She is upset with 
her husband for not sharing in household chores, not only because she 
believes he should do so, but also because, prior to lockdown, the maid 
fulfilled a crucial role in keeping the household running. If the lockdown 
had not prevented people’s mobility, especially of maids, then chances 
are that Mrs Ghosh would not have started the petition. The article refers 
to a set of memes in Bengali which satirised what lockdown had come to 
mean.2 One is as follows:
Lockdown uthe geley, karo jodi kajer meso dorkar hoy amake bolben
Let me know if anyone needs a maid uncle once lockdown is over.
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In Bengali, a maid is referred to as kajer masi, i.e. working aunt or maid 
aunt. A man who does household chores now calls himself kajer meso, i.e. 
household help uncle or maid uncle. Biplab Basu of Greenwood Park, 
New Town, lists his daily chores:
Bason maja, ghor jhar dewa, ghor mochha, washing machine theke 
kapor mela.
Wash dishes, sweep the floor, wipe it dry, take the washed clothes 
out of the washing machine to dry.
These men present lockdown as a capacity-building exercise in honing 
specific skills, which has come to define who they are – domestic helpers- 
in-the-making.
Another popular meme widely circulated on WhatsApp was shared 
by the noted industrialist Anand Mahindra in April (Jagran Trending Desk 
2020). It shows, Vijaykanth, a Tamil actor, popular in the 1980s and 1990s. 
He is dressed in formal clothing, with a black shirt and trousers and a 
jacket, a laptop on his lap. He is seated in a chair and speaking (Figure 
19.4). The meme is entitled ‘expectations’, as opposed to the ‘reality’ of a 
man cooking. Mahindra, who has millions of ‘followers’ on social media, 
and whose words media keenly watch, deftly remarks that he too dressed 
informally at home during meetings, wearing a formal piece of clothing on 
top and informal lungi not visible in camera. He avoids commenting on the 
subtext, that of men multi-tasking at home, cooking and attending office 
work. It is not just the sartorial difference of the two men that informs this 
meme. The man in lungi is not only pretending to be attending a meeting 
while dressed informally. He’s actually cooking. He’s present in the meeting 
only aurally, with the video clearly switched off.
What’s the reality here, and what’s the expectation? When a major 
influencer like Mahindra shares such a meme for laughs, it brings home 
the fact that lockdown is widely understood as a space for a ‘role-reversal’ 
and a shift in gender dynamics in India. One of the comments to 
Mahindra’s ‘share’ is a simple text: ‘Some couples are now MAID for each 
other’. In cooking for her family, a woman is assumed to be the maid; now 
the man has become a maid as well. The meme is a pun on the well-known 
phrase ‘made for each other’. It is also a telling commentary on the 
absence of the usual ‘maid’ as a result of lockdown.
Another issue often commented on in memes was about weight gain 
during lockdown, resulting from excessive cooking and eating, with very 
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Figure 19.4 Work from home. Shared on Twitter by Anand Mahindra, 
@anandmahindra, 5 April 2020. Accessed 20 December 2020
little physical exercise. In this context, a number of memes also talked 
about the danger of obesity (see also Saldaña-Tejeda, Chapter 14). While 
some target men, a number focused on women’s weight gain. The 
implication is that women put on weight by not doing enough household 
chores. In the absence of a maid or cook, the conjecture is that the 
husband had done all the work. The meme in Figure 19.5 features a 
gender-neutral character talking to its tummy, saying ‘should I tell you 
separately (meaning, once again) that there is a lockdown, and you 
should not come out?’ And in Figure 19.6, a woman goes for a medical 
consultation thinking she is pregnant; it turns out she’s just obese. ‘The 
lockdown is to keep everyone safe and healthy, not to become 
sweetmakers’, says another text meme.
The comments on obesity are ironic given the huge labour crisis that 
occurred post lockdown. Data continues to emerge of jobs lost and 
livelihoods severely affected by the pandemic and the resulting economic 
situation, as many memes reflected (Figure 19.7). Another meme 
captured the spectre of hundreds and thousands of migrant workers 
leaving urban areas on foot, back to their villages. Entitled ‘The Social 
Distance’, it pictorially renders the wide gap in the lives of middle class 
and poor people. While the middle classes, who have come to be called 
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Figure 19.5 Dear Tummy. WhatsApp. Accessed 19 April 2020
Figure 19.6 After three months of quarantine. WhatsApp. Accessed 
19 April 2020
the ‘balcony class’, gathered on their balconies to show their appreciation 
for frontline workers on 22 March 2020 (the day of Janata curfew) in a 
manner reminiscent of Italy and the UK, poor migrants gathered their 
belongings and started the long walk home (Figure 19.8).
Nonetheless, memes were laughs that were ‘forwarded’ and ‘shared’. 
These often caricatured women as shrill and shrewish, relishing the 
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Figure 19.8 The social distance. Artwork: Ananda Vikatan 
Figure 19.7 The lockdown is to keep everyone safe and healthy. 
WhatsApp. Accessed 27 April 2020
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opportunity provided by the lockdown to lord over their husbands. This 
‘joke’ in Hindi, circulated on WhatsApp, is one example:
पेट पर से बार नीच ेसरकते बरमड़ूा को ऊपर चढ़ाते संता ने ख़ुशी जाहिर की !
म़ुझ ेलगता ि ैमैं द़ुबला िो गया िू ँ... दखेो ये बरमड़ूा हकतना लजू िोने लगा ि ै!
हकचन से िाथ में बेलन पकड़े उसकी बीबी प्ीतो बािर आई और बोली !
आइने में अपनी शकल दखेो धयान से ... ! मिीने भर से दारू निीं हमली त़ुमि ेतो त़ुमिारे हदमाग ने भी काम करना बंद 
कर हदया ि ै! स़ुबि से मरेा पेटीकोट पिने घमू रि ेिो ! फौरन उतारो उसे !
Santa the husband says he must have lost weight since his ‘bermuda’ 
[as shorts are called in India] are very loose. His wife, Preeto, 
coming with a belan [stick used to make roti], says to him furiously, 
‘your brain has stopped working because of non-availability of 
alcohol. Since morning you have been wearing my petticoat and 
walking around. Remove it immediately’.
Alcohol shops were shut during the lockdown. The meme here stereotypes 
the man as excessively fond of drinking, without which he cannot think. 
The woman is portrayed as dominating, the man as an idiot who has lost 
his thinking capacity. Santa is a popular Sikh character, usually portrayed 
as a dimwit in jokes.
Lockdown in reality
We now move to empirical vignettes from women during lockdown, to see 
how these images played out in real life. A recent survey by well-known 
economist Ashwini Deshpande (2020) found that there was a marginal 
increase in the time that men spent on domestic work. The memes shared 
through WhatsApp seem to reflect this, either with mild or extreme 
exaggeration. But we turn to the narratives of women, especially those 
who had paid employment and were mothers, and examine their 
experiences of the lockdown. As mentioned above, this study had three 
stages, of which two are completed. The third stage will look at the same 
women in January 2021. We provide some excerpts from interviews, 
before moving to the analysis.
I don’t enjoy doing all this domestic stuff. So, I have been feeling so 
lucky and so grateful that I have somebody helping me out with all 
this. Because trust me, if I had to do the household work, I would be 
in a very shitty mood. Like snapping at everybody, because oh my 
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god! You know. The kind of a mess these kids make, the mess I make 
um … there is really no way I would be so (laughing) happy. So, I am 
very, very grateful and so lucky that I am in this situation. And from 
the beginning of the lockdown, I have been thinking, oh my god! I am 
so lucky that I have got this girl along with me. You know, because I 
was coming here only for four days, and I am like what is the point of 
spending all this money on a flight ticket, why should I bring her? 
Then I thought let me see you know, she will get out of the house, 
what is the big deal? So, I am so grateful to her, that she is here, baba.
Malati is a 38-year-old upper caste, stay-at-home mother of two young 
children (9 and 4 years old). She had a love marriage with a man from 
another caste. A resident of Hyderabad, she had recently moved to 
Mumbai, and had come on a visit to Hyderabad when the lockdown 
happened. She found herself ‘stuck’ in the city. She had brought with her 
a ‘live-in maid’ whose presence she deeply appreciated. About her 
husband, Malati had this to say:
So I do the cooking, and you know Kishore [husband] can’t cook to 
save his life. So, he goes out and buys whatever groceries I need. He 
has actually begun to learn the name of vegetables, and learn the 
name of you know, dals. He had no idea about these things, 
absolutely no idea. So, he has totally impressed me with the 
knowledge of how to pick the right vegetables, how to get stuff and 
all these things … he has become more domesticated … after he is 
done with his meal, he takes up the plate and takes it to the kitchen 
which he would normally not do. He … after his shower he picks up 
his clothes and puts them in tub to be washed and all that. You 
know, it sounds really spoiled, but um … (laughing)
For Malati, with two small children and a full-time paid helper, it still 
mattered a lot that her husband was doing some tasks at home, even if 
some of them were his own, and she appreciated the learning curve he 
had negotiated.
Both working women and those who were at home full time 
commented at length in interviews on the loss of maids and cooks due to 
lockdown. One of their ‘lockdown memories’, as was the case for middle 
class women across India, was the sudden non-availability of maids. The 
revelation that from now on for the foreseeable future, at least before 
constraints due to COVID-19 were lifted, women were expected to sweep, 
mop floors and wash dishes, came to many as a rude jolt. This was 
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particularly so for working women, who simultaneously had to manage 
housework, answer calls and be available to their superiors at work. One 
of the ‘positives’ women took from this was not waiting for the maid to 
turn up. The maids do not have fixed hours of work, although a maid and 
her employer might agree on an approximate time. Being able to work at 
home at one’s own pace without depending on another person was also 
liberating for some women. But some of them also mentioned that maids 
helped them to achieve ‘peace’ in a personal sense, by taking away stress, 
as well as to ensure the smooth running of the household.
Shailaja, one of the respondents, commented that the lockdown did 
not initially have particular impact on her, because she expected it would 
last only for a few weeks, from late March to April, although it was then 
extended until May and then June. Like many others, Shailaja assumed 
that sooner or later, her life, and that of her family, would return to 
normal. But the lockdown was extended again and again, and life seemed 
to be in limbo, with husband and children at home, and this hit women 
hard. Some women working as maids returned to their native villages, 
fearing infection were they to remain in the city. For women like Shailaja, 
it became essential that she find household help. She had two children 
aged 10 and 5. As a stay-at-home mother, she managed to enlist her 
husband and older daughter in household work.
I do the cooking and cleaning, Karthik [husband] does the dishes. I 
think yeah, Karthik does the dishes. Ribhav [son], shower, and 
whatever … he takes care of it. Nandini [daughter] helps me with 
the laundry. Ah … Ribhav I think is too small so I won’t count him. 
But yeah, Karthik and Nandini yeah. So, dishes part and all Karthik 
is taking care of, cooking and cleaning I am doing, laundry me and 
Nandini together we do it. Again Nandini’s room and all is up to her. 
She has to clean it and dust it off.
Working mothers emphasised the importance of ‘structure’ in their lives. 
This was a struggle to locate and put in place, at least in the initial days of 
the lockdown. Malini, aged 36 with two children, found it extremely 
difficult to run a school virtually. As she explained, the first week of the 
lockdown was especially hard:
That week was difficult because, everything, my home has changed. 
My husband is working all the time, even on Sundays many times. 
I suddenly have him all the time in home. So, that was a big, big shift 
in our entire family structure. So, you know, plus with my children 
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being home all the time. And they are not used to – they have like 
physical activities in the evening. So, I think, for me, the difficult 
part was to manage my work. And yet make sure, that ah … my 
presence is equally felt at home. That was one, one challenge that I 
had to overcome. The other challenge was that to help everybody at 
home, realised that while I am at home, I am still doing my work. So 
to respect that time and space, that okay I am on a call or when I am 
working, I am working. I can’t be available to you.
Far from feeling in charge, women mentioned the struggle to find 
‘balance’ between being at home and engaged for their family, and 
attending to all the household requirements, while also, as in this case, 
continuing their paid work. After a few weeks, Malini managed to 
establish some structure to the way her household functioned. But her 
husband was always at work, and her mother-in-law was staying with 
them, and Malini felt the pressure to ensure that the household did not 
collapse. She explained that she took the lead to organise tasks and 
delegate duties, lest, in her words, ‘if I don’t do it, or if I didn’t do it, we 
would be living on Maggi [instant noodles] or something, yaar. We would 
not have food on the table [laughing]. Our clothes won’t be [washed] big 
time I guess’. In addition to her established career in the field of education, 
which kept her very busy, during the lockdown Malini also tried many 
dishes and felt extremely happy with her family’s response to her cooking.
Shabari, in her mid-thirties and a manager in an IT firm, had calls 
to take from 9 p.m. since her clients are based in the US. She has an inter-
caste marriage – what is termed a love marriage in India – which means 
that she and her husband knew each other much better before marriage 
than do couples whose marriages are arranged. She often mentioned her 
husband’s cooperation with her in managing the home. A self-confessed 
‘control freak’, Shabari said the lockdown taught her not to bother if her 
garden wasn’t tidied up for several days. As a secretary in charge of the 
housing society which administered the complex where she lived, she was 
involved in the decision to stop maids and cooks from entering the 
building, and in keeping lockdown protocol, facing wrath from fellow 
residents. Without help, she found it very difficult to keep her huge 
bungalow (a ‘villa’ in Indian real estate terminology) tidy all the time. She 
spent nearly five hours on weekends just cleaning the house. It was 
therefore essential for her to have a ‘cooperative’ husband prepared to 
vacuum and help in other ways.
Cooking took a toll on her even though she insisted she enjoyed it 
and her husband, Madan, also helped in the kitchen. Perhaps the ‘love 
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marriage’ gave her a little more leeway than women in arranged marriages 
had. However, as a working woman, it was difficult to manage both the 
household and the people in it, and demands from work:
I think home, as I said … because there is no house help … and we 
… we have … like a considerable-sized place … and this just means 
that you need to be aware … If you have to plan for lunch, then you 
have to cook in the morning, which also means that you know, plan 
ahead. Like usually what happens is when I cook the lunch itself I 
think … what should I cook for dinner. Toh my plan is ready at that 
point in time. And when I cook the dinner, I know that okay what I 
am gonna do tomorrow. Which is, you see, in the mind is stressful 
right? Because you are always constantly thinking.
Conclusion
The four women whose narratives we summarised above were very clear 
about who was responsible for the running of the household – they were. 
They sought help from spouses in the absence of maids, in one case, even 
with a domestic helper also present. In our sample of 14 women, 6 of 
them also had elderly parents or parents-in-law staying with them. They 
felt a strong sense of duty in ensuring that they were taken care of. In the 
extended interviews, women voiced their worries about their own 
physical and mental health, not having time for themselves, lack of 
exercise for their children, and their children’s school work. Those with 
paid work felt under even more pressure.
The interviews were conducted only with women, but questions were 
asked about their spouses and their participation in household activities. 
Interviews with men might have offered different perspectives on lockdown 
and its impact on households. Almost all women observed that their 
husbands did share in some tasks, whether it had to do with children or 
doing minor chores in the kitchen. Women did not complain much, unlike 
Mrs Ghosh who started a petition demanding the intervention of the prime 
minister. However, they did not acquiesce quietly, batting for the home and 
the kitchen as their exclusive domain. Contrary to popular assumptions 
that women who stayed at home would have an easier transition to life in 
lockdown, they were emphatic that they made sure that their husbands and 
young children stepped up to the situation and did their bit. 
However, the man with the broomstick and a mop, a towel on his 
shoulder wiping his forehead of sweat, as seen in the video that went viral, 
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did not manifest. Women admitted to ‘training’ their husbands to undertake 
various tasks at home. Men featured in memes and newspaper articles, 
attending meetings in informal clothing while cooking, squatting on the 
floor and washing dishes while their wives chatted away on the phone 
(including with the PM), and being woolly headed enough to not realise 
what they were wearing. These images did not emerge in women’s 
narratives. A time-use survey conducted in 2019 across India (for the first 
time) showed that urban men spend 94 minutes per day on ‘unpaid 
domestic service for household members’, while urban women spend 293 
minutes doing the same ‘service’ (Time Use Survey 2019). The question 
then arises as to why the memes showed women lazing around and men 
hard at work in the kitchen. Was this wishful thinking, a ‘could have been 
this’ scenario? If so, whose wishful thinking was it? Does the sheer presence 
of such memes reflect a ‘nightmare’ scenario dreamed up largely by men?
Where the identity of the creators of such memes is unknown, given 
the fact that more men than women own mobile phones in India, it is 
possible that these memes were a doomsday version playing out. 
Nevertheless, mere speculation does not help situate where contemporary 
India stands in its approach to the home, and to changing gender 
dynamics as increasing numbers work from home. Articles touting the 
benefits of working from home appear with increasing frequency online. 
The Indian IT industry is a flagship project for the urban middle class. 
News of more and more IT companies, looking at working from home as 
a serious option, not only for health and safety reasons but also to save 
costs on renting huge office space, percolates the public space (TNM 
2020). Washing dishes or cutting vegetables may not remain a dream (or 
nightmare) for men for long.
For an anthropological take on various dimensions to COVID-19 and 
its impact on our lives, memes such as the ones described in this chapter 
call for more serious attention. Blevins (2020) argues that memes are to be 
seen from three angles – as revelation, critique and ideation. As Marshall 
McLuhan (1964) pointed out long ago, we have to ask what this medium 
does, and how crucial a given medium is in transmitting a message. What 
does it reveal and what does it hide? Who does it exclude and who does it 
suddenly allow to emerge? In line with Blevins’ (2020) argument, we 
propose that these memes appeared to ‘imagine new futures’. Daniel Miller 
(2020) suggests that memes can be serious or humorous depending on the 
situation. In Irish memes, he detected a moral undertone about the right 
behaviour to observe during the pandemic.
In this line, what might we say about the memes shared in India 
through WhatsApp? Devoid of (female) domestic helpers, women 
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attempted to involve men in household work, with varying degrees of 
success. The memes reflect the animated discussion of this shift in 
domestic relations and labour. But if our empirical data are any indication, 
the man who had supposedly completely transformed into a ‘maid uncle’ 
by the end of the lockdown has not yet made his appearance. With one 
more cycle of interviews to do, we could say ‘watch this space!’. What is 
certain at this stage is that the pandemic-induced lockdown has 
inaugurated a vibrant debate on men’s participation in household tasks, 
at least among urban, middle class, Indians.
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Notes
1 This Facebook group called ‘Quarantine Cooking’ also calls itself a mental health support 
group. Most members appear to be Bengali-speaking. https://www.facebook.com/groups/ 
560796447893450.
2 We thank Saloka Sengupta for this translation.
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At the interstices of religion and public  
health in Israel
tsipy ivry and sarah segal-katz
In Purity and Danger, Mary Douglas (1966, 30) argued that materialist 
explanations of biblical rules concerning the body, such as in relation to 
diet and sex, as beneficial to health, are insufficient. By pointing out the 
semiotic rationale of these rules within a sorting system that classifies 
conditions of pollution and purity, she insisted that even if some of Moses’ 
rules were ‘hygienically beneficial it is a pity to treat him as an enlightened 
public health administrator, rather than as a spiritual leader’ (1966, 30). 
Douglas never conceived of hygiene/contamination versus purity/
defilement classification systems as mutually exclusive, but the COVID-19 
pandemic provides a sharp perspective on their interplay and on the 
institutional division of labour between religious and public health 
experts. In this chapter, we look at how a purification ritual risks becoming 
a site of infection and how spiritual leaders take on public health 
responsibilities.
Toward the end of March, the Israeli media reported that religious 
centres in Israel, particularly those with ultra-orthodox populations, were 
registering high coronavirus infection rates. Community members were 
accused of transgressing governmental lockdown restrictions and 
endangering public health, thus reigniting stereotypes of faith-based 
communities as resistant to state and public health rationales. By mid-
March, however, rabbinic authorities affiliated to the full range of Jewish 
religious observance – ranging from ultra-orthodox to modern orthodox 
– had already invested in restructuring communal and family life in order 
to facilitate adherence to public health measures.
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This entailed a deep transformation, particularly given the 
intensive sociality of Jewish faith-based communities, including large 
families which, in densely populated urban settings, means overcrowded 
housing. The restructuring of long-standing religious styles of worship 
and sociality – the social configuration of praying, religious learning 
and the scale of Passovers meals – involved innovative negotiations of 
rabbinic laws. Marital sexuality became a locus of particular tension, as 
the halachic (rabbinic legal) requirement that women immerse in a 
mikveh (ritual bath) before resuming sexual relations after menstruation 
was seen to place women, and their families and communities, at risk of 
infection. For observant couples comprising women of fertility age who 
are not pregnant, this meant the imminent disruption of the rhythm of 
marital intimacy, namely, the recurrent cycle of sexual abstinence and 
complete 11–14 day physical distance upon the onset of menstrual 
bleeding followed by reunion after the woman’s immersion in the 
mikveh.
In mid-March, swimming pools and men’s mikvehs were closed, 
along with gyms, shopping malls, restaurants and more.1 However, 
women’s mikvehs remained open. The state-authorised chief rabbinate 
assured the public that women’s mikvehs were safe and under state 
supervision and encouraged women to continue their immersion practice. 
Yet, at the same time, the public was informed of cases of women who 
tested positive soon after visiting the mikveh, although in no cases was 
the mikveh identified as the source of infection. In response to ensuing 
public anxiety, halachic opinions suggesting alternatives to immersion 
in a public mikveh were published in social and public media by rabbis 
who were not part of the state-authorised religious establishment. These 
alternatives were condemned by various rabbinic figures. The debate 
intensified when two women rabbinic scholars, Sarah Segal-Katz and 
Dr Chanah Adler-Lazarowitz, a gynaecologist by profession, published a 
public statement on the lack of institutional supervision and general 
uncertainty about the sanitary condition of mikvehs. Their statement 
encouraged women to consider not immersing if they were unsure about 
hygienic standards and claimed that there were halachically appropriate 
ways to uphold abstinence if the risk of infection was to linger. The 
statement led to a heated public debate on the safety of mikvehs, the 
observance of family purity laws (FPL) and kosher ways to negotiate their 
observance.
On 1 April, a few days before the Passover holiday and in the midst 
of an almost complete lockdown in Israel, Rabbanit2 Malka Piotrokowski, 
a prominent modern-orthodox scholar of rabbinic law, participated with 
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three other women rabbinic scholars in a public Zoom panel discussion 
on the mikveh (Karish-Hazony 2020). The panel, organised by Makor 
Rishon, a newspaper with a wide readership among various orthodox 
and traditional Jewish communities, received 13,000 views as of 30 
September 2020. Piotrokowski opened with a direct attack on the 
established rabbinic authorities:
I have been waiting to hear, for once, in an unusual reality, that a 
cohort of rabbis have gathered and strained their brains [to find a 
halachic solution] … because until Sarah [Segal-Katz] and Chanah 
[Adler-Lazarowitz] came out bravely, and it was clear they are going 
to pay for it personally, there was no clear guidance. Much worse, 
I know that an unequivocal demand by the Ministry of Health to 
close the mikvehs was silenced; no one considered it (Karish-
Hazony, 2020, Hebrew, translated by Ivry).
Piotrokowski thus condemned the macro politics of religion and health, 
according to which health concerns are overridden by religious 
considerations (see Ivry 2013). Yet, drawing on her own experience as a 
halachic instructor, Piotrokowski admitted that, ‘Personally, when women 
consulted me … about whether to go to the mikveh, I couldn’t bring 
myself to say “don’t go”, because I am acutely and painfully aware of the 
implications of not going to the mikveh’ (Karish-Hazony 2020). Thus, 
prioritising religious obligations over public health concerns can be 
traced to the micro politics of intimacy.
COVID-19 offered an opportunity to challenge this order of priorities 
by asking how the pandemic entered the macro and micro politics of 
religion, health and marital intimacy. We examine the suggestions 
emerging from public debates on women’s mikvehs among religious 
scholars and lay people, paying particular attention to the interaction 
between two bodies of authoritative knowledge, rabbinic law and 
biomedicine and public health, in challenging the structure of rabbinic 
authority and illuminating relations between state and religion. We 
consider two specific kinds of threats: the risk of infection by COVID-19 
and other pathogens – as negotiated by references to biomedical and 
public health discourses – and, in line with Mary Douglas (1966), the 
danger associated with pollution, with references to rabbinic discourse 
about the spiritual consequences of violating FPL. We heed the political 
interplay between these risks and dangers while exploring the tensions 
between public health initiatives and communities of faith.
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Religion, state and public health
Religious belief systems and social structures emerge in the public health 
literature as being potentially either impediments or incentives to health 
promotion (Chatters 2000; Idler 2014; Van Ness 1999). Affiliation to a 
faith community has been identified as influencing a range of health 
outcomes throughout the life cycle including longevity, depression, 
cancer survival, suicide (Li et al. 2016), reproduction (Gaydos et al. 2010) 
and child health (Bramadat et al. 2017). The involvement of religious 
leaders and organisations in public health initiatives, and their 
accompanying tensions, has also been noted (e.g. Murray et al. 2011).
In Israel, representatives of orthodox Jewish communities are 
involved in shaping health policies as part of their general political 
participation. At the level of legislation, tensions gather around issues 
at both the beginning of life (e.g. abortion (Ivry 2015)) and the end of 
life (e.g. the legal definition of brain death (Gabbay and Fins 2019)). 
Ultra-orthodox Jewish communities are often perceived as presenting 
challenges to maternal and child health. For example, there is higher 
vaccine hesitancy among ultra-orthodox (16 per cent) and orthodox 
(9.5 per cent) Jews than among secular Jews and Arabs (Velan 2016), 
and ultra-orthodox women use state-funded prenatal care services 
selectively (Sher et al. 2003). Yet, ethnographic work has complicated 
notions of ‘compliance’ (Ivry 2015; Ivry et al. 2011), and orthodox Jewish 
communities tend to be eager consumers of healthcare and medical 
services, particularly community tailored programmes (Ivry 2010; Ivry 
and Teman 2019).
Such public health programmes echo an institutional imperative, 
authorised as Ministry of Health (MH) formal guidance since February 
2011, to make public health services culturally and linguistically accessible 
to all ethnic and cultural minorities in Israel. Nonetheless, the expectation 
that medical care providers cultivate sensitivity to religious commitments 
may have questionable consequences. In one specific rabbinic organisation, 
FLOH (a pseudonym of Fertility in Light of Halacha), in which rabbis 
negotiate halachically appropriate routes to reproductive medicine with 
doctors on behalf of religious patients, they may also use their authority to 
pressure medical experts into compromising safety standards (Ivry 2013). 
A similar prioritisation of religious concerns emerged from the debates 
over women’s mikvehs, albeit on a larger scale at the level of government 
ministries. Unlike the rabbis documented by Ivry (2013), the women 
rabbinic scholars whose public statement ignited the current debate 
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advocated against the exemption of religious medical services from full 
adherence to state safety standards. We now explore the debates as a 
collaboration between Tsipy Ivry, a medical anthropologist, and one of the 
leading figures in the public debates, Sarah Segal-Katz, a rabbinical scholar 
and long-term mikveh attendant volunteer.
Methodology
Ivry had studied the intersection between medicine, rabbinic Judaism and 
women’s reproductive health (Ivry 2010, 2015; Ivry et al. 2011; Ivry and 
Teman 2019), and was drawn to the debates over women’s mikvehs. After 
conducting a few short, informal telephone conversations with former 
informants, she collected over 100 texts including articles published in the 
public and religious media on the subject from mid-March to mid-April 
2020, statement papers and formal instructions issued by the MH and the 
Ministry of Religious Services (MRS) and watched Zoom panel discussions. 
Ivry then embarked in a dialogical collaboration with Sarah Segal Katz, 
bringing together the medical anthropological perspective of a non-
participant online observer (Ivry) and the rabbinical scholar/activist 
perspective of a deeply involved participant observer (Segal-Katz). This 
was an opportunity, for Ivry, to rethink a decade-long exploration of the 
politics of medicine and religion from the vantage point of a pandemic; for 
Segal-Katz, it was an opportunity to reflect on the consequences of a debate 
in which she is deeply involved.
We discussed how best to bring the responses of observant women 
and men into our analysis and decided, due to ethical considerations, not 
to opt for seeking permission to quote (anonymously) from conversations 
in the exclusive social networks in which Segal-Katz participates as a leader, 
respondent and observer. Rather, Segal-Katz retrieved a range of responses 
from the open public Facebook network, that, she believes, allows for a 
preliminary mapping of responses. Our combined collection of data thus 
includes a wide variety of responses from women and men, religious and 
non-religious people, healthcare providers and mikveh attendants who 
participated in the debates between mid-March and mid-April. Excerpts 
from four Zoom panel discussions were transcribed verbatim in Hebrew 
and selected quotations, along with posts from the public Facebook 
discussions, were translated into English by Ivry. Both authors analysed the 
materials in light of four orienting questions: which discourses – religious 
and/or public health – are used, by whom, on what scale and to what 
effect? We applied these questions to the dataset described above, noticing 
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how different contestants negotiated their religious and/or public health 
rationales, and the political consequences of this.
A short history is now required of transformations in FPL over the 
last two millennia – laws that have often served as the battleground for 
struggles over rabbinic authority, thus echoing Foucault’s (1990) notion 
of sexuality as a dense transfer point of power relations.
Family purity laws
According to Leviticus 15, the onset of menstrual bleeding places a 
woman in a state of ritual impurity which renders her a niddah (separated, 
removed from the community of the pure) for seven days. Leviticus 17–26 
warns twice that sexual relations and other forms of physical closeness 
with a niddah are strictly forbidden and violators are punished by being 
cut off from the people of Israel (karet). Menstrual impurity lapses on the 
eighth day. Bleeding beyond the seven days or a resumption of spotting is 
deemed an abnormal impurity (zavah) and requires women to count 
seven more days before they may perform purification rituals.
The collapse of Jewish national sovereignty, the destruction of the 
Second Temple in 70 ce, and the subsequent development of rabbinic 
Judaism wrought a change in the niddah laws. The period of sexual 
abstinence was extended, arguably for fear of confusing irregular 
bleeding (zavah) with normal menstrual blood (Rosenak 2011; Wasserfall 
1999). The extension received the status of a full-fledged rabbinic law in 
the second century ce and has since retained its authority in orthodox 
and ultra-orthodox communities around the world. Whereas biblical law 
assumed a simple timeline to ritual purity, from the second century 
women were instructed to systematically inspect their menstrual flow and 
all genital discharges. Only after ascertaining seven ‘clean’ days via pieces 
of cloth and daily check-ups, may a woman immerse in a mikveh. While 
biblical law had held women accountable for self-diagnosing, the Mishnah 
allocated this authority to rabbis, and women were expected to bring 
samples of their vaginal discharges to rabbis for their ruling (Fonrobert 
1999). This still occurs in many ultra-orthodox communities. There is 
extensive discussion in contemporary rabbinic literature about the correct 
observance of FPL, including the appropriate length of sexual abstinence 
and how to count it (Ivry 2013). There are both historical (Cohen 1999; 
Wasserfall 1999) and contemporary accounts (Avishai 2008) of women 
choosing to lengthen the period of abstinence for contraceptive purposes 
or as a means of empowerment (Wasserfall 1999). In addition, the 
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Figure 20.1 Immersion pool in a mikveh in Haifa. During outbreaks 
mikveh attendants are expected to sterilise the railings and tiles leading 
to the pool after each immersion. A blessing is recited by women before 
immersion: ‘Blessed are You, our G-d, Who has sanctified us with His 
commandments, and commanded us concerning the immersion’. This is 
written in Hebrew on the sign over the pool. Photo: Merav Fenigstein Gizbar
architectural structure and dimensions of a mikveh were specified to 
ensure that a person of average size is completely covered by the water; 
only rain water collected without direct human intervention can purify 
menstrual impurity and a woman’s body must be fully immersed in the 
water. This led to the requirement that the immersion be witnessed by 
another woman.
Contemporary mikvehs in Israel are designed to meet orthodox 
rabbinic requirements, as represented by MRS, and sanitation standards 
set by MH. They are, accordingly, built as a complex of private preparation 
rooms, each equipped with a bathtub, cleansing paraphernalia, a mirror 
to confirm that no object remains that might separate the woman’s body 
from the water (a single hair is considered a separation), and a door 
leading to a common immersion pool (Figure 20.1). Until the outbreak of 
Covid-19, a woman was expected to conduct lengthy preparations inside 
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one of these private rooms according to detailed rabbinic instructions, 
which include soaking for 30 minutes in a hot bath, washing her entire 
body with soap, shampooing her hair, cutting her nails and more. She 
then calls the woman mikveh attendant, who confirms that she has 
done all the necessary preparations, leads her to the immersion pool 
and supervises her immersion. ‘Secular’ cleanliness (to use Douglas’ 
[1966] idiom) is only a prerequisite to the purification ritual, and it was 
precisely the fear that ‘secular’ public health standards of hygiene were 
compromised that ignited the women’s mikveh crisis.
The mikveh as a state service
In contemporary Israel – a state constituted to be both democratic and 
Jewish – mikveh immersion is a personal choice as part of the freedom to 
practise religion granted by the state. Mikvehs are a state-funded religious 
service that operate under the mandate of MRS and according to MH 
regulations. These regulations, issued in 1999, require that to operate 
legally, mikvehs must hold a business licence, which is conditional on 
fulfilling MH health and safety standards. According to an MRS report 
from 22 April 2020, over 700 mikvehs operate throughout Israel and 
around 130,000 women immerse in them each month (Ministry of 
Religious Services, 2020).
The use of mikvehs extends beyond self-defined religiously 
observant Jewish women (Cicurel 2000). Of Israel’s six million Jewish 
citizens, 30 per cent identify themselves as religiously observant and 
25 per cent as traditional (Central Bureau of Statistics 2018). The 
observant communities are divided into various categories according to 
theological orientation, attitudes and commitment to Halacha, styles of 
observance, ethnic origin and political inclination (Ivry and Teman 
2019). Orthodox Judaism maintains a powerful and controversial legal 
standing within the apparatus of state governance with state-sanctioned 
religious courts ruling on matters of personal status and family laws and 
the orthodox rabbinate having full authority over citizens registered as 
Jewish. Jewish Israelis can only marry under the authority of the chief 
rabbinate; one prerequisite for marriage is that the woman, regardless of 
her self-definition, brings a certificate testifying that she has immersed in 
a mikveh. Israel endorses freedom of religion, but freedom from religion 
is a contested issue (Ferziger 2008; Neuberger 1999).
Orthodox Jewish representatives also play an important role in 
policy making. For example, Ya’akov Litzman, the minister of health who 
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handled the Covid-19 outbreak until his resignation on 25 April, is an 
ultra-orthodox Jew. Despite popularity associated with the implement- 
ation of several health reforms, Litzman was criticised for his handling of 
the pandemic and accused of using his position to prevent senior MH 
executives from closing women’s mikvehs. Decades earlier, senior MH 
executives had also refrained from closing mikvehs that failed to meet 
MH standards of safety, arguing that ‘closing the mikvaot without 
providing an alternative solution would cause the religious public, for 
whom this service is vital, great distress’ (Adler-Lazarowitz and Segal-
Katz 2020).3
Underlying this is the notion that religious obligations are non-
negotiable and the rules unchanging. This does not conform with either 
the history of contestation over FPL or recent gendered challenges to 
rabbinic authority. While FPL were deemed throughout history the 
epitome of a woman’s Jewish identity and a source of pleasure and 
empowerment (e.g. Cicurel 2000; Waserfall 1999), women continued to 
negotiate and resist the rabbinic laws of niddah and to foster their own 
private versions of observance, sometimes despite explicit protests 
(Cohen 1999). However, for the past four decades, women’s initiatives to 
reclaim authority over the observance of FPL have increasingly been 
made public.
The rise of women’s rabbinic authority
Orthodox commentators and scholars of Jewish orthodoxy have claimed 
that observant Judaism is undergoing a ‘women’s literacy revolution’ 
(El-Or 2002; Ross 2004). Orthodox women can now become halachically 
proficient through a variety of institutional routes, and women rabbinic 
scholars, such as Piotrokowski, are becoming more prominent. The 
majority of institutional opportunities for women to qualify and become 
certified as halachic experts lie in the realm of FPL. Avishai (2008, 209) 
pointed out a ‘cultural industry surrounding niddah’ that began in the 
1980s, and the list of formally certified women professionals now includes 
premarital educators who teach FPL to brides and niddah consultants 
who are trained to answer women’s questions on the observance of 
the niddah laws and to serve ‘as quasi marriage counsellors, medical 
professionals and sex educators’ (Avishai 2008, 210; see also Zimmerman 
2001). Women halachic experts are advancing new kinds of knowledge 
that is simultaneously traditional and modern, religiously committed and 
emancipatory (Avishai 2008).
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These experts also offer new venues of consultation that almost 
bypass direct engagement with male rabbis, thus steadily transforming 
the structure of authority while emphasising their full commitment 
to traditional structures. Feminist religious women’s movements 
with their commitment to both Halacha and feminist ideals exerted 
important influence over these developments (Irshai 2014; Irshai and 
Zion-Waldoks 2013). Observant women’s advocacy groups have struggled 
with gender inequality in religious marriage and divorce and with sexual 
harassment and abuse perpetrated by rabbinic figures. Social networks 
have given these struggles considerable momentum. Segal-Katz and 
Adler-Lazarowitz are both rabbinic scholars and instructors, co-leaders 
and participants in large closed Facebook groups dedicated to discussions 
on the halachic lives of women.4 Segal-Katz, an orthodox feminist activist 
on issues of religion and state, has been active in Advot, a group that was 
involved in a successful petition to the high court submitted by ITIM,5 
granting women the right to immerse in the mikveh without supervision. 
COVID-19 rode on the wave of women’s efforts to reclaim authority over 
FPL and, with health at stake, pushed them forward.
Sanctified state regulations and halachic alternatives  
in ‘times of distress’
From mid-March 2020, the numbers of confirmed infection cases were 
rising and lockdown restrictions were tightening. Businesses were closed 
by state order and citizens were warned to wear masks, to refrain from 
gathering, to keep a minimum of two metres from other people, and not 
to go more than 100 metres from their homes. On 12 March, Ashkenazi 
Chief Rabbi Lau issued guidance that sanctified state regulations, 
emphasising that ‘these restrictions are halachically binding’ (Berger 
2020). The guidance included detailed instructions limiting various 
gatherings in synagogues including learning, prayer quorums, weddings, 
funerals and other religious celebrations. The instructions concerning 
women’s ritual immersion were comparatively brief and vague, stating 
that ‘the routine of “home purity” should be continued and there is no 
place for apprehension. A woman who, according to MH instructions, 
must self-quarantine, should act as her situation necessitates’. What her 
situation necessitated remained unclear.
In the ensuing days, 15 women who had immersed in various 
mikvehs around the country and two mikveh attendants tested positive, 
two mikvehs were closed and women who had visited the mikveh on the 
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same day as those infected went into self-quarantine. The MRS issued 
instructions for the operation and use of mikvehs, including that women 
wash and prepare in their homes to shorten their visit and that mikveh 
attendants monitor the chlorination of the water in the immersion pool 
more often and change the water once a day. Tiles, railings and all 
surfaces were to be sterilised after each immersion, and women’s visits to 
the mikveh were to be scheduled in advance to ensure 15-minute intervals 
between each immersion. The media reported that rabbis abroad had 
issued instructions to close women’s mikvehs for fear of infection. By 16 
March, the MH had negotiated plans to issue a full lockdown during and 
possibly beyond the week of the Passover holiday, leading to the closing 
of all public institutions excluding mikvehs.
On 17 March, Rabbi Haim Amsalem, a rabbinic scholar, former 
member of parliament, and Mizrahi social activist, uploaded a post on 
Facebook suggesting that in ‘times of great distress’ (she’at dechak) 
women be permitted to immerse in their own bathtubs on condition that 
this fulfils rabbinic requirements concerning the structure, dimensions, 
and volume and quality of water. His post, quoting the halachic literature, 
addressed men – the traditional audience of halachic texts – occasionally 
insinuating the difficulty of sexual abstinence. Immediate responses on 
Facebook ranged from women’s assertions that the mikveh is ‘the practice 
that has protected us [spiritually and physically] for generations’, doubts 
by both women and men about Amsalem’s qualifications as a rabbi, and, 
more specifically, requests for a simpler clarification of the dimensions of 
an appropriate bathtub.6 The chief rabbinate published unequivocal 
condemnation of Amsalem’s solution, explicitly addressing women 
and praising their devoutness to FPL. Women were encouraged to 
proceed with the practice and not ‘lend their ears to lies, because [proper 
observance of the FPL] is crucial to the well-being of our souls’.
On 18 March, 100 new COVID-19 cases were reported. The 
following day, after more women tested positive after immersing in the 
mikveh, Kolech, the leading orthodox feminist movement, published a 
handwritten halachic opinion (not a ruling) by Rabbi Dr Daniel Sperber, 
an authority in Israeli modern-orthodox circles and a supporter of 
orthodox feminism. Sperber cited the Mishna to argue for ‘leniency on the 
prohibition against physical closeness for women who choose not to 
immerse’. Soon after, the Sephardi Chief Rabbi Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron 
published his opposition, reinforcing the danger of breaking FPL and 
invoking the traditional notion of death as a consequence of breaking a 
taboo (Douglas 1992, 16). Both rabbis avoided any detailed discussion of 
the sanitary condition of the mikvehs.
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Evidence-based halachic statement
On 20 March, as new lockdown restrictions were implemented, Segal-Katz 
and Adler-Lazarowitz published a public statement addressed to women 
entitled, ‘Women, be very careful for your souls/lives (venishmarten 
lenaphshoteichen)’.7 The two women authors identified themselves as 
halachic instructors who had received ‘a flood of questions’ about the safety 
of immersion and were striving to provide responsible answers:
We felt that it was preferable to obtain a clear picture of the 
actual reality before issuing a halachic response. We therefore wish 
here to inform the public of what we have learned regarding the 
mikveh system over the years. In so doing, we hope to allow 
the public to make an informed decision about observing the 
mitzvah of immersion as long as the MH refrains from ensuring 
proper standards in every mikveh (Adler-Lazarowitz and Segal-
Katz 2020).
Unlike the previous rabbinic statements, this one recognised the difficulty 
of giving halachic instructions, highlighted the contingency of halachic 
decisions on empirical realities and, importantly, called for personal 
‘evidence-based halachic decision-making’. Segal-Katz and Adler-
Lazarowitz (2020) informed the public of repeated institutional warnings 
about the non-implementation of MH standards in the mikvehs long 
before the outbreak of COVID-19. For example, the state comptroller in 
2004 had criticised the ‘unsatisfactory and undersupervised’ conditions 
of mikvehs, but recommendations for increased sanitary supervision and 
increased training of mikveh attendants had been ignored. A report from 
2015 (Achrak-Wein et al. 2015) stated that only 75 per cent of mikvehs 
actually held a valid business licence. In a parliamentary discussion in 
2017, the director-general of MRS admitted that ‘they simply lack the 
means or ability to enforce the business licenses of mikvehs’. Segal-Katz 
and Adler-Lazarowitz reported that MH supervision was infrequent and 
mikveh attendants monitored sanitation alone. Public swimming pools, 
by comparison, are monitored by MH on a fortnightly basis for chlorine 
and bacteria levels, and pools that deviate from standards are closed. 
Following the outbreak of COVID-19, MRS updated mikveh instructions; 
however, according to Segal-Katz and Adler-Lazarowitz, ‘not all mikvehs 
have been supplied with all the means for disinfecting the mikveh and 
protecting mikveh attendants, some of whom are in a high risk group 
because of their age’.
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Segal-Katz and Adler-Lazarowitz wrote as citizen scientists (Conrad 
and Hilchey 2011), quoting institutional reports, their own research and 
their own experiences. But they also drew on rabbinic scholarship, claiming 
that ‘it is forbidden by Halacha to put oneself in potential danger if there is 
no safe immersion option’. They encouraged women observing FPL and 
their spouses to be ‘stringent in matters of life and death’, reminded readers 
that many couples contend with long periods of abstinence after birth, 
miscarriage and irregular bleeding, and stressed the importance of couples 
cultivating ‘emotional and spiritual affinity’. In their evidence-based 
attitude, neither health risks nor halachic obligations are taken for granted. 
Their statement provoked an immediate response signed by 46 community 
rabbis, reasserting that physical touch between spouses was forbidden 
according to Halacha, that mikvehs under MRS responsibility were safe and 
that the virus cannot survive in water chlorinated according to MH 
instructions. However, MRS data indicated a 16.8 per cent decrease in the 
number of women using mikvehs since the outbreak of COVID-19.
On 1 April, the head rabbi of FLOH addressed observant women in a 
special broadcast on Arutz 7, a popular religious news channel (Arutz 7 
2020). He suggested that women take contraceptive pills continuously to 
prevent menstruation and so delay the need to visit the mikveh as long 
as possible. Reassuring them of the safety of long-term contraception, 
he asked women who resisted this for ideological reasons ‘to make as 
much effort’ to prevent menstruation for the sake of shalom bayit (marital 
harmony) and to ask their gynaecologists to prescribe them several 
packages of contraceptives. Consistent with its strategic approach to 
technology to advance the observance of religious duties (Ivry 2010, 2013, 
2015), FLOH thus advocated a hormonal solution to a halachically 
aggravated problem, dismissing considerations of safety (Bartz et al. 2020; 
Huber et al. 2020). While there were intense discussions in 2006 about 
FLOH’s hormonal solution to delay ovulation for women with ‘halachic 
infertility’ due to the length of observance required by FPL (Ivry 2013), this 
2020 solution raised few responses. Instead, women complained about the 
shortage of contraceptive pills in pharmacies, implying the wide use of 
contraceptives by women in religious communities to work around mikveh 
requirements both with and without rabbinic permission.
Negotiating uncertainties 
Segal-Katz and Adler-Lazarowitz’s statement prompted a heated debate, 
not only because of their explicit call for couples to take halachic decisions 
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into their own hands. Their description of the infrastructure of mikvehs 
attempted to achieve a somewhat paradoxical feat: to clarify the 
uncertainty about the sanitary conditions while appealing to MH for 
supervision and transparency. This attempt to demystify various 
interrelated uncertainties seems to have challenged the public.
Most participants in the open Facebook discussions on the topic 
were women, including medical doctors, an epidemiologist, the head of 
a local religious committee, mikveh attendants, niddah consultants and 
pre-marital instructors. Initially, participants tended to reduce the 
message, in particular questions of uncertainty, potentiality, and 
contingency of the halachic and medical systems. Many interpreted the 
statement as either an (unsolicited) rabbinic ruling – rather than a 
confession about the inability to give halachic answers – or as an 
unequivocal proclamation of all mikvehs as dangerous places – rather 
than an attempt to alert the public to potential health risks and to advocate 
for systematic state supervision, clarity and transparency. Participants’ 
acknowledgement of uncertainty in one arena, Halacha or public health, 
often led to statements of certainty in the other. See, for example, an 
exchange on Facebook between Segal-Katz and RT:
RT:  [The solution is] simply not to immerse. That’s what I’ve 
written as a medical doctor in two other discussion groups. 
The discussion should proceed to consider the halachic 
question of where the limit of distancing between spouses 
should be.
Segal-Katz:  I hinted at such space of halachic discussion. If this is indeed 
all that is left to us, these will be the questions. The question 
is though: is this indeed all that is left?
RT: Unfortunately, that is what’s left.
RT interpreted the statement as an unequivocally negative assessment 
and concluded that immersion was unsafe by default. Segal-Katz 
attempted to emphasise uncertainty, but this did not change RT’s 
conviction that the public health aspect was non-negotiable. Other 
participants conveyed the opposite, namely, that halachic obligation was 
non-negotiable even if there was uncertainty about safety:
I am so ambivalent … I immersed in the mikveh a short while ago, 
I was trembling from fear, and then I heard that a mikveh attendant 
in Maale Adumim tested positive … This can happen in other 
mikvehs as well, clearly there is no way not to immerse, especially 
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since [the pandemic] is here for a long time … It was the first 
time I really wanted to cry my heart out after immersion, only 
from the stress that my body accumulated during the long days 
before immersion.
Anxiety notwithstanding, many participants insisted that even doubts 
about their hygiene would not open the mikveh to negotiation. N stated: 
‘This is all very important but we must immerse, we shall not remain 
without [the option] to immerse’. Segal-Katz then reminded part- 
icipants of the contingency of halachic considerations on public health 
assessments and of the negotiability of Halacha on even the most 
binding obligations: ‘If there is a danger to life here, if not for an 
individual woman but for the general public, then the halachic 
consideration will not necessarily reach the same conclusion’. Faced 
with the negotiability of Halacha, N returned to the public health arena 
to doubt the severity of the sanitary condition of mikvaot and the 
potential health risk; ‘some (public health) professors’ she wrote, ‘claim 
that there is needless public panic and that statistically more people die 
of influenza’.
Several trajectories thus emerged. The first echoed the criticisms of 
several Israeli health professionals: ‘There are professors who claim that 
much of the current crisis is due to anxiety … statistically more die of flu, 
so I am not sure I understand’. The second draws on participants’ own 
experiences of the cleanliness and aesthetics of mikvehs. Y wrote: ‘I have 
never seen a dirty mikveh. The most I have seen is a mikveh operating in 
an old building but always clean and sterile’. S, on the other hand, 
described how filthy her local mikveh was, reminding the participants 
that ‘not all the mikvehs are clean’. The participants used cleanliness and 
sterility as interchangeable terms, while Segal-Katz repeatedly pointed 
out that cleanliness was not the same thing as sterility. A third trajectory 
of scepticism related to MRS instructions.
L:  I know that they doubled the quantity of chlorine stated 
in the instructions … I spoke yesterday to the mikveh 
attendant who told me they sterilize the rooms between 
women.
Segal-Katz:   Implementation and strict adherence to the instructions are 
wonderful, but are you sure this is really happening? 
According to Halacha, can a woman who works in the mikveh 
and receives her salary from the religious local authority, 
testify to the condition of the water and the sanitation as a 
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whole? She has not taken an MH course that qualifies her to 
supervise and assess the level of sanitation, and if she says 
there’s a problem, isn’t she endangering her employment? 
Can she really testify to everything being excellent, or is it, 
halachically, a conflict of interest? Everybody’s intentions are 
good, but it is necessary to establish order and professional 
supervision in the mikvehs.
Women responded with testimonies about having their temperature 
taken before entering the mikveh and the diligence with which mikveh 
attendants cleaned between immersions: ‘I doubt whether the virus can 
survive more than three minutes’. Others noted, however, that even 
people with no temperature can later test positive and that little is known 
about the virus.
Mikveh attendants themselves depicted their meticulousness in 
following MRS instructions. One even scolded Segal-Katz: ‘What do you 
think? That there is lawlessness here? There are water checks, there is 
chlorine in the water automatically and tablets are added, we change the 
water frequently, I have to report the number of towels used … this is 
sacred work (avodat kodesh)’. While Segal-Katz attempted to transfer 
responsibility for safety standards to MH, the attendants sanctified their 
work and MRS instructions and saw themselves as responsible for 
ensuring safety. Segal-Katz responded:
I am familiar with the instructions and the heavy load that mikveh 
attendants carry … what you witness around you cannot be a 
reflection of everything that happens in all mikvehs. There are 
mikveh attendants who are willing to follow the instructions but 
lack the necessary equipment or there is a problem with the 
frequency of changing the water. So please enjoy the good that you 
witness, but understand that I am raising awareness about the 
sanitary conditions in places where the instructions are not applied 
fully because more test tubes are needed now than usual and … 
there are even sometimes problems … ensuring a 15-minute gap 
between immersions.
Both mikveh attendants and women who defended the safety of mikvehs 
attempted to establish certainty. However, depictions of mikvehs that 
‘smell of bleach’ also raised ironic responses such as: ‘There is chlorine in 
the water, it is changed twice a week, it’s really revolting but sacred’ and 
‘the mikveh is so sterilized that you can get bleach poisoning from corona’. 
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Women thus expressed the paradox of a purification ritual that had 
become potentially infectious.
Facing uncertainty about the sanitary conditions  
of mikvehs
When uncertainty about the state of sanitation was acknowledged, some 
participants tried to measure the risk against similar risks in other public 
arenas – ‘People can sneeze on you in the supermarket too’ – leading 
some to compare general health risks with the dangers of non-compliance 
with religious obligations: ‘The mikveh is within the category of pikuach 
nefesh [meaning it endangers one’s life not to immerse in a mikveh]; it is 
as necessary to religious people as food’. The participant thus reversed 
the meaning of the halachic idiom of pikuah nefesh, which allows 
for temporary violations of Halacha when a life is endangered, echoing 
MH avoidance of closing mikvehs that do not meet safety standards 
and rabbis’ difficulties telling women not to immerse due to health 
risks (Piotrokowski cited in Karish-Hazony, 2020, Hebrew, translated 
by Ivry).
Segal-Katz was accused of ‘a cold halachic discourse’, of misunder- 
standing the ‘sacred value of the spousal union’, and of overlooking the 
stressful real-life struggles of couples during the pandemic. One head of a 
local religious authority accused her of causing needless anxiety and 
reassured women of the safety of the mikvehs under his jurisdiction. Other 
participants protested MRS strategies. They reported feeling ‘offended as a 
woman and a person’ or ‘cheated – they endanger my life for immersion’ 
and asked how ‘the health of religious women is being discarded?’ After 
discussing and rejecting alternatives to mikveh (bathtubs, natural springs, 
the sea), some participants declared immersion during a pandemic as 
irresponsible.
Some women demanded clarification of the uncertainty. S asked 
Segal-Katz directly: ‘I would be grateful for a focused and clear answer. 
Your writing takes many directions. For those who are halachically 
committed, please write an answer to the point … to immerse or not to 
immerse?’ Segal-Katz answered: ‘I am trying to say that I cannot give 
halachic answers in a situation where it is unclear whether the necessary 
conditions in the mikveh are fulfilled’. Participants continued pleading for 
an unequivocal (male) rabbinic ruling in the face of the uncertainty. The 
rabbinic authorities answered this plea to an extent when, on 6 April, 
FLOH and the Association of Community Rabbis in Israel published a list 
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of mikvehs that adhered to MH standards and the names of the responsible 
rabbis. However, the supervision procedures remained unclear. Segal-
Katz continued to update the public on her personal website about women 
who had tested positive, sharing women’s reports on safety standards 
in mikvehs.
By 11 May, after the first wave of COVID-19 was deemed contained, 
the MRS cancelled the requirement for a 15-minute interval between 
immersions. Following the outbreak of the second wave, with thousands 
of new cases each day and new lockdown instructions, including strict 
limits on mobility, for at least three weeks starting from 18 September, 
MRS published a statement allowing women to walk further than the 
permitted one kilometre to visit a mikveh. MH was silent.
Segal-Katz’s preliminary mapping of observant women’s choices 
during the second wave suggests great diversity. Some women continue 
to immerse in public mikvehs (where health and safety is now being 
monitored more strictly by MRS) and they see attempts to question the 
sanitation of the mikveh as heresy. Others are foregoing immersion and 
reducing their commitment to FPL. Between these poles, women continue 
to immerse after checking the state of sanitation and sharing their 
findings, travelling, when possible, to well-maintained and less crowded 
mikvehs in remote areas, or immersing in natural springs or the sea. 
Finally, some women have deferred immersion and remain fully 
committed to the halachic rules of physical separation and some take 
long-term contraception.
Purity’s dangers and risks
What, then, can controversies over the potential infectiousness of a 
purification ritual during a pandemic teach us about the intersection 
between religion and public health? What can religious scholars’ 
negotiations over public health responsibilities show about the role of a 
pandemic in challenging state and religious structures of authority?
The women’s mikveh crisis demonstrates that an event such as a 
pandemic can illuminate long-standing institutional dysfunctions and 
intensify ongoing inter-communal and inter-institutional strife. The 
outbreak of COVID-19 loaded onto the macro and micro politics of 
religion, health and gender, particularly women’s ongoing efforts to 
reclaim authority over rabbinic laws organising sexuality and question 
rabbinic authority. The statement that ignited the debates entangled 
public health discourse with rabbinic scholarship, calling for MH 
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intervention to ensure the safety of a religious ritual and drawing public 
attention to the issue at hand. This call for both public and institutional 
attention was made in the name of women’s health, the health of their 
communities and the entire public.
Significantly, rabbis incorporated biomedical knowledge into rabbinic 
considerations. Yet, as work on FLOH illustrates, biomedical knowledge 
and technologies are often presented as progressive ways of assisting 
religious commitments while downplaying risks (Ivry 2010, 2013). In 
contrast, Segal-Katz and Adler-Lazarowitz pursued a powerful public 
health risk discourse in the context of rising morbidity and mortality rates.
In 1966, Douglas pointed out the role of danger in guarding ‘the 
ideal order of society’ (1966, 3), noting that ‘pollution beliefs can be used 
in a dialogue of claims and counter-claims to status’ (1966, 3). If dangers 
are to risks as pre-modern is to modern, then negotiating a matrix of 
contingencies around dangers, risks, pollution and viral contagion at the 
interstices of two authority systems – a state public health governance of 
risk and a religious system of authority – seem to have the dramatic 
potential to reorganise the social order.
However, in addressing the moral implications of risk discourse, 
Douglas argued that being ‘“at risk” is not an equivalent but the reciprocal 
of being “in sin”. To be “at risk” is equivalent to being sinned against, 
being vulnerable to the events caused by others, whereas being “in sin” 
means being the cause of harm’ (1992, 28). By pointing out both purity’s 
risks and dangers, Segal-Katz and Adler-Lazarowitz tried to remind 
observant women, their spouses and mikveh attendants of their matrix of 
religious and citizenship rights and obligations while advocating against 
religious exceptionalism. Yet, the introduction of a matrix of contingencies 
and contradictions stimulated attempts to separate the systems and 
declare one of them non-negotiable.
Such separations are ‘useful’ for policymakers to draw on when 
prioritising religious obligations over health concerns. Underlying the 
prioritisation of religion in the name of cultural sensitivity or commitment 
to Halacha, religious obligations are presented as a non-negotiable set of 
rules. However, the debates over women’s mikvehs illustrate what 
medical anthropologists have argued for decades, namely, that any 
consideration of health policy should take into account the open-ended, 
power-ridden, and multivocal diversity of cultures and religious 
communities. Specifically, intercommunal structures of meaning 
and governance and gendered challenges carry simultaneously 
conservative and transformative powers, thus opening up many spaces 
for negotiation.
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Notes
1 Men also immerse in the mikveh, but this is rendered a custom and not a commandment.
2 ‘Rabbanit’ designates a woman rabbinic scholar (not the wife of a rabbi). An appeal to the high 
court to make women elegible to attend state exams is pending. 
3 Names by alphabetical order.
4 Segal-Katz is co-leader of ‘Tranquil Immersion’ (Tovlot benachat) with 1,400 participants, and 
Adler-Lazarowitz is co-leader of ‘Halachic Feminists’ with 11,000 participants.
5 ITIM is an ‘advocacy organization working to build a Jewish and democratic Israel’ https://
www.itim.org.il/en/
6 Segal-Katz published on her internet site the halachic opposition of Rabbanit Tikochinski 
(2020). 
7 The title converts the famous verse from Deuteronomy quoted previously, which is originally 
phrased in the second person male plural, into the second person female plural.
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Fracturing the pandemic
The logic of separation and infectious  
disease in Tanzania
rebecca Marsland
As COVID-19 unfolded, a stark picture of global health inequalities 
emerged. This invites reflection on the ‘pan’ in pandemic, for as 
anthropologists know all too well, when it comes to infectious disease, we 
are certainly not ‘all in it together’. Instead, public health measures 
require us to isolate ourselves from other human beings, and other forms 
of life – viruses, bacteria, and insect and animal vectors. Pandemics 
fragment; they do not create unity.
In this chapter, I reflect on the pandemic via another globalised 
infectious disease – malaria – which, in contrast with COVID-19, is 
experienced as part of ordinary life. I consider how public health measures 
used to interrupt the transmission of malaria, COVID-19 and many 
other infectious diseases frequently depend on what I call a ‘logic of 
separation’. This logic, in which it is assumed that humans can be 
separated from each other and from other forms of life, informs the 
protective barriers that we try to put in place between humans and 
pathogenic microbes. Interrogating this logic may help us understand 
responses to COVID-19 – not just in relation to the lockdowns that have 
taken place across the world, but because this new virus is considered to 
have crossed the ‘species barrier’. It is likely that future disease prevention 
efforts will focus with renewed intensity on relations between humans 
and nonhuman species, through the One Health approach to control and 
surveillance.
In African countries, COVID-19 has not been so severe as in the 
Americas, Europe and South-East Asia (WHO n.d.). This has been 
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attributed to a swift response by African health ministries, the greater 
experience of individuals and public health systems with infectious 
disease in contrast to the Global North, and the younger population. 
African countries have had to weigh up the economic costs of lockdown, 
and so in general have imposed fewer restrictions. The situation in 
Tanzania is less clear. The late Tanzanian president, John Magufuli, 
closed schools and universities, but did not enforce a lockdown or social 
distancing, citing economic danger to life. Controversially, he instead 
encouraged Tanzanians to attend church to pray. No data have been 
published since 29 April 2020, when the number of confirmed cases had 
reached 509 (BBC News 2020a).1 In May, Tanzanians crossing the borders 
into Zambia and Kenya were tested, found positive and turned back. In 
June, President Magufuli announced that the virus had been defeated. 
President Magufuli died on 17 March 2021, and a month later his 
successor, President Samia Suluhu, announced that an expert committee 
would advise her on COVID-19.2 Given reports of the detention of 
journalists who have criticised Magufuli (BBC News 2020b), I have 
assumed that Tanzanian friends and colleagues cannot speak freely about 
COVID-19. Instead, the research on which I draw in this chapter comes 
from fieldwork in Kyela District, in the southwest of Tanzania, originally 
conducted from 2000 to 2002, and since then, through multiple return 
visits. I understand that there was no upsurge in funerals in Kyela in 2020, 
as there was during the peak of the HIV pandemic, but this is not evidence 
of the absence of infections or deaths from coronavirus.
My long engagement with people who live in Kyela allows me to 
reflect on some of the limits to interventions that depend on the logic of 
separation. Kyela, located on the north shore of Lake Nyasa, is low-lying 
and malaria is holoendemic. In the early 2000s, people trod an uneasy 
line in their efforts to separate themselves from the causes of malaria in 
order to avoid risk of infection. Their use of and sometimes reluctance to 
use insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs) in order to inhabit separate 
spaces to mosquitoes to protect themselves from malaria were tied up 
with moral concerns about sociality at funerals and overlapping 
ontological worlds. I draw on this experience to illustrate how the logic of 
separation can puncture multispecies and social worlds, and requires 
people to produce pluriversal solutions, if they are to hold these worlds 
together. I relate this to the indifference, as manifested in their resistance 
to ITNs, of mosquitoes to this logic and the reluctance of global health 
science to debate the associated risk of the loss of a partial immunity to 
malaria that could, in theory, result when transmission is temporarily 
interrupted. To conclude, I argue that it is important to acknowledge the 
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complex relations between humans, nonhumans, social structures, 
biology and political agendas that the logic of separation ignores, and 
consider lessons for responses to COVID-19, in particular One Health.
Pandemic/polydemic?
What is a pandemic? Does this word adequately reflect the ways that 
people everywhere experience a pathogen with global reach? A pandemic 
is defined loosely as a disease that spreads over two (or more) continents 
and is destructive of human life. Its etymology (pan – all, demos – a 
population of people in a democracy) reveals a once deprecatory term 
that in the seventeenth century referred disapprovingly to a ‘political 
system in which all the people govern equally’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 
n.d.) and to ‘vulgar forms of love’ (Harrison 2016, 130). As European 
imperialism intensified and hastened the spread of pathogens through 
the forced movement of people through slavery, colonial rule and 
impoverishment, the word’s negative connotations were linked to disease.
Despite the imperial and post-imperial role of Europe and North 
America in spreading disease to the global south, an ‘outbreak narrative’ 
(Wald 2008) has formed in which it is imagined that new diseases emerge 
in the ‘global south’ and travel to the economic centres of the ‘global 
north’. In this narrative, the African continent is prominent. Viruses, 
themselves seen as ancient life forms (Wald 2008, 33), emerge out of a 
place which in the western imagination is also positioned back in time 
(Fabian 1983). The colonial ‘heart of darkness’ image of Africa still 
conjures up an antediluvian zone where humans are part of a fecund 
‘nature’ that brings forth disease. China, despite its technological 
sophistication and superpower status, occupies a similar place in the 
western imagination; it, too, is thought to be a place located in primordial 
time, where ‘spillover’ across the species barrier is likely to occur (Lynteris 
2020a; Zhan 2005). The US and Europe do not feature in this imagined 
geography of disease emergence (Wald 2008, 44), even though swine flu 
originated in the US and BSE (‘mad cow disease’) in the UK. The fact that 
in Africa COVID-19 has not caused the devastation that was predicted 
further indicates the blind spots that the outbreak narrative produces 
(Chigudu 2020).
Malaria shares with pandemic disease its prevalence and high 
mortality rates across more than two continents. However, it is understood 
to be endemic rather than pandemic. This endemicity is linked to the 
distribution of the Anopheles mosquitoes which spread malaria. Anopheles 
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once transmitted malaria in England, Italy, North America and Siberia, 
and its present-day prevalence in the tropics is an outcome of the history 
of human ecology, rather than a straightforward relationship with 
geographical place (Packard 2007). In 2018, malaria caused 405,000 
deaths in the Americas, sub-Saharan Africa, South and East Asia 
(Medicines for Malaria Venture n.d.).
The meanings of pandemic, epidemic and endemic are, as historian 
Mark Harrison notes, highly ‘elastic’ (2016, 139), with distinctions in 
meaning mirroring their social and emotional significance. Plague is still 
framed as a pandemic, even if its prevalence is insignificant (Lynteris 
2020b). The historian Charles Rosenberg points out that in the nineteenth 
century tuberculosis ‘did not elicit the sense of crisis that accompanied 
epidemics of yellow fever and cholera’ (1992, 285). The everyday quality 
of an old disease like malaria contrasts with the fear and urgency 
generated by the new disease COVID-19, and the global social, economic 
and political upheaval associated with what is unknown about the virus 
SARS-CoV-2. The distinction between crisis and the everyday is a political 
matter, raising questions about how different human lives are valued 
(Marsland and Prince 2012).
Pandemics are not equal in their effects. The risks of infection, 
serious disease and fatality are higher in some socio-economic groups 
than others. Social divisions are firmed up as the borders around 
nation-states are policed and quarantines put into place, and while 
pathogens hold the same biological forms (give or take mutations) 
wherever they go, they are not, to use Nading’s (2013) phrase, ‘entangled 
with’ the same socio-economic groups, political systems, economies, 
social structures or geographical locations. A disease can manifest 
differently in different bodies or as time passes, and there can be a range 
of ways of interpreting the symptoms. Within biomedicine, different 
specialisms produce alternative understandings of a disease, and create 
new kinds of social relationships (Berg and Mol 1998). We can extend 
these ideas about multiplicity to pandemics: Mignolo (2018), challenging 
the western concept of the universal as assumed to be a universal, 
encourages us to think in terms of a pluriverse. In acknowledging the 
pluriversal nature of pandemics, I propose here the idea of polydemics 
and highlight the ‘interconnected diversity’ (Mignolo 2018, x) of 
the effects of, and responses to, the same pathogen. Thinking about 
polydemics acknowledges that disease outbreaks are filtered through 
‘many cosmologies, [and there is] no longer one that subsumes and 
regulates all the others’ (Mignolo 2018, x) and so allows us to see that 
different versions of a pandemic can coexist.
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The logic of separation
We can examine the ‘interconnected diversity’ of a global outbreak by 
considering a key component of infectious disease control, elimination and 
eradication: that is, in the absence of a vaccine, the cycle of transmission is 
broken by separating humans from each other or from nonhumans. This is 
a ‘contagionist’ view of infectious disease (Rosenberg 1992), within which 
‘barriers to transmission and contamination become the main technology 
through which health is delivered’ (Hinchliffe 2015, 30). With this logic of 
separation, single disease interventions from control measures to 
eradication campaigns are orchestrated from the top. The emphasis is on 
technological innovation, at the expense of primary healthcare and 
improvements to standards of living. In this way, social inequality is allowed 
to continue – life is promoted under conditions that might otherwise cause 
death. The approach medicalises politics because it sidesteps questions 
about the distribution of wealth and discrimination based on ‘race’ and 
gender.
Techniques of separation such as quarantine, social distancing and 
cordons sanitaires focus on humans, their susceptibility to pathogens and 
their role in facilitating the movement of microorganisms. But vectors 
and microbes do not recognise human social borders, and the public 
health response to this is to understand and implement borders that 
take nonhumans into account. And so other forms of life, often not 
considered as part of our society (Latour 2004), are also singled out for 
separation.
Anxieties about the hazards of nonhuman life crossing over into 
human spaces are central to outbreak narratives. New pathogens are 
considered to ‘spillover’ when the pristine zone of nature is entered by 
humans, or creatures from it encroach on human ‘territory’ (Quammen 
2013; Wald 2008). ‘Spillback’, the transmission of disease from humans to 
other species, rarely features in outbreak narratives even though it can 
establish new reservoirs of disease and zoonotic cycles (Guth et al. 2020, 
3). That spillback is marginal to this narrative reveals the anthropocentricity 
of the logic of separation. The wild places where spillover is predominantly 
thought to take place are cast in the media as dangerous, exotic and 
uncivilised. Humans local to them are often racialised as animal-like, with 
discriminatory discourses of race projected onto hierarchies that distinguish 
between human and nonhuman (Haraway 1989; Mavhunga 2011). These 
pejorative racial hierarchies combine with fears about boundary-crossing 
pollution (Douglas 1966), as evident in the association of outbreaks with 
the consumption of wild animals. The hunting of bats and bushmeat 
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(Ebola), and sale of civet cats as food in China (SARS) confound the 
western category of ‘food’; pangolins (COVID-19) used in Chinese 
Traditional Medicine likewise fall outside of the western category of 
‘medicine’ (Lynteris 2020a; Zhan 2005). Thus, nonhuman forms of life are 
incorporated into biomedical understandings of hygiene, and the 
management of ‘inappropriate’ human contact with animals becomes a 
matter of medical concern (Keck and Lynteris 2018, 9).
The separation of humans and nonhumans in biomedical thinking 
about outbreaks has been incorporated into pandemic preparedness; 
with COVID-19 this is likely to intensify. The One Health idea has been 
taken up by the WHO, the World Organization for Animal Health and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization to address the threat of emerging 
zoonotic diseases. The western division between the human and 
nonhuman world is fundamental to One Health projects, which 
understand interactions between human, animal and environmental 
health in terms of the historical distinctions between these categories 
(MacGregor and Waldman 2017; Wolf 2015). The geographer Steve 
Hinchliffe argues that One Health is ‘one world-ist’ because it aims to 
generate a ‘single biosecure planet’ where ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of life are 
separated out. In practice, biosecurity predominantly exists in the Global 
North, whereas the Global South is potentially dangerous because of 
‘interspecies intimacy’ (2015, 30). This logic of separation of humans and 
nonhumans is also at the centre of malaria control. Attending to this may 
offer clues to thinking about the response to COVID-19.
The emphasis in malaria control has been on separating humans from 
nonhumans (mosquitoes and the parasitic Plasmodia that cause malaria) 
rather than separating humans from humans. Still, in colonial settings, 
‘native’ humans were seen as a reservoir of infection and a danger to 
colonising humans (Litsios 1996; Manderson 1996; Packard 2016; Packard 
and Brown 1997). Public health measures were intended to protect colonial 
settlers from local populations, and towns were segregated accordingly. 
Homes for Europeans were often located in elevated land (where there 
were fewer mosquitoes), at a distance from areas designated for the 
residence of local populations and immigrant labourers (Curtin 1992; 
Goerg 1998; Harrison 2016, 137). In 1930s South Africa, assumptions 
about ‘malaria tolerant Africans’ justified segregation, and health officials 
claimed that Africans did not need to live in areas provided with malaria 
control services (Packard 2016). The segregation of colonised humans 
reflects the fact that they were not considered to be fully human; they were 
rarely distinguished from an environment that harboured diseases harmful 
to Europeans (Vaughan 1992, 42).
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The logic of separation depends on a western cosmology in which 
humans occupy a separate space to nonhumans. In this world, humans, and 
some domesticated nonhumans, are assigned places marked out by culture; 
other forms of life are designated to places of nature (Descola 2013). In this 
understanding of the world, foundational to western thinking although not 
universal, nature is seen to be subdued and exploited by humans (DeMello 
2012, 36–40). As this logic of separation travels and interacts with different 
cosmologies, it becomes pluriversal. This is how polydemics proliferate. 
The ethnography that follows illustrates how efforts to separate humans 
from mosquitoes can generate a pluriverse.
A world without mosquitoes?
The Plasmodia parasites that cause malaria are transmitted by Anopheles 
mosquitoes – the vectors of malaria. Since this link between mosquitoes 
and malaria was discovered by Ronald Ross in 1897, the separation of 
humans from mosquitoes has been a major component of malaria control: 
killing adult mosquitoes using insecticide, killing mosquito larva with 
larvicide, using repellents and sleeping under bed nets. In the 1990s, 
ITNs were found to be effective at reducing transmission, and have been 
promoted since then. The Plasmodia can also be targeted with antimalaria 
drugs either as treatment or prophylaxis. Malaria has been eliminated 
from some parts of the world with improved socioeconomic conditions, 
referred to by Packard as ‘growing out of malaria’ (2007, 65).3
Mosquito control is part of the logic of separation in global health 
(Beisel 2015). It originated with the goal of eradication, a possibility that 
has fallen in and out of sight. In the 1950s, the Global Malaria Eradication 
Programme (GMEP) used the insecticide dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane 
(DDT) to kill mosquitoes and interrupt the transmission cycle (Stepan 
2011). DDT had been developed during the Second World War, and was 
used primarily in parts of Asia to protect troops from mosquitoes. This led 
to a new era of confidence in the use of a single technology to control 
malaria (Packard 2007, 143). In the context of the Cold War, the GMEP 
fell into the US strategy to demonstrate its superiority to socialist regimes. 
It was known that mosquitoes would develop resistance to DDT, but 
eradication work went ahead (Packard 1997; 1998). The consequences 
were disastrous: DDT lost its efficacy, and there were large epidemics of 
malaria in the 1960s and 1970s (Litsios 1996, 83).
These epidemics were a result of the ‘rebound effect’. Those who 
survive childhood without dying of malaria develop partial immunity. 
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They may still experience mild symptoms if infected, but they are unlikely 
to develop severe or fatal malaria. Partial immunity relies on ‘endemic 
stability’ in which there are high levels of infection but little disease 
(Coleman et al. 2001). Immunity is also lost during pregnancy, and is not 
acquired at all when malaria transmission is unstable. The risk of death is 
higher for nonimmune adults than it is for infants.
After the failure of the GMEP, malaria control was neglected. 
Eradication had never been seriously attempted in Africa because there was 
insufficient infrastructure and resources to support it; hence here there was 
no rebound effect. However, the burden of malaria continued to grow with 
reduced spending on malaria control, increased poverty and parasite 
resistance to chloroquine – the most affordable antimalarial treatment. 
This resurgence led to the launch of Rollback Malaria (RBM) in 1998; a 
partnership between the WHO, malaria-affected countries, development 
agencies, donors, researchers, non-governmental organisations and the 
private sector. RBM’s target was to halve the burden of malaria by 2010 
with the use of ITNs, effective treatment and early warning systems to 
control epidemics.
In 2000, I watched a health education film with about two hundred 
other people in a bus station in Kyela. I’d travelled there with a team of 
Tanzanians who worked for the social marketing NGO, Population 
Services International (PSI), and were promoting ITNs as part of the RBM 
campaign. They were touring the country and teaching people how to use 
ngao (shield), a tablet of insecticide that could be dissolved in water, in 
which a mosquito net could be soaked, then hung up in the shade to dry. 
Afterwards, the ITN would kill any mosquito that landed on it for a period 
of about three months; it would then have to be treated again. The film, 
which I described in my fieldnotes from February 2000, was part of their 
road show:
A young woman is sleeping fitfully, raising her hand to swat away the 
mosquitoes which are filling the air with their remorseless high-
pitched hum. When she wakes, she has a high fever and is very ill 
indeed. When her parents discover her, they have a heated argument 
about where to take her for treatment. Her mother wants to take her 
to see the medical officer at the nearest health facility. Her father 
argues that she should go to see a mganga (a traditional healer) to get 
some herbs and to divine in order to find out which spirit has made 
her sick. Her mother gives in reluctantly and they go to see the 
mganga. However, after the mganga’s administrations, the girl is still 
ill, and her father then angrily accuses an elderly neighbour of 
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bewitching her. In the midst of all this, the young woman starts 
convulsing, and her father leaves his quarrel to help his wife give their 
daughter more of the herbs from the mganga. It is at this point that his 
wife’s brother appears on the scene and he insists that the sick woman 
is taken to hospital. At first her father is angry, and complains that he 
is head of the household, and cannot listen to decisions made by the 
brother of his wife. But, in the end they all go to hospital.
A few days later, the woman is much better, and not only that, 
her father has learnt at the hospital that her illness was malaria. 
There he was advised that to prevent malaria, his family should 
sleep under a mosquito net, and he also learnt to treat the net with 
insecticide so that it can kill and repel mosquitoes. The father left 
his superstitious ways and made up the quarrel with his family. 
Peace and happiness reigned in the household.
The film was faithful to a genre of colonial health education films which 
commonly depicted two opposing characters. One would demonstrate 
moral failings by seeking help from a traditional healer, believing in 
witchcraft and exhibiting personality flaws such as argumentativeness. 
The other would follow the directions of biomedicine, and would be 
rewarded with ‘health, fertility and prosperity’ (Vaughan 1992, 183). 
In the PSI film a message intended to reshape people’s relationship to 
mosquitoes was tied into this moral lesson. The film aimed to teach people 
to use bednets and to treat them with insecticide. The message, consistent 
with the logic of separation, was that a division must be created between 
the spaces of human and insect life.
ITNs are more effective than untreated nets. Their repellent effect 
reduces the number of mosquitoes in the environment and discourages 
them from biting. ITNs also kill other insects that disturb sleep or spread 
disease, such as bed lice, fleas and other species of mosquito. In the early 
days of RBM, Anopheles mosquitoes tended to bite at night when people 
were sleeping, and so ITNs afforded protection at a time when malaria 
transmission is highest. Trials in Tanzania demonstrated that their use led 
to a clear reduction in mortality from malaria (Lengeler 2001).
The challenge was to persuade people to use them. Research was 
carried out to identify beliefs about malaria – it could be caught by sitting 
in the hot sun, getting caught in the rain, working too hard or drinking dirty 
water – that might be corrected through education, and replaced with 
knowledge of the role of mosquitoes and parasites (Winch et al. 1996). 
Between 1997 and 1999, the Ifakara Health Research and Development 
Centre trialled social marketing to provide ITNs at near cost price with 
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relative success. ITNs were popular when people could afford them: 
according to Renggli and colleagues (2013), 72.7 per cent of Tanzanian 
households were using ITNs by 2012. However, people were not always 
able to pay for ITNs, and often the sole ITN was used by the head of 
household – the man, not women and children who are more vulnerable to 
severe malaria. Local health officials had underestimated the market for 
the largest nets, because they thought that people in villages did not sleep 
in large beds (Marsland 2006). The large nets are used by women and 
children who share sleeping mats. People were less likely to buy insecticide 
to re-treat nets (Armstrong Schellenberg et al. 2001), and so long-lasting 
insecticidal nets were introduced.
Another ‘barrier’ (to use the public health jargon) in Kyela was 
widespread acceptance that humans and non-domestic creatures inhabit 
the same spaces. Mosquitoes can be avoided in great density if one sits 
in the smoke of a fire, but this is uncomfortable and inconvenient. 
Mosquitoes fly in and out of houses and latrines, and bite people when 
they are resting in the shade under cocoa bushes and mango trees. They 
are part of a way of living that includes other wild creatures: termites 
must be dug out of kitchens, and bat manure scraped from roofs. Long-
legged spiders span the surfaces of walls, scorpions hide in beds and 
clothing, rats and mice run across the rafters and chew their way into 
stored sacks of grain, monkeys steal the cocoa crop, and at night pods of 
hippopotamus trespass and feast on the rice paddy and green mamba 
snakes suddenly drop out of trees. People, domestic animals and wild 
creatures muddled along together. The notion that somehow people 
might erect a permanent barrier between themselves and these various 
insects and animals seemed unthinkable and unrealistic.
The everyday presence of wild creatures in human spaces challenged 
the notion that pests are unwanted forms of life that enter human spaces 
(Knight 2000). Nobody particularly liked mosquitoes, but their presence 
was rarely questioned. And so, an important part of RBM’s work was to 
instil the idea that mosquitoes should not be tolerated: they are enemies 
because they spread malaria. ITNs divided space up into zones where 
mosquitoes could circulate freely with people, and human sleeping places 
that they could not enter. This was quickly accepted, and applied to 
ordinary, night-time, indoor sleeping arrangements.
In conversations with people in Kyela, it became clear to me that 
because mosquitoes were ubiquitous, part of the everyday mundane world, 
and despite the suffering and nuisance they caused, it had not occurred to 
people to regard their presence as a problem that could be acted upon.4 
Unlike entomologists (Kelly 2012) and public health workers, they did not 
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know the mosquito in microscopic detail. Instead, the female mosquito, 
which feeds on blood to provide nutrition for her eggs, made herself known 
through her irritating whine, the itchy lumps that she left on ankles, and 
the satisfying smear of blood left on the wall if someone successfully 
swatted her. Most people knew that mosquitoes caused malaria in some 
way, but they were not that interested in knowing any more. They would 
say things like ‘they say malaria is caused by mosquitoes, but I don’t know 
if it is’, or ‘the scientists say it is caused by mosquitoes, but I can’t comment 
on that’. This ‘not knowing’ reflected a ‘combination of secrecy, uncertainty, 
and skepticism’ (Last 2007, 9) in relation to medical knowledge.
Those willing to expand commented on mosquitoes as a reflection 
of the poor state of the environment in which they lived (see also Kelly 
and Lezaun 2014; Nading 2014, 17). They told me that mosquitoes were 
a product of rain, living in a valley or close to standing water, leading to 
complaints about the conditions in which people live. Many people lived 
in homes constructed from mud bricks and bamboo with thatched roofs. 
Even those who could afford burnt bricks and corrugated iron roofs 
usually had open eaves, and screens on windows or doors were rare. 
Homes were not mosquito proof, hence the advantage of the ITN, as it 
formed a mosquito-free zone where people slept. For the poorest people 
in Kyela, mosquitoes were emblematic of their poverty: they had no 
choice but to live in mosquito-ridden environments.
Despite ‘not knowing’ about mosquitoes, ITNs featured in some 
local bylaws that had been passed against ‘misleading traditions of the 
Nyakyusa’. One of the clauses in the bylaws pertained to malaria, and 
stipulated that during funerals and the subsequent mourning period, ‘the 
relatives of the deceased (women folk) with small children are forbidden 
to be at a funeral without a mosquito net’. This acknowledged a problem 
that RBM had not adequately taken into account – that people do not 
always sleep inside, and when they sleep outside they rarely use an ITN 
(see also Moshi et al. 2017; 2018). Unofficially, by making it compulsory 
to sleep under nets at funerals, the bylaw undermined the moral authority 
of the community to complain about women who slept under nets and so, 
in a roundabout way, protected people from the murmurs of dissatisfaction 
that led to a form of witchcraft called imbepo sya bandu (the breath of the 
people). This operates as a form of indigenous law, whereby members of 
the community mutter about a person who has committed an offence 
against them. These words manifest a collective breath with the power to 
cause magical harm (Marsland 2015; Wilson 1951).
At funerals, female relatives and neighbours of the bereaved sleep 
at her home in order to take part in the mourning songs, to help with 
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cooking and to collect firewood and water. Houses are not big enough to 
accommodate all these women overnight, and so they sleep outside. The 
mosquitoes would bite them so much that they could not sleep, and 
afterwards my exhausted neighbours came to show me their arms, 
covered in mosquito bites as evidence of their suffering. It was unthinkable 
to sleep under a mosquito net on these occasions, because suffering was 
an important element of the work of mourning (see also Moshi et al. 
2018). Women were both literally and symbolically close to mosquitoes 
at funerals, because they left a mark which could be shown to others as a 
sign of wretchedness in their grief. Building on Monica Wilson’s 
ethnographies, mosquitoes act as a ‘prophylactic against the effects of 
death’ (1957, 89), that is, the madness that is part of grief. Wilson 
described how mourners would associate themselves with dirt as would 
a mad person. Mosquitoes are not dirt, but only a mad person would sleep 
outside and proudly show others their mosquito bites. To sleep under a 
mosquito net would invite the disapproval of others, and therefore imbepo 
sya bandu. It would be seen as ‘showing off’, an act of individual self-
preservation at a time when group solidarity was required.
In 2000–02, it was possible to imagine a world in which separating 
humans and mosquitoes from each other made sense and seemed 
achievable, despite people’s apparent resignation to the presence of 
mosquitoes and local notions of the immorality of protecting oneself against 
mosquitoes at funerals. But women in Kyela were anxious that they would 
be seen to be guilty of failing to protect human relations, which were 
essential to protect against witchcraft. ‘Knowing or not knowing the 
mosquito’, I wrote in my fieldnotes, ‘was a moral matter’. For scientists 
working in the field of global health, knowing the mosquito meant that it 
was essential to live apart from it and save millions of lives. For women in 
Kyela, not knowing and tolerating the mosquito was essential to live healthy 
social lives. One mosquito could be eradicated or separated out from 
human worlds; the other mosquito was entangled in human social lives.
Over time, however, women in Kyela supported each other to make 
use of ITNs at funerals. They clubbed together to buy enough mosquito 
nets to take with them and hang up under trees. By making sure that 
everyone had access to ITNs, it was possible to maintain healthy social 
connections while separating themselves from mosquitoes at night. By 
2008, ITNs were a normal feature of funeral arrangements. For them, 
malaria control required they prevent witchcraft and mosquito bites at 
the same time. This takes us back to the idea of the pluriversal polydemic. 
In Kyela, people were able to hold together these contradictory 
understandings of being in the world and to resolve them.
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A decade later, Anopheles mosquitoes were developing resistance to 
the pyrethroid insecticide used to treat bed nets, and changing their 
behaviour to feed during the day and evening (Finda et al. 2019; Moshi et 
al. 2017). Mosquitoes have not signed up to the logic of separation, which 
is based on a cosmology that sees nonhumans as inert or at best tractable. 
They are not biddable to human agendas, and through their resistance to 
our chemical challenges and nets, they bind us closer to them. Malaria is 
shaped by multispecies co-existences (Kelly and Beisel 2011).
This resistance of mosquitoes means that malaria could be 
transmitted even when ITNs were used. This raises the question of the 
rebound effect. If ITNs successfully interrupted the transmission of 
malaria, people might lose or never acquire immunity to malaria. With 
mosquito resistance, malaria could resurge. Studies conducted in the 
1990s to examine the relationship between ITNs and immunity (Guyatt 
et al. 1999) concluded that it was too difficult to make any predictions. 
ITN programmes should continue ‘in the absence of other tools to control 
malaria adequately’, but they should be carefully monitored (Mathanga 
and Molyneux 2001, 1220). One team of researchers recommended that 
improvements in health services, and better use of antimalarials, would 
be preferable to the risks of the rebound effect (Trape and Rogier 1996).
Between 2000 and 2002, I asked health workers in Tanzania 
about this, and they were clear that ‘bed nets should not be withheld 
when so many children are dying from malaria’. Prior to this, questions 
about the link between acquired immunity and the use of ITNs had been 
dismissed by prominent scientists as ‘irresponsible’; one commented that 
any intervention in the host-parasite life cycle was bound to lead to 
‘surprises’, but that ‘this is not a reason to deny anyone the protective 
measures that are available’ (Brown 1997).5 Randall Packard (2007, 242) 
describes a similar conversation with the Director of the Malaria Control 
and Evaluation Partnership in Africa. These responses are reminiscent 
of the tendency of those advocating vertical, technical, public health 
interventions to dismiss critique (Parker and Allen 2014, 227). The 
mainstream view was that the combination of available technology, 
cautiously optimistic scientific evidence and moral urgency were sufficient 
to dispel any lingering doubts about acquired immunity and to press on. 
Debate was suppressed with the claim that critique could endanger the 
good that ITNs promised.
The current response to the resistance of mosquitoes to insecticide 
is to invest in the development of new insecticides along with integrated 
vector management led by the Innovative Vector Control Consortium.6 If 
vector control were to fail, the remaining technologies would be 
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diagnostics, antimalarial treatment and the distant prospect of a vaccine. 
Beyond one paper (Griffin et al. 2015), it is hard to find published 
evidence that the rebound effect is taken seriously. There is, however, still 
a debate to be had. Vaccines are generally accepted as a means to confer 
immunity to disease, but acquired immunity is not. This is for good 
reason; it would require that a number of deaths should be tolerated – in 
effect a sacrifice.
Immunity is solely conceived of in biological terms, but it operates 
in a social context. Could we extend it to ‘biosocial immunity’? This might 
allow us to move beyond the logic of separation and open up the debate. 
We could consider anthropologist Uli Beisel’s (2015, 153) recom- 
mendation to take seriously the possibility that people may have to coexist 
with mosquitoes and ‘slowly rework the complex knots of mosquito-
human-parasite entanglements’. Currently, social immunity is used to 
describe the efforts of social insects – honeybees, ants, termites – to 
collectively cooperate to reduce the risk of disease (Cremer et al. 2007, 
693). Could local, collective collaborations take this up by finding ways 
to make the acquisition of immunity to malaria safer through better 
healthcare, or by working to understand how social inequalities, poor 
standards of living and multispecies communities are tied up with the 
bodily immune response to malaria parasites?
Conclusions: lessons for COVID-19
These reflections on malaria – a global disease with high mortality, but 
one which is experienced as ordinary – invite us to consider how the logic 
of separation is shaping responses to the globalised spread of COVID-19. 
This logic has fractured our everyday worlds into unfamiliar pieces, and 
finds danger in nonhuman life ‘spilling over’ into what we perceive to be 
our separate human world. The outbreak narrative imagines this is more 
likely in African countries, and COVID-19 is likely to increase One Health 
efforts on the continent. The pandemic so far has turned out to be not so 
devastating in most countries in Africa as it has in the Global North, but 
they are likely to be required to prioritise the prevention of emerging 
zoonotic diseases. There are multispecies and pluriversal lessons here for 
One Health, which, despite its holistic aspirations, is based on the logic 
of separation – of humans, animals and the environment. Resistant 
mosquitoes have exposed the categories of nature and culture on which 
this logic is based for the ‘fictive, man-made arbitrary creations that they 
are’ (Douglas 1966, 200). If this logic is not questioned, we risk ignoring 
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the tightening human–nonhuman entanglements that currently threaten 
the viability of ITNs and other vector control measures.
This takes us to the suppressed debates about acquired immunity to 
malaria, which provide a clue to the public disgust at proposals to mitigate 
COVID-19 by permitting herd immunity to develop without a vaccine. 
Herd immunity is a multispecies concept originating in veterinary science 
(Jones and Helmreich 2020), and it assumes that sacrificing human lives 
is acceptable to control the disease and to protect others. But as with 
malaria, there has been no discussion about a biosocial approach to 
immunity, that is, how collective care and social forms of protection might 
promote an immune response.
The term pandemic suggests that the events that follow in the wake 
of a pathogen are the same across the world, and it has generated an 
outbreak narrative that is based on a particular, western medical, 
cosmology. Unpacking the logic of separation through the example of 
malaria control in Tanzania highlights how a pluriversal response was 
required to accommodate this cosmology, enforced through the 
biomedical measure of the ITN and based on non-universal, historically 
shaped categories of nature–culture, human–nonhuman, and biological–
social. People in Kyela at once acknowledged the logic of separation, but 
also worked out how to maintain multispecies and social relationships 
that would ordinarily be incompatible with this logic. To be successful, 
One Health responses to COVID-19 will also need to work their way 
through a multispecies pluriverse, and pay attention to the interconnected 
diversity of this, in anticipating and responding to future polydemics.
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Notes
1 In 2019 Tanzanian authorities were criticised for not providing sufficient information to the 
World Health Organization (WHO) about a suspected Ebola case (WHO 2019).
2 https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-covid-19-expert-committee- 
formed-3368024, accessed on 19 April 2021. 
3 ‘Horizontal’ interventions, such as those carried out in the 1930s by the Tennessee River Valley 
Authority (Carter 2014) and in colonial Malaya (Manderson 1996, 154–57, 164–65) 
deliberately attempted to bring this about, but during and after the Cold War, this was 
associated with socialism, and thus became politically unacceptable in northern capitalist 
countries, most notably the US (Packard 2007, 149).
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4 In contrast, Nading (2014) describes how women carrying out dengue control work in 
Nicaragua take great pleasure in getting to know mosquitoes. 
5 After the Brown article, a small controversy played out on the pages of New Scientist. Lengeler 
and Tanner (1997) claimed that Snow and Marsh’s findings would dissuade donors from 
funding nets. Snow and Marsh’s response (1997) was that they had never suggested that nets 
should not be used; they simply wanted to examine the long-term effects of using ITNs. 
6 https://www.ivcc.com/, accessed 29 October 2020.
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Living together in precarious times
COVID-19 in the Philippines
gideon Lasco
Ostrich
On 4 August 2020, just as Metro Manila, Philippines, was living through 
a newly reimposed lockdown, two ostriches escaped from a gated upper 
middle-class village, running through streets made deserted by the 
restrictions on public transportation and stay-at-home mandates. Within 
hours, the footage of the ostriches had gone viral on social media, giving 
rise to numerous memes, celebrity reactions and even political 
commentary. ‘The absurdity of the runaway ostriches – which are not 
native to the Philippines – made them an Internet sensation and a 
welcome distraction during one of the world’s longest and most stringent 
lockdowns’, a report from The Washington Post observed (Cabato 2020).
Just like the other animals – fake and real – that went viral 
throughout the world at the height of the pandemic (see, for example, 
Daly 2020), the ostriches were a reminder, foremost, that this is a more-
than-human world. In my own house in Los Baños – some 50 kilometres 
away from Manila – olive-backed sunbirds have taken up residence in the 
small garden. Like dogs, sunbirds can live up to 12, even 15 years. Without 
the pandemic and the quarantine, I surely would not have had the 
opportunity – and the perspective – to notice my nonhuman companions.
Of course, the ostrich is something else: not only is it relatively rare, 
it is also relatively big for a bird. In the viral videos, one notable aspect 
was how people actually talked to the ostriches. In their macro-ness, they 
seemed amenable to conversation. ‘You need a quarantine pass!’, a village 
guard jokingly shouted after them, referring to the slip of paper issued to 
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one member of each household that served as a requirement for going out 
of one’s house. Adding to the birds’ appeal was the fact that their mad 
dash through the streets of Quezon City was a transgression of the world 
as we knew it: roads are for people; ostriches belong to the zoo, or in the 
wild. Seeing these birds on the streets had some subversive quality, 
especially at a time when humans themselves were confined to their 
houses.
In the end, one of the ostriches died and was cooked into a local dish 
called adobo, eliciting some outrage because such a ‘cute’ animal – an 
animal that belongs to a ‘more charismatic species who are “big like us”’ 
(Greenhough 2012, 291) – should not have been eaten. Anthropologists, 
of course, would have immediately bracketed such responses in terms of 
cultural norms of what is good to eat. Elsewhere, there were questions 
about the legalities of keeping an ostrich in a subdivision.
Framework
This is all in keeping with the turn towards multispecies anthropology 
and the conceptualisation of the Anthropocene (for example, Chakrabarty 
2009; D’Souza 2015), falling under the rubrics of science, technology 
and society studies that see humans as enmeshed, entangled and 
imbricated in networks with nonhuman actors (Latour 1993). I will not 
rehearse the literature, for as the cultural geographer Hayden Lorimer 
(2005, 84) puts it, ‘To do so would very likely bore the most devoted and 
risk baffling the uninitiated’. However, it is important to stress that today, 
as we live through a pandemic – or more aptly, a syndemic (Singer et al. 
2017) – a multispecies perspective is not just a fancy theory but an 
ecological and even existential necessity. 
Indeed, a multispecies perspective is upon us whether we like it or 
not. Ten years ago, ‘living with a virus’ may have been a title of a 
conference, a panel or an academic paper, but today it is a catchphrase 
used by politicians and physicians alike. We are learning, via the hard and 
painful way, what Donna Haraway calls the ‘foolishness of human 
exceptionalism’ (2008, 244), for, as Jane Goodall averred back in April, 
‘it is our disregard for nature and our disrespect for animals that has 
caused this pandemic’ (Burton 2020). 
Moreover, and relevant to COVID-19, a ‘public health optimism’ that 
imagined a world free from disease – borne of the Pasteurian belief in 
antibiotics and vaccines – has not aged well. Not only are humans 
becoming increasingly affected by non-communicable diseases like 
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hypertension and diabetes; microbes have adapted to antibiotics, and 
today antimicrobial resistance is a growing threat (Chandler et al. 2016). 
Viruses have proven particularly difficult to diagnose and treat, as they, 
too, can mutate, especially when they cross species. Consequently, the 
pandemic has forced humans to grapple with a world where we are 
vulnerable, even through the air we breathe, a world where microbes 
pose an existential threat. 
How, then, can anthropology account for the interspecies encounters 
in the time of COVID-19? One approach – one that I follow in this chapter 
– entails following species as they travel amid the milieu of the pandemic 
and expanding conceptions of their trajectories beyond the individual level 
(e.g. ‘How did the ostrich qua species reach the Philippines in the first 
place?’). Analytically, it also involves moving nonhumans from the level of 
zoe or ‘bare life’ to that of bios – ‘with legibly biographical and political lives’ 
(Agamben 1998, in Kirksey and Helmreich 2010, 545), and foregrounding 
them in our ethnographies. In the oft-cited language of Eduardo Kohn 
(2013, 4), we must move towards ‘an anthropology that is not just confined 
to the human but is concerned with the effects of our entanglements with 
other kinds of living selves’ – and just as importantly, recognise that such a 
perspective is as valid and vital in highly urbanised cities like Manila as it is 
in the Amazonian rainforest – or the Philippines’ own lush tropical jungles. 
If not more so: after all, the world has never been more urbanised and has 
brought species together in unprecedented proximity and intimacy, and 
this is why pandemics are closely linked with urbanisation (Santiago-
Alarcon and MacGregor-Fors 2020). 
For the purpose of this chapter, what is more useful is to highlight that 
this perspective, or set of perspectives, has long animated the ‘national 
anthropology’ in the Philippines, albeit often implicitly. For instance, at the 
2018 conference of Ugnayang Pang-Agham Tao (UGAT), the country’s 
association of anthropologists, the theme was ‘Our Interconnectedness: 
Doing Anthropology in Times of Environmental Crisis’. The conference 
featured presentations that ranged from human–seaweed relations in the 
Tawi-Tawi Islands and human–elephant communications in a zoo, to living 
with crocodiles in Palawan Island and with cats in urban settings. Taken 
together, these papers underscored that far from linear, let alone vertical, 
our encounters with nonhumans are best characterised as ‘rhizomatic’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988) – that is, non-hierarchical and relational (see 
also Ogden et al. 2013).
This ecological consciousness comes to us not just as part and 
periphery of global anthropological currents, but also from our inter- 
locutors who have always thought along these lines, not as a way of 
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thinking, but as a way of living. As our wealth of ethnography, folklore 
and cultural history shows, local notions of ecology have always seen the 
world as animated by more-than-human actors. When the Mindanao 
indigenous leader Bae Inatlawan performed a ceremony in April to pray 
amid the pandemic, she mentioned the trees, the birds and the eagle in 
the same breath as humans and the virus, unknowingly, as she spoke of 
humans belonging to the forest as much as the forest belonging to 
humans, endorsing the tenets of ‘biophilia’ (Kellert and Wilson 1993).
Such knowledge is vital not just in asserting the local character of 
our anthropology but also in tempering our own aspirations as to what 
this way of thinking might mean for the world. Writing on human–pig 
relations among the Pala’wan, Will Smith (2020) rightfully warns against 
a ‘post-environmentalism’ that assumes ‘affective relationships’ will 
always be based on loving and caring. His warning echoes the insight of 
Padmapani Perez (2018) in her work on conservation in Benguet and 
Borneo – we cannot idealise indigenous peoples as ‘noble green savages’.
As for microbes, while little – if any – local research has been in 
terms of characterising human relations with them, the above warning is 
likewise useful, for, while we can either view them as noxious germs that 
must be killed with antibiotics – or as ‘good bacteria’ to be cultivated and 
consumed, it is more insightful to view them in terms of what Paxson 
(2008, 18) calls ‘microbiopolitics’, or the ‘recognition and management, 
governmental and grassroots, of human encounters with the vital 
organismic agencies of bacteria, viruses, and fungi’. 
My own thinking in this direction was inspired by my fieldwork with 
forest guards in Mindanao, but also by my childhood experiences of 
growing up near Mt Makiling in the university town of Los Baños, 
southeast of Manila, and by my travels to ecotourism destinations of the 
world. Before the pandemic, I had the opportunity to visit the Amazon 
rainforest and the Galápagos Islands. In the former I saw the intimacy 
with which people lived with wildlife. In the Galápagos I glimpsed the 
world without humans, although within a few centuries of human 
settlement on Isabela Island, guava trees had invaded hectares upon 
hectares of land, while Darwin’s finches approached humans with 
evolutionary innocence, unaware of the havoc we have wrought 
throughout much of the planet. 
My visit to the Galápagos – weeks before the first cases of COVID-19 
were reported in the Philippines – reminded me of environmental writer 
Robert Macfarlane’s (2016) call to imagine ourselves as ‘inhabitants not 
just of a human lifetime or generation, but also of deep time’. Can we 
approach the pandemic in those same terms – not as a singular moment 
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in human history, but as event in longer processes? And, following Anna 
Tsing (2013), can we analyse how nature comes into being rather than 
seeing it as a backdrop for this account? 
Coronavirus
First, of course, we need to attend to the encounter between humans and 
microbes, including bacteria and the coronavirus itself. Technically, 
viruses are not a ‘species’ because they don’t fulfil the criteria of ‘organism’. 
Anthropologists, however, have labelled them as quasi-species, and, in 
any case, part of a multispecies perspective is to question the ontology 
and validity of our biological categories.
Microbes have been around for billions of years. Scientists tell us 
that they’re the earliest organisms, hardy enough to survive in the depths 
of the earth, the deepest parts of the oceans, perhaps even in space, as the 
recent brouhaha over possible life on Venus showed (see Lasco 2020a). 
But as far as humans are concerned, viruses are a recent phenomenon. 
People never viewed illness as caused by microbes prior to their discovery. 
For example, the Filipino national hero and polymath Jose Rizal, whose 
medical practice came at the twilight of humoral theory, opined that El 
aire, el calor, el frio, el vapor de tierra y la indigestion, son las unicas causas 
patogenas que se admiten en el pais (‘Winds, heat, cold, vapors of the earth, 
and indigestion are the main causes of illness in the country’) (Bantug 
1953, 12). 
The Pasteurian worldview – which today remains the dominant 
mode of thinking on illness – sees the world as made up of noxious 
microbes against which humans must battle through antibiotics or 
vaccines. According to anthropologist Heather Paxson (2008, 15), this 
view explains why people ‘blame colds on germs, demand antibiotics 
from doctors, and drink ultra-pasteurized milk and juice, while politicians 
on the campaign trail slather on hand sanitizer’. Likely, it explains the 
appeal of Filipino soap commercials from the 1970s onwards that depict 
germs on the body as being eliminated ‘99 per cent of the time’. Although, 
as mentioned above, this view has been shattered by the failure of 
medicine to eradicate pathogens, it remains at the fore of people’s 
consciousness.
In some ways, however, the pre-Pasteurian worldview is still upon 
us, with microbes and wind melding in people’s conceptions, as when 
President Rodrigo Duterte interpreted airborne transmission to mean 
that COVID-19 is nasa hangin, even as the outdoor hangin does not 
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correspond with biomedical understandings of airborne transmission (for 
instance, as occurring in poorly ventilated, indoor spaces) (see Tan and 
Lasco forthcoming). Similarly, people’s ‘germ consciousness’ may not 
correspond with Pasteurian notions of virus. As Michael Tan (2008, 91) 
noted:
Concepts about microorganisms vary, sometimes with amusing 
variations. The idea that food dropped on the floor isn’t necessarily 
dirty if it hasn’t been on the floor for a certain time (varying between 
30 seconds and 5 minutes) is tied to childhood concepts that the 
dropped food ‘scares’ off germs … Germs are often given qualities 
of humans, if not the supernatural. Women fear toilet seats, 
believing that the germs lie waiting, ready to pounce on the 
vulnerable. Terms such as kumakapit (sticking on) show that the 
germs’ mode of infection [is] not often understood. I have found 
villagers speaking of intestinal parasites (bulate) as ‘adult germs’ 
(mikrobyong naging laki).
These insights resonate today when people talk about ‘madapuan’ ng virus 
and ‘matamaan’ ng COVID. When Duterte joked, back in February, just as 
the threat of a pandemic was emerging, that he wanted to slap the virus, 
he was reaching for an object. The microscopic, transcending our sensory 
faculties in terms of scale, is semantically transposed to language that 
facilitates our ability to visualise and conceptualise the virus, on top of 
technologies that render the virus visible. Unlike colonial plagues that did 
not localise onto a tangible object, COVID-19 has acquired an objecthood. 
Thanks to our technologies of imagination, we visualise the virus as this 
red pathogen with spikes, even though viruses actually do not have colour 
and the red is merely the human attempt at visualisation. But such is the 
certitude of the virus’ existence as this red, spiked object that food writers 
have even compared it to the rambutan, much to the outcry of many 
Southeast Asians (Estrada 2020). 
Beyond the processes of visualisation, there are also the politics of 
association, as when certain groups of people and places get lumped 
together with the virus – from Chinese tourists, returning overseas 
Filipino workers (and returning Senegalese workers, see Onoma, Chapter 
10), to Donald Trump referring to the coronavirus the ‘China virus’ or the 
‘Wuhan virus’.
Yet already before the pandemic, anthropologists had documented 
a shift to a post-Pasteurian view that considers microbes not as harmful 
but in some ways potentially useful (Paxson 2008). From the Yakult and 
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yoghurt to keffir and kombucha, we have become patrons of microbial 
goodness. Now more than ever, we recognise microbes and macrobes alike 
as what Donna Haraway (2006) terms ‘companion species’.
The microbial presence in the human body is actually even more 
profound. Year after year, scientists continue to chart the full extent of 
so-called ‘normal flora’. As the Human Microbiome Project of the National 
Institutes of Health (2012, n.p.) revealed:
The human body contains trillions of microorganisms – outnumbering 
human cells by 10 to 1. Because of their small size, however, micro- 
organisms make up only about 1 to 3 percent of the body’s mass (in a 
200-pound adult, that’s 2 to 6 pounds of bacteria), but play a vital 
role in human health.
Additionally, and contrary to popular imagination, 50 per cent of the 
oxygen we utilise comes from microbes. At one point, this recognition led 
to questions over the necessity of handwashing, while Japanese doctors 
voiced concerns that ‘hygiene addiction’ might actually remove good 
microbes (Uranaka 2001).
The pandemic has at least temporarily suspended – or superseded 
– this paradigm, renewing our suspicion of microbes, helping make sense 
of the ‘rituals of disinfection’ of our time (Lasco 2020b) regardless of their 
biomedical efficacy. Suddenly, people are potential vectors of a virus, 
despite the fact that we have long been exchanging all kinds of microbes 
not just among ourselves but also our nonhuman companions (Rillig et al. 
2015). And while this exchange with every handshake, hug or huddle has 
largely been unwitting, it is worth mentioning that once upon a time, 
human vectors of a virus arrived in the Philippines not as a threat, but as 
salvation, as when orphan boys from Mexico came to the country, their 
blood containing the weakened viral strains of smallpox as part of the 
Balmis expedition (Mark and Rigau-Perez 2009). 
The divergence between local and biomedical knowledge of 
microbes can have public consequences, and when this tension is 
adjudicated by the powers that be – as when Duterte decided that one 
metre physical distancing was good enough (Reuters Staff 2020) – we 
see, often painfully, what is truly at stake with the ‘microbiopolitics’ of 
COVID-19. Indeed, the contested knowledge claims about the virus – 
whether it is airborne, whether masks are enough, whether face shields 
are needed – all rest on our understandings of the virus and how it is 
mediated. But, ultimately, it is political actors who make the decision with 
life-and-death consequences for their constituents.
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Of course, it’s not like other microbes have disappeared. Floodwaters 
still pose the risk of leptospirosis infection, and tuberculosis has not left 
us. Neither have HIV and other venereal diseases, or the myriad other 
viruses in and around us that are harmless and perhaps even beneficial 
– to say nothing about the viruses and bacteria that afflict nonhumans 
and can potentially cause zoonoses and human pandemics (Levitt 2020). 
We have always been exchanging microbes, from one community to 
another, but microbiopolitics foregrounds the ways in which some viruses 
are visible and others, invisible.
Finally, we see this microbiopolitics in the conceptualisation of 
vulnerability and resistance, as when people say, Ang tibay ng mga 
mahirap (‘The poor are strong’). In my ongoing ethnographic research on 
local health knowledge and how it has affected how people make sense of 
the pandemic (see Tan and Lasco 2021), I have encountered people 
saying that the poor – particularly those in urban areas – cannot be 
infected by the coronavirus because they are exposed to a lot of bacteria 
and, therefore, have higher resistensya to viruses. Resistensya is to the 
physical as resilience is to the social, and both have been used to justify 
health and social disparities in the time of COVID-19. To borrow from 
Stawkowski’s (2016, 155) account of marginalised communities living in 
the aftermath of radioactive pollution in Kazakhstan, it seems that for the 
urban poor in Manila and elsewhere, ‘their only option is to become (or 
believe themselves to be) enhanced human beings who can survive in 
toxic environments’. 
Nonhuman animals
Beyond and alongside the virus, other animals have been involved in the 
pandemic in various ways. As Deleuze and Guattari (1988, 11) write: ‘We 
form a rhizome with our viruses, or rather our viruses cause us to form a 
rhizome with other animals’. Animals figure in the purported genesis of 
the virus’ jump to humans; they figure in the way humans cope with the 
virus, in entanglements that range from abuse to affection. And I refer not 
just to the ability of dogs to detect the presence of a virus, even though 
this is an amazing reminder that our sensory universes hardly overlap.
At the start of the pandemic, animals figured in two major ways. 
First, there was the question of which animals served as vectors or hosts, 
that is, which animals were to blame for the pandemic. Pangolins were 
proposed as intermediate hosts, which struck a chord among Filipino 
environmentalists, given that the pangolin is poached heavily in Palawan. 
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Eventually, suspicion fell on bats; this remains the current view. But bats 
have always had coronaviruses. In the Philippines, a study found that 
among bats from two campuses of the University of the Philippines, 55 
per cent had coronaviruses of some sort (Watanabe et al. 2010). The 
question is how the virus jumped from bats to humans, why and how bats 
have come to be in such close proximity to humans, and why this 
particular strain of coronavirus is so virulent and effective. 
The indictment of certain species as disease carriers – potential or 
real – is a matter of life and death for them. When millions of chickens 
were culled in Indonesia as a result of avian flu, Celia Lowe (2010) 
described those chickens as part of a ‘viral cloud’ of H5N1 in the country. 
Similarly, in November 2020, millions of minks were killed in Denmark 
over fears of spread and potential mutation of the coronavirus through 
them. To quote one report: ‘Mass graves have appeared in the Danish 
countryside filled with the slaughtered animals’ (Murray 2020). Farmers 
were in tears, although their concern was more over their lost livelihoods 
than the lost lives of the animals whose fur is used to make luxury 
garments and fake eyelashes. Evidently, unlike the ostrich, which, when 
turned into adobo, sparked outcry in the Philippines, certain species do 
not attract as much human sympathy: a further reminder of our local 
moral taxonomies.
Another major way in which animals have figured in the pandemic 
is via the narrative of ‘nature’s revenge’ – or of a healing planet. In the 
early months of the pandemic, the news media repeatedly circulated 
images of animals roaming and ‘reclaiming’ the streets: from deer in 
Japan and monkeys in Thailand to wild goats in Wales and wild boar in 
Spain (Kretchmer 2020). But as environmental scientists have pointed 
out, COVID-19 is actually not ‘good’ for the environment. Discarded 
personal protective equipment is contributing to plastic waste, while 
economic deprivation has led people to hunt down and poach endangered 
species. Zoos and wildlife parks are losing revenue and funding, leaving 
their animals vulnerable both to hunger and the virus itself (Wang et al. 
2020). Two months into the lockdown, Filipinos were greeted by the 
pitiable sight of an emaciated lion in the privately owned Malabon Zoo, 
its owner appealing for cash donations (for which he felt embarrassed 
because ‘the focus should be on humans’):
[Some were] apologizing that during this time, the focus has been 
on human beings and somehow the animals seem to have been 
forgotten. And I had to assure them that [they were right; the focus 
should be on] people, especially the poor and the hungry people. 
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So I myself am ashamed to be asking for help for the animals during 
these trying times (Valenzuela 2020).
Beyond the material consequences of the pandemic to animals, social 
scientists have warned that such narratives simplify the discourse and 
reinforce the ‘apart-ness’ of humans from so-called ‘nature’ (Searle and 
Turnbull 2020). Of course, animals do not just figure as part of the 
etymology of the virus and its ecological impacts, but also in the 
phenomenological experience of the pandemic. Dogs and cats have 
served as quarantine companions, immune to the rules of physical 
distancing. Already, there is emerging literature from various countries 
on how human–dog relations were also disrupted during lockdowns 
(Morgan et al. 2020; Tomé 2020); how the presence of pets became more 
important than ever; and how the constant presence of humans in their 
houses has endangered intimacy between households of humans and 
nonhumans.
Plants
All of the above point to the pandemic as a more-than-human event. But 
it is also more-than-animal. One fascinating development during the 
pandemic is the ersatz ‘botanic boom’. Biking in my hometown in Laguna, 
I would see tricycles packed with potted plants, plants being sold on the 
highways, people traveling all the way from Manila just to buy plants. 
Social media, too, has become overgrown with monsteras and carnivorous 
plants. And not just for the upper and middle classes. I see people in low-
income neighbourhoods walking with plants they just purchased, tending 
to their recently refurbished gardens.
Filipinos have long cared for and nurtured plants; the Spanish priest 
and chronicler Antonio Morga described the first bonsai seen by 
westerners on his visit to Manila in 1603. These seemingly mundane 
houseplants actually come from different places, finding their way from 
colony to metropole and back to colony – a reminder that just like the 
pandemic, colonialism, too, was a multispecies process that involved 
uprooting and transplanting different species. The irony now is how 
‘plants are able to travel much more freely than humans in the time of the 
pandemic’, as a friend pointed out.
Another notable observation is the growing trend of naming 
houseplants. To name is to confer importance, and humans only give 
names to people and things that matter to them. While mostly said in jest, 
L iV iNg togEthEr iN PrECArious t iMEs 437
being ‘plant parents’ – plantito, plantita – establishes a form of kinship 
that is arguably new, at least among the many who have recently 
discovered the joys of nurturing houseplants. And with this, there is 
growing concern about the commodification of plants. What happens 
when something taken for granted suddenly has value, and when that 
value can be quantified in monetary terms? Plants hold immense value, 
but they have to be literally uprooted for such value to be realised, like 
trees in a forest that are more valuable dead than alive. Given that ferns 
can now sell for far more than rice, how will this phenomenon shape our 
mountains, and transform our ways of living?
At the personal level, of course, plants matter differently to different 
people. Some may see them as a project to be shared with others. Others 
may see nature in them, even as they are far from ‘natural’ given all the 
artificial interventions from breeding and transportation to potting and 
cultivation. And then there are those who perceive the health benefits of 
plants, an inkling increasingly supported by the notion of ‘biophilia’ 
(Ulrich 1993). 
But the plants thriving in our homes cannot be dissociated from 
their ecological entanglements. For instance, their popularity has 
prompted cries of alarm from environmentalists who fear its impacts on 
biodiversity (Lim and Lasco 2020):
Some of the plants on sale are sourced from our mountains and other 
unique ecosystems, disrupting habitats and potentially further 
endangering plant species and the wild fauna that depend on them 
for food and shelter. With rarity and ‘exotic-ness’ being valued 
characteristics in plant collecting, this craze might drive unscrupulous 
entrepreneurs deeper into our forests in search of plants that will 
command high prices in both local and international markets. 
Already, Department of Environment and Natural Resources offices 
in many parts of the country are reporting encroachments driven by 
the demand for these plants.
They also warn that ‘plants can also bring along with them pests and 
diseases that can infest, infect, and kill other plants in one’s collection’ 
(Lim and Lasco 2020), further underscoring the limits of thinking in 
terms of individual species. Although plants are thought to be immune to 
coronaviruses, it is also worth adding that they are not without their own 
viral nemeses, not to mention all kinds of pests – as consequence of their 
participation in our lifeworld – even as they can also forge alliances with 
microbes (Wilkinson et al. 2019). 
VIRAL LOADS438
My own thinking about plants (Lasco 2020c) is that they link us to 
the past by serving as enduring lifelong companions. My mother has held 
on to her bonsai since she was in her early twenties, taking the plants with 
her from apartment to apartment until, when my parents had the money 
to buy their own land, the bonsai, too, were allowed take root in the 
ground. ‘They’ve been around for much longer than you, and unlike 
human children, they never leave’, she told me, showing that trees are 
‘portable companions’ that can follow humans – not just in the sense of 
Lucia Monge’s planton movil (Vich 2016; see also www.luciamonge.com). 
Perhaps beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, the plants we have today will 
hold a special place as companions through a difficult moment. Moreover, 
at a time when life itself seems most precarious, perhaps plants offer an 
alternative vision of life, one of growth and regeneration, with each new 
leaf signifying hope and positive change. 
But regardless of the entanglement of motivations that have allowed 
plants to take root in our households, and mindful of the threats to plant 
life that the pandemic has exacerbated, the question remains: Can our 
newfound affection for plants translate to heightened concern for the 
planet?
Living together
In light of the necessity of multispecies ways of thinking about the world, 
our mandate is clear: we must act on the implications, from the personal 
to the political, of our more-than-human togetherness amid the precarities 
of our time. At a personal level, this can simply mean a greater appreciation 
for the world-at-large, perhaps making us less lonely, wherever we are. 
Here in Los Baños, I have not welcomed a single guest since March, but 
the sunbirds, our two dogs, the narra trees and even the Stephanie erecta 
that I have been nurturing, all keep me company. They also raise the 
stakes of whom – and what – we are responsible for. 
At a professional level, thinking of and about interspecies connections 
should enrich our praxis and broaden our conceptions of the ‘field’ to 
include what these connections actually do, and what they mean, for 
the people with whom we engage. At the outset, I already argued for the 
methodological necessity of following species as they travel, and 
foregrounding them in our ethnographies. But in light of COVID-19 
and its aftermath, we need to go back to our interlocutors, human 
and nonhuman, and see how they are living, and living together, in a 
pandemic. Given our current constraints, we need methodological 
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innovations and research ethics adaptations that facilitate and support 
these changes. Surely, many anthropologists are already working on this, 
and we will hopefully see the fruits of their labours in the coming years.
Logistically, this can also lead to engagements with people from 
other disciplines –microbiologists, horticulturists, zoologists, farmers, 
physicians – and a host of other fields, advocacies and activisms. If the 
task at hand is ‘thick description’, and if it entails long-term observation, 
then we have a lot to offer in helping people understand their own work, 
especially among those dealing with other species. While resisting the 
urge to view terms of engagement solely as terms of endearment, we need 
to trace the connections – from affectionate to antagonistic – that make 
up the ‘convivium’ of organisms to which we belong.
Finally, at a political level, it entails recognising the power relations 
that underwrite, disrupt, destroy and render antagonistic our relations 
with nonhumans – the structural violence that not only exposes humans 
to harmful species, but exposes other species to human harm. Although 
those at the forefront of thinking about post-human politics are suggesting 
an attention to land and indigenous peoples as priorities (see Panelli 
2010), this is something we in the Philippines have always known.
It also entails challenging the neoliberal order that renders vulnerable 
not just humans, but the whole planet, from the rising incidence of diabetes 
among our pets, global warming that threatens animal habitats and, of 
course, the pathogenic viruses that result from habitat destruction, illegal 
wildlife trade and industrial farming. On the local scale, we see this unfold 
in what Wolfram Dressler (2011) calls ‘nature as capital’, as when national 
parks protecting immense biodiversity are viewed in terms of their ‘market 
value’. Surely, anthropologists can speak to debates on valuing and 
expanding our time-honoured notions of reciprocity and kinship to 
‘natureculture’ (Fuentes 2010) around us. It may even lead us to interrogate 
our symbolic taxonomies – how some species are seen as more worthy of 
compassion than others – as well as rethinking our unsustainable ways of 
life. After all, do we really need millions of rodents in farms just so humans 
can have fur coats and fake eyelashes?
I conclude with three questions. The first one, raised in the 2018 
UGAT conference, remains salient as ever. In light of our interconnectedness, 
how do we live together in precarious times, in times of environmental, 
medical and political crises? Mindful that structural violence and state 
violence (see Tandog 2020) necessarily extend to nonhumans, we should 
also ask: How can we bear witness to forms of more-than-human 
togetherness, from abuse to affection, in ways that lead to action, in ways 
that do justice to both humans and other species? Finally, returning to 
VIRAL LOADS440
anthropology’s core mission: How do we do all this in ways that allow us to 
deepen our understanding of what it means to be human in a more-than-
human world? 
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COVID-19 in Italy
A new culture of healthcare for future 
preparedness
Chiara Bodini and ivo Quaranta
When the first autochthonous cases of COVID-19 were diagnosed in 
Lombardy in late February 2020, the whole country went into a shock 
(Raffaetà 2020). Both the virus and the effect it elicited quickly spread to 
the rest of Europe. Suddenly, what had been described as a ‘Chinese 
virus’, a threat confined to far away countries perceived as ‘less developed’, 
was inside our borders, in the very heart of a rich and productive region 
in Northern Italy. The severe underestimation of the pandemic in Italy, 
that was already rapidly spreading worldwide, resulted in the slow and 
chaotic reaction of Italian authorities facing the diffusion of the virus. The 
lack of preparedness, and fragmentations in governance between central 
government and the regions, led to contradictory messages being 
communicated to the public and incoherent and inconsistent measures 
being adopted. This led to the exposure of large numbers of people, 
including many ‘essential services’ workers. Huge numbers of critically ill 
patients required hospital care in a healthcare system that had suffered 
from budget cuts and privatisation over the past decades, particularly in 
its primary care and public health components. It was a very long time 
since hospitals in Europe had been overwhelmed in the way that they 
were in Lombardy, and this was seen as a wake-up call for other European 
countries and a portent of how COVID-19 might impact other settings. 
Measures to contain the epidemic, including a two-month national 
lockdown, were introduced. 
However – as we argue in this chapter – the response to COVID-19, 
consistent with the culture and the organisation of health and medicine 
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in Italy, was largely biomedical, and so failed to incorporate the social 
dimensions of the disease. This response was inadequate to build future 
preparedness.
COVID-19 in Italy
In late January 2020, two Chinese tourists visiting Rome were diagnosed 
with COVID-19. The news was alarming as it showed that the virus had 
entered the country, but not too disturbing as it fitted the stereotype of a 
foreign-borne virus that could be controlled by closing the borders. In 
what appeared to be strategic timing, the day before these cases were 
diagnosed, the government had blocked all flights to and from China; this 
measure was later labelled as detrimental as it made it impossible to test 
and trace people coming from China who chose other indirect routes to 
reach Italy. For two more weeks, no other measures were taken, until – on 
21 February – the first Italian case of COVID-19 was diagnosed in 
Lombardy. To the shock of many, the 38-year-old man, labelled as ‘patient 
1’, had not travelled to China, and all efforts to find ‘patient 0’ and trace 
the origin of the virus failed. From then on, the situation rapidly escalated, 
with new diagnoses concentrated in the same geographical area. 
Lombardy became the first ‘red zone’ under lockdown. Still, the belief was 
that the virus came from abroad and, if contained where it had first been 
found, the rest of the country would be spared (Horton 2020a). 
Unfortunately, the data later showed that the virus had been circulating 
in Lombardy since at least a month before, with hundreds of cases of 
infection – including severe ones – that had not been tested and therefore 
not diagnosed.
The period that followed was intense and confusing. The central 
government and regional authorities took decisions in an uncoordinated 
way, and messages to the population were openly contradictory. 
While the people in Codogno were locked in their homes, neighbouring 
cities such as Milan and Bergamo launched a media campaign to 
emphasise that life there was going on as usual – ‘Milan does not stop’ 
(#milanononsiferma) – and that there was no reason to panic. Similar 
messages appeared on social media, posted by key political figures from 
different parties.
Less than a week later, on 4 March, schools and universities 
were closed across the country and, on 8 March, a national lockdown 
was imposed. It was an unprecedented measure for Italy and for the 
world. People could not go out of their homes unless they carried a 
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self-declaration that stated the reason to do so – for health, work or to 
assist relatives in need – and few were so permitted. The (rather arbitrary) 
application of this norm resulted in thousands of fines ranging from 400 
to 3,000 euros , many of which have been contested.
Many praised the Italian government for acting decisively. However, 
the delay in implementing lockdown measures are, at time of writing, 
under investigation: this applies especially in the province of Bergamo, 
the hardest hit by the epidemic. Government documents, made public 
over the northern summer 2020, showed that on 3 March the National 
Scientific Committee had called for a ‘red zone’ in the area, and an 
investigation is ongoing to find out why this had not been applied, 
although allegedly motivated by the desire to avoid the economic 
consequences of a lockdown. At the same time, for several weeks, even 
under the lockdown, so-called ‘essential services’ continued to function, 
exposing health providers, transport workers and cleaners, among others, 
to a higher risk of infection.
The daily report issued by the Civil Protection from early March was 
dominated by the escalating number of new cases, hospital admissions, 
patients in intensive care units (ICU) and deaths. The National Health 
System (NHS), although still considered as one of the best in Europe, 
soon became insufficient to admit and adequately treat all patients, 
especially in Lombardy. Despite a referral system which included all 
public and some private facilities throughout the country, there were 
increasing reports by physicians in Lombardy that patients were being 
told to stay at home because hospital facilities were overloaded, and that 
patients could not be ventilated – despite meeting the clinical criteria for 
such action – because there were not enough ventilators available. These 
reports were so shocking that they were silenced or openly contested by 
public authorities, but they circulated widely, particularly among health 
professionals. A few weeks later, the army trucks moving coffins of 
coronavirus victims from Bergamo because there were no spaces available 
in local cemeteries could not so easily be concealed.
The lack of preparedness and insufficient human and material 
resources, combined with an elderly population and a high level of air 
pollution in the areas most affected, likely contributed to a particularly 
high mortality rate in the first wave of the pandemic. Delays in admitting 
patients to the hospitals and inappropriate approaches to both 
antimicrobial and intensive care treatment were particularly called into 
question by public health officials and health activist networks; so too was 
the approach to test and trace in Italy in ways that did not follow the 
recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO).
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As of 22 December 2020, Italy had recorded 1,977,370 cases and 
69,842 COVID-19 deaths. One quarter of the cases and almost one third 
of the deaths were recorded in Lombardy (Ministry of Health 2020).
A healthcare response to a public health emergency
Interviewed in early April, the president of the Medical Board of Bergamo, 
the city in Lombardy that became the symbol of the COVID-19 crisis in the 
country, declared:
The National Healthcare Service (NHS) has been dramatically 
dismantled, hospitals and community services … A public health 
emergency has been mistakenly considered as an emergency of 
intensive care units. At the beginning, COVID cases were not 
isolated, epidemiological investigations were not done, patients 
were not tested, doctors did not have personal protective equipment 
(Marinoni 2020).
In a few words, Dr Marinoni summarised the failure of the initial response 
to the crisis and identified its root causes.
It is now clear that Italy was not prepared for the epidemic, and its 
preparedness plan, drawn up in 2006 and unknown to most health 
professionals, has been judged ‘old and inadequate’ (Giuffrida and 
Boseley 2020). In addition to this, since the early 1990s the NHS has been 
subject to reforms and budget cuts that severely altered its capacity to 
react to a sudden increase in health needs (Geddes da Filicaia 2020). As 
in many countries across the globe, privatisation affects the capacity of 
public state-funded and government-run health systems to coordinate 
large-scale preventive campaigns, and limits their capacity to expand 
curative services in crisis situations, while eroding the broad public’s 
confidence in the health system as a whole (De Ceukelaire and Bodini 
2020). Moreover, the regionalisation of healthcare – very much part of a 
broader design to progressively dismantle and privatise the NHS – 
significantly delayed the adoption of coherent measures to contain the 
disease and strengthen the health system. While the Italian public health 
authorities at regional and national levels tried to cope with the growing 
epidemic, the highly fragmented health system resulted in a complex 
situation that became difficult to manage (Villa et al. 2020).
The area that suffered the most from these processes, now considered 
the weakest link of the NHS, is primary healthcare (PHC), particularly at 
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the intersection of public health, primary care departments and family 
doctors. Structural weaknesses date back to the healthcare reform of 1978, 
when, under pressure from the physicians themselves, legislators decided 
that family doctors would not be employed by the NHS, but would be 
contracted as private professionals under a national agreement. A decade 
after, what were initially called ‘local social and healthcare units’ (Unità 
Sanitarie Locali, USL) became ‘local healthcare enterprises’ (Aziende 
Sanitarie Locali, ASL), with a double shift: the removal of the word ‘social’ 
and the shift from ‘unit’ to ‘enterprise’. This change marked the inauguration 
of the managerialisation of the NHS, which coincided with the progressive 
reduction of the national public healthcare budget. The participation of 
citizens at different levels of the system’s governance, included in the 
original reform, was never developed.
The region that most aggressively pursued privatisation, and that 
developed secondary and tertiary-level hospitals to the detriment of 
primary care, is Lombardy. This has been repeatedly used as (part of) the 
explanation of why the region was hit harder by coronavirus and why the 
region failed to implement a coherent and effective strategy in an effort 
to contain it. To date, the problems of primary care and public health 
organisation have not been addressed, and professionals in the field are 
still left alone to face a new wave of infections.
As a critical situation, the pandemic revealed the impact of austerity 
and market-oriented reforms in undermining the capacity of the NHS to 
perform its biopolitical duties of health promotion, prevention and care 
(Basu et al. 2017). It also made explicit the cultural values informing 
national health policy: the pandemic was mainly dealt with at the hospital 
level, with a reactive approach that focused on acute care, infection 
control and virology, rather than a proactive public health approach 
grounded on epidemiological surveillance and health promotion. 
Moreover, although the spread of the virus began to be contained mainly 
through lockdown and people’s willingness to modify their social 
behaviour, the NHS did not act through its community-based local 
articulations such as primary care health facilities and professionals. 
These were, in fact, rather inaccessible to the public, as either closed 
down (as in the case of many primary care facilities) or overwhelmed (as 
in the case of GPs). It was not until late April that special ‘home care units’ 
were established, in order to assist and monitor patients who did not meet 
the criteria for hospitalisation. However, their implementation has been 
uneven across the country in terms of both capacity and timeliness.
The inadequate management of the COVID-19 epidemic, 
particularly evident in the region that invested the most in a privatised, 
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market-oriented and hospital-centric healthcare system, draws attention 
to the failures of such an approach in dealing with a complex public 
health emergency. More intensive care beds and ventilators, although 
necessary at the beginning of the crisis, soon became a technical fix that 
was ineffective at the source of the problem. In the community, the virus 
was circulating, undetected by an inadequate public health effort.
Cultural values informing national health policy
These preliminary considerations help us understand how human agency 
contributes to shaping the local configuration of COVID-19 in a specific 
context. In order to further develop the analysis, we now examine the 
implicit cultural assumptions that guided the Italian response to the 
pandemic.
The initial underestimation of the pandemic was clearly rooted in 
the fallacious idea that highly contagious infectious diseases are a medical 
reality confined to low-income countries in the Global South (Kleinman 
and Watson 2006). Consistent with this, the initial tracing operations 
focused on ‘Chinese contacts’ of the first cases. Rather than engaging in 
collaborative and cooperative actions with Chinese (and other national) 
authorities, the government decided to stop flights arriving in Italy from 
the risk regions, ignoring the most basic global health assumptions on the 
collective nature of any local phenomenon (Biehl and Petryna 2013; 
Farmer et al. 2013). Looking at the patterns of its distribution and at the 
different national responses to it, we can certainly consider COVID-19 as 
an indicator of our glocal (Kearney 1995) (dis-)order: an assemblage by 
which the viral pathogen mingles with specific social configurations 
within which people’s actions unfold at the local and global level. 
Infectious viruses are about social networks and cultural norms, as much 
as about microbes. As virological research makes clear, viruses are inert, 
sometimes for thousands of years, unable to attack us. We transmit viral 
data though our social networks and cultural pathways. We give viral 
information to each other by how we live and what we do. Understanding 
cultural contexts is therefore just as important as sequencing genomes in 
tackling viral outbreaks (Napier and Fischer 2020).
The very absence of an adequate pandemic plan testifies the lack of 
a global health perspective in the Italian institutional response, that 
might have been able to explicitly address the social nature of the virus 
agency. The Italian response reduced COVID-19 to its aetiology: SARS-
CoV-2. Even the National Scientific Committee, appointed on 5 February 
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2020 by the government to manage the emergency, has been mainly 
informed by a reductionist medical perspective with little acknowledge- 
ment of socially-oriented approaches including public health, 
epidemiology and the social sciences. In so doing, the complex reality of 
COVID-19 was stripped of its social dimensions, limiting the possibility 
for action (Rajan et al. 2020).
A behavioural approach to prevention
Such reductionism was also present in the preventive strategy adopted by 
the state, rooted in a well-known behavioural approach geared around 
the spread of information for the adoption of individual practices such as 
avoiding contact, frequently washing hands, wearing masks and gloves 
and so on. Such campaigns, as they unfolded in Italy, have a number of 
limitations and side effects which were not adequately considered.
In the first place, in general behavioural campaigns fail to address 
possible structural constraints impacting on individual behaviour. This 
was particularly evident when trying to halt the transmission of 
coronavirus in the cases of homeless people, asylum seekers and refugees 
living in overcrowded centres, seasonal migrant workers living in informal 
settlements, Roma people living in camps (see also Pop, Chapter 8) and 
detainees in prisons. Despite vibrant protests by people who were 
imprisoned, and different advocacy actions by groups, associations and 
networks working with vulnerable populations, very little was done to 
improve the structural conditions contributing to their risks for contagion. 
On the contrary, rather than highlighting such constraints, people’s 
culture and values tended to be presented as obstacles in health 
promotion, leading to forms of blaming of different groups of people. 
Depending on the phase of the emergency and the lockdown, these 
included migrants who were alleged to bring the virus from abroad (as 
Onoma, Chapter 10, also describes), even if at the time – given the 
situation in Italy – the risk was rather that they would become infected 
upon arrival. Blame was also directed at people walking or jogging in 
parks, who were accused of placing individual interest above everything 
else; and youth, who were charged with returning too quickly to 
socialising after the lockdown was eased. Both public authorities and the 
social media accused these groups of people of deliberately ignoring 
public health norms and so of being responsible for the spread of infection.
Framing the issue of responsibility in individual terms undermined 
the very possibility for a representation of the crisis as a collective 
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condition to be dealt with in cooperative terms. Even now, rather than 
imagining new forms of sociality as a collective response to the perduring 
emergency, we are facing increasing sanitisation of sociality, with the risk 
of its very criminalisation. To strip COVID-19 of its social dimensions 
inevitably precludes the possibility of acknowledging the importance of 
looking at people’s perspectives, and of considering how to promote their 
wellbeing. Paraphrasing Napier and colleagues (2014, 1611), if we ignore 
what brings value and meaning to another’s life, it becomes difficult to 
make it better when it is necessary to do so.
Yet little room was left for an approach capable of taking into 
consideration people’s understandings of their needs and how to meet 
them. Unless we look at health as a cultural construct and equip our 
healthcare services with the proper competence to foster the participation 
of people in the very definition of their best interests, we are always at risk 
of producing ineffective interventions. Again, we have a cultural issue 
here, related to the biomedical devaluation of the cultural dimensions of 
health and wellbeing. 
People as a resource
If there is one lesson from social science analysis of past epidemics, it is that 
people’s behaviours make a difference and, therefore, the ability to actively 
involve them in the processes that concern them can be decisive (Packard 
2016; Richards 2016). Yet, to address people’s behaviours implies the need 
to consider their capabilities, for example, to negotiate the terms of their 
social engagement and circumstances in a given local reality. Despite the 
fact that it was only through a lockdown that the emergency was kept 
under control, people’s behaviours were never assumed as a possible 
resource in managing the crisis. Yet these behaviours made a difference 
also by attending to the needs of those who were most affected by the 
economic and relational consequences of lockdown.
At the grassroots level, many initiatives took shape. In the 
Municipality of Bologna, for example, formal and informal civil society 
groups organised themselves to support those in need, delivering to them 
food supplies, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. This effort 
largely came from below, as in many other places throughout the country, 
while public services were shut down and public officials were discussing 
what should be done in endless online meetings. Well-established charity 
organisations linked to churches, political parties, trade unions and 
private foundations were joined (or, at times, were preceded) by many 
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new and often informal networks, largely composed of students and 
people who, due to the lockdown, suddenly had a lot of spare time and 
felt the urge to help others. New needs also appeared and were rapidly 
addressed by grassroots solidarity networks, such as the need for laptops 
and tablets for families with children who – with all schools closed – had 
to follow distance learning programmes.
Even in the City of Bologna, with a centuries-old tradition of good 
governance and progressive welfare policies, it took several weeks, even 
months, for the public system to acknowledge, support and finally 
regulate such efforts. Meanwhile, this activity remained fully voluntary 
and largely autonomous of public institutions, and was hyperlocal in 
nature, involving people at the level of buildings, blocks and streets. 
These forms of mutual support from below were the only ones capable of 
making a difference for those already trapped by socio-economic 
inequalities, who were, and still are, the most vulnerable to and affected 
by the pandemic (see also Burke, Chapter 2).
These initiatives were crucial in complementing the institutional 
actions prescribed by the national government and by local authorities, 
which invested a substantial part of the public budget to support those 
most in need. In this regard, Italy might be seen as a good example in 
addressing both the medical and the socio-economic consequences 
of the COVID-19 pandemic (Horton 2020a). Yet a critical dimension 
is in the incapacity of government, at all levels, to develop the operative 
integration of social and medical actions grounded in community 
participation as a form of care and the promotion of equity.
In the summer of 2020, as transmission of COVID-19 slowed down, 
local and national institutions developed emergency plans in order to be 
adequately prepared for a possible second wave of the pandemic (as 
occurred a few months later). Such plans were mainly designed to enhance 
the capacity of medical services to treat patients, to store equipment for 
testing and treatment, and to ensure a proper supply of personal protective 
equipment. In other words, preparedness was again tailored on pathology 
rather than on the wider reality of which pathology is part. By stripping 
COVID-19 of its social dimensions, again, institutional preparedness ended 
up limiting its effective responsiveness. No attention was given to those 
dynamics that made resilient specific local contexts, i.e. community 
participation. The crucial role of social relations is the main issue that was 
exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet Italian institutions have not been 
able so far to consider them as part of any form of preparedness.
In anthropological terms, preparedness should be seen as a means by 
which a specific social order is produced, especially in a critical time in 
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which habitual forms of relatedness are compromised and need to be 
rethought. The post COVID-19 scenario cannot be imagined as a return to 
a previous normality, as if the impact of the pandemic might leave no trace 
in our conscience and social arrangements. Clearly, we have to talk of new 
forms of normalisation, by which a new social order becomes embodied 
and can promote our unproblematic being-in-the-world. In order to avoid 
that such a process of re-normalisation ends up in naturalising the 
medicalisation and criminalisation of sociality, we must engage in forms of 
creative social relatedness to produce new forms of sociality capable of 
sustaining a meaningful collective existence. For this reason, we need to 
include the promotion of those forms of social relatedness that have proved 
protective in our institutional responses to the pandemic. If we reduce 
preparedness merely to the adoption of protective individual behaviours, 
we are stripping the person of its constitutive social dimension. As 
anthropology has long taught us, by focusing on the body, cultural practice 
articulates broader social and political issues. This is precisely why it is 
crucial to work beyond the sole adoption of protective individual behaviours 
and towards the idea of designing forms of protective social relatedness.
Primary healthcare as a space for integrated action
Institutional action on COVID-19 has not valued community participation 
as a resource in dealing with the emergency, despite its crucial role in 
giving birth to adaptative forms of sociality. Such a lack stems in part from 
having relegated institutional action to the hospital level, without 
drawing on the network of community-based primary care services, the 
only component of the health system capable of proximate contact with 
local neighbourhoods and their inhabitants. As already discussed above, 
primary healthcare (PHC) has been severely undermined over the last 
decades by processes of underfinancing and cultural devaluation (Geddes 
da Filicaia 2020). Yet PHC represents the only articulation of the NHS 
capable of producing forms of participation and mutual trust between 
institutional actors and people.
This is not intended to diminish the decisive role that hospital 
settings have played in treating people affected by COVID-19; this would 
be both ungenerous and inaccurate. Rather, it highlights that the 
healthcare system is culturally calibrated on values that do not take into 
account the proximity of services to local neighbourhoods, the only 
context in which it would be possible to create a proactive synergy 
between institutions and people’s agency.  
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Again COVID-19 seems to play a pedagogic role in making manifest 
the limitation and contradictions of our social reality, shedding light on 
its fault lines, a critical situation that unveils those implicit processes that 
inform our social reality. 
A different approach for future preparedness
By dividing medical action from social support, and by formulating the 
latter mainly in a top-down manner centred on individuals, Italy ended 
up limiting its institutional capacity to manage the local configuration of 
the pandemic. The focus of Italy’s response was mainly on the virus, 
SARS-CoV-2, rather than on the disease, COVID-19. The current challenge 
is related to the possibility of grounding medical and social services with 
a view of health as a cultural construct that requires the participation of 
people to define their needs. This must be socially produced, and this can 
only occur through the constitutive relations that people have with the 
social circumstances of their life in a given context. Unless we are capable 
of taking into account the constitutive social dimensions of medical 
reality, we are bound to a permanent state of emergency.
Future preparedness, in other words, should not be reduced to the 
adequate storage of medical supplies. It should rather take advantage of 
the lessons we are learning in the current global predicament. On the one 
hand, we need a global perspective capable of looking at health as a 
common global good, and we need to strengthen an approach that looks 
at the mutual involvement of the contexts we imagine as local, with 
awareness that one’s own interests coincide with the promotion of those 
of others. On the other hand, we need to place as central community 
involvement and participation (Rajan et al. 2020), with the aim of 
considering people as actors in the process of health promotion, avoiding 
their reduction to a ‘mere population’ (in Foucauldian terms) crushed by 
top-down measures and incapable of generating their active valorisation 
(Loewenson et al. 2020). To do so, we need a culture of health and 
healthcare capable of creating conceptual and political room for local 
participatory action in local services.
As anthropologists, we know well that communities are not entities 
but forms of relatedness rooted in the ongoing symbolic processes of 
belonging. Institutions should accommodate and rely on forms of 
symbolic belonging that emerge at the grassroots level (especially if they 
proved to be resilient in facing the critical circumstances produced by the 
pandemic). Otherwise, when community participation is most needed, 
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we run the risk of having no community to rely on. Social policy should 
complement medical reasoning in designing emergency plans for future 
preparedness, bearing in mind the symbolic performance of institutional 
activity. Our challenge today relates to the ability to create organisational 
settings capable of overcoming those cultural fragmentations that reduce 
care to disease treatment, while they strip health of those social 
relationships on which we might act for its promotion (Wilkinson and 
Kleinman 2016).
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the many strains that Italy’s 
healthcare system has amassed over past decades. Yet we have shown 
how analysis cannot be reduced to the mere impact of austerity measures: 
we also need to address the broader cultural assumptions at the core of 
medical and public health policy. As we have shown for the Italian 
context, in order to design an effective preparedness, we need an 
institutional culture capable of considering health as a cultural construct 
to be socially generated, where participation is the means to operationalise 
both: people’s involvement in defining their best interest, and their 
engagement in transformative actions.
Quite timely, on 26 September 2020 The Lancet chief editor, Richard 
Horton (2020b), claimed that we should look at COVID-19 as a syndemic 
rather than a pandemic. In introducing the concept of syndemic, Merrill 
Singer (2009) referred to the constitutive social embeddedness of any 
given biological reality, and their complex articulations at the local as well 
as global level. Along such a line of reasoning, in this chapter we have 
showed the local emergence of COVID-19 in Italy, arguing for a finer 
approach capable of addressing its social articulation at the local level. 
Likewise, we have tried to show how to translate the outcome of such a 
theoretical approach in designing institutional responses capable of taking 
into proper account the constitutive social dimensions of COVID-19. 
The concept of syndemic is most welcome if it helps to drive 
institutional reasoning towards the appreciation of human agency and 
responsibility in medical reality, and coherently of public health 
interventions as cultural practices by which a specific social order is 
produced, and, by focusing on the body, naturalised. The way we 
approach the present critical situation related to COVID-19 will inevitably 
have a deep impact on the way we represent ourselves, social relations 
and the global scenario – in a nutshell, the very meaning of humanity.
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‘Viral Loads demonstrates anthropology’s power of description, analysis and theory to capture 
a global tragedy as it unfolds. Anthropologists from around the world draw on their own deep 
knowledge to trace COVID’s impact on social, economic and political life.’ – Melissa Parker, 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
‘This impressive collection of well researched and preciously substantiated essays shows that 
evidence-based scholarship has not gone to sleep despite the COVID-19 menace and its 
imposition of physical and social distancing. If anything, the pandemic has introduced an urgency 
to social enquiry informed by improvisation and complementarity between virtual and face-to-
face encounters.’ – Francis B. Nyamnjoh, University of Cape Town
‘In Viral Loads, the editors and contributors offer a penetrating analysis of how, worldwide, the 
COVID pandemic has exposed and exploited the racially, socioeconomically and globally 
uneven ways in which people live; it demands, in response, that we extend our rationales 
emergent from anthropological and interdisciplinary architectures. This broad and intensive work 
is as much a book of the academy as it is of the heart, with enormously important ramifications 
for humankind in the present and for the future. This is a magnificent work of action and reflection 
that must be read carefully and with care.  To not do so is to ensure the present as the continuing 
model for the future.’ – Carlos G. Vélez-Ibáñez, Arizona State University
Viral Loads illustrates how the COVID-19 pandemic, and responses to it, lay bare and load onto 
people’s lived realities in countries around the world. Social unevenness and gross economic 
disparities have shaped global and local responses to the pandemic, while effects of both the 
virus and efforts to contain it have amplified these inequalities.  In reflecting on how the pandemic 
has interrupted daily lives, state infrastructures and healthcare systems, the contributing authors 
mobilise anthropological theories and concepts to locate the pandemic in a highly connected 
and exceedingly unequal world. 
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